

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

IN RE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY)
TELECOMMUNICATIONS RECORDS)
LITIGATION)
This Document Relates to:)
(1) All Actions Against the *MCI* and *Verizon*)
Defendants in the Master MCI and Verizon)
Consolidated Complaint, Dkt. 125; (2) *Bready,*)
et al. v. *Verizon Maryland* (06-06313); (3) *Chulsky*)
et al. v. *Cellco Partnership d/b/a Verizon*)
Wireless (06-06570); and (4) *Riordan, et al. v.*)
Verizon Communications (06-3574))

MDL Dkt. No. 06-1791-VRW

**PUBLIC DECLARATION
OF LT. GEN. KEITH B.
ALEXANDER, DIRECTOR,
NATIONAL SECURITY
AGENCY**

Hon. Vaughn R. Walker

I, Lieutenant General Keith B. Alexander, do hereby state and declare as follows:

INTRODUCTION

1. I am the Director of the National Security Agency (NSA), an intelligence agency within the Department of Defense. I am responsible for directing the NSA, overseeing the operations undertaken to carry out its mission and, by specific charge of the President and the Director of National Intelligence, protecting NSA activities and intelligence sources and methods. I have been designated an original TOP SECRET classification authority under Executive Order No. 12958, 60 Fed. Reg. 19825 (1995), as amended on March 25, 2003, and Department of Defense Directive No. 5200.1-R, Information Security Program Regulation, 32 C.F.R. § 159a.12 (2000).

2. The purpose of this declaration is to support an assertion of the military and state secrets privilege (hereafter “state secrets privilege”) by the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) as the head of the intelligence community (as well as the statutory privilege assertion by the DNI under 50 U.S.C. § 403-1(i)(1)). In addition, through this declaration, I also hereby invoke and assert the NSA’s statutory privilege set forth in section 6 of the National Security

1 Agency Act of 1959, Public Law No. 86-36 (codified as a note to 50 U.S.C. § 402) (“NSA Act”),
2 to protect the information related to NSA activities described below. The statements made
3 herein are based on my personal knowledge of NSA activities and operations, and on
4 information available to me as Director of the NSA.

5 3. In the course of my official duties, I have been advised of this litigation and the
6 allegations in the various complaints in this action brought against the Verizon Defendants,
7 including the MCI entities.¹ As summarized herein and described further in my classified
8 declaration submitted for the Court’s *in camera, ex parte* review, various classified facts related
9 to the Plaintiffs’ claims are subject to the DNI’s state secrets and statutory privilege assertions, as
10 well as to my assertion of the NSA’s statutory privilege. The disclosure of this information,
11 which relates to NSA intelligence information, activities, sources, and methods, reasonably could
12 be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security of the United States.
13 Accordingly, as set forth further below and in my classified declaration, it is my judgment that
14 information described in these declarations should be protected from disclosure. In addition, it is
15 my judgment that sensitive state secrets are so central to the subject matter of the litigation that
16 any attempt to proceed in the case risks the disclosure of the secrets described herein and in my
17 classified declaration and, thus, exceptionally grave damage to the national security of the United
18 States.

19 **BACKGROUND**

20 **A. The National Security Agency**

21 4. The NSA was established by Presidential Directive in 1952 as a separately
22 organized agency within the Department of Defense. Under Executive Order 12333, § 1.12(b),

23 ¹ (U) Any reference to “Verizon” in this declaration includes all Verizon Defendants in
24 this matter. “Verizon” also specifically includes the MCI Defendants, which are now a part of
Verizon, even though “MCI” may at times be referenced separately.

1 as amended, the NSA's cryptologic mission includes three functions: (1) to collect, process, and
2 disseminate signals intelligence (SIGINT) information, of which COMINT is a significant
3 subset, for (a) national foreign intelligence purposes, (b) counterintelligence purposes, and (c)
4 the support of military operations; (2) to conduct information security activities; and (3) to
5 conduct operations security training for the U.S. Government.

6 5. There are two primary reasons for gathering and analyzing foreign intelligence
7 information. The first, and most important, is to gain information required to direct U.S.
8 resources as necessary to counter external threats. The second reason is to obtain information
9 necessary to the formulation of U.S. foreign policy. Foreign intelligence information provided
10 by the NSA is thus relevant to a wide range of important issues, including military order of
11 battle; threat warnings and readiness; arms proliferation; international terrorism; and foreign
12 aspects of international narcotics trafficking.

13 **B. September 11, 2001 and the al Qaeda Threat.**

14 6. On September 11, 2001, the al Qaeda terrorist network launched a set of
15 coordinated attacks along the East Coast of the United States. Four commercial jetliners, each
16 carefully selected to be fully loaded with fuel for a transcontinental flight, were hijacked by al
17 Qaeda operatives. Those operatives targeted the Nation's financial center in New York with two
18 of the jetliners, which they deliberately flew into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center.
19 Al Qaeda targeted the headquarters of the Nation's Armed Forces, the Pentagon, with the third
20 jetliner. Al Qaeda operatives were apparently headed toward Washington, D.C. with the fourth
21 jetliner when passengers struggled with the hijackers and the plane crashed in Shanksville,
22 Pennsylvania. The intended target of this fourth jetliner was most evidently the White House or
23 the Capitol, strongly suggesting that al Qaeda's intended mission was to strike a decapitation
24 blow to the Government of the United States—to kill the President, the Vice President, or

1 Members of Congress. The attacks of September 11 resulted in approximately 3,000 deaths—
2 the highest single-day death toll from hostile foreign attacks in the Nation’s history. In addition,
3 these attacks shut down air travel in the United States, disrupted the Nation’s financial markets
4 and government operations, and caused billions of dollars of damage to the economy.

5 7. On September 14, 2001, the President declared a national emergency “by reason
6 of the terrorist attacks at the World Trade Center, New York, New York, and the Pentagon, and
7 the continuing and immediate threat of further attacks on the United States.” Proclamation No.
8 7463, 66 Fed. Reg. 48199 (Sept. 14, 2001). The United States also immediately began plans for
9 a military response directed at al Qaeda's training grounds and haven in Afghanistan. On
10 September 14, 2001, both Houses of Congress passed a Joint Resolution authorizing the
11 President “to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or
12 persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks” of
13 September 11. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40 § 21(a), 115 Stat.
14 224, 224 (Sept. 18, 2001) (“Cong. Auth.”). Congress also expressly acknowledged that the
15 attacks rendered it “necessary and appropriate” for the United States to exercise its right “to
16 protect United States citizens both at home and abroad,” and acknowledged in particular that
17 “the President has authority under the Constitution to take action to deter and prevent acts of
18 international terrorism against the United States.” *Id.* pmb1.

19 8. As the President made clear at the time, the attacks of September 11 “created a
20 state of armed conflict.” Military Order, § 1(a), 66 Fed. Reg. 57833, 57833 (Nov. 13, 2001).
21 Indeed, shortly after the attacks, NATO took the unprecedented step of invoking article 5 of the
22 North Atlantic Treaty, which provides that an “armed attack against one or more of [the parties]
23 shall be considered an attack against them all.” North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, art. 5, 63
24 Stat. 2241, 2244, 34 U.N.T.S. 243, 246. The President also determined that al Qaeda terrorists

1 “possess both the capability and the intention to undertake further terrorist attacks against the
2 United States that, if not detected and prevented, will cause mass deaths, mass injuries, and
3 massive destruction of property, and may place at risk the continuity of the operations of the
4 United States Government,” and he concluded that “an extraordinary emergency exists for
5 national defense purposes.” Military Order, § 1(c), (g), 66 Fed. Reg. at 57833-34.

6 9. As a result of the unprecedented attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States
7 found itself immediately propelled into a worldwide war against a network of terrorist groups,
8 centered on and affiliated with al Qaeda, that possesses the evolving capability and intention of
9 inflicting further catastrophic attacks on the United States. That war is continuing today, at
10 home as well as abroad. Moreover, the war against al Qaeda and its allies is a very different kind
11 of war, against a very different enemy, than any other war or enemy the Nation has previously
12 faced. Al Qaeda and its supporters operate not as a traditional nation-state but as a diffuse,
13 decentralized global network of individuals, cells, and loosely associated, often disparate groups,
14 that act sometimes in concert, sometimes independently, and sometimes in the United States, but
15 always in secret—and their mission is to destroy lives and to disrupt a way of life through
16 terrorist acts. Al Qaeda works in the shadows; secrecy is essential to al Qaeda’s success in
17 plotting and executing its terrorist attacks.

18 10. Accordingly, after the September 11 attacks, the President directed the NSA to
19 detect and prevent al Qaeda-related terrorist attacks within the United States by intercepting the
20 content² of telephone and Internet communications for which there were reasonable grounds to
21 believe that (1) such communication originated or terminated outside the United States, and (2) a
22 party to such communication was a member or agent of al Qaeda or an affiliated terrorist

23 _____
24 ² The term “content” is used herein to refer to the substance, meaning, or purport of a
communication, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8).

1 organization (hereafter referred to as the “Terrorist Surveillance Program” or “TSP”). The
2 President acknowledged the existence of this program in December 2005.³

3 **INFORMATION SUBJECT TO ASSERTIONS OF PRIVILEGE**

4 11. I understand that the Plaintiffs allege that MCI and Verizon have assisted the
5 NSA with a massive, dragnet-type program involving the content surveillance of domestic and
6 international communications made by millions of Americans. I also understand that the
7 Plaintiffs allege that the content of their own communications over the telephone and Internet
8 services of the Verizon Defendants has been intercepted by the NSA. I further understand that
9 the Plaintiffs allege that since about October 2001, MCI and Verizon have disclosed to the NSA
10 telephone and electronic communications records concerning all or substantially all of their
11 customers.

12 12. As set forth further below, the following categories of information are subject to
13 the DNI’s assertion of the state secrets and statutory privileges, as well as my assertion of the
14 NSA statutory privilege, and this information should be protected from disclosure in this matter:

- 15 A. Information that may tend to confirm or deny whether
16 Verizon/MCI has assisted the NSA with any alleged
17 intelligence activities; and
18 B. Information that may tend to confirm or deny whether the
19 Plaintiffs have been subject to any of the alleged NSA
20 intelligence activities that may be at issue in this matter;
21 and

21 ³ On January 17, 2007, the Attorney General made public the general facts that new
22 orders of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court had been issued that authorized the
23 Government to target for collection international communications into or out of the United States
24 where there is probable cause to believe that one of the communicants is a member or agent of al
Qaeda or an associated terrorist organization; that, as a result of these orders, any electronic
surveillance that was occurring as part of the TSP is now being conducted subject to the approval
of the FISA Court; and that, under these circumstances, the President determined not to
reauthorize the TSP.

1 C. Information concerning any NSA intelligence, activities,
2 sources, or methods, including:

3 (1) Information concerning the scope and operation of the
4 Terrorist Surveillance Program, including information that
5 may be needed to demonstrate that the TSP was limited to
6 one-end foreign al Qaeda communications and that the
7 NSA does not otherwise engage in the content surveillance
8 dragnet that the Plaintiffs allege; and

9 (2) Information that would tend to confirm or deny whether
10 the NSA collects large quantities of communication records
11 information as Plaintiffs allege.

12 **HARM OF DISCLOSURE**

13 13. As set forth in my classified declaration submitted for the Court's *in camera*, *ex*
14 *parte* review, disclosure of information in the foregoing categories would cause exceptionally
15 grave harm to national security. I briefly summarize the harms at issue below.

16 14. First, these lawsuits put at issue whether or not the Verizon Defendants assisted
17 the NSA with any of the alleged intelligence activities described in Plaintiffs' complaints.
18 Disclosure of information that would tend to confirm or deny whether or not the Verizon
19 Defendants provided such assistance would cause exceptionally grave harm to the national
20 security by disclosing whether or not the NSA utilizes particular intelligence sources and
21 methods and, thus, by revealing to foreign adversaries information about the NSA's intelligence
22 capabilities or lack thereof.

23 15. The second major category of information as to which I am supporting the DNI's
24 assertion of privilege, and asserting the NSA's own statutory privilege, concerns information as
to whether particular individuals, including the Plaintiffs in the lawsuits against Verizon, have
been subject to alleged NSA intelligence activities. Disclosure of information that would tend to
confirm or deny whether or not certain individuals have been subject to NSA intelligence
activities would cause exceptionally grave harm to the national security. As a matter of course,

1 the NSA cannot publicly confirm or deny whether any individual is subject to surveillance
2 activities because to do so would tend to reveal actual targets. For example, if the NSA were to
3 confirm in this case and others that specific individuals are not targets of surveillance, but later
4 refuse to comment (as it would have to) in a case involving an actual target, a person could easily
5 deduce by comparing such responses that the person in the latter case is a target. The harm of
6 revealing targets of foreign intelligence surveillance should be obvious. If an individual knows
7 or suspects he is a target of U.S. intelligence activities, he would naturally tend to alter his
8 behavior to take new precautions against surveillance. In addition, revealing who is not a target
9 would indicate who has avoided surveillance and who may be a secure channel for
10 communication. Such information could lead a person, secure in the knowledge that he is not
11 under surveillance, to help a hostile foreign adversary convey information; alternatively, such a
12 person may be unwittingly utilized or even forced to convey information through a secure
13 channel. Revealing which channels are free from surveillance and which are not would also
14 reveal sensitive intelligence methods and thereby could help any adversary evade detection.

15 16. Third, I am supporting the DNI's assertion of privilege and asserting the NSA's
16 statutory privilege over any other facts concerning NSA intelligence sources and methods that
17 would be needed to resolve this case. This includes: (1) facts concerning the operation of the
18 Terrorist Surveillance Program and any other NSA intelligence activities needed to demonstrate
19 that the TSP was limited as the President stated to the interception of one-end foreign
20 communications reasonably believed to involve a member or agent of al Qaeda or an affiliated
21 terrorist organization and that the NSA does not otherwise conduct the content surveillance
22 dragnet that the Plaintiffs allege; and (2) facts that would confirm or deny whether the NSA,
23 collects large quantities of communication records information as the Plaintiffs allege. As set
24

1 forth below, the disclosure of information needed to address these allegations would cause
2 exceptionally grave harm to national security.

3 17. As noted above, in December 2005, President Bush explained that, after the
4 September 11 attacks, he authorized the NSA to intercept the content of certain communications
5 for which there are reasonable grounds to believe that (1) such communication originated or
6 terminated outside the United States, and (2) a party to such communication is a member or
7 agent of al Qaeda or an affiliated terrorist organization. The President stated at the time that this
8 activity, now referred to as the Terrorist Surveillance Program, did not involve the collection of
9 purely domestic communications, or international communications with no al Qaeda connection,
10 and these facts were reiterated publicly by the Attorney General and then-Deputy Director of
11 National Intelligence. As the President made clear in describing the limited scope of the TSP,
12 Plaintiffs' allegations of a content surveillance dragnet are false. But if the NSA had to
13 demonstrate in this case that the TSP was limited as the President stated, and not a dragnet as the
14 Plaintiffs claim, and that the NSA does not otherwise engage in the dragnet that Plaintiffs allege,
15 sensitive and classified facts about the operation of the TSP and NSA intelligence activities
16 would have to be disclosed.⁴ The disclosure of whether and to what extent the NSA utilizes
17 certain intelligence sources and methods would reveal to foreign adversaries the NSA's
18 capabilities, or lack thereof, enabling them to either evade particular channels of communications
19 that are being monitored, or exploit channels of communications that are not subject to NSA
20 activities, in either case risking exceptionally grave harm to national security.

21 18. Similarly, confirmation or denial of any information concerning Plaintiffs'
22 allegations that the Verizon Defendants assist the NSA in the alleged collection of
23

24 ⁴ To the extent the Plaintiffs in this case are challenging the lawfulness of the TSP itself, facts about the operation of that program (which remain classified) also could not be disclosed.

1 communication records would also disclose information about whether or not the NSA utilizes
2 particular intelligence sources and methods and, thus, the NSA's capabilities or lack thereof.


3 19. Any further elaboration on the public record concerning these matters would
4 reveal information that would cause the very harm that my privilege assertion and the DNI's
5 privilege assertion are intended to prevent. As noted, my separate classified declaration provides
6 a more detailed explanation of the information and harms to national security at issue.

7 **CONCLUSION**

8 20. In sum, I support the DNI's assertion of the state secrets privilege and statutory
9 privilege to prevent the disclosure of the information described herein and detailed in my
10 classified declaration that is available for the Court's *in camera* and *ex parte* review. I also
11 assert a statutory privilege under Section 6 of the National Security Act with respect to the
12 information described herein which concerns the functions of the NSA. Moreover, because
13 proceedings in this case risk disclosure of privileged and classified intelligence-related
14 information, I respectfully request that the Court not only protect that information from
15 disclosure but also dismiss this case to prevent the exceptional harms to the national security of
16 the United States at stake.

17
18 I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

19 DATE: 20 APR 07



LT. GEN. KEITH B. ALEXANDER
Director, National Security Agency