

Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts

FOIPA# 1056287 and FOIPA#1056307-1

Subjects: DCS-3000 and RED HOOK

File Number: DIVISION DOCUMENTS

Section: 22



102207-dcs03.pdf

Federal Bureau of Investigation

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-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, February 15, 2006 2:31 PM
To: [redacted] (NY) (FBI); [redacted] (NY) (FBI)
Cc: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI); [redacted] (NY) (FBI); [redacted] (NY) (FBI)
Subject: RE: [redacted] upgrade and CALEA

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED
NON-RECORD

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I just spoke with [redacted] Everything seems to be in order. We'll see how this thing works on the cluster ring....

Tentatively speaking, week of 27Feb. We'll give a definite date after I speak with [redacted] to check his schedule.

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Thnx,

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (NY) (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, February 15, 2006 11:26 AM
To: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI); [redacted] (NY) (FBI)
Cc: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI); [redacted] (NY) (FBI); [redacted] (NY) (FBI)
Subject: RE: [redacted] upgrade and CALEA
Importance: High

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SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED
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I am forwarding this message to [redacted] to get some of the answers for you. [redacted] is on Vacation till 2/20. The DCS-3000 is now in the Shield. It is probably about 150-200 feet between the DCS-3000 and [redacted] and [redacted] What we can do is run a longer CAT5 from the port and move the DCS-3000 closer to [redacted] so you can order two 50 ft cables [redacted] is in NJ. What we will probably need to do is get an additional DCS-3000 for our NJ site where [redacted] is. We can create VLAN over the SONET Ring to get the info out there. Also, it would make good sense to have a DCS-3000 out there for contingency purposes. You will need a 50 ft. cable for out there too.

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I will be ordering a static DSL line into the Shield in the next couple of days. I got authorization to put it under our covert Title III account.

Thanks for the help.

TTA [redacted]
NYO Squad SO-1
work: 212 [redacted]
cell: 917 [redacted]

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-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, February 15, 2006 8:46 AM
To: [redacted] (NY) (FBI)
Cc: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI); [redacted] (NY) (FBI)
Subject: FW: [redacted] upgrade and CALEA

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

DATE: 06-07-2007
CLASSIFIED BY 65179/DMH/KSR/MAJ
REASON: 1.4 (B/G)
DECLASSIFY ON: 06-07-2032


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Hi [redacted]

In preparation for the One Way Push installation I'll need to know what length serial cables are needed



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[redacted] Please let me know so that I can get the cables made to size. Usually we use 20ft, 35ft, and 50ft denominations. Please call if you have any questions.

Thnx.

[redacted]
703 [redacted]

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-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (NY) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, January 26, 2006 9:03 AM
To: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI); [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Cc: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: [redacted] upgrade and CALEA

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[redacted] I know you are avoiding me. The sooner the better. We will start with the DCS-3000 targets first. Once we get those working, we will start on some CALEA T-1s. I have the [redacted] making a list for me regarding how many targets come from each CO. We will start with the biggest Central Offices first and then go from their. Once I have some numbers I will let you know. [redacted] is the TTA in charge of the DCS-3000 here if you have any questions. Talk to you soon.

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[redacted]

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, January 25, 2006 5:30 PM
To: [redacted] (NY) (FBI); [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Cc: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: [redacted] upgrade and CALEA

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[redacted]
I spoke with [redacted] today and he has already discussed [redacted] issues and concerns at length. We discussed some possible system configurations, implementation approaches, and pilot testing. Upon my return to ERF, we will complete our configuration

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preparations, perform lab tests to verify operational performance, and will prepare for [redacted] installation. More details to follow. If you have any further questions, feel free to give us a call. Hopefully, mid to later-part of Feb2006?

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Peace Out,
[redacted]

PS - We aren't avoiding you, just stalling for opening day at Yankee Stadium...

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (NY) (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, January 18, 2006 9:17 AM
To: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Cc: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Subject: [redacted] upgrade and CALEA

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~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~
~~NON-RECORD~~

[redacted] The upgrades we just did on [redacted] should allow us to do CALEA now, correct? I want [redacted] to work with [redacted] in my office to push all our FISA from the DCS-3000 into [redacted] and see how it works. Let me know when we can do this. Soon is better than later.

[redacted] I think a vacation in NY for a couple of days is just what you need. What do you think?

[redacted]
NYO Squad SO-1
work: 212-[redacted]
cell: 917-[redacted]

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[redacted] (OTD) (FBI)

From: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, August 25, 2005 9:25 AM
To: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Cc: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Subject: FW: Continued FISA troubles

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Importance: High

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RECORD 315B-KC-84652

[redacted]
Is there anything that can be done to resolve these issues with [redacted] What do I need to do in order to get a resolution.
Do you believe the issue is [redacted] or DCS-5000?

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thnx.

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (KC) (OGA)
Sent: Wednesday, August 24, 2005 7:08 PM
To: [redacted] (KC) (FBI)
Cc: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI); [redacted] (KC) (FBI); [redacted] (KC) (OGA)
Subject: Continued FISA troubles

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RECORD 315B-KC-84652

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[redacted]
We're going to need to bypass the latchbox on the primary [redacted] The packet I left for you yesterday (23 August) details call activity and line troubles for the past 10 days.

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[redacted]
Our DSC3000 crashed overnight and we lost our pen data for the past 36 hours.

The new problems incurred by the stopgap measure are outweighing those it was designed to overcome.

Respectfully,

[redacted]
Kansas City Division
Wichita, Kansas RA
FBI/JTTF
(316) [redacted] (Desk)
(316) [redacted] (Fax)

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~~DERIVED FROM: G-3 FBI Classification Guide G-3, dated 1/97, Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations~~
~~DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1~~
~~SECRET~~

~~DERIVED FROM: G-3 FBI Classification Guide G-3, dated 1/97, Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations~~
~~DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1~~
~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI)

From: [REDACTED] (BH) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, January 06, 2005 12:39 PM
To: [REDACTED] (ITD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Upcoming TICTU Regional Conferences

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1. We want to ensure that we have in our possession the most accurate and up to date 24/7 contact numbers for court orders and emergency requests. The ones for criminal and the ones cleared for FISAs. What access and info can we get by without an order or delayed order.
2. As FISAs become more prevalent, we need [REDACTED] solution to [REDACTED] without long delays.
3. What is the most they or their systems can do to trace/tack [REDACTED] (with or without [REDACTED])
4. Can we get the time zone [ET, CT, MT, PT] of the location of the target's calls included on the DCS 3000.
5. Any foreign telephone service available to subscribers (outside US) and will we be able to receive real time data? In other words, the implications of world wide service availability.

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-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED] (ITD) (FBI)
Sent: Tuesday, January 04, 2005 9:13 AM
Cc: [REDACTED] (ITD) (FBI); [REDACTED] (ITD) (FBI); [REDACTED] (ITD) (CON)
Subject: Upcoming TICTU Regional Conferences

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NON-RECORD

In the first half of 2005 the Telecommunications Intercept and Collection Technology Unit (TICTU) plans to once again host two regional conferences. These forums will provide specialized training to field office practitioners responsible for telephone ELSUR operations and foster cooperation between the FBI and the nation's telecommunications industry.

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TICTU is currently developing the agenda for these conferences and requests your suggestions for agenda topics and carriers of particular interest. We need your input as soon as possible so that we can set a tentative agenda. You may send your ideas to me via email or contact [redacted] at 703 [redacted]

Thanks,

[redacted]

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[redacted] (OTD) (FBI)

From: [redacted] (OTD)(CON)
Sent: Monday, August 07, 2006 5:16 PM
To: [redacted] (CG) (FBI); [redacted] (KC) (FBI); [redacted] (DL) (FBI); [redacted] (HO) (FBI); [redacted] (PH) (FBI); [redacted] (AT) (FBI); [redacted] (CV) (FBI); [redacted] (JK) (FBI)
Cc: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI); [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Subject: DSC [redacted]

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Greetings.

I am checking in to see if you have had a chance to install the van integration package (aircard, [redacted] etc) you received at the RTL conference in Tampa.

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If you haven't, please take some time this week, to do so. I would also like to run a few tests with each of you with a test phone to confirm it's working.

You will need to work with [redacted] on the DCS-3000 side to be able to configure your target for the 10-20 van integration. He can be reached at 703 [redacted]

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Please let me know if and when you have completed the install and tested it.

If I don't hear from you I will start calling you and bugging you. :-)

Thanks.

[redacted]
703- [redacted] work
703- [redacted]
816- [redacted] cell

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[redacted] (OTD) (FBI)

From: [redacted] (ITD) (FBI)
Sent: Monday, August 23, 2004 10:53 AM
To: [redacted] (ITD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: DCS 3000 C&A

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[redacted]

Thanks!

Cheers, [redacted]

[redacted]
ISSM, Quantico Complex
ERF (703) [redacted]

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-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (ITD) (FBI)
Sent: Monday, August 23, 2004 10:14 AM
To: [redacted] (ITD) (FBI)
Subject: DCS 3000 C&A

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[redacted]

It's categorized as Tier 2. I've attached all the related documentation.

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[redacted]

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[redacted] (OTD) (FBI)

From: [redacted] (SecD) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, February 03, 2005 2:51 PM
To: [redacted] (SecD) (FBI); [redacted] (CV) (FBI); [redacted]
(SecD)(CON); [redacted] (ITD) (FBI)
Cc: [redacted] (CV) (FBI); [redacted] (CV) (FBI); [redacted] (CV) (FBI); [redacted]
(CV) (FBI); [redacted] (CV) (CON); [redacted] (SE) (FBI); [redacted]
(ITD) (FBI); [redacted] (CV) (FBI); [redacted] (CV) (FBI); [redacted]
(CV) (FBI); [redacted] (CV) (FBI); [redacted] (CV) (FBI); [redacted]
(CV) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Portable Voicebox

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NON-RECORD

[redacted]

[redacted] (TICTU) and I collaborated on this issue and agree that the course of action is acceptable. Such that: the Hard disk drive must either be FBI property before the start of the operation or seized, kept/controlled by the FBI before the end of the T-III intercept. We expect that the drive will be replaced by the bureau at our expense if we choose to "borrow the unit."

Follow-on concerns should be addressed to the TICTU PM for resolution.

Cheers, [redacted]
[redacted]
ISSM, Quantico Complex
ERF (703) [redacted]

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-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (SecD) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, February 03, 2005 9:14 AM
To: [redacted] (CV) (FBI); [redacted] (SecD)(CON); [redacted] (SecD) (FBI)
Cc: [redacted] (CV) (FBI); [redacted] (CV) (FBI); [redacted] (CV) (FBI); [redacted]
[redacted] (CV) (CON); [redacted] (SE) (FBI); [redacted] (ITD) (FBI); [redacted] (CV)
(FBI); [redacted] (CV) (FBI); [redacted] (CV) (FBI); [redacted] (CV) (FBI); [redacted]
[redacted] (CV) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Portable Voicebox

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Hi [redacted]
[redacted] will be happy to assist you in this matter. Sending you to the experts :-)
Take care...

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (CV) (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, February 02, 2005 4:29 PM
To: [redacted] (SecD) (FBI)

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Cc: [redacted] (CV) (FBI); [redacted] (CV) (FBI); [redacted] (CV) (FBI);
[redacted] (CV) (CON); [redacted] (SE) (FBI); [redacted] (ITD) (FBI); [redacted] (CV)
(FBI); [redacted] (CV) (FBI); [redacted] (CV) (FBI); [redacted] (CV) (FBI);
[redacted] (CV) (FBI)

Subject: Portable Voicebox

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[redacted]

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Several months ago, I spoke to you regarding our task force squad that purchased its own Voicebox digital collection system and needed the OK from Security Division to use it on FBI cases. This is still in the works on our end, but we have a similar situation regarding a portable system and require the input of Security Division before we move forward.

Quantico ERF has supplied our division with a portable Voicebox system, but it is currently in use in our Toledo RA. The case agent in our Youngstown RA would like to conduct an upcoming FBI T-III on a digital system (rather than cassette tapes), but we do not have another system available (neither does ERF). The local HIDTA has purchased a portable Voicebox system and has agreed to let the Youngstown RA use it for this T-III. The system will be operated in the RA space and would be connected to our DCS-3000 network to obtain telephone target data. According to ERF, there is an acceptable configuration which enables secure transfer of the data. The issue arises in regards to conducting an FBI case on a system that is not owned by the FBI. As far as the data and audio that will be stored on the system is concerned, if necessary, we could remove the hard drives from the system before it is returned to HIDTA (replacements would have to be supplied by the FBI and software reloaded by the manufacturer).

From the security standpoint, can we use this system to conduct this upcoming T-III? Are there any other issues that must be resolved?

If you have any questions, please feel free to call me.

Thanks,

[redacted]

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[redacted]

Cleveland Division

216 [redacted] (office)

216 [redacted] (cell)

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SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted] (OTD) (FBI)

From: [redacted] (HO) (FBI)
Sent: Tuesday, September 13, 2005 2:55 PM
To: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Cc: [redacted] (HO) (CON)
Subject: FISA tgt fo [redacted]

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[redacted]

The [redacted] for this case is [redacted]. The [redacted] number that is allegedly calling the tgt is [redacted]. We pulled and printed the [redacted] calls from 09/10/05; 0946 hrs to 09/12/05; 1935 hrs and found a call session on the [redacted] for every DCS 3000 call we had.

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Unless the [redacted] is being less than candid with the case agent I do not see a problem unless we need to take a larger snapshot of the tgt's incoming and outgoing calls. We will also recommend to the case agent that she subpoena the [redacted] phone records so we can match his charged calls with our equipment's calls.

If you have any questions, please shoot me an email or give me a call.

Thanks,

[redacted]

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~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

[redacted] (OTD) (FBI)

From: [redacted] (SA) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, December 29, 2005 11:58 AM
To: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Subject: [redacted] in San Antonio

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For some unknown reason, San Antonio keeps losing its [redacted] server connection on the DCS 3000. I have no problem reconnecting, it's just that every couple of days I find the connection is lost and I have to reconnect.

Thanks,

SA [redacted]
210 [redacted]

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(OTD) (FBI)

From: [REDACTED] (ER) (FBI)
Sent: Friday, May 14, 2004 4:48 PM
To: [REDACTED] (ER) (FBI)
Subject: RE: [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] I see you resolved the issues I witnessed the other day. Bravo.

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SSA [REDACTED]
Unit Chief, I/D/ESTS/ATU
(703) [REDACTED]

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED] (ER) (FBI)
Sent: Friday, May 14, 2004 3:00 PM
To: [REDACTED] (ER) (FBI); CLIFFORD, MICHAEL (ER) (FBI); [REDACTED] (ER) (FBI); [REDACTED]
Subject: [REDACTED]

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Gentlemen,

I thought you might be interested to know that we have successfully intercepted a [REDACTED] test phone in real-time with our DCS 3000 system. The results are better than expected and we're ahead of schedule. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] has not yet fully deployed the solution throughout their network, but it should not be too much longer.

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[REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI)

From: [REDACTED] (ER) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, April 01, 2004 5:26 PM
To: [REDACTED] (ER) (FBI)
Subject: FW: DCS 3000 Pen Mode



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[REDACTED] Glacier Bkgrd.jpg (2 KB)
G. (ER) (FBI).vc...

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[REDACTED]
Just a heads up.

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[REDACTED] ITD/ESTS/ATU

(703) [REDACTED]

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED] (ER) (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, March 31, 2004 3:46 PM
To: [REDACTED] (ER) (FBI)
Cc: CLIFFORD, MICHAEL (ER) (FBI); THOMAS, MARCUS C. (ER) (FBI); [REDACTED] (ER) (FBI); [REDACTED] (Div09) (FBI)
Subject: DCS 3000 Pen Mode

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[REDACTED]
As discussed, I would recommend that, at the next possible upgrade (if not sooner), DCS3000 be redesigned to eliminate as an option the [REDACTED] selection (and any other full content option) once the PEN REGISTER selection has been made in the warrant category. In the interim, we should forward an EC to the field: 1) Affirming that SMS cannot be legally obtained with only a PR/T&T order, and 2) Alerting them to the misconfiguration potential and advising them to take care in configuration.

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I would note that the IITRI report on [REDACTED] recommended not having combined full content/PR devices on the theory that miss-configuration could occur. That recommendation was one of the 3 (out of 11) that the FBI chose not to follow, arguing in part that we doubted that it would be a problem. IITRI stated in perteninet part:

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5.3 PEN MODE AND FULL MODE

Provide separate versions of [] for pen register and full content collection. []

[]

[]

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PRIVILEGED DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT - NOT FOR DISCLOSURE OUTSIDE THE FBI
WITHOUT PRIOR OGC APPROVAL

[]

Technology Law Unit
Engineering Research Facility
Bldg 27958A, Room A-207
Quantico, VA 22135
Tel. 703 []
Fax. 703 []

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TECHNOLOGY LAW UNIT - OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL

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[redacted] (OTD) (FBI)

From: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, May 11, 2006 5:10 PM
To: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Request [redacted] assistance for St Louis

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I should have known better!

[redacted]
Advanced Telephony Unit
Operational Technology Division
Office (703) [redacted]
Mobile (703) [redacted]
Fax (703) [redacted]

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-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, May 11, 2006 5:09 PM
To: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Request [redacted] assistance for St Louis

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That's [redacted] The Magnificent ...

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, May 11, 2006 4:52 PM
To: [redacted] (SL) (FBI); [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Cc: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI); [redacted] (CG) (FBI); [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Request [redacted] assistance for St Louis

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[redacted]
Thanks for the heads up. I spoke with [redacted] a little while ago. Once it's determined that the subject is using that specific phone, through the use of the DCS-3000, the magnificent [redacted] will work his magic and and help you locate the target. Keep us posted.

[redacted]
Advanced Telephony Unit
Operational Technology Division
Office (703) [redacted]
Mobile (703) [redacted]
Fax (703) [redacted]

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-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (SL) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, May 11, 2006 4:47 PM

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To: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Cc: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI); [redacted] (CG) (FBI); [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Request [redacted] assistance for St Louis

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[redacted]
I have spoken with [redacted] concerning SL's "possible" need for [redacted]

The details are as follows:

Case Agent [redacted] (573) [redacted] (O) (573) [redacted] (C)

Location Cape Girardeau RA, approx. 120 miles South of SL.

A drug related homicide investigation. One subject is in custody, Agents are attempting to locate the subject who is somewhere in Southern Illinois, Eastern Missouri, or NorthWestern Kentucky. The carrier is [redacted] Case Agent is obtaining the 2703D order as I type this, the AUSAs office advise the order should be ready by 05/11/06, but I will call you once I have it in my hands. As soon as I have the 2703D and entered into our DCS-3000 I'll contact [redacted] as he instructed. That's all I know at this point.

Thx for your help - tm

FBI - St. Louis

(314) [redacted]

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, May 11, 2006 3:36 PM
To: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI); [redacted] (SL) (FBI); [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Cc: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI); [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Request [redacted] assistance for St Louis

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We are on it.

[redacted]
Advanced Telephony Unit
Operational Technology Division
Office (703) [redacted]
Mobile (703) [redacted]
Fax (703) [redacted]

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-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, May 11, 2006 3:48 PM
To: [redacted] (SL) (FBI); [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Cc: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI); [redacted] (OTD) (FBI); [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Request [redacted] assistance for St Louis

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[redacted] contact [redacted] to get your regional team on the hook.

[redacted]

[redacted]

Technical Personnel Development Unit
O: 540 [redacted]
C: 202 [redacted]

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (SL) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, May 11, 2006 3:41 PM
To: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Cc: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI); [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Subject: Request [redacted] assistance for St Louis

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~~NON-RECORD~~

[redacted]

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The Cape Girardeu RA has the potential for needing the assistance of [redacted] on a murder investigation. What do I need to do to get our regional team on standby? What does the case Agent need to do in the way of providing information, case Hx, ect? The carrier is [redacted] and the geographic area is Western KY, South Illinois, Eastern Missouri (all very rural). Please advise.
Thx - tm

[redacted]

FBI - St Louis
(314) [redacted]

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(OTD) (FBI)

From: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, May 11, 2006 4:52 PM
To: [redacted] (SL) (FBI); [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Cc: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI); [redacted] (CG) (FBI); [redacted]
(OTD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Request [redacted] assistance for St Louis

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[redacted]
Thanks for the heads up. I spoke with [redacted] a little while ago. Once it's determined that the subject is using that specific phone, through the use of the DCS-3000, the magnificent [redacted] will work his magic and help you locate the target. Keep us posted.

[redacted]
Advanced Telephony Unit
Operational Technology Division
Office (703) [redacted]
Mobile (703) [redacted]
Fax (703) [redacted]

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-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (SL) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, May 11, 2006 4:47 PM
To: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Cc: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI); [redacted] (CG) (FBI); [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Request [redacted] assistance for St Louis

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~
~~NON-RECORD~~

[redacted]
I have spoken with [redacted] concerning SL's "possible" need for [redacted]

The details are as follows:

Case Agent [redacted] (573) [redacted] (O) (573) [redacted] (C)

Location Cape Girardeau RA, approx. 120 miles South of SL.

A drug related homicide investigation. One subject is in custody, Agents are attempting to locate the subject who is somewhere in Southern Illinois, Eastern Missouri, or NorthWestern Kentucky. The carrier is [redacted] Case Agent is obtaining the 2703D order as I type this, the AUSAs office advise the order should be ready by 05/11/06, but I will call you once I have it in my hands. As soon as I have the 2703D and entered into our DCS-3000 I'll contact [redacted] as he instructed. That's all I know at this point.

Thx for your help - tm

[redacted]
FBI - St. Louis
(314) [redacted]

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~~SECRET~~

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, May 11, 2006 3:36 PM
To: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI); [redacted] (SL) (FBI); [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Cc: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI); [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Request [redacted] assistance for St Louis

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~~UNCLASSIFIED~~
~~NON-RECORD~~

We are on it.

[redacted]

[redacted]

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Advanced Telephony Unit
Operational Technology Division
Office (703) [redacted]
Mobile (703) [redacted]
Fax (703) [redacted]

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, May 11, 2006 3:48 PM
To: [redacted] (SL) (FBI); [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Cc: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI); [redacted] (OTD) (FBI); [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Request [redacted] assistance for St Louis

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[redacted] to get your regional team on the hook.

[redacted]

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[redacted]

Technical Personnel Development Unit
O: 540 [redacted]
C: 202 [redacted]

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (SL) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, May 11, 2006 3:41 PM
To: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Cc: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI); [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Subject: Request [redacted] assistance for St Louis

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~~NON-RECORD~~

[redacted]

The Cape Girardeu RA has the potential for needing the assistance of [redacted] on a murder investigation. What do I need to do to get our regional team on standby? What does the case Agent need to do in the way of providing information, case Hx, ect? The carrier is [redacted] and the geographic area is Western KY, South Illinois, Eastern Missouri (all

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very rural). Please advise.

Thx [redacted]

[redacted]

FBI - St Louis
(314) [redacted]

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~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

[redacted] (OTD) (FBI)

From: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, March 23, 2006 2:49 PM
To: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI); [redacted] (OTD) (FBI); [redacted] (OTD) (FBI); [redacted] (OTD) (FBI); [redacted] (CQ) (FBI); [redacted] (WF) (FBI)
Cc: CLIFFORD, MICHAEL (OTD) (FBI); [redacted] (OTD) (FBI); [redacted] (OTD) (FBI); [redacted] (OTD) (FBI); [redacted] (WF) (FBI); [redacted] (SecD) (FBI); [redacted] (OTD) (FBI); [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: [redacted] Resource

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[redacted]
This falls under my purview

[redacted]

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[redacted]
Advanced Telephony Unit
Operational Technology Division
(703) [redacted]

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-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, March 23, 2006 10:18 AM
To: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI); [redacted] (OTD) (FBI); [redacted] (OTD) (FBI); [redacted] (CQ) (FBI)
Cc: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI); [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Subject: FW: [redacted] Resource

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~
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Thanks,
[redacted]

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-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, March 23, 2006 9:21 AM
To: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Subject: FW: [redacted] Resource

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~
~~NON-RECORD~~

Hi [redacted] I'm not certain if this falls under your unit, or if you have any input, but I'm forwarding the below e-mail to you in case you do have input. Thank you!

[redacted]
(703) [redacted]

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-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (SecD) (FBI)
Sent: Monday, February 27, 2006 12:42 PM
To: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Cc: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)
Subject: FW: [redacted] - Resource

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[redacted]
Please see the questions presented below. Perhaps you could inquire of some of the units there regarding their input into this, especially the units that deal with telephonic intercepts and [redacted]

Thanks,
[redacted]

[redacted]
[redacted] Security Compliance

Unit

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Security Division
FBIHQ Room PA-555
202 [redacted]

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-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, February 23, 2006 4:42 PM
To: [redacted] (SecD) (FBI)
Subject: FW: [redacted] Resource

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What do you think of this?

[redacted]
Washington Field Office
Office (202) [redacted]

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, February 23, 2006 4:40 PM
To: [redacted] (WF) (FBI); [redacted] (WF) (FBI)
Cc: [redacted] (WF) (FBI); [redacted] (WF) (FBI); [redacted] (WF) (FBI); [redacted] (WF) (FBI); [redacted] (WF) (FBI); [redacted] (WF) (FBI)
Subject: RE: [redacted] Resource

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~~NON-RECORD~~

It certainly seems like a useful tool. However, I share the concern that WFO requests could be tracked back to the FBI.

While an UC account would address the concern for a single FO. Is it possible that HQ Security or whomever could contact this group and make an assessment re the danger of compromise. If the group is comprised of security officers - then our concern is lessened - but if the group is a private venture with no security awareness then the compromise issue becomes heightened.

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-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, February 23, 2006 12:25 PM
To: [redacted] (WF) (FBI); [redacted] (WF) (FBI)
Cc: [redacted] (WF) (FBI); [redacted] (WF) (FBI); [redacted] (WF) (FBI); [redacted] (WF) (FBI); [redacted] (WF) (FBI)
Subject: RE: [redacted] Resource

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~~NON-RECORD~~

I believe [redacted] had been working on establishing UC accounts for this type of service a while back. Not sure if [redacted] is aware of this. Similar to what is done for [redacted] etc. mpk

[redacted]
WFO Technical Supervisor
Investigative Services Branch
202 [redacted] office
202 [redacted]
164 [redacted]

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-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, February 23, 2006 10:26 AM

To: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)

Cc: [redacted] (WF) (FBI); [redacted] (WF) (FBI); [redacted] (WF) (FBI); [redacted] (WF) (FBI)

Subject: RE: [redacted] Resource

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~~NON-RECORD~~

Perhaps our use can be tracked on this service...any thoughts, anyone?

[redacted]
ASAC - Security Branch

WFO

(202) [redacted] (office)

(202) [redacted] (blckbrry)

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-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)

Sent: Thursday, February 23, 2006 10:03 AM

To: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)

Subject: FW: [redacted] Resource

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Does FBI use of this service raise any security concerns?

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)

Sent: Wednesday, February 22, 2006 2:47 PM

To: WF-CT-11; WF-CT-12; WF-CT-13; WF-CT-14-JTTF

Cc: [redacted] (WF) (FBI); [redacted] (WF) (FBI); [redacted] (WF) (FBI); [redacted] (WF) (FBI); [redacted] (WF) (FBI); [redacted] (CTD) (FBI); [redacted] (CTD) (CON)

Subject: [redacted] Resource

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All:

If you already know this - please disregard.

For those of you who are actively sending out NSL's and or subpoena's for telephone subscriber information, telephone numbers are now [redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

NOTE - This resource **ONLY** provides the name and contact info of the service provider. They do NOT provide any subscriber information.

NOTE - NSL's should ALWAYS be directed to the proper contact for the service provider as listed on

[Redacted]

Feel free to pass this along to any FBI / JTTF personnel. Anyone who wants to get a separate law enforcement account may do so at

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

FBI WFO JTTF

[Redacted]

Desk 202

[Redacted]

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[REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI)

From: [REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI)
Sent: Tuesday, October 03, 2006 3:26 PM
To: [REDACTED] (IP) (FBI)
Subject: [REDACTED]

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~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~
~~NON-RECORD~~



[REDACTED] Right now, it's a manual - albeit relatively easy
- process to extract, decode, and present the data. We are working on a method for the DCS-3000 to automatically do
this, but it will take some more development effort. For now, I can do the manual extraction as often as you need me to.
Just let me know.

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[REDACTED] ndy.doc (45
KB)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

[REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI)

From: [REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, September 28, 2006 10:58 AM
To: [REDACTED] (OTD)(CON)
Subject: RE: DCS3000 raw data question

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I just verified this also.



-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED] (OTD)(CON)
Sent: Thursday, September 28, 2006 10:57 AM
To: [REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: DCS3000 raw data question

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I just heard back from the IP customer. She had also talked to her Tech Agent and he had called someone at ERF
and then told her that it was fixed. So they may have just set that parm to true. Thanks.



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-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, September 28, 2006 10:54 AM
To: [REDACTED] (ITOD)(CON)
Subject: RE: DCS3000 raw data question

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~~NON-RECORD~~

We're looking into it right now. There is an configuration option that has to be set on the collection system to allow DTMF digits to included in the CDNRS report. I checked the system in Indy and it is currently set to true. This may have been recently adjusted. If so, no problem. If it was set to true before this data was collected then we have a bug.



-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED] (ITOD)(CON)
Sent: Thursday, September 28, 2006 10:10 AM
To: [REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI)
Cc: [REDACTED] (ITOD) (FBI)
Subject: DCS3000 raw data question


b6
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~~UNCLASSIFIED~~
~~NON-RECORD~~

I have a question from a customer in IP. She has a pen using a DCS3000 and is asking why she is not receiving complete information in the Raw Data. The example shown is a sample of what she is seeing. On the CDNRS file the record is as follows:



The Summary file shows the following for the same call:



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~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

[REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI)

From: [REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, September 28, 2006 10:54 AM
To: [REDACTED] (ITOD)(CON)
Subject: RE: DCS3000 raw data question

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~~UNCLASSIFIED~~
~~NON-RECORD~~

We're looking into it right now. There is an configuration option that has to be set on the collection system to allow DTMF digits to included in the CDNRS report. I checked the system in Indy and it is currently set to true. This may have been recently adjusted. If so, no problem. If it was set to true before this data was collected then we have a bug.




-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED] (ITOD)(CON)
Sent: Thursday, September 28, 2006 10:10 AM
To: [REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI)
Cc: [REDACTED] (ITOD) (FBI)
Subject: DCS3000 raw data question


b6
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~~UNCLASSIFIED~~
~~NON-RECORD~~

I have a question from a customer in IP. She has a pen using a DCS3000 and is asking why she is not receiving complete information in the Raw Data. The example shown is a sample of what she is seeing. On the CDNRS file the record is as follows:



The Summary file shows the following for the same call:



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~~SECRET~~

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b7E

~~SECRET~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

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~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

[REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI)

From: [REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI)
Sent: Friday, September 22, 2006 3:46 PM
To: [REDACTED] (LA) (FBI)
Cc: [REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI)
Subject: FW: OWP Installation

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~~NON-RECORD~~

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I think the one way transfer (OWT) method is reliable. The problems you have described are not unique to the OWT. The

If you have any ideas to help us improve the current technique or if you want to further discuss the problem, let me know. I hope to see you in Denver next month.

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI)
Sent: Friday, September 22, 2006 2:56 PM
To: [REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI)
Subject: FW: OWP Installation

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-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (LA) (FBI)
Sent: Friday, September 22, 2006 1:06 PM
To: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: OWP Installation

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~~NON-RECORD~~

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It's not a time stamp problem [redacted]

[redacted] As a result of this the agents become confused as to the correct time of the call. When it is time for us to reimport the call we have to compare the time provided to us by the agent to the time that it was recorded in [redacted]. The time can be off any where from a couple of seconds to a few minute. Also I have been asked by the agents if the data and audio will ever be married together. If the current solution is not reliable then I do not want it. It will just create other problems.

[redacted]

310 [redacted] (Desk)
310 [redacted] (Cell)

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-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Sent: Friday, September 22, 2006 10:01 AM
To: [redacted] (A) (FBI)
Cc: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Subject: OWP Installation

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~~NON-RECORD~~

[redacted]

The OWP is not a reliable solution at this time. I don't understand you when you say it will help you with your time stamp problem? If [redacted] thinks the OWP should be installed at your site then so be it. I'll check to see what he wants to do.

Thnx,
[redacted]

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[REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI)

From: [REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, September 14, 2006 4:40 PM
To: [REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI)
Subject: SSP

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Here's the SSP for the DCS-3000.



DCS3000 System
Security Plan 2...

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~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

[REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI)

From: [REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI)
Sent: Friday, September 15, 2006 4:22 PM
To: [REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI)
Cc: [REDACTED] (SF) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Cell Sites Information

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~~NON-RECORD~~

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I found the problem in the database for the [REDACTED] PCS sites in San Francisco and have remedied it.

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-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI)
Sent: Friday, September 15, 2006 10:41 AM
To: [REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI); [REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI)
Subject: Cell Sites Information

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speculation on my part. When he calls, I will patch you in to share your expertise in the matter.

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Thanks

[redacted] would like to

resolve this as well while we are addressing the problems with [redacted] Please let me know if we need to talk with [redacted]

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~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

[redacted] (OTD) (FBI)

From: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Sent: Friday, September 15, 2006 9:42 AM
To: [redacted] (SC) (FBI)
Subject: DCS-1020

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[redacted]
Just give me a call, and I will show you how to use the DCS-1020 feature on the DCS-3000.

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

[redacted] (OTD) (FBI)

From: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Sent: Friday, September 15, 2006 9:35 AM
To: [redacted] (SC) (FBI)
Subject: RE: [redacted]

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[redacted]
I will configure your DCS-3000 to work with the DCS 1020. You will have to contact [redacted] for the DCS-1020 software and [redacted]

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-----Original Message-----

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~~SECRET~~ b6 b7C

From: [redacted] (SC) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, September 14, 2006 8:35 PM
To: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Cc: [redacted] (SC) (FBI); [redacted] (SC) (FBI); [redacted] (OTD) (FBI); [redacted]
Subject: [redacted] (OTD) (CON)

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~
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Hello [redacted]

Could you set up the Sacramento DSC 3000 computer to work with the [redacted] tracking [redacted]
We recently received the necessary [redacted] We would like to be able
to receive the call data in our [redacted] We will also need the software (dcs 1020) that goes with that system.

Thanks !!!

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~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

[redacted] (OTD) (FBI)

From: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, September 14, 2006 6:28 PM
To: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Subject: DCS-3000 and DCSnet Paragraphs

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~~NON-RECORD~~

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[redacted]
Here are the brief descriptions of the DCS-3000 and DCSnet that you requested:

DCS-3000

In late 1996, TICTU spearheaded the development of a unique telecommunications access program called the DCS-3000. This system was designed to interface with the switching facilities of wireless carriers using new digital technologies and offering diverse "Personal Communications Services." Since that time, the DCS-3000 has evolved into the FBI's primary pen-register collection system for all CALEA enabled intercepts, capable of interfacing with many models of wireline and wireless circuit and packet switching systems. The DCS-3000 is also used by more than 50 other federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies for CALEA-based electronic surveillance. The certified and accredited system uses a suite of in-house developed software applications designed for a client/server architecture. The DCS-3000 system is currently deployed in all 56 FBI field offices and 29 resident agencies. These systems are interconnected using the DCSNET Peerless IP network.

DCSnet

The Digital Collection Systems Network (DCSNET) is a certified and accredited network for transporting all CALEA Call Data Channel (CDC) and various streamed VOIP Call Content Channel (CCC) data from the service provider sources to the proper FBI Field Office destinations.

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The DCSNET has nodes in all 56 FBI Field Offices and 29 Resident agencies, with the current node total at 85. The DCSNET is utilizes the FTS2001 contract vehicle for its physical circuit connections and its IP traffic is encrypted and routed using [redacted] network equipment. The DCSNET is monitored and maintained by staff from the Operational Technology Division's (OTD) Telecommunications Intercept and Collection Technology Unit (TICTU).

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UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted] (OTD) (FBI)

From: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Sent: Monday, August 28, 2006 5:04 PM
To: [redacted] (SD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Single Warrant Database for DCS 3000 Clients (almost)

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~~UNCLASSIFIED~~
~~NON-RECORD~~

[redacted]
I have re-configured all Clients except .100: [redacted] s not running on this machine.

b2
b7E

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (SD) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, August 17, 2006 3:35 PM
To: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Cc: [redacted] (SD) (FBI); [redacted] (SD) (CON); [redacted] (SD) (CON)
Subject: RE: Single Warrant Database for DCS 3000 Clients (almost)

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~~NON-RECORD~~

(S) Primary Client (HQ CMP) [redacted]

(S) HQ T-III Room 1 [redacted]
HQ T-III Room 2 [redacted]
HQ T-III Room 2 [redacted]
HQ FCI Room 1 [redacted]
HQ FCI Room 2 [redacted]

b1

Off-Site T-III Room 1 [redacted]
Off-Site T-III Room 2 [redacted]
Off-Site T-III Room 3 [redacted]
Off-Site CMP [redacted]
Off-Site Tech Office [redacted]

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, August 17, 2006 11:35 AM
To: [redacted] (SD) (FBI)

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b7C

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~~SECRET~~

Subject: Single Warrant Database for DCS 3000 Clients (almost)

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~
~~NON-RECORD~~

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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To make this happen, I need to know the IP address of the primary Client (I assume this will be your current Client) and the addresses of all the secondary Clients you want to have this feature.

(S)

[Redacted]

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~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

[Redacted] (OTD) (FBI)

From: [Redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Sent: Monday, August 28, 2006 1:52 PM
To: [Redacted] (SecD) (FBI)
Cc: [Redacted] (SecD)(CON)
Subject: FW: UPDATE, Immediate inspection data call... URGENT!!!!

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~~UNCLASSIFIED~~
~~NON-RECORD~~

[Redacted]

Here is the requested documentation for the DCS-3000.

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b7C

[Redacted]



ITSS OCIO CEED
HANDBOOK - DCS ..

b6
b7C

-----Original Message-----

From: [Redacted] (SecD)(CON)
Sent: Monday, August 21, 2006 8:55 AM
To: [Redacted] (SecD)(CON); [Redacted] (LD) (FBI); [Redacted] (ITOD) (FBI); [Redacted] (TR);
[Redacted] (FBI); [Redacted] (OTD) (CON); [Redacted] (ITOD) (FBI); [Redacted] (OTD) (FBI); [Redacted]
[Redacted] (LD) (FBI)
Subject: UPDATE, Immediate inspection data call... URGENT!!!!

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UNCLASSIFIED
NON-RECORD

All...

For reporting:

Please send (email) your responses to my unit chief, [REDACTED] (on FBI Net) He will ensure they are passed to the inspector, [REDACTED] Thank you.

b6
b7C

[REDACTED]
Quantico Complex
CISM, CISSP, ISS, PSEC, MCSE
(703) [REDACTED] Bld 9, room 9-LL-14
..."lead, follow, or get out of the way." Thomas Paine

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED] (SecD)(CON)
Sent: Friday, August 18, 2006 9:56 AM
To: [REDACTED] (LD) (FBI); [REDACTED] (ITOD) (FBI); [REDACTED] (IR) (FBI); [REDACTED] (OTD) (CON); [REDACTED] (ITOD) (FBI); [REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI); [REDACTED] (LD) (FBI)
Subject: Immediate inspection data call... URGENT!!!!
Importance: High

UNCLASSIFIED
NON-RECORD

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All:

Attached is a DOJ form that MUST be completed ASAP!!!
Answer the questions to the best of your ability, with "unvarnished" answers!!! The inspectors WILL compare your written responses with their actual finding during the inspection. If the answers are "NO, or I don't know", so state... do NOT fabricate answers that can not be verified/proven.
Once you've completed the form... **CALL** me for submission instructions please!!

Specific questions about the form should be addressed to the inspection POC [REDACTED] @ 202 [REDACTED]
Systems are:

CWAN, CODIS, VICAP, CART SAN, OPDC LAN, DCS 3000, DDMS, ChemNet
<< File: ITSS OCIO CEED HANDBOOK - Merge Template 6 14 06.doc >>

[REDACTED]
Quantico Complex
CISM, CISSP, ISS, PSEC, MCSE
(703) [REDACTED] Bld 9, room 9-LL-14
..."lead, follow, or get out of the way." Thomas Paine

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b7C

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

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~~SECRET~~

[redacted] (OTD) (FBI)

From: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Sent: Monday, August 28, 2006 9:42 AM
To: [redacted] (SA) (FBI)
Cc: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: DCS-3000 SAHQ new office

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~~UNCLASSIFIED~~
~~NON-RECORD~~

[redacted]

b6
b7C

No problem. We'll fix you up right.

[redacted]

The stars are bright Deep in the heart of Texas!

[redacted]

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (SA) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, August 24, 2006 6:18 PM
To: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Subject: DCS-3000 SAHQ new office

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~~NON-RECORD~~

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Hey [redacted] in or around June 2007 we will be moving into our new office. I want to fix up our DCS-3000 for our new office. If possible a rack mounted DCS-3000 with a router that will connect all the RAs in a fashion that is more manageable than we have it now. Our current CPU is four years old. We have two routers, 4 Adtrans DSU, two router mounted DSU, a modem for [redacted] and several other boxes. If you need a RMS request please advise. Also, if you want a trip to SA, you are welcome anytime to survey the office. Thanks for all your help.

[redacted]

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b7C

San Antonio Division
210 [redacted] office
210 [redacted] fax
210 [redacted] cell

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~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

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[REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI)

From: [REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI)
Sent: Friday, August 18, 2006 4:08 PM
To: [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Post-Cut-Though-Dialed Digits

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RECORD 66F-HQ-A1247863

The field controls this forwarding on a per target basis.



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b7C

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI)
Sent: Friday, August 18, 2006 3:55 PM
To: [REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI); [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI)
Cc: [REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI); [REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Post-Cut-Though-Dialed Digits

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RECORD 66F-HQ-A1247863

Does the Field control the forwarding function from DCS3000 or can you over-ride that from ERF?

PRIVILEGED DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT - NOT FOR DISCLOSURE OUTSIDE THE FBI WITHOUT PRIOR OGC APPROVAL

[REDACTED]
**Science & Technology Law Unit
Engineering Research Facility
Bldg 27958A, Room A-207
Quantico, VA 22135
Tel. 703 [REDACTED]
Fax. 703 [REDACTED]**

b2
b6
b7C

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI)
Sent: Friday, August 18, 2006 3:44 PM
To: [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI); [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI)
Cc: [REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI); [REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Post-Cut-Though-Dialed Digits

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RECORD 66F-HQ-A1247863

The pen-register data forwarded from the DCS-3000 to the DCS-5000 and DCS-6000 systems is unfiltered, raw data. In most cases this information is associated with a full content intercept order. Occasionally, field offices elect to forward CALEA-based pen-register data obtained under FISA pen-register authority to the DCS-5000. In these cases, the PCTDD are delivered and collected by the DCS-5000 and eventually uploaded to TA.



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~~SECRET~~

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (OGC) (FBI)
Sent: Friday, August 18, 2006 3:35 PM
To: [redacted] (OGC) (FBI)
Cc: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI); [redacted] (OTD) (FBI); [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Post-Cut-Though-Dialed Digits

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~~SECRET~~
RECORD 66F-HQ-A1247863

I was under the impression from [redacted] that DCS3000 itself does keep all data in an administratively accessed file used for debugging, including PCTDD even when the default of do not record is selected. I thought I understood [redacted] to say that that file is overwritten over time, but otherwise, if the do not record default remains unchanged, the PCTDD does not go to TA or anywhere else.

b6
b7C

[redacted]
Is this not correct?

PRIVILEGED DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT - NOT FOR DISCLOSURE OUTSIDE THE FBI WITHOUT PRIOR OGC APPROVAL

[redacted]
**Science & Technology Law Unit
Engineering Research Facility
Bldg 27958A, Room A-207
Quantico, VA 22135
Tel. 703 [redacted]
Fax. 703 [redacted]**

b2
b6
b7C

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (OGC) (FBI)
Sent: Friday, August 18, 2006 1:01 PM
To: [redacted] (OGC) (FBI)
Cc: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Post-Cut-Though-Dialed Digits

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RECORD 66F-HQ-A1247863

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[redacted]

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When DSC 3000 is used for a FISA collection, doesn't the DCS 3000 pass all to the [redacted] (DSC 5000) including the PCTDD --in other words for FISAs the DCS3000 does NOT use the default of not recoding the PCTDD???? I might have this incorrect, but I thought there were some differences.

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (OGC) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, August 17, 2006 10:05 PM
To: [redacted] (OGC) (FBI); [redacted] (OGC) (FBI); [redacted] (OGC) (FBI); [redacted] (OGC) (FBI); [redacted] (OTD) (FBI); [redacted] (OTD) (FBI); [redacted] (OGC) (FBI); [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Cc: [redacted] (OGC) (FBI); [redacted] (OGC) (FBI); [redacted] (OGC) (FBI); [redacted] (FBI); [redacted] (OGC) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Post-Cut-Though-Dialed Digits

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b7C

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RECORD 66F-HQ-A1247863

~~SECRET~~



Since OTD only acquires the information and passes it along, and since the determination on whether one set of PCTDDs is content and not addressing, routing, dialing or signaling can only be made at the field office or analyst level, there really is nothing technologically speaking that can be done to ensure that content determined PCTDD is not used for investigative purposes.

However, OTD and STLU is proposing to amend the FD 871 which is required to be signed to authorize tech agents to implement a criminal or FISA PR to add a selection box requesting that PCTDD be recorded. That box will have an asterisk which near the signature line will alert approval signatories that "If Post Cut Through Dialed Digit (PCTDD) recording is required, approving authorities are certifying that they have read and will ensure compliance with the DOJ Deputy Attorney General's policy directive of May 24, 2004 prohibiting any investigative use of PCTDDs that are determined to qualify as content of communications." In this way, there will at least be a record with a staff level supervisor, and ASAC acknowledging the DAG Directive each and every time they approve a pen register. In the absence of the box being checked, the DCS 3000 default of not recording PCTDDs will remain unchanged (although we still have the problem of non CALEA compliant provider networks where we cannot use the DCS 3000 and have to use older PR decoders that do not have the same ability to shut off recording of PCTDDs).

Please advise if you see any problems with this approach.

**PRIVILEGED DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT - NOT FOR DISCLOSURE OUTSIDE THE FBI
WITHOUT PRIOR OGC APPROVAL**

Science & Technology Law Unit
Engineering Research Facility
Bldg 27958A, Room A-207
Quantico, VA 22135
Tel. 703 
Fax. 703 

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI)
Sent: Friday, August 11, 2006 2:06 PM
To: [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI); [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI); [REDACTED]
 (OGC) (FBI); [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI); [REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI);
 [REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI); [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI); [REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI)
Cc: [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI); [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI); [REDACTED] (OGC)
 (FBI); [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI)
Subject: Post-Cut-Through-Dialed Digits
Importance: High

~~SECRET~~
RECORD 66F-HQ-A1247863

IN RE [REDACTED]

Docket Number PR/TT 06-102

I just received a supplemental order from Judge Kotelly. The order is dated August 7.

Judge Kotelly has ordered the FBI to submit a report no later than September 25. This report must contain:

(1) an explanation of how the FBI is implementing its obligation to make no affirmative investigative use, through pen register authorization, of post-cut-through digits that do not constitute call dialing, routing, addressing or signaling information, except in a rare case in order to prevent an immediate danger of death, serious physical injury or harm to the National Security,

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addressing in particular: a) whether post-cut-through digits obtained via FISA pen register surveillance are uploaded into TA, Proton, IDW, EDMS, TED, or any other FBI system; and b) if so what procedures are in place to ensure that no affirmative investigative use is made of post-cut-through digits that do not constitute call dialing, routing, addressing or signaling information, including whether such procedures mandate that this information be deleted from the relevant system.

(2) an explanation of what procedures are in place to ensure that the Court is notified, as required pursuant to the Court's Order in the above captioned matter, whenever the government decides to make affirmative investigative use of post-cut-through digits that do not constitute call dialing, routing, addressing or signaling information in order to prevent an immediate danger of death, serious physical injury, or harm to the national security.

[REDACTED]

You are in the building. Could you pick up copies of the order from me for STLU.

[REDACTED]

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National Security Law Policy and Training Unit

FBI HQ Room 7975

STU III: (202) [REDACTED]

Unclassified Fax: (202) [REDACTED]

Secure Fax: (202) [REDACTED]

~~DERIVED FROM: Multiple Sources
DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1
SECRET~~

~~DERIVED FROM: Multiple Sources
DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1
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DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1
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~~DERIVED FROM: Multiple Sources
DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1
SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[redacted] (OTD) (FBI)

From: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Sent: Friday, August 18, 2006 4:06 PM
To: [redacted] (OTD)(CON)
Subject: FW: Immediate inspection data call... URGENT!!!!

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b7C

Importance: High

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~~NON-RECORD~~

[redacted]
I hope you can help with the following request. I'll be out of the office until 8/28, but [redacted] will be here and can answer any questions that you may have just as well as I can.

Thanks,

b6
b7C

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] SecD)(CON)
Sent: Friday, August 18, 2006 9:56 AM
To: [redacted] (LD) (FBI); [redacted] (ITOD) (FBI); [redacted] (IR) (FBI); [redacted] (OTD) (CON); [redacted] (ITOD) (FBI); [redacted] (OTD) (FBI); [redacted] (LD) (FBI)
Subject: Immediate inspection data call... URGENT!!!!
Importance: High

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~
~~NON-RECORD~~

All:

Attached is a DOJ form that MUST be completed ASAP!!!
Answer the questions to the best of you ability, with "unvarnished" answers!!! The inspectors WILL compare your written responses with their actual finding during the inspection. If the answers are "NO, or I don't know", so state... do NOT fabricate answers that can not be verified/proven.
Once you've completed the form... CALL me for submission instructions please!!

Specific questions about the form should be addressed to the inspection POC [redacted] @ 202 [redacted]
Systems are:

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CWAN, CODIS, VICAP, CART SAN, OPDC LAN, DCS 3000, DDMS, ChemNet



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1ANDBOOK - Merg..

[redacted]
Quantico Complex
CISM, CISSP, ISS, PSEC, MCSE
(703) [redacted] Bld 9, room 9-LL-14
..."lead, follow, or get out of the way." Thomas Paine

b6
b7C

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SECRET~~

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~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

[redacted] (OTD) (FBI)

From: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Sent: Friday, August 18, 2006 3:59 PM
To: [redacted] (SecD)(CON)
Subject: RE: Immediate inspection data call... URGENT!!!!

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~~NON-RECORD~~



I will be out of the office until 8/28/06. I will have one of our security analyst work on this in the interim. Also, I am concerned and curious how the DCS-3000 made this list and other more critical systems (i.e., DCS-5000, DCS-6000, DCSnet, and EDMS) did not.

b6
b7C



-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (SecD)(CON)
Sent: Friday, August 18, 2006 9:56 AM
To: [redacted] (LD) (FBI); [redacted] (ITOD) (FBI); [redacted] (IR) (FBI); [redacted] (OTD) (CON);
[redacted] (ITOD) (FBI); [redacted] (OTD) (FBI); [redacted] (LD) (FBI)
Subject: Immediate inspection data call... URGENT!!!!
Importance: High

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~
~~NON-RECORD~~

All:

Attached is a DOJ form that MUST be completed ASAP!!!
Answer the questions to the best of you ability, with "unvarnished" answers!!! The inspectors WILL compare your written responses with their actual finding during the inspection. If the answers are "NO, or I don't know", so state... do NOT fabricate answers that can not be verified/proven.
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Systems are:

CWAN, CODIS, VICAP, CART SAN, OPDC LAN, DCS 3000, DDMS, ChemNet
<< File: ITSS OCIO CEED HANDBOOK - Merge Template 6 14 06.doc >>



b6
b7C

Quantico Complex
CISM, CISSP, ISS, PSEC, MCSE
(703) [redacted] Bld 9, room 9-LL-14
..."lead, follow, or get out of the way." Thomas Paine

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

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[REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI)

From: [REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI)
Sent: Friday, August 18, 2006 3:44 PM
To: [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI); [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI)
Cc: [REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI); [REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Post-Cut-Though-Dialed Digits

~~SECRET~~

RECORD 66F-HQ-A1247863

The pen-register data forwarded from the DCS-3000 to the DCS-5000 and DCS-6000 systems is unfiltered, raw data. In most cases this information is associated with a full content intercept order. Occasionally, field offices elect to forward CALEA-based pen-register data obtained under FISA pen-register authority to the DCS-5000. In these cases, the PCTDD are delivered and collected by the DCS-5000 and eventually uploaded to TA.

b5
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b7C

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI)
Sent: Friday, August 18, 2006 3:35 PM
To: [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI)
Cc: [REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI); [REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI); [REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Post-Cut-Though-Dialed Digits

~~SECRET~~

RECORD 66F-HQ-A1247863

I was under the impression from [REDACTED] that DCS3000 itself does keep all data in an administratively accessed file used for debugging, including PCTDD even when the default of do not record is selected. I thought I understood [REDACTED] to say that that file is overwritten over time, but otherwise, if the do not record default remains unchanged, the PCTDD does not go to TA or anywhere else.

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b7C

[REDACTED]
Is this not correct?

PRIVILEGED DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT - NOT FOR DISCLOSURE OUTSIDE THE FBI WITHOUT PRIOR OGC APPROVAL

[REDACTED]
**Science & Technology Law Unit
Engineering Research Facility
Bldg 27958A, Room A-207
Quantico, VA 22135
Tel. 703. [REDACTED]
Fax. 703. [REDACTED]**

b2
b6
b7C

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI)
Sent: Friday, August 18, 2006 1:01 PM
To: [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI)
Cc: [REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Post-Cut-Though-Dialed Digits

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~~SECRET~~
RECORD 66F-HQ-A1247863

[redacted]
When DSC 3000 is used for a FISA collection, doesn't the DCS 3000 pass all to the [redacted] DSC 5000) including the PCTTD—in other words for FISAs the DCS3000 does NOT use the default of not recoding the PCTTD???? I might have this incorrect, but I thought there were some differences.

b2
b7E

-----Original Message-----

b5
b6
b7C
From: [redacted] (OGC) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, August 17, 2006 10:05 PM
To: [redacted] (OGC) (FBI); [redacted] (OGC) (FBI); [redacted] (OGC) (FBI); [redacted] (OGC) (FBI); [redacted] (OTD) (FBI); [redacted] (OTD) (FBI); [redacted] (OGC) (FBI); [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Cc: [redacted] (OGC) (FBI); [redacted] (OGC) (FBI); [redacted] (OGC) (FBI); [redacted] (OGC) (FBI); [redacted] (OGC) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Post-Cut-Through-Dialed Digits

~~SECRET~~
RECORD 66F-HQ-A1247863

FYI.

Since OTD only acquires the information and passes it along, and since the determination on whether one set of PCTDDs is content and not addressing, routing, dialing or signaling can only be made at the field office or analyst level, there really is nothing technologically speaking that can be done to ensure that content determined PCTDD is not used for investigative purposes.

However, OTD and STLU is proposing to amend the FD 871 which is required to be signed to authorize tech agents to implement a criminal or FISA PR to add a selection box requesting that PCTDD be recorded. That box will have an asterisk which near the signature line will alert approval signatories that "If Post Cut Through Dialed Digit (PCTDD) recording is required, approving authorities are certifying that they have read and will ensure compliance with the DOJ Deputy Attorney General's policy directive of May 24, 2004 prohibiting any investigative use of PCTDDs that are determined to qualify as content of communications." In this way, there will at least be a record with a staff level supervisor, and ASAC acknowledging the DAG Directive each and every time they approve a pen register. In the absence of the box being checked, the DCS 3000 default of not recording PCTDDs will remain unchanged (although we still have the problem of non CALEA compliant provider networks where we cannot use the DCS 3000 and have to use older PR decoders that do not have the same ability to shut off recording of PCTDDs).

Please advise if you see any problems with this approach.

PRIVILEGED DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT - NOT FOR DISCLOSURE OUTSIDE THE FBI WITHOUT PRIOR OGC APPROVAL

[redacted]
**Science & Technology Law Unit
Engineering Research Facility
Bldg 27958A, Room A-207
Quantico, VA 22135
Tel. 703 [redacted]
Fax. 703 [redacted]**

b2
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b7C

-----Original Message-----

b6
b7C
From: [redacted] (OGC) (FBI)
Sent: Friday, August 11, 2006 2:06 PM
To: [redacted] (OGC) (FBI); [redacted] (OGC) (FBI); [redacted] (OGC) (FBI); [redacted] (OGC) (FBI); [redacted] (OGC) (FBI); [redacted] (OTD) (FBI); [redacted] (OTD) (FBI); [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

b6
b7c

~~SECRET~~

Cc:

[redacted] (OGC) (FBI); [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
[redacted] (OGC) (FBI); [redacted] (OGC) (FBI) [redacted] (OGC) (FBI);
[redacted] (OGC) (FBI)

Subject:
Importance:

Post-Cut-Through-Dialed Digits
High

~~SECRET~~

RECORD 66F-HQ-A1247863

b6
b7c

IN RE [redacted]

Docket Number PR/TT 06-102

I just received a supplemental order from Judge Kotelly. The order is dated August 7.

Judge Kotelly has ordered the FBI to submit a report no later than September 25. This report must contain:

(1) an explanation of how the FBI is implementing its obligation to make no affirmative investigative use, through pen register authorization, of post-cut-through digits that do not constitute call dialing, routing, addressing or signaling information, except in a rare case in order to prevent an immediate danger of death, serious physical injury or harm to the National Security, addressing in particular: a) whether post-cut-through digits obtained via FISA pen register surveillance are uploaded into TA, Proton, IDW, EDMS, TED, or any other FBI system; and b) if so what procedures are in place to ensure that no affirmative investigative use is made of post-cut-through digits that do not constitute call dialing, routing, addressing or signaling information, including whether such procedures mandate that this information be deleted from the relevant system.

(2) an explanation of what procedures are in place to ensure that the Court is notified, as required pursuant to the Court's Order in the above captioned matter, whenever the government decides to make affirmative investigative use of post-cut-through digits that do not constitute call dialing, routing, addressing or signaling information in order to prevent an immediate danger of death, serious physical injury, or harm to the national security.

[redacted]

You are in the building. Could you pick up copies of the order from me for STLU.

b2
b6
b7c

[redacted]

National Security Law Policy and Training Unit

FBI HQ Room 7975

STU III: (202) [redacted]

Unclassified Fax: (202) [redacted]

Secure Fax: (202) [redacted]

~~DERIVED FROM: Multiple Sources~~
~~DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1~~
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~~DERIVED FROM: Multiple Sources~~
~~DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1~~
~~SECRET~~

~~DERIVED FROM: Multiple Sources~~
~~DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1~~
~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

~~DERIVED FROM: Multiple Sources~~
~~DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1~~
~~SECRET~~

~~DERIVED FROM: Multiple Sources~~
~~DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1~~
~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI)

From: [REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI)
Sent: Friday, August 18, 2006 10:55 AM
To: b6 [REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI); CLIFFORD, MICHAEL (OTD) (FBI); [REDACTED]
b7C [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI); THOMAS, MARCUS C. (OTD) (FBI)
Subject: Post Cut Through Digits

UNCLASSIFIED
NON-RECORD

Gentlemen,

I checked all 56 field office's criminal pen-register DCS-3000 systems for post cut through dialed digit information. The attached spreadsheet list the field office and the observed data for the office. Rather than counting all targets with and without the dialed digit extraction option set I categorized the data as All, Most, Some, Few, and None. All means all targets in the system are currently set to collect post cut through digits. A ranking of Few means the majority of the targets are set with the option turned off. For example, WFO was ranked Few because only [REDACTED] out of [REDACTED] current targets were set to collect post cut through digits.

A summary of the results:

Field offices with All targets set: [REDACTED]
Field offices with Most targets set: [REDACTED]
Field offices with Some targets set: [REDACTED]
Field offices with Few targets set: [REDACTED]
Field offices with No targets set: [REDACTED]

b2
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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b6
b7C



Post Cut Thru.xls
(19 KB)

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI)

From: [REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, August 17, 2006 5:57 PM
To: [REDACTED] (SD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Single Warrant Database for DCS 3000 Clients (almost)

b6
b7C

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~
~~NON-RECORD~~

b6
b7C

(S)

Since this is a new direction for us, I have decided to soak the application on just three Client machines before going for the whole enchilada. The clients on [REDACTED] have upgraded and configured. The .5 machine is the master, and from the quick test I did using my [REDACTED] number as a target seemed to work without any problem. So, give it a go for a while and if it holds up I will upgrade all the other machines.

b1
b2
b7E

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED] (SD) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, August 17, 2006 3:35 PM
To: [REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI)
Cc: [REDACTED] (SD) (FBI); [REDACTED] (SD) (CON); [REDACTED] (SD) (CON)
Subject: RE: Single Warrant Database for DCS 3000 Clients (almost)

b6
b7C

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~
~~NON-RECORD~~

(S)

Primary Client (HQ CMP) - [REDACTED]

HQ T-III Room 1 - [REDACTED]
HQ T-III Room 2a - [REDACTED]
HQ T-III Room 2b - [REDACTED]
HQ FCI Room 1 - [REDACTED]
HQ FCI Room 2 - [REDACTED]

b1

(S)

Off-Site T-III Room 1 - [REDACTED]
Off-Site T-III Room 2 - [REDACTED]
Off-Site T-III Room 3 - [REDACTED]
Off-Site CMP - [REDACTED]
Off-Site Tech Office - [REDACTED]

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, August 17, 2006 11:35 AM
To: [REDACTED] (SD) (FBI)
Subject: Single Warrant Database for DCS 3000 Clients (almost)

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~
~~NON-RECORD~~

b6
b7C

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b2
b7E

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~



[Redacted]

b2
b7E

(S)

To make this happen, I need to know the IP address of the primary Client (I assume this will be your current Client on [Redacted] and the addresses of all the secondary Clients you want to have this feature.

[Redacted]

b1
b6
b7C

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

[Redacted] (OTD) (FBI)

From: [Redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, August 17, 2006 2:35 PM
To: [Redacted] (SD) (FBI)
Subject: Single Warrant Database for DCS 3000 Clients (almost)

b6
b7C

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~
~~NON-RECORD~~

(S)

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b2
b7E

[Redacted]

To make this happen, I need to know the IP address of the primary Client (I assume this will be your current Client on [Redacted] and the addresses of all the secondary Clients you want to have this feature.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b1
b6
b7C

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI)

From: [REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, August 17, 2006 9:38 AM
To: [REDACTED] (HN) (FBI)
Cc: [REDACTED] (HN) (FBI)
Subject: Guam

b6
b7C

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~
~~NON-RECORD~~

[REDACTED]

Before you attempt to push the CDC data from the DCS-3000 into the [REDACTED] you should have [REDACTED] change the caseids he's using: I checked your GR30 data this morning and the caseid is still [REDACTED] for all your targets. If this is not changed the push to the [REDACTED] will be useless.

b2
b7E

b6
b7C

[REDACTED]

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

[REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI)

From: [REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, August 17, 2006 9:35 AM
To: [REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: DCS5000/Different time zones/dates/Hi LO Server

b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~
~~RECORD 225C-HN~~

Honolulu needs to configure the intercepts on the [REDACTED] and on the low side machine. If the data arrives at the [REDACTED] or near the same time as the audio is received the [REDACTED] will correlate the two data streams, regardless of the time stamp in the data. The linguist in Portland should see a HN timestamp in the session window - very close examination in the telephony log will reveal the [REDACTED] timestamp. But, I don't think the linguist are looking at the telephony log timestamps - shouldn't be a problem.

b2
b7E

[REDACTED]

—Original Message—

From: [REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, August 17, 2006 7:35 AM
To: [REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI)
Subject: FW: DCS5000/Different time zones/dates/Hi LO Server

b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~
~~RECORD 225C-HN~~

[REDACTED]

Please let me know when you will have time to discuss this.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Thnx.

[Redacted]

-----Original Message-----

From: [Redacted] (HN) (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, August 16, 2006 10:02 PM
To: [Redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Cc: [Redacted] (HN) (FBI); [Redacted] (HN) (FBI)
Subject: DCS5000/Different time zones/dates/HI LO Server

b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~
RECORD 225C-HN

[Redacted]

Got a situation hopefully you can help us.

HN has a FISA id [Redacted]

b2
b7E

The CCC being received on the 5000 is showing HN time. We need the 5000 to match the CCC and CDC if it can be done. Our understanding is the 5000 will not match the CCC and the CDC as the times/date are vastly different. Or, will the 5000 match the CDC and CCC according to the time received in HN, notwithstanding the actual date/time shown in the CDC [Redacted]

(Example: [Redacted])

I understand we need to go through the HI/LO server on a one-way push for the CDC to the 5000. We never used the HI LO for any previous calls. Any info on how we should do this is appreciated.

This FISA will be long term. If the CCC and CDC are not matched in the 5000 can there be software changes so we have a solution?

Our situation may be unique to the bureau since HN jurisdiction crosses the [Redacted]
do FISAs on [Redacted]

Thanks

[Redacted]
TTA Honolulu Division
808 [Redacted] Desk
808 [Redacted] Cell

b6
b7C

~~DERIVED FROM: G-3 FBI Classification Guide G-3, dated 1/97, Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations
DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1
SECRET~~

~~DERIVED FROM: G-3 FBI Classification Guide G-3, dated 1/97, Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations
DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1
SECRET~~

~~DERIVED FROM: G-3 FBI Classification Guide G-3, dated 1/97, Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations
DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1
SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[redacted] (OTD) (FBI)

From: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Sent: Monday, August 14, 2006 3:53 PM
To: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Subject: FW: Not a survey

b6
b7C

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~
~~NON-RECORD~~

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)
Sent: Monday, August 14, 2006 12:31 PM
To: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Not a survey

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~
~~NON-RECORD~~

Thanks [redacted]

b6
b7C

202 [redacted] (Desk)
202 [redacted] (Cell)
202 [redacted] (Pager)

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Sent: Monday, August 14, 2006 12:04 PM
To: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Not a survey

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~
~~NON-RECORD~~

b6
b7C

[redacted]

I think it best if someone from your office replies. [redacted] is asking if your office enables the "post cut thru dialed digits" for each pen-register (criminal and FISA) target as a matter of policy/practice. The default on the DCS-3000 is not to allow the digits dialed by the target after the call is setup unless the check box called "Post Cut Thru Digits" is checked for each target. I just checked your criminal DCS-3000 system, and the vast majority are set to "N", which means you're not collecting all the digits just the 10/11 digits dialed at the beginning of the calls for the majority of your targets. I assume this is due to policy/practice in the office. If so, your response to [redacted] "just the first string of digits" in most cases.

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)
Sent: Monday, August 14, 2006 9:37 AM
To: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI) [redacted] (OTD) (FBI) [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Subject: FW: Not a survey

b6
b7C

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~
~~NON-RECORD~~

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~~SECRET~~

Hey guys!! Could one of you please respond to [redacted] e-mail? We are not quite sure what he is asking for.

[redacted]

202 [redacted] (Desk)
202 [redacted] (Cell)
202 [redacted] (Pager)

b6
b7C

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)
Sent: Monday, August 14, 2006 9:14 AM
To: [redacted] (WF) (FBI); [redacted] (WF) (FBI); [redacted] (WF) (FBI)
Subject: FW: Not a survey

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~
~~NON-RECORD~~

Good morning all:

See [redacted] e-mail below. [redacted] can you advise me regarding the FISA side of the Unit [redacted] can you do the same regarding the Criminal side.

Thanks

b6
b7C

[redacted]

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (OTD)(CON)
Sent: Monday, August 14, 2006 8:22 AM
To: [redacted] (PD) (FBI); [redacted] (AT) (FBI); [redacted] (AT) (FBI); [redacted] (HN) (FBI); [redacted] (BH) (FBI); [redacted] (MM) (FBI); [redacted] (NY) (FBI); [redacted] (PG) (FBI); [redacted] (LA) (FBI); [redacted] (CV) (FBI); [redacted] (DL) (FBI); [redacted] (WF) (FBI); [redacted] (CE) (FBI); [redacted] (DL) (FBI); [redacted] (PD) (FBI); [redacted] (AN) (FBI); [redacted] (EP) (FBI); [redacted] (KC) (FBI); [redacted] (OC) (FBI); [redacted] (XX) (FBI); [redacted] (LV) (FBI); [redacted] (AO) (FBI); [redacted] (SL) (FBI); [redacted] (BS) (FBI); [redacted] (SA) (FBI); [redacted] (LV) (FBI); [redacted] (SU) (FBI); [redacted] (MM) (FBI); [redacted] (MW) (FBI); [redacted] (MP) (FBI); [redacted] (SI) (FBI); [redacted] (CH) (FBI); [redacted] (RH) (FBI); [redacted] (NY) (FBI); [redacted] (TP) (FBI); [redacted] (PH) (FBI); [redacted] (WF) (FBI); [redacted] (BF) (FBI); [redacted] (SE) (FBI); [redacted] (CG) (FBI); [redacted] (MP) (FBI); [redacted] (AL) (FBI); [redacted] (SF) (FBI); [redacted] (ME) (FBI); [redacted] (NY) (FBI); [redacted] (SA) (FBI); [redacted] (SD) (FBI); [redacted] (SC) (FBI); [redacted] (NH) (FBI); [redacted] (BS) (FBI); [redacted] (NF) (FBI); [redacted] (UM) (FBI); [redacted] (WF) (FBI); [redacted] (PH) (FBI); [redacted] (DN) (FBI); [redacted] (SD) (FBI); [redacted] (SC) (FBI); [redacted] (CO) (FBI); [redacted] (TP) (FBI); [redacted] (CG) (FBI); [redacted] (DE) (FBI); [redacted] (LR) (FBI); [redacted] (JN) (FBI); [redacted] (NO) (FBI); [redacted] (PX) (FBI); [redacted] (BA) (FBI); [redacted] (SJ) (FBI); [redacted] (HO) (FBI); [redacted] (NK) (FBI); [redacted] (LA) (FBI); [redacted] (BA) (FBI); [redacted] (CV) (FBI); [redacted] (JK) (FBI); [redacted] (HO) (FBI); [redacted] (MO) (FBI)

b6
b7C

Subject: FW: Not a survey

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~
~~NON-RECORD~~

~~SECRET~~



Please see [REDACTED] email below and respond directly back to him as soon as possible. Thanks!

-----Original Message-----

Subject: Not a survey
Importance: High

UNCLASSIFIED
NON-RECORD

☐ please forward to all TS/TA's for a response.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Can everyone please send me a very short reponse on the practice your offices follows in the use of the DCS-3000. Do you **ONLY** capture the first string of numbers or do you use the toggle to capture ALL numbers.

Since there are many options available to us on how much dialed information we collect we need to know what the norm is around the country. I understand that some of you will answer it is on a "case to case" basis, but I am just looking for the norm in your office.

Thanks for your quick response. The legal guys need this information to talk to all the options the DCS-3000 allows.

b6
b7C

--

Technical	Personnel Development	Unit
O: 540		
C: 202		

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~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

[REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI)

From: [REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI)
Sent: Monday, August 14, 2006 3:47 PM
To: [REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Not a survey

b6
b7C

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~
~~NON-RECORD~~

Yeah! I emailed [REDACTED] with my recommendation.

[REDACTED]

b6
b7C

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI)
Sent: Monday, August 14, 2006 12:11 PM
To: [REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI)
Subject: FW: Not a survey

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~
~~NON-RECORD~~

Were you aware of this request?

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED] (WF) (FBI)
Sent: Monday, August 14, 2006 9:37 AM
To: [REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI); [REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI); [REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI)
Subject: FW: Not a survey

b6
b7C

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~
~~NON-RECORD~~

Hey guys!! Could one of you please respond to [REDACTED] e-mail? We are not quite sure what he is asking for.

[REDACTED]

202 [REDACTED] (Desk)
202 [REDACTED] (Cell)
202 [REDACTED] (Pager)

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED] (WF) (FBI)
Sent: Monday, August 14, 2006 9:14 AM
To: [REDACTED] (WF) (FBI); [REDACTED] (WF) (FBI); [REDACTED] (WF) (FBI)
Subject: FW: Not a survey

b6
b7C

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~
~~NON-RECORD~~

Good morning all:

See [REDACTED] e-mail below. [REDACTED] can you advise me regarding the FISA side of the Unit [REDACTED] can you do the same regarding the Criminal side.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Thanks



b6
b7C

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (OTD)(CON)
Sent: Monday, August 14, 2006 8:22 AM
To: [redacted] (PD) (FBI); [redacted] (AT) (FBI); [redacted] (AT) (FBI); [redacted]

b6
b7C

[redacted] (HN) (FBI); [redacted] (BH) (FBI); [redacted] (MM) (FBI); [redacted] (NY) (FBI); [redacted] (DL) (FBI);
[redacted] (PG) (FBI); [redacted] (LA) (FBI); [redacted] (CA) (FBI); [redacted] (DL) (FBI);
[redacted] (WF) (FBI); [redacted] (CE) (FBI); [redacted] (DL) (FBI);
[redacted] (PD) (FBI); [redacted] (AN) (FBI); [redacted] (EP) (FBI); [redacted] (KC) (FBI);
[redacted] (OC) (FBI); [redacted] (XX) (FBI); [redacted] (LV) (FBI); [redacted] (AO) (FBI);
[redacted] (SL) (FBI); [redacted] (BS) (FBI); [redacted] (SA) (FBI); [redacted] (LV)
[redacted] (FBI); [redacted] (SU) (FBI); [redacted] (MM) (FBI); [redacted] (MW) (FBI);
[redacted] (MP) (FBI); [redacted] (SI) (FBI); [redacted] (CI) (FBI); [redacted] (RH) (FBI);
[redacted] (NY) (FBI); [redacted] (TP) (FBI); [redacted] (PH) (FBI); [redacted] (WF) (FBI);
[redacted] (BF) (FBI); [redacted] (SE) (FBI); [redacted] (CG) (FBI); [redacted] (MP) (FBI);
[redacted] (AL) (FBI); [redacted] (SF) (FBI); [redacted] (ME) (FBI); [redacted] (NY) (FBI);
[redacted] (SA) (FBI); [redacted] (SD) (FBI); [redacted] (SC) (FBI);
[redacted] (NH) (FBI); [redacted] (BS) (FBI); [redacted] (NF) (FBI); [redacted] (OM) (FBI);
[redacted] (WF) (FBI); [redacted] (PH) (FBI); [redacted] (DN) (FBI);
[redacted] (SD) (FBI); [redacted] (SC) (FBI); [redacted] (CO) (FBI); [redacted] (IP) (FBI);
[redacted] (CG) (FBI); [redacted] (DE) (FBI); [redacted] (LR) (FBI); [redacted] (JN) (FBI);
[redacted] (NO) (FBI); [redacted] (PX) (FBI); [redacted] (BA) (FBI);
[redacted] (SJ) (FBI); [redacted] (HO) (FBI); [redacted] (NK) (FBI); [redacted] (LA) (FBI); [redacted] (BA)
[redacted] (FBI); [redacted] (CV) (FBI); [redacted] (JK) (FBI); [redacted] (HO) (FBI);
[redacted] (MO) (FBI)

Subject: FW: Not a survey

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~
~~NON-RECORD~~

All,

Please see [redacted] email below and respond directly back to him as soon as possible. Thanks!

b6
b7C

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Sent: Monday, August 14, 2006 8:14 AM
To: [redacted] (OTD)(CON)
Cc: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI); [redacted] (DE) (FBI); [redacted] (OTD) (FBI); [redacted] (OTD)
[redacted] (FBI); [redacted] (OTD) (FBI); [redacted] (OTD) (FBI); [redacted] (OTD) (FBI); [redacted] (OTD) (FBI); [redacted] (OTD) (FBI);
[redacted] (OTD) (FBI)

Subject: Not a survey
Importance: High

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~
~~NON-RECORD~~

b6
b7C

[redacted] please forward to all TS/TA's for a response.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Can everyone please send me a very short reponse on the practice your offices follows in the use of the DCS-3000. Do you ONLY capture the first string of numbers or do you use the toggle to capture ALL numbers.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Since there are many options available to us on how much dialed information we collect we need to know what the norm is around the country. I understand that some of you will answer it is on a "case to case" basis, but I am just looking for the norm in your office.

Thanks for your quick response. The legal guys need this information to talk to all the options the DCS-3000 allows.

[REDACTED]

b6
b7C

[REDACTED]

Technical Personnel Development Unit
O: 540
C: 202 [REDACTED]

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

[REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI)

From: [REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI) b6
Sent: Monday, August 14, 2006 12:05 PM b7C
To: b2 [REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI)
Subject: b7E RE [REDACTED] DCS3000

~~SECRET~~
RECORD 315N-SD-62550

Yes.

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI)
Sent: Monday, August 14, 2006 12:05 PM
To: [REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI)
Subject: FW: [REDACTED] vs DCS3000

b6
b7C

b2
b7E

~~SECRET~~
RECORD 315N-SD-62550

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b6
b7C

Do you have this?

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (SD) (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, August 09, 2006 7:47 PM
To: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI); [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Subject: [redacted] /s DCS3000

~~SECRET~~
~~RECORD 315N-SD-62550~~

b2
b7E

I forwarded all the [redacted] sessions I had for 8/8-9/06 (up through about 1530 hrs) and attached is a copy of the DCS3000 report for this same period. You will see that DCS shows Associated DNs in some sessions and [redacted] does not. You will see that DCS3000 shows more calls than [redacted] reports. Thanks for all you've already done.

<< File: [redacted] All.rpt.txt >>

~~DERIVED FROM: Multiple Sources~~
~~DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1~~
~~SECRET~~

~~DERIVED FROM: Multiple Sources~~
~~DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1~~
~~SECRET~~

~~DERIVED FROM: Multiple Sources~~
~~DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1~~
~~SECRET~~

[redacted] (OTD) (FBI)

From: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Sent: Monday, August 14, 2006 12:04 PM
To: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Not a survey

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~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~
~~NON-RECORD~~

[redacted]

I think it best if someone from your office replies. [redacted] is asking if your office enables the "post cut thru dialed digits" for each pen-register (criminal and FISA) target as a matter of policy/practice. The default on the DCS-3000 is not to allow the digits dialed by the target after the call is setup unless the check box called "Post Cut Thru Digits" is checked for each target. I just checked your criminal DCS-3000 system, and the vast majority are set to "N", which means you're not collecting all the digits just the 10/11 digits dialed at the beginning of the calls for the majority of your targets. I assume this is due to policy/practice in the office. If so, your response to [redacted] just the first string of digits" in most cases.

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (VF) (FBI)

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Sent: Monday, August 14, 2006 9:37 AM
To: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI); [redacted] (OTD) (FBI); [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Subject: FW: Not a survey

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~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~
~~NON-RECORD~~

Hey guys!! Could one of you please respond to [redacted] e-mail? We are not quite sure what he is asking for.

[redacted]
202 [redacted] Desk)
202 [redacted] Cell)
202 [redacted] Pager)

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-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)
Sent: Monday, August 14, 2006 9:14 AM
To: [redacted] (WF) (FBI); [redacted] (WF) (FBI); [redacted] (WF) (FBI)
Subject: FW: Not a survey

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~
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Good morning all:

See [redacted] e-mail below [redacted] can you advise me regarding the FISA side of the Unit. [redacted] can you do the same regarding the Criminal side.

Thanks

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-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (OTD)(CON)
Sent: Monday, August 14, 2006 8:22 AM
To: [redacted] (PD) (FBI); [redacted] (AT) (FBI); [redacted] (AT) (FBI); [redacted] (NY) (FBI); [redacted] (DL) (FBI); [redacted] (CV) (FBI); [redacted] (CE) (FBI); [redacted] (WF) (FBI); [redacted] (AN) (FBI); [redacted] (EP) (FBI); [redacted] (OC) (FBI); [redacted] (SL) (FBI); [redacted] (BS) (FBI); [redacted] (SA) (FBI); [redacted] (SU) (FBI); [redacted] (MM) (FBI); [redacted] (MW) (FBI); [redacted] (MP) (FBI); [redacted] (SI) (FBI); [redacted] (LI) (FBI); [redacted] (PH) (FBI); [redacted] (WF) (FBI); [redacted] (BF) (FBI); [redacted] (SE) (FBI); [redacted] (CG) (FBI); [redacted] (MP) (FBI); [redacted] (AL) (FBI); [redacted] (SE) (FBI); [redacted] (ME) (FBI); [redacted] (NY) (FBI); [redacted] (SA) (FBI); [redacted] (SD) (FBI); [redacted] (SC) (FBI); [redacted] (NH) (FBI); [redacted] (BS) (FBI); [redacted] (NF) (FBI); [redacted] (OM) (FBI); [redacted] (SD) (FBI); [redacted] (SC) (FBI); [redacted] (CO) (FBI); [redacted] (IP) (FBI); [redacted] (CG) (FBI); [redacted] (DE) (FBI); [redacted] (PA) (FBI); [redacted] (IN) (FBI); [redacted] (NOV) (FBI); [redacted] (PX) (FBI); [redacted] (BA) (FBI); [redacted] (SJ) (FBI); [redacted] (HO) (FBI); [redacted] (NK) (FBI); [redacted] (LA) (FBI); [redacted] (BA) (FBI); [redacted] (CV) (FBI); [redacted] (JK) (FBI); [redacted] (HO) (FBI); [redacted] (MO) (FBI)

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Subject: FW: Not a survey

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All,

Please see [redacted] email below and respond directly back to him as soon as possible. Thanks!

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Sent: Monday, August 14, 2006 8:14 AM
To: [redacted] (OTD)(CON)
Cc: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI); [redacted] (DE) (FBI); [redacted] (OTD) (FBI); [redacted] (OTD) (FBI); [redacted] (FBI); [redacted] (OTD) (FBI); [redacted] (OTD) (FBI); [redacted] (OTD) (FBI); [redacted] (OTD) (FBI); [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)

Subject: Not a survey

Importance: High

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[redacted] please forward to all TS/TA's for a response.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Can everyone please send me a very short reponse on the practice your offices follows in the use of the DCS-3000. Do you ONLY capture the first string of numbers or do you use the toogle to capture ALL numbers.

Since there are many options available to us on how much dialed information we collect we need to know what the norm is around the country. I understand that some of you will answer it is on a "case to case" basis, but I am just looking for the norm in your office.

Thanks for your quick response. The legal guys need this information to talk to all the options the DCS-3000 allows.

[redacted]

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[redacted]

Technical Personnel Development Unit
O: 540- [redacted]
C: 202- [redacted]

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~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

[redacted] (OTD) (FBI)

From: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Sent: Monday, August 14, 2006 11:44 AM
To: [redacted] (SD) (FBI)
Cc: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: [redacted] vs DCS3000

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RECORD 315N-SD-62550

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[redacted]
Last Wednesday, we set a trap on the high side of the one way push system to verify data delivery from the DCS-3000 to the [redacted]. Have you seen any discrepancies since Wednesday? If so, please forward a sample to us so we can investigate using the packet sniffer data.

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] M. (SD) (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, August 09, 2006 7:47 PM
To: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI) [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Subject: [redacted] vs DCS3000

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RECORD 315N-SD-62550

I forwarded all the [redacted] sessions I had for 8/8-9/06 (up through about 1530 hrs) and attached is a copy of the DCS3000 report for this same period. You will see that DCS shows Associated DNs in some sessions and [redacted] does not. You will see that DCS3000 shows more calls than [redacted] reports. Thanks for all you've already done.

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<< File [redacted] .rpt.txt >>

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~~DERIVED FROM: Multiple Sources~~
~~DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1~~
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[REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI)

From: [REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI)
Sent: Tuesday, August 08, 2006 5:54 PM
To: [REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI)
Cc: [REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI)
Subject: XML


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~~NON-RECORD~~

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Here are the types of data elements the DCS-3000 produces:



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[REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI)

From: [REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI) b6
Sent: Tuesday, August 08, 2006 4:23 PM b7C
To: [REDACTED] (SD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: DCS3000

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~
~~NON-RECORD~~

We'll give it a shot. Good idea.

[REDACTED]

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED] (SD) (FBI)
Sent: Tuesday, August 08, 2006 2:18 PM
To: [REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI); [REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI)
Subject: DCS3000

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At the risk of sounding lazy, is it possible to have an auto-update feature that would allow the input of a target into the warrant database on one client that would then allow you to select other clients you would like to populate with this same data. For many different reasons, some good, some not so good, we are in a position where we have the same target in multiple clients and not all are always remembered to be update at renewals.

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~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

[REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI)

From: [REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI)
Sent: Monday, August 07, 2006 11:37 AM
To: [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI)
Subject: RE: PCTDD -- DCS 300

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Sure. Where do you plan to meet?

[REDACTED]

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-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI)
Sent: Friday, August 04, 2006 7:04 PM
To: [REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI)
Cc: [REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI); CLIFFORD, MICHAEL (OTD) (FBI); [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI); [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI); [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI)
Subject: PCTDD -- DCS 300

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[redacted]
Will you or someone from your shop be around Tuesday mid morning (10:30 AM), August 8th to provide me and a couple of DOJ attorneys a quick presentations on the capabilities and limitations of DCS3000 to restrict PCTDDs. We are struggling to come up with a strategy of dealing with the recent Texas Magistrate's ruling that law enforcement cannot collect any PCTDDs unless they utilize some technology so as to limit the collection of content.

BTW. Telenor will be visiting in the FishBowl Tuesday afternoon to give a presentation on [redacted] telephone systems on aircraft.

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[redacted] (OTD) (FBI)

From: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Sent: Friday, August 04, 2006 5:51 PM
To: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Cc: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: [redacted] Symposium Follow-up Questions

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[redacted]
I don't see a problem sharing the data with any of the TTEC members.

I don't know if CIU is doing anything to address the [redacted] problem. Supposedly, it was documented by the SOLVER group several years ago. It still remains a problem.

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-----Original Message-----

(S) From: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Sent: Friday, August 04, 2006 9:00 AM
To: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: [redacted] Symposium Follow-up Questions

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(S) Wow...That is amazing. Good job [redacted] and thanks for the details. I'm not sure if our northern friends have the same problem. Do you see any problem in sharing this information with [redacted] since it's a North America (maybe U.S.) issue only.

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Also, do you know if there is anything being done with [redacted] on the [redacted] problem thru our CALEA test team.

[redacted]
Electronic Surveillance Technology Section
Operational Technology Division
Quantico, Virginia
703 [redacted]

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(S)

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, August 03, 2006 5:29 PM
To: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI); [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: [redacted] Symposium Follow-up Questions

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[redacted]

The problem I described at the TTEC meeting is related to wireless number portability. Today, U.S. wireless service providers are required to comply with the wireless number portability (WNP) mandate issued by the FCC a few years ago. WNP allows a wireless subscriber to take his/her telephone number from one carrier to another carrier. In essence the subscriber owns the telephone number, not the service provider. This mandate created technical problems for the U.S. wireless providers because their switching infrastructure routes calls based on telephone numbers: carrier owned (internal numbers) are usually routed differently than external numbers.

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Before WNP, routing calls were simply based on routing tables, which were populated with NPA-NXX and trunk combinations. These combinations are point codes the switch uses to determine how to route the call. WNP blurs the distinction between internal and external numbers, and therefore complicates call routing. For example, if a [redacted] subscriber decides to switch service to [redacted] and requests his number to be ported from [redacted] to [redacted] switching network will have to accept the external [redacted] assigned number as it's own and route it as if it belongs to [redacted]

To route and manage external numbers as internal numbers, the wireless providers use a technique called "number pooling". This technique allows the service provider to commit a block of numbers per switch to a pool of numbers that are assigned/owned by the carrier that are only used for internal routing, never (in theory at least) to be assigned to its subscribers for external use. When a foreign/external number is ported into the switch with a new subscriber, one of these internal numbers is assigned as an alias to the new subscriber's account, and the switch uses this internal alias number to internally route calls to and from the subscriber. This technique allows the wireless providers to implement WNP without having to redesign their entire switching infrastructure.

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We have found an evidentiary problem caused by some U.S. wireless providers' implementation of number pooling. The IS-41 based providers [redacted] and other CDMA/TDMA providers) use the [redacted] identification (MSID) feature of IS-41 to implement number pooling. These carriers usually assign one of the numbers from their internal pool to the [redacted] and assign the [redacted] external directory number (either one of their own numbers or the ported number) to the [redacted] assigned to the phone. Note the [redacted] is the number used by the rest of the world to call the subscriber. In recent intercept cases, we have found that [redacted] switches sometimes only report the [redacted] of the calling party for incoming calls. We have found this to happen when the associate calling the target is a wireless subscriber served by the same carrier and the same switch as the target for the call. In this scenario we have found the JSI VoiceBox III (version 3.6) extracts the [redacted] as the calling party number, which is not the external [redacted] of the calling party. This error has recently misled a few FBI investigations. In one case, the intercepted [redacted] of the target's associate was actually assigned as a [redacted] to another subscriber with no relation to the target. Due to the misinformation presented in the call records, the unrelated subscriber was temporally included in the investigation.

We remedied this problem on the DCS-3000 by ignoring the [redacted] of the calling party in the [redacted] Termination Attempt message and using the caller id field that is usually presented in the Network Signal message that is delivered for incoming calls. In the case where the calling associate blocks his/her caller id and the Network Signal message does not present the caller id we simply leave the calling party number blank rather than using the [redacted]

(S)

I am not sure if Canada has the same problem. But, I thought it was appropriate to share the information with [redacted] just in case. Also, we notified JSI about the problem a few weeks ago; and hopefully they will have a patch soon that solves the problem.

b1

There was a second problem that I informed the TTEC subgroup: the "'82" [redacted] This problem was documented by the SOLVER lab when testing the DMS platforms many years ago. If an intercept target dials "'82" to disable caller id blocking (to allow his/her caller id to be delivered to the called party for the one call), the [redacted] DMS platforms cease call intercept, and law enforcement will not be able to intercept the call content nor

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the digits dialed after ""82".

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-----Original Message-----

(S) From: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, August 02, 2006 4:59 PM
To: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI) [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Cc: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Subject: FW: [redacted] Symposium Follow-up Questions

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[redacted]
I may have missed your response, I got a lot of e-mail to catch up on. Please see the note below, (your comments in "red") and provide some feedback to me re your comments in Canada.

Thanks,

[redacted] please set "T" for Friday 5 August 2006.

[redacted] Comments:

[redacted] indicated that under certain circumstances, [redacted] switches can provide "incorrect" metadata (specifically, metadata that are linked to subscribers other than the target(s) of an interception operation).

[redacted]
Electronic Surveillance Technology Section
Operational Technology Division
Quantico, Virginia
703-[redacted]

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-----Original Message-----

(S) From: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Sent: Friday, July 28, 2006 8:22 AM
To: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI) [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Cc: CLIFFORD, MICHAEL (OTD) (FBI); [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Subject: Re: [redacted] Symposium Follow-up Questions

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~
~~NON-RECORD~~

[redacted]
Please respond to [redacted] with the following message and we will follow up with details later:

[redacted]
Thank you for your kind words. But we should be thanking you for hosting this symposium, we all know how time consuming these events can be. The feedback that I have received so far mirrors your comments, great job to all of you.

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I will talk with [redacted] today regarding the matter of [redacted]
[redacted] switches which on occasion provide "incorrect"
metadata, specifically metadata that is not linked to the target.
He or I will provide a response back as soon as possible.

Thanks for your inquiry,
[redacted]

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[redacted]
Electronic Surveillance Technology Section
Quantico, Virginia
703-[redacted]

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Sent: Friday, July 28, 2006 7:54 AM
To: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI) [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Subject: [redacted] Symposium Follow-up Questions

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[redacted]
Can you please review the attached email sent to my attention via
TTEC Net. Let me know if you have any response/feedback and I'll
forward it on to [redacted] Thanks

(S)

[redacted]
As you know, [redacted] hosted a Collection System Symposium earlier
this week, which I had the privilege of attending in large part,
as an observer. Based on what I heard and saw, I think this was
a very successful event.

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Please pass our thanks to [redacted] for having arranged the
FBI's participation to this event, and please also thank all
members of your delegation for their active contribution to the
Symposium.

My colleague [redacted] who co_hosted this meeting, has
asked me to follow up on information that he obtained during the
Symposium. At some point during the discussions, one of your
representatives, [redacted] indicated that under certain
circumstances, [redacted] switches can provide
"incorrect" metadata (specifically, metadata that are linked to
subscribers other than the target(s) of an interception
operation).

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Would it be possible for you to ask [redacted] and [redacted]
[redacted] whether they could provide us more details on this
problem and how to reproduce it for analytic purposes. Since

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[redacted] technology is deployed and used in Canada, we would like to make sure that we understand this problem and hopefully contribute to its analysis and resolution, in concert with your colleagues.

Should [redacted] wish to discuss this with [redacted] [redacted] please note that [redacted] can be reached at +1 613 [redacted] (non_secure line).

If possible, please send me a receipt confirmation for this e_mail.

Thanks in advance for your response, and best regards!

(S)

+1 613 [redacted]

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b2
b6
b7C

[redacted]
Engineering Research Facility (ERF)
Operational Technology Division (OTD)
Technical Liaison Office (TLO) Room A214
703 [redacted]
703 [redacted] (fax)
202 [redacted] (cell)

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BLACKARD, KENNETH L. (OTD) (FBI)

From: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, August 03, 2006 5:29 PM
To: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI); [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Subject: (S) RE: [redacted] Symposium Follow-up Questions

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED
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[redacted]

The problem I described at the TTEC meeting is related to wireless number portability. Today, U.S. wireless service providers are required to comply with the wireless number portability (WNP) mandate issued by the FCC a few years ago. WNP allows a wireless subscriber to take his/her telephone number from one carrier to another carrier. In essence the subscriber owns the telephone number, not the service provider. This mandate created technical problems for the U.S. wireless providers because their switching infrastructure routes calls based on telephone numbers: carrier owned (internal numbers) are usually routed differently than external numbers.

Before WNP, routing calls were simply based on routing tables, which were populated with NPA-NXX and trunk combinations. These combinations are point codes the switch uses to determine how to route the call. WNP blurs the distinction between internal and external numbers, and therefore complicates call routing. For example, if a [redacted] subscriber decides to switch service to [redacted] and requests his number to be ported from [redacted] switching network will have to accept the external [redacted] assigned number as it's own and route it as if it belongs to [redacted]

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To route and manage external numbers as internal numbers, the wireless providers use a technique called "number pooling". This technique allows the service provider to commit a block of numbers per switch to a pool of numbers that are assigned/owned by the carrier that are only used for internal routing, never (in theory at least) to be assigned to its subscribers for external use. When a foreign/external number is ported into the switch with a new subscriber, one of these internal numbers is assigned as an alias to the new subscriber's account, and the switch uses this internal alias number to internally route calls to and from the subscriber. This technique allows the wireless providers to implement WNP without having to redesign their entire switching infrastructure.

We have found an evidentiary problem caused by some U.S. wireless providers' implementation of number pooling. The IS-41 based providers [redacted] and other CDMA/TDMA providers) use the [redacted] feature of IS-41 to implement number pooling. These carriers usually assign one of the numbers from their internal pool to the [redacted] and assign the external directory number (either one of their own numbers or the ported number) to the [redacted] assigned to the phone. Note the [redacted] is the number used by the rest of the world to call the subscriber. In recent intercept cases, we have found that [redacted] sometimes only report the [redacted] of the calling party for incoming calls. We have found this to happen when the associate calling the target is a wireless subscriber served by the same carrier and the same switch as the target for the call. In this scenario we have found the JSI VoiceBox III (version 3.6) extracts the [redacted] as the calling party number, which is not the external [redacted] of the calling party. This error has recently misled a few FBI investigations. In one case, the intercepted [redacted] of the target's associate was actually assigned as a [redacted] to another subscriber with no relation to the target. Due to the misinformation presented in the call records, the unrelated subscriber was temporally included in the investigation.

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(S) We remedied this problem on the DCS-3000 by ignoring the [redacted] of the calling party in the J-STD-025A Termination Attempt message and using the caller id field that is usually presented in the Network Signal message that is delivered for incoming calls. In the case where the calling associate blocks his/her caller id and the Network Signal message does not present the caller id we simply leave the calling party number blank rather than using the [redacted]

I am not sure if Canada has the same problem. But, I thought it was appropriate to share the information with [redacted] in case. Also, we notified JSI about the problem a few weeks ago; and hopefully they will have a patch soon that solves the problem.

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platforms cease call intercept, and law enforcement will not be able to intercept the call content nor the digits dialed after "82".

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(S)

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, August 02, 2006 4:59 PM
To: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI); [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Cc: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Subject: FW: [redacted] Symposium Follow-up Questions

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~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~
~~NON-RECORD~~

[redacted]
I may have missed your response, I got a lot of e-mail to catch up on. Please see the note below, (your comments in "red") and provide some feedback to me re your comments in Canada.

Thanks,

[redacted] please set "T" for Friday 5 August 2006.

[redacted] Comments:

[redacted] indicated that under certain circumstances, [redacted] switches can provide "incorrect" metadata (specifically, metadata that are linked to subscribers other than the target(s) of an interception operation).

[redacted]
Electronic Surveillance Technology Section
Operational Technology Division
Quantico, Virginia
703-[redacted]

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(S)

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Sent: Friday, July 28, 2006 8:22 AM
To: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI); [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Cc: CLIFFORD, MICHAEL (OTD) (FBI); [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: [redacted] Symposium Follow-up Questions

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~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~
~~NON-RECORD~~

[redacted]
Please respond to [redacted] with the following message and we will follow up with details later:

[redacted]
Thank you for your kind words. But we should be thanking you for hosting this symposium, we all know how time consuming these events can be. The feedback that I have received so far mirrors your comments, great job to all of you.

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I will talk with [] today regarding the matter of [] switches which on occasion provide "incorrect" metadata, specifically metadata that is not linked to the target. He or I will provide a response back as soon as possible.

Thanks for your inquiry,
[]

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[]
Electronic Surveillance Technology Section
Quantico, Virginia
703-[]

-----Original Message-----

(S) From: [] (OTD) (FBI)
Sent: Friday, July 28, 2006 7:54 AM
To: [] (OTD) (FBI) [] (OTD) (FBI)
Subject: [] Symposium Follow-up Questions

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~~NON-RECORD~~

(S) []
[] Can you please review the attached email sent to my attention via []
[] Let me know if you have any response/feedback and I'll forward it on to [] Thanks
[]

(S) As you know, [] hosted a Collection System Symposium earlier this week, which I had the privilege of attending in large part, as an observer. Based on what I heard and saw, I think this was a very successful event.

Please pass our thanks to [] for having arranged the FBI's participation to this event, and please also thank all members of your delegation for their active contribution to the Symposium.

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My colleague [] who co_hosted this meeting, has asked me to follow up on information that he obtained during the Symposium. At some point during the discussions, one of your representatives, [] indicated that under certain circumstances, [] switches can provide "incorrect" metadata (specifically, metadata that are linked to subscribers other than the target(s) of an interception operation).

Would it be possible for you to ask [] and [] whether they could provide us more details on this problem and how to reproduce it for analytic purposes. Since [] technology is deployed and used in Canada, we would like to make sure

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that we understand this problem and hopefully contribute to its analysis and resolution, in concert with your colleagues.

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Should [redacted] wish to discuss this with [redacted] please note that [redacted] can be reached at +1 613 [redacted] (non_secure line).

If possible, please send me a receipt confirmation for this e_mail.

Thanks in advance for your response, and best regards!

(S)

[redacted]
[redacted]

+1 613 [redacted]

[redacted]

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Engineering Research Facility (ERF)
Operational Technology Division (OTD)
Technical Liaison Office (TLO) Room A214

703

703

202

(fax)
(cell)

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~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

[redacted] (OTD) (FBI)

From: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Sent: Friday, July 28, 2006 10:42 AM
To: [redacted] (LA) (FBI)
Cc: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI); [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: [redacted]

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[redacted]

I'm glad to hear our enhancements to the Client have been well received. We are still working on the Client's concatenate feature for the Trace files. In the interim, I have written a simple program that will help you do the concatenation of the trace files. A shortcut named "Trace Cat" is located on the .16 machine's desktop. When you run this application it will prompt you for the start date and time you wish to use for the concatenation. Note the default start date is the current date minus 1 day to assist with daily archiving. If you need to change the date or time just enter "n" when prompted and enter

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the desired date or time. The application compares each record in each .trace log file against the start date and time and writes the filtered records to a single file. When all the .trace files have been processed the Windows notepad application is spawned and the concatenated file is automatically opened. From here, you can print, save, etc. using the notepad features.



-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (LA) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, July 27, 2006 11:38 AM
To: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Cc: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI); [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: [redacted]

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Hi guys,

We upgraded our machines. We really like the changes. It's funny how the smallest things can make your day. We like that all the features are visible, ie SMS, Post Cut Digits, etc., on the window used for entering the target information. We also like the change from "Dialed Digits Displayed" to the standard court order terminology of "Post Cut Through Digits." (It would be nice if "Location Authorized" could also be changed to the standard court order terminology of "Cell Sites Authorized.") We were a bit disappointed that we still cannot concatenate the TRACE files. We really LOVE the concatenate feature. As you know, we have dropped the 3094 and have been using the concatenate feature to upload our CDNRS files for about two weeks now. It is awesome! Please thank all at TICTU for their tremendous work.



I will forward the below info. to the Tel Apps people and see if they can get it corrected.

Thanks,

TTAs



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-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, July 27, 2006 7:02 AM
To: [redacted] (LA) (FBI)
Subject: RE: [redacted]

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Since TA is an analytical tool we pass all the dialed digits from the DCS 3000. Have you contacted TA to see if they can modify their system to handle this types of called numbers?



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-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (LA) (FBI)
Sent: Monday, July 24, 2006 2:28 PM
To: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: [redacted] Mystery

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
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
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I just spoke with [REDACTED] They are familiar with this. They said the customer is not actually dialing the 011. Apparently this occurs when the customer makes a call that is handed off to the old [REDACTED] network. They claim during the handoff a 011 is added. Here is a sample of two calls that were rejected today and the associated log file:



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<< File: 090512.205 >>

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI)
Sent: Monday, July 24, 2006 10:39 AM
To: [REDACTED] (LA) (FBI)
Subject: RE: [REDACTED]

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Do you have an example call or target number? 011 is usually for international calls. 11+number is used by [REDACTED] to access voicemail. We need to look at the data to determine why it's happening.



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-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED] (LA) (FBI)
Sent: Monday, July 24, 2006 1:30 PM
To: [REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI); [REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI)
Subject: [REDACTED]

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Hi guys,

I have a quick question about [redacted] This may be something you have long been aware of but, since I just started doing the uploads, I have not seen it before. On some outgoing local calls with [redacted] pens the raw data indicates a 011 was dialed before the number. As a result this number does not get uploaded to telephone apps. Instead the call is rejected as an error, "MISSING TO NUMBER." These are completed calls, with a duration. This is occurring with different targets on unrelated cases. All are outgoing calls from [redacted] phones to local numbers here in LA. I can't believe would be dialing 011 before they make a local call. Do you know why this is happening?

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[redacted] (OTD) (FBI)

From: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, July 27, 2006 10:02 AM
To: [redacted] (LA) (FBI)
Subject: RE: [redacted]

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Since TA is an analytical tool we pass all the dialed digits from the DCS 3000. Have you contacted TA to see if they can modify their system to handle this types of called numbers?

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Original Message
From: [redacted] (LA) (FBI)
Sent: Monday, July 24, 2006 2:28 PM
To: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: [redacted]

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
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
NON-RECORD

[redacted]

I just spoke with [redacted] They are familiar with this. They said the customer is not actually dialing the 011. Apparently this occurs when the customer makes a call that is handed off to the old [redacted] network. They claim during the handoff a 011 is added. Here is a sample of two calls that were rejected today and the associated log file:



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<< File: 090512.205 >>

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Sent: Monday, July 24, 2006 10:39 AM
To: [redacted] (LA) (FBI)
Subject: RE: [redacted]

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NON-RECORD



Do you have an example call or target number? 011 is usually for international calls. 11+number is used by [redacted] to access voicemail. We need to look at the data to determine why it's happening.



-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (LA) (FBI)
Sent: Monday, July 24, 2006 1:30 PM
To: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI); [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)

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Subject: [redacted] Mystery

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Hi guys,

I have a quick question about [redacted] This may be something you have long been aware of but, since I just started doing the uploads, I have not seen it before. On some outgoing local calls with [redacted] pens the raw data indicates a 011 was dialed before the number. As a result this number does not get uploaded to telephone apps. Instead the call is rejected as an error; "MISSING TO NUMBER." These are completed calls, with a duration. This is occurring with different targets on unrelated cases. All are outgoing calls from [redacted] phones to local numbers here in LA. I can't believe would be dialing 011 before they make a local call. Do you know why this is happening?

[redacted]

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[redacted] (OTD) (FBI)

From: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, July 27, 2006 9:41 AM
To: [redacted] (WF) (FBI); [redacted] (OTD) (FBI); [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Cc: [redacted] (WF) (FBI); [redacted] (WF) (FBI); [redacted] (WF) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Tracking System

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Were the calls collected on the DCS-3000? If so, we can give you and the attorney's office a CD with an MS Excel Spreadsheet with the call records and hypertext links to the corresponding cell site maps.

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, July 26, 2006 8:24 AM
To: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI); [redacted] (OTD) (FBI); [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Cc: [redacted] (WF) (FBI); [redacted] (WF) (FBI); [redacted] (WF) (FBI)
Subject: FW: Tracking System

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NON-RECORD

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-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (WF) (FBI)
Sent: Tuesday, July 25, 2006 2:25 PM
To: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI); [redacted] (ITD) (CON)
Cc: [redacted] (WF) (FBI); [redacted] (WF) (FBI); [redacted] (WF) (FBI); [redacted] (WF) (FBI)
Subject: Tracking System

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Hi [redacted]

Can we download a number and its information from the tracking system to a disk? An agent is inquiring about this because the attorney's office said he needs the information to present to the judge.

[redacted]

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FBI-WFO

[redacted]

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[REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI)

From: [REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI)
Sent: Monday, July 24, 2006 11:24 AM
To: [REDACTED] (FD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: [REDACTED]

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RECORD 212A-WF-224477

Well, I wasn't looking at numbers Just thinking about numbers. And yes, I do need to get a life - I had one until I took this job.

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED] (FD) (FBI)
Sent: Monday, July 24, 2006 11:21 AM
To: [REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: [REDACTED]

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RECORD 212A-WF-224477

[REDACTED] it worries me that you are looking at [REDACTED] numbers on a Friday night, boy I thought I needed to get a life.

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI)
Sent: Monday, July 24, 2006 11:15 AM
To: [REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI); [REDACTED] (CD) (FBI); [REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI); [REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI)
Cc: [REDACTED] (FD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: [REDACTED]

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RECORD 212A-WF-224477

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I realized Friday night that there was an error in the numbers I provided you last week. Specifically, last week's number included target-days from the beginning of the intercept through [REDACTED] If the intercept started before [REDACTED] and was active between [REDACTED] the target-days data will be statistically flawed. So, I have re-run the numbers with a hard-limit on the start and stop dates.

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I am sorry for the earlier mistake: haste makes waste.

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-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, July 20, 2006 11:44 AM
To: [redacted] (CD) (FBI); [redacted] (OTD) (FBI); [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Cc: [redacted] (FD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: [redacted]

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RECORD 212A-WF-224477

[redacted]

I have numbers for [redacted] that I believe are accurate. I processed all the intercepted call records on our DCS-3000 system for both carriers for the period of [redacted] Here are the results:

[redacted]

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[redacted]

Since [redacted] has a simple cost fee schedule, the costs were easily calculated using the following formula:

[redacted]

It is impossible for me to accurately calculate the [redacted] costs using the data from the DCS-3000 system since [redacted] costs are a function of the number of switches provisioned with the target. Since the number of switches vary with each intercept order I cannot accurately calculate the cost.

[redacted]

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, July 19, 2006 10:50 AM
To: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI); [redacted] (OTD) (FBI); [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Cc: [redacted] (FD) (FBI)
Subject: [redacted]

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RECORD 212A-WF-224477

Hello Gentlemen -

[redacted] has been dragging their feet in getting back with us regarding the number of lines/targets we

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have with them. So I met with [] to discuss the contracting issue. Here's what we came up with and would welcome your input.

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Since [] has been slow in responding, let's start with [] you indicated that you have a good relationship with them, (and they're starting to charge us) can you get an indication of coverage from them, regarding all of our stuff to include anything with the Bureau name on it (to include joint [] coverage etc) and [] Then [] can you pull from [] what numbers you have with [] so we can compare the two.

What we're looking to do is get a snap shot of actual lines being used that we can verify. Then, what [] will do is add a rider in the contract that will allow for an increased amount/coverage. What she is concerned about in getting into a big excessive contract with the carriers and then not using the service (i.e, paying/contract for 500 lines and only using 300).

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They other thing we were looking to do to jump start this is to go through the government sales/marketing people of the carriers and not the security people. Since this will be an overt contract and other Law Enforcement Depts. & agencies, along with [] would be our customers and not the vendor's, we should be able to go through open government sales without issues (PLEASE correct me if I am wrong!!) So if either of you know a sales person/contact in either [] or can find out through your other channels/contacts, please let me and [] know. We would still like to have something in place for October 1st.

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So, to sum up...I need you gentlemen help with the following action items:

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(*I recognize it may not be an actual representation of all coverage due to the field offices not all using TMD etc, but we have to start somewhere. And [] his may be the springboard you need to get the Finance Division to help promote TMD.)

- []
- []

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If possible can you get this information to me by this Friday? (Please, please, please) I apologize for the short deadline, but I was hoping we might be able to talk about this at Friday's [] will not be able to join us at the meeting, but I will be meeting with her later Friday afternoon.

Thanks for your help and support [] will see you on Friday at 10:00am here in 1B045. [] [] you are both welcome to attend if you like as well.

Thanks []

OSIC/Special Projects
FBIHQ/CD-8A, Room 1B045
(202 [])

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~~DERIVED FROM: G-3 FBI Classification Guide G-3, dated 1/97, Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations~~
~~DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1~~
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~~DERIVED FROM: G-3 FBI Classification Guide G-3, dated 1/97, Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations~~
~~DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1~~

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~~DERIVED FROM: G-3 FBI Classification Guide G-3, dated 1/97, Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations
DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 4
SECRET~~

~~DERIVED FROM: G-3 FBI Classification Guide G-3, dated 1/97, Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations
DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 4
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~~DERIVED FROM: G-3 FBI Classification Guide G-3, dated 1/97, Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations
DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1
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[REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI)

From: [REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI)
Sent: Monday, July 24, 2006 11:15 AM
To: [REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI); [REDACTED] (CD) (FBI); [REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI); [REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI)
Cc: [REDACTED] (FD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: [REDACTED]

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RECORD 212A-WF-224477

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[REDACTED]

I realized Friday night that there was an error in the numbers I provided you last week. Specifically, last week's number included target-days from the beginning of the intercept through [REDACTED]. If the intercept started before [REDACTED] and was active between [REDACTED] the target-days data will be statistically flawed. So, I have re-run the numbers with a hard-limit on the start and stop dates.

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

I am sorry for the earlier mistake: haste makes waste.

[REDACTED]

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, July 20, 2006 11:44 AM
To: [REDACTED] (CD) (FBI); [REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI); [REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI)

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Cc:
Subject:

RE: [redacted]

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(FD) (FBI)

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~~SECRET~~
RECORD 212A-WF-224477

[redacted]
I have numbers for [redacted] that I believe are accurate. I processed all the intercepted call records on our DCS-3000 system for both carriers for the period of [redacted] Here are the results:

[redacted]

[redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

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-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, July 19, 2006 10:50 AM
To: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI); [redacted] (OTD) (FBI); [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Cc: [redacted] (FD) (FBI)
Subject: [redacted]

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~~SECRET~~
RECORD 212A-WF-224477

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Hello Gentlemen -

[redacted] has been dragging their feet in getting back with us regarding the number of lines/targets we have with them. So I met with [redacted] to discuss the contracting issue. Here's what we came up with and would welcome your input.

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Since [redacted] has been slow in responding, let's start with [redacted] you indicated that you have a good relationship with them, (and they're starting to charge us) can you get an indication of coverage from them, regarding all of our stuff to include anything with the Bureau name on it (to include joint [redacted] coverage etc) and [redacted] Then [redacted] can you pull from [redacted] what numbers you have with [redacted] so we can compare the two.

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What we're looking to do is get a snap shot of actual lines being used that we can verify. Then, what [] will do is add a rider in the contract that will allow for an increased amount/coverage. What she is concerned about in getting into a big excessive contract with the carriers and then not using the service (i.e, paying/contract for 500 lines and only using 300).

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So, to sum up...I need you gentlemen help with the following action items:

- []
- []
- []

(*I recognize it may not be an actual representation of all coverage due to the field offices not all using TMD etc, but we have to start somewhere. And [] this may be the springboard you need to get the Finance Division to help promote []

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- []
- []

If possible can you get this information to me by this Friday? (Please, please please) I apologize for the short deadline, but I was hoping we might be able to talk about this at Friday's [] will not be able to join us at the meeting, but I will be meeting with her later Friday afternoon.

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Thanks for your help and support [] I will see you on Friday at 10:00am here in 1B045. [] you are both welcome to attend if you like as well.

Thanks, []

[]
OSIC/Special Projects
FBIHQ/CD-8A, Room 1B045
(202) []

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~~DERIVED FROM: G-3 FBI Classification Guide G-3, dated 1/97, Foreign CounterIntelligence Investigations
DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1
SECRET~~

~~DERIVED FROM: G-3 FBI Classification Guide G-3, dated 1/97, Foreign CounterIntelligence Investigations
DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1
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~~DERIVED FROM: G-3 FBI Classification Guide G-3, dated 1/97, Foreign CounterIntelligence Investigations
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[redacted] OTD) (FBI)

From: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Sent: Friday, July 21, 2006 6:49 PM
To: [redacted] (HN) (FBI)
Subject: RE: DCS3000

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~~NON-RECORD~~

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b7C

[redacted]
I'm curious why you're setting up a pen-register line on the VB.

[redacted]

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (HN) (FBI)
Sent: Friday, July 21, 2006 6:35 PM
To: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Cc: [redacted] (HN) (FBI); [redacted] (HN) (FBI)
Subject: DCS3000

b6
b7C

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~
~~NON-RECORD~~

b6
b7C

[redacted] (S)

b1
b2
b7E

Have been setting up a pen register for a [redacted] line in VoiceBox III, vs. 3.6. and in the DCS3000. Appears to be working in the DCS3000 but for some reason VB does not have access to the DCS3000. JSI suspects the Pix firewall is not allowing VB access to the DCS3000. [redacted] shows ISG12 and ISG2 down. [redacted] input status is shown as Unknown. Cannot ping [redacted] from VB; had restarted JSI Service Manager to no avail. Never had this problem previously, only since we have upgraded VB to 3.6 earlier this year. As far as I know no, IP addresses have not changed. Any guidance on how to work this is appreciated.

[redacted]
b2
b7E

Thanks.

[redacted]
TTA Honolulu Division
808 [redacted] Desk
808 [redacted] Cell

b6
b7C

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SECRET~~

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[redacted] (OTD) (FBI)

From: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Sent: Friday, July 21, 2006 6:46 PM
To: [redacted] (HN) (FBI)
Subject: RE: DCS3000

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~~UNCLASSIFIED~~
~~NON-RECORD~~

(S)

b1

[redacted]

b2
b7E

[redacted]

-----Original Message-----

b6
b7C
From: [redacted] (HN) (FBI)
Sent: Friday, July 21, 2006 6:35 PM
To: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Cc: [redacted] (HN) (FBI); [redacted] (HN) (FBI)
Subject: DCS3000

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~
~~NON-RECORD~~

b1
b2
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b7C

(S)

Have been setting up a pen register for a [redacted] line in VoiceBox III, vs. 3.6. and in the DCS3000. Appears to be working in the DCS3000 but for some reason VB does not have access to the DCS3000. JSI suspects the Pix firewall is not allowing VB access to the DCS3000. [redacted] shows ISG12 and ISG2 down, [redacted] input status is shown as Unknown. Cannot ping [redacted] from VB; had restarted JSI Service Manager to no avail. Never had this problem previously, only since we have upgraded VB to 3.6 earlier this year. As far as I know no, IP addresses have not changed. Any guidance on how to work this is appreciated.

[redacted]

Thanks,

[redacted]
[redacted] Honolulu Division
808 [redacted] Desk
808 [redacted] Cell

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b7C

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI)

b5
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From: [REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI)
Sent: Friday, July 21, 2006 3:59 PM
To: [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Brief Question

~~SECRET~~
RECORD OIPR 0001

I don't think there's one, absolute answer. In general, I think the carriers deliver CDC by default if there's a content order. For example [REDACTED] will not provision a content order unless the CDC circuits and connections are already in place. They claim their intercept software requires the delivery of CDC simultaneously with the intercepted content. I think [REDACTED] requires content orders to expressly state the need for PR/TT - you can double check this with [REDACTED] is a little more liberal in their interpretations. Just yesterday, the Richmond field office called with the problem that a FISA pen was receiving cell-site and post cut-through digits, which their CDC said was not covered in the order. When the office contacted [REDACTED] to ask for the information not to be delivered, [REDACTED] said something like "but it's a FISA".

b2
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-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI)
Sent: Friday, July 21, 2006 3:42 PM
To: [REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Brief Question
Importance: High

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~~SECRET~~
RECORD OIPR 0001

Thanks—if there's a full-content fisa surveillance order served on a provider, does the provider send the CCC and CDC or only the CCC unless the order specially also orders deliver of the PR/TT or associated data? OR is the answer—it depends on the provider—Some carriers will provide it along with everything else, while others will stipulate that the order must contain specific text identifying location as required..?

thanks
[REDACTED]

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED] (OTD) (FBI)
Sent: Friday, July 21, 2006 3:28 PM
To: [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Brief Question

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RECORD OIPR 0001

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We can block the information on the DCS 3000 - [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[redacted] The other systems cannot.

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-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (OGC) (FBI)
Sent: Friday, July 21, 2006 12:35 PM
To: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Subject: FW: Brief Question
Importance: High

~~SECRET~~
RECORD OIPR 0001

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[redacted]
what's the answer? can we at the collection end tell the equipment NOT to receive the cell site location information?

Another related concern is whether if the field has ONLY a PR/TT orders (no 2703(d)) authority but the provider send the [redacted] data along with the PR/TT data--do we get it all or can we, when required, tell the equipment to not collect the [redacted] data?

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b7E

thanks
[redacted]

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (OGC)
Sent: Thursday, July 20, 2006 6:52 PM
To: [redacted] (OGC) (FBI)
Cc: [redacted] (OGC) (OGA) [redacted] (OGC) (OGA)
Subject: Brief Question

b5
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~~SECRET~~
RECORD OIPR 0001

[redacted]
I am one of the OIPR attorneys working on the [redacted] brief and was at the presentation ERF gave to OIPR about cell site location information several months ago.

b2
b7E

A question was posed to me today that I thought you or others there may know the answer to -- currently, from a technical position, when a full content FISA is approved (as opposed to just a pen register or business records request) is [redacted] information obtained and provided to the field, along with the other take, or does a specific, separate request need to be made to obtain [redacted] information?

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Thank you, both for your assistance with this inquiry and for all your help over the past few months with this topic.

Thanks again,
[redacted]

OIPR

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[redacted] (temporary)

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~~DERIVED FROM: Multiple Sources~~
~~DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1~~
~~SECRET~~

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~~DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1~~
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~~DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1~~
~~SECRET~~

~~DERIVED FROM: Multiple Sources~~
~~DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1~~
~~SECRET~~

[redacted] (OTD) (FBI)

From: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI) b5
Sent: Friday, July 21, 2006 3:28 PM b6
To: [redacted] (OGC) (FBI) b7C
Subject: RE: Brief Question

~~SECRET~~
~~RECORD OIPR 0001~~

b2
b7E

We can block the information on the DCS 3000 [redacted]
[redacted] he other systems cannot.

-----Original Message-----
From: [redacted] (OGC) (FBI) b5
Sent: Friday, July 21, 2006 12:35 PM b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
To: [redacted] (OTD) (FBI)
Subject: FW: Brief Question
Importance: High

b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~
RECORD OIPR 0001

b6
b7C

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b2
b7E

thanks,
[redacted]

b5
b6
b7C

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Sent: Thursday, July 20, 2006 6:52 PM
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Cc: [redacted] (OGC) (OGA); [redacted] (OGC) (OGA)
Subject: Brief Question

~~SECRET~~
RECORD OIPR 0001

b5
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b7E

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Thank you, both for your assistance with this inquiry and for all your help over the past few months with this topic.

Thanks again,
[redacted]

[redacted] OIPR
[redacted] (temporary)

b6
b7C