

Case No. A173244

**IN THE COURT OF APPEAL FOR THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT, DIVISION FOUR**

MAURY BLACKMAN,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

SUBSTACK INC.; JACK POULSON; and TECH INQUIRY, INC.,

Defendants and Respondents,

Appeal from the Superior Court for the County of San Francisco
The Honorable Christine Van Aken, Presiding Judge
Case No. CGC-24-618681

**RESPONDENTS JACK POULSON, TECH INQUIRY, INC., AND
SUBSTACK INC.'S MOTION FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE AND
DECLARATION OF ATTORNEY VICTORIA NOBLE IN SUPPORT**

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**RESPONDENTS JACK POULSON, SUBSTACK INC., AND TECH
INQUIRY’S MOTION FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
[CALIFORNIA RULES OF COURT, RULE 8.252]**

Pursuant to California Rule of Court 8.252, Local Rule 6, and Evidence Code sections 452, 453, and 459, Respondents Jack Poulson, Substack Inc., and Tech Inquiry, Inc. respectfully request that this Court take judicial notice of Exhibits A–H to the Declaration of Victoria Noble in Support of Respondents’ Motion for Judicial Notice; Exhibit B (RA0008–RA0084) and Exhibit D (RA0092–RA0098) to Respondent Jack Poulson’s Appendix; and three documents contained in Appellant’s Appendix (AA0884–AA0906; AA0907–AA0932; AA0933–AA0937).

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

The Court “may take judicial notice of any matter specified in Section 452,” and has “the same power as the trial court” to do so. Evid. Code § 459. All of the materials to be noticed are properly subject to judicial notice pursuant to Evidence Code sections 452 and 453 and are highly material to the issues on appeal. This Motion should thus be granted.

**I. DOCUMENTS FILED IN APPELLANT’S LAWSUIT
AGAINST THE SAN FRANCISCO POLICE DEPARTMENT
OVER ITS RELEASE OF THE INCIDENT REPORT.**

Exhibits A–D and H to the Declaration of Victoria Noble in Support of Respondents’ Motion for Judicial Notice are publicly available documents filed in the Superior Court of San Francisco County in *Blackman v. City and County of San Francisco*, CGC-25-624793. This separate but related lawsuit was filed by Appellant Maury Blackman against the City and County of San Francisco over the San Francisco Police

Department's disclosure of Blackman's arrest report in response to a public records request.

Exhibit A is Blackman's April 25, 2025 complaint against the City and County of San Francisco, in which he admits that the SFPD released the arrest report to a member of the public, and failed to effectuate the seal.

Exhibit B is the San Francisco Police Department's Order to Seal Report 210-844-280, which is attached as Exhibit F to the City and County of San Francisco's July 30, 2025 Request for Judicial Notice. The Order to Seal Report 210-844-280 demonstrates that the SFPD unit responsible for sealing the record did not receive the order to do so until October 15, 2022, and did not actually seal the arrest records until December 14, 2022, another eight weeks later. A court ordered the arrest sealed almost one year earlier, on February 17, 2022, and Blackman's claims assume that the arrest report was sealed on that date.

Exhibit C is the June 30, 2025 declaration of Diane Bryan, an SFPD official, which authenticates the Order to Seal Report 210-844-280.

Exhibit D is an order granting in part San Francisco's motion to strike Blackman's claims under the anti-SLAPP statute. It also took judicial notice of the Order to Seal Report 210-844-280.

Exhibit H is Blackman's Request for Dismissal, which was granted on October 1, 2025.

Exhibits A–D and H are records of a California court and are thus subject to judicial notice under Evidence Code section 452(d)(1). *See Thayer v. Kabateck Brown Kellner LLP*, 207 Cal. App. 4th 141, 156 (2012), *as modified* (June 22, 2012) (“a request for judicial notice allows parties to introduce records of any court of the State of California” in support of or opposition to an anti-SLAPP motion); *Newport Harbor Offs.*

& Marina, LLC v. Morris Cerullo World Evangelism, 23 Cal. App. 5th 28, 50 (2018) (considering judicially noticed court filings in granting anti-SLAPP motion); *Tucker v. Pac. Bell Mobile Servs.*, 208 Cal. App. 4th 201, 218, n.11 (2012).

Additionally, Exhibit B is also an official government act of the SFPD and is thus subject to judicial notice under Evidence Code section 452(c). *See Inns-by-the-Sea v. California Mutual Ins. Co.*, 71 Cal. App. 5th 688, 693, n.2 (2021) (taking judicial notice of orders of county government orders under Evid. Code § 452(c)); *Cruz v. County of Los Angeles*, 173 Cal.App.3d 1131, 1134 (1985) (same).

Exhibits A–D and H are relevant to this appeal because they establish that the SFPD did not seal the arrest record for at least ten months after a court ordered it to be sealed, and during that time, disclosed it as a public record. Blackman’s claims against Respondents arise from the publication of his purportedly sealed arrest report.

Blackman v. City and County of San Francisco was filed after the trial court granted Appellants’ motions to strike. These documents were not presented to the trial court, because they did not yet exist. Judicial notice is appropriate because the documents are highly material, the court’s review is *de novo*, and no unfairness would result. *Shamsian v. Atl. Richfield Co.*, 107 Cal. App. 4th 967, 975 n.5 (2003); *Cal-Am. Income Prop. Fund II v. Cnty. of Los Angeles*, 208 Cal. App. 3d 109, 113 n.2 (1989); *see also Conservatorship of B.C.*, 6 Cal. App. 5th 1028, 1033 n.3 (2016). These documents “help complete the context of this case,” and judicial notice should thus be granted. *See Flatley v. Mauro*, 39 Cal. 4th 299, 306 n.2 (2006) (taking judicial notice of documents not before trial court in anti-SLAPP appeal).

II. BLACKMAN'S DECLARATION ABOUT THE NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF HIS WORK.

Exhibit D to Respondent Jack Poulson's Appendix (RA0008–RA0084) is a true and correct copy of the Declaration of Maury Blackman in Support of Premise Data Corporation's Motion for Protective Order Limiting PQM Deposition Topic #11, a publicly available document filed on August 28, 2023 in the Superior Court of Santa Clara County in *Premise Data Corp. v. Pompe*, No. 19CV346678.

The Court may take judicial notice of Exhibit D because it is a genuine and accurate record of a California state court. Cal. Evid. Code § 452(d). Here, Poulson seeks judicial notice of a declaration filed by Blackman in a California court, for the purpose of showing Blackman's characterization of the work performed by his former company, Premise Data, in this document. The "existence and facial contents" of Exhibit D are properly subject to judicial notice. *Yvanova v. New Century Mortg. Corp.*, 62 Cal. 4th 919, 924 (2016). The Court may also take judicial notice of the accuracy of the contents of Exhibit D, because "the truth of statements may be accepted when made by a party." *C.R. v. Tenet Healthcare Corp.*, 169 Cal. App. 4th 1094, 1103 (2009), *as modified on denial of reh'g* (Feb. 3, 2009); *Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co.*, 123 Cal. App. 3d 593, 605 (1981).

This document was presented to the trial court by Respondent Poulson, who requested judicial notice of this document in support of its anti-SLAPP motion. RA0093–94. The trial court did not rule on this

request, but that does not preclude the Court from doing so here. *Duarte v. State Teachers' Ret. Sys.*, 232 Cal. App. 4th 370, 381 (2014).¹

This document is relevant because it contains Blackman's testimony regarding the sensitive national security implications of Premise's work for the U.S. military, which bears on the public interest in incidents that reflect poorly on his fitness for such a position, such as his arrest for felony domestic violence. The trial court found that Premise's work in the national security arena contributed to the public interest in Respondents' speech about Blackman and was thus one of the reasons why these statements were protected by the anti-SLAPP statute. AA0993–94.

III. NEWS COVERAGE OF BLACKMAN, HIS ARREST, AND HIS COMPANY.

Exhibit B to Respondent Jack Poulson's Appendix (RA0009–RA0084) contains publicly available news reports and online publications about Blackman, his former employer, and his work as an executive in the technology sector; op-eds that Blackman has published; and publications that report his arrest for felony domestic violence. These online publications were included in Exhibits 3–6 to the Declaration of Sarah E. Burns ("Burns Declaration").

Exhibit 3 to the Burns Declaration contains copies of publicly available online publications concerning Premise Data, two of which are included in Exhibit 2 to Respondent's Appendix:²

¹ Blackman did not include this document in his Appellant's Appendix.

² Respondent Jack Poulson's Appendix includes only the articles from Exhibit 3 that he cited in his Responding Brief pursuant to California Rule of Court 8.124(b)(3)(A) and advisory committee comment to subdivision

- Byron Tau, “App Taps Unwitting Users Abroad to Gather Open-Source Intelligence,” *The Wall Street Journal* (June 24, 2021), available at <https://www.wsj.com/business/telecom/app-taps-unwitting-users-abroad-to-gather-open-source-intelligence-11624544026>.
- Byron Tau, “Premise Mobile-Phone App Suspends Ukraine Activities After Accusations Fly,” *The Wall Street Journal* (February 26, 2022), available at <https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/russia-ukraine-latest-news-2022-02-26/card/premise-mobile-phone-app-suspends-ukraine-activities-after-accusationsfly-8FDnhZe9raunaIJ4HV66>.

Exhibit 4 to the Burns Declaration contains copies of publicly available online publications concerning Appellant Maury Blackman and his work as an executive in the technology sector:

- John Mannes, “Accela appears headed for exit with new CEO,” *TechCrunch* (October 25, 2016), available at <https://techcrunch.com/2016/10/25/accela-appears-headed-for-exit-with-new-ceo/>.
- Ben Miller, “Former Accela CEO Maury Blackman Jumps into Investing,” *GovTech* (January 12, 2018), available at <https://www.govtech.com/biz/former-accela-ceo-maury-blackman-jumps-into-investing.html>.
- Alexander Davis, “Premise Data Taps New CEO for Gig-

(b). As originally filed in the trial court, Exhibit 3 to the Burns Declaration also contains other articles which are not included in Respondent Jack Poulson’s Appendix.

Based Data Collection Startup,” *The Wall Street Journal* (February 6, 2018), available at <https://www.wsj.com/articles/premise-data-taps-new-ceo-for-gig-based-data-collection-startup-1517920208>.

- Jason Shueh, “Under New CEO, Premise Brings Crowdsourced Research to Government,” *StateScoop* (February 7, 2018), available at <https://statescoop.com/under-new-ceo-premise-brings-crowdsourced-research-to-government/>.

Exhibit 5 to the Burns Declaration contains op-eds by Appellant that have been published on publicly available websites:

- “MAURY BLACKMAN: Make open data the default policy for government,” *The Press-Enterprise* (May 24, 2014), available at <https://www.pressenterprise.com/2014/05/24/maury-blackman-make-open-data-the-default-policy-for-government/>.
- Maury Blackman, “Beyond the Tech Industry Drama, Civic Startups Make a Difference,” *Media Shift* (October 15, 2014), available at <https://mediashift.org/2014/10/beyond-tech-industry-drama-civic-startups-make-a-difference/>.

Exhibit 6 to the Burns Declaration, contains publicly available online news stories regarding this lawsuit:

- Bob Egelko, “Tech Exec Sues Journalist for \$25M for Publishing His Sealed Arrest Report,” *San Francisco Chronicle* (Oct. 29, 2024), available at <https://www.sfchronicle.com/politics/article/maury-blackman-lawsuit-19871638.php>.
- Noor Al-Sibai, “Tech Exec Sues Journalist for Reporting the

Fact That He Was Arrested for Domestic Violence,” *Yahoo News* (October 31, 2024), available at <https://uk.news.yahoo.com/tech-exec-sues-journalist-reporting-151635164.html?guccounter=1>.

- *California Courts Newsroom*, “Tech Exec Sues Journalist for publishing his sealed arrest report,” (Oct. 29, 2024).³
- Rachel Bowman, “Tech Executive Files \$25m Lawsuit Against Journalist Who Revealed Shocking Secret Arrest Report,” *Daily Mail* (Oct. 30, 2024), available at <https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-14020567/tech-executive-lawsuit-journalist-secret-arrest-report-maury-blackman.html>.

The Court may properly take judicial notice of these news articles as “evidence of public interest” in these matters. *Sexton v. Apple Studios LLC*, 110 Cal. App. 5th 183, 194 (2025); *see also Seelig v. Infinity Broadcasting Corp.*, 97 Cal. App. 4th 798, 807, n.5 (2002).

These online publications were presented to the trial court by Defendant Amazon Web Services, Inc. (“AWS”), in its Compendium of Evidence in Support of its Special Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Complaint Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 425.16. AWS requested judicial notice of these documents on December 6, 2024. AA1026;

³ An archived copy of this webpage is available at <https://web.archive.org/web/20241107013653/https://newsroom.courts.ca.gov/news/tech-exec-sues-journalist-25m-publishing-his-sealed-arrest-report>. This page is no longer available at the link referenced in the Burns Declaration, RA0014, <https://newsroom.courts.ca.gov/news/tech-exec-sues-journalist-25m-publishing-his-sealed-arrest-report>.

RA0005–07. Respondents Jack Poulson and Tech Inquiry joined AWS’s request for judicial notice on January 29, 2025. AA1028; RA0100–02.

Blackman did not file an objection to the request for judicial notice of the news articles. Nor could Blackman object to this Court taking judicial notice of the *San Francisco Chronicle* article about his arrest, because he cited it as evidence of his damages in his January 14, 2025 Declaration filed in the Superior Court on January 28, 2025 in support of his Opposition to Mr. Poulson’s Special Motion to Strike. AA0851–52.

The trial court did not rule on this request, but as noted above, that does not preclude the Court from doing so here. *Duarte*, 232 Cal. App. 4th at 381.

These materials are relevant to Blackman’s appeal because they establish Respondents’ First Amendment defenses and support the Superior Court’s order that Blackman’s claims arise from Respondents’ acts in furtherance of speech “in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest” under California Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16(e)(3)–(4).

IV. WEBPAGES FOR BLACKMAN’S PODCAST.

Exhibits F and G to the Declaration of Victoria Noble in Support of Respondents’ Motion for Judicial Notice are webpages for “Great Minds Think Data,” a podcast hosted by Blackman from 2022–2025.

These documents were not presented to the trial court and were downloaded after the court’s decision on Respondents’ anti-SLAPP motions.

These online publications are relevant to Respondents’ arguments that Blackman was a limited-purpose public figure and that his arrest was a

matter of public interest, and thus that Respondents’ speech was protected by section 425.16(e)(3)–(4) and the First Amendment. Thus, Exhibits F and G are properly subject to judicial notice as evidence of the public’s interest in Mr. Blackman. *See Sexton*, 110 Cal. App. 5th at 194 (2025).

V. FEDERAL COURT ORDER ENJOINING THE CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY GENERAL FROM ENFORCING PENAL CODE 851.92(C) PURSUANT TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT.

Exhibit 7 (AA0884–AA0906), Exhibit 8 (AA0907–AA0932) and Exhibit 9 (AA0933–AA0937) to the Reply Declaration of Joshua A. Baskin In Further Support of Reply to Plaintiff’s Opposition to Special Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Complaint and Defendant’s Demurrer to Complaint (“Baskin Reply Declaration”), are documents contained within Appellant’s Appendix. Exhibits 7–9 are publicly available documents filed in the U.S. District Court, Northern District of California, in *First Amendment Coalition v. Chiu*, No. 24-cv-08343, and are thus subject to judicial notice under Evidence Code section 452(d)(2). *See Forty-Niner Truck Plaza, Inc. v. Union Oil Co.*, 58 Cal. App. 4th 1261, 1277 n.7 (1997) (taking judicial notice of orders from two U.S. district court cases pursuant to Evidence Code § 452(d)(2)); *People v. Belcher*, 11 Cal. 3d 91, 95 n.2 (1974) (“Since these documents are records of a court of the United States ... we take judicial notice of them.”).

Exhibit 7 (AA0884–AA0906) is a November 22, 2024 complaint, *First Amendment Coalition v. Chiu*, filed by the First Amendment Coalition, one of its employees, and First Amendment scholar Eugene Volokh against California Attorney General Rob Bonta and San Francisco City Attorney David Chiu. The complaint alleges that Penal Code § 851.92(c) violates the First Amendment because it is (1) a “content-based

restriction that penalizes the ‘dissemination’ of lawfully obtained ‘information related to a sealed arrest report’” that fails strict scrutiny both facially and as applied to the plaintiffs; (2) unconstitutionally overbroad; and (3) “void for vagueness.” The complaint asks the district court to declare that Penal Code § 851.92(c) is “unconstitutional, facially and as applied to Plaintiffs, under the First Amendment Fourteenth Amendments” and issue a preliminary and permanent injunction barring Bonta and Chiu’s offices from enforcing Penal Code § 851.92(c) against the three plaintiffs and barring enforcement of the statute against “any dissemination of any lawfully obtained information about a sealed arrest report.”

Exhibit 8 (AA0907–AA0932) is the Plaintiffs’ Notice of Motion and Motion for Preliminary Injunction filed on November 25, 2024 in U.S. District Court in *First Amendment Coalition v. Chiu*. AA0908–32.

Exhibit 9 (AA0933–AA0937) is the December 19, 2024 order of U.S. District Judge Rita F. Lin in *First Amendment Coalition v. Chiu* entering a preliminary injunction stipulated by the parties barring Bonta and Chiu’s offices from enforcing Penal Code § 851.92(c) against “any person or entity” for the “dissemination ... of information relating to any arrest report that the person or entity reasonably believes was obtained from the government through a public records request” or has been previously made public, including the Blackman arrest report. AA0935–37.

These three federal court records are relevant because they support Respondent Tech Inquiry’s contention that Penal Code § 851.92(c) violates the First Amendment. These court records establish that Attorney General Bonta, the top law enforcement in the state, has agreed to a preliminary injunction barring state and local prosecutors from civil enforcement of Penal Code § 851.92(c) against “any person or entity” for the

“dissemination ... of information relating to any arrest report that the person or entity reasonably believes was obtained from the government through a public records request” or has been previously made public, including the Blackman arrest report. AA0935–37.

These three federal court documents were filed in trial court by Substack in its Reply in Support of its Special Motion to Strike Blackman’s complaint. Substack did not request that the trial court take judicial notice of these federal court records. Blackman did not object to the exhibits. Courts may properly take judicial notice of documents that, “although not judicially noticed by the trial court, ... were brought to the trial court’s attention.” *Duarte*, 232 Cal. App. 4th at 381.

Judicial notice is appropriate because these court records were presented to the trial court, are highly material, the court’s review is *de novo*, and no unfairness would result. *See Shamsian*, 107 Cal. App. 4th at 975 n.5; *Cal-Am. Income Prop. Fund II*, 208 Cal. App. 3d at 113 n.2 (1989). Indeed, these documents provide essential “context” for this appeal. *See Flatley*, 39 Cal. 4th at 306 n.2. Judicial notice should therefore be taken.

VI. U.S. GOVERNMENT DOMESTIC VIOLENCE STATISTICS.

Exhibit E is a report by the U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics on crime victimization statistics, including the number of Americans who have experienced domestic violence. This “official government document[] is a proper subject of judicial notice.” *Vargas v. City of Salinas*, 46 Cal. 4th 1, 22, 205 P.3d 207, 219 n.10 (2009). While it was not presented to the trial court, it does not postdate the trial court’s order, and it is relevant as evidence of the widespread public impact of domestic violence, and thus,

this Court's analysis of whether Respondents' speech about Blackman's domestic violence arrest was a matter of public interest.

CONCLUSION

For all of these reasons, Appellants Appellants Jack Poulson, Tech Inquiry Inc., and Substack, Inc. respectfully request that this Court take judicial notice of Exhibits A–H to the Declaration of Victoria Noble in Support of Respondents' Motion for Judicial Notice; Exhibit B (RA0008–RA0084) and Exhibit D (RA0092–RA0098) to Respondent Jack Poulson's Appendix; and Exhibits 7–9 to the Baskin Reply Declaration, contained in Appellant's Appendix (AA0884–AA0906; AA0907–AA0932; AA0933–AA0937).

Dated: December 16, 2025

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Victoria Noble

Victoria Noble (SBN 337290)

David Greene (SBN 160107)

ELECTRONIC FRONTIER

FOUNDATION

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DECLARATION OF VICTORIA NOBLE

I, VICTORIA NOBLE, declare as follows:

1. I am an attorney licensed to practice in the State of California and am counsel for Respondent Jack Poulson in the above-captioned action. I have personal knowledge of the facts stated here, and if called upon to do so, could and would testify competently as follows:
2. Attached as **Exhibit A** is a true and correct copy of Maury Blackman's Complaint for Damages, a publicly available document filed in *Blackman v. City and County of San Francisco*, CGC-25-624793, on April 25, 2025 in the Superior Court of San Francisco County.
3. Attached as **Exhibit B** is a true and correct copy of the Request for Judicial Notice in Support of City and County of San Francisco's Special Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Complaint and Request for Attorneys' Fees, and the Order to Seal Report 210-844-280, attached as Exhibit F thereto. This publicly available document was filed in *Blackman v. City and County of San Francisco*, CGC-25-624793, on June 30, 2025 in the Superior Court of San Francisco County.
4. Attached as **Exhibit C** is a true and correct copy of the Declaration of Diane Bryan in Support of the City and County of

San Francisco's Special Motion to Strike, filed in *Blackman v. City and County of San Francisco*, CGC-25-624793, on June 30, 2025 in the Superior Court of San Francisco County.

5. Attached as **Exhibit D** is a true and correct copy of the Notice of Entry of Order and Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants' Special Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Complaint, a publicly available court order entered in *Blackman v. City and County of San Francisco*, CGC-25-624793, on September 5, 2025 in the Superior Court of San Francisco County.
6. Attached as **Exhibit E** is a true and correct copy of the U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics report titled "Criminal Victimization, 2024," published on the U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics website, as downloaded from <https://bjs.ojp.gov/document/cv24.pdf> on December 12, 2025.
7. Attached as **Exhibit F** is a true and correct copy of the webpage titled "Great Minds Think Data with Maury Blackman," published on the Art19 website, as downloaded from <https://art19.com/shows/great-minds-think-data-with-maury-blackman> on December 11, 2025.
8. Attached as **Exhibit G** is a true and correct copy of "Great Minds Think Data," as downloaded from <https://greatmindsthinkdata.com/> on December 11, 2025.

9. Attached as **Exhibit H** is a true and correct copy of Maury Blackman’s Request for Dismissal, a publicly available document filed in *Blackman v. City and County of San Francisco*, CGC-25-624793, on April 1, 2025 in the Superior Court of San Francisco County.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

Executed this 15th day of December 2025 in San Francisco, California.

/s/ Victoria Noble
Victoria J. Noble

[PROPOSED] ORDER

Having considered Respondents Jack Poulson, Substack Inc., and Tech Inquiry Inc.’s Motion for Judicial Notice, and good cause appearing, it is

HEREBY ORDERED:

The Court **GRANTS** the Motion for Judicial Notice of **Exhibit A** to the Declaration of Victoria Noble in Support of Respondents’ Motion for Judicial Notice (“Noble Declaration”);

The Court **GRANTS** the Motion for Judicial Notice of **Exhibit B** to the Noble Declaration;

The Court **GRANTS** the Motion for Judicial Notice of **Exhibit C** to the Noble Declaration;

The Court **GRANTS** the Motion for Judicial Notice of **Exhibit D** to the Noble Declaration;

The Court **GRANTS** the Motion for Judicial Notice of **Exhibit E** to the Noble Declaration;

The Court **GRANTS** the Motion for Judicial Notice of **Exhibit F** to the Noble Declaration;

The Court **GRANTS** the Motion for Judicial Notice of **Exhibit G** to the Noble Declaration;

The Court **GRANTS** the Motion for Judicial Notice of **Exhibit H** to the Noble Declaration;

The Court **GRANTS** the Motion for Judicial Notice of **Exhibit B** (RA0008–RA0084) to Respondent Jack Poulson’s Appendix;

The Court **GRANTS** the Motion for Judicial Notice of **Exhibit D** (RA0092–RA0098) to Respondent Jack Poulson’s Appendix;

The Court **GRANTS** the Motion for Judicial Notice of a document within Appellant’s Appendix, **Exhibit 7** (AA0884–AA0906) to the Reply Declaration of Joshua A. Baskin In Further Support of Reply to Plaintiff’s

Opposition to Special Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Complaint and
Defendant's Demurrer to Complaint.

The Court **GRANTS** the Motion for Judicial Notice of a document within Appellant's Appendix, **Exhibit 8** (AA0907–AA0932) to the Baskin Reply Declaration.

The Court **GRANTS** the Motion for Judicial Notice of a document within Appellant's Appendix, **Exhibit 9** (AA0933–AA0937) to the Baskin Reply Declaration.

SO ORDERED.

DATED: _____, 2025

PRESIDING JUDGE

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Victoria Python, declare:

I am a resident of the state of California and over the age of eighteen years and not a party to the within action. My business address is 815 Eddy Street, San Francisco, California 94109.

On December 15, 2025, I served the foregoing documents:

**RESPONDENTS JACK POULSON, TECH INQUIRY, INC., AND
SUBSTACK INC.'S MOTION FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE AND
DECLARATION OF ATTORNEY VICTORIA NOBLE IN SUPPORT**

X BY TRUEFILING: I caused to be electronically filed the foregoing document with the court using the court's e-filing system, TrueFiling. Parties and/or counsel of record were electronically served via the TrueFiling website at the time of filing.

X BY FIRST CLASS MAIL: I placed the document in a sealed envelope for collection and mailing following our ordinary business practices and deposited it with the United States Postal Service, with postage fully paid:

San Francisco Superior Court
Attn: Hon. Christine Van Aken, Dept. 301
400 McAllister Street
San Francisco, CA 94102

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on December 15, 2025 at San Francisco, California.



Victoria Python

EXHIBIT A

Respondents' Motion for Judicial Notice

1 THE MAREK LAW FIRM, INC.
2 DAVID MAREK (CA Bar No. 290686)
3 david@marekfirm.com
4 AMI SANGHVI (CA Bar No. 331801)
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ELECTRONICALLY
FILED
Superior Court of California,
County of San Francisco

04/25/2025
Clerk of the Court
BY: SAHAR ENAYATI
Deputy Clerk

Attorneys for Plaintiff Maury Blackman

SUPERIOR COURT OF STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNT OF SAN FRANCISCO
[UNLIMITED JURISDICTION]

MAURY BLACKMAN, an individual,

Case No.: **CGC-25-624793**

Plaintiff,

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES

v.

1. Negligence Per Se – Breach of Duty to Perform Mandatory Duty – Violation of California Civil Code § 815.6
2. Negligence – Violation of California Civil Code § 815.2
3. Public Disclosure of Private Facts

THE CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, DIANE BRYAN; and DOES 1-25, inclusive,

Defendants.

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Plaintiff MAURY BLACKMAN (“Plaintiff”) complains against Defendants THE CITY AND COUNTRY OF SAN FRANCISCO (“CITY”), DIANE BRYAN (“Bryan”), and DOES 1-25 (collectively “Defendants”) hereby alleges as follows:

INTRODUCTION

1. Plaintiff commenced this action because Defendants repeatedly released a sealed arrest report or its contents to unauthorized individuals, including a former City employee who was engaged in an adversarial proceeding against Plaintiff’s employer, in violation of California Penal Code §§ 851.91(b)(4) and (5), a valid Court Order sealing the arrest report, and the California Constitution.

2. The City concedes, as it must, that the arrest report had been sealed by a valid court order before it was released by Defendants to unauthorized persons, and that disclosing the sealed arrest

1 report and its contents “is contrary to California law.” (*See First Amendment Coalition et al. v. David*
2 *Chiu et al.*, Case No. 24-cv-08343-RFL, Doc. #17)

3 3. California’s public policy, as set forth in the Penal Code, by the Supreme Court in cases
4 such as *Loder v. Municipal Court*, 17 Cal.3d 859, 868 (1976), and in the California Labor Code
5 §432.7, also recognizes the critical importance of safeguarding the rights of an individual who was
6 arrested without a conviction, particularly – though not exclusively – when the arrest report was
7 sealed by a court order.

8 4. Moreover, after Plaintiff notified Defendants of what had occurred, Defendants failed to
9 appropriately investigate and refused to use the authority granted to them under Penal Code §
10 851.92(c) to punish the parties that engaged in the unlawful conduct and mitigate Plaintiff’s damages.

11 5. Defendants’ conduct has caused and will continue to cause Plaintiff irreparable damage,
12 including substantial financial damage, damage to Plaintiff’s reputation and mental health, and the
13 permanent stigmatization of Plaintiff.

14 **JURISDICTION AND VENUE**

15 6. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to California law cited with particularity below.

16 7. The amount in controversy as to each Cause of Action set forth below following the
17 factual allegations exceeds the minimum jurisdictional threshold of this Court.

18 8. Jurisdiction is proper pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 410.10.

19 9. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants because each Defendant had
20 sufficient contacts with California and intentionally availed itself of the benefits of California; and
21 asserting personal jurisdiction would be fair and substantial.

22 10. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 395A
23 because the injuries described herein occurred in the County of San Francisco.

24 **PARTIES**

25 11. Plaintiff Maury Blackman is an individual and a resident of San Francisco, California.

26 12. Defendant City and County of San Francisco is, and at all times relevant herein was, a
27 public entity existing in the state of California. At all times relevant to this action, the San Francisco
28 Police Department (“SFPD”) is and was a part of the City.

1 13. Upon information and belief, Defendant Bryan is a resident of the State of California
2 and of this judicial district. At all relevant times herein, Bryan was employed by the City and acting
3 under color of law and in her individual capacity within the scope of employment pursuant to the
4 statutes, ordinances, regulations, policies, customs, and usage of the City.

5 14. Plaintiff does not know the true names and capacities of Defendants sued herein as
6 Does 1-25, including but not limited to members of the “investigative unit” who approved the release
7 of the unredacted Sealed Report, and therefore sues these Defendants by fictitious names. Plaintiff
8 will amend this Complaint to state the true names and capacities when ascertained. Plaintiff is
9 informed and believes and thereon alleges that each of the fictitiously named Defendants is
10 responsible in some manner for the occurrences alleged herein, and thereby proximately caused
11 Plaintiff’s injuries and damages alleged herein.

12 15. At all times herein mentioned, the acts and omissions of various Defendants, and each
13 of them (including the Does), concurred and contributed to the various acts and omissions of each and
14 all of the other Defendants in proximately causing the injuries and damages as herein alleged.

GOVERNMENT CLAIMS

15 16. In accordance with the provisions of California Government Code § 910, on
16 September 12, 2024, Plaintiff made a written Claim for Damages to the Defendant City.

17 17. By the Claim for Damages and correspondence sent by and on behalf of Plaintiff to the
18 City, Plaintiff communicated in detail all relevant theories and facts of his claims.

- 19 • Plaintiff and representatives of Plaintiff notified the Defendant City through its
20 employees in October 2023 and several times thereafter that Defendants disclosed the
21 Sealed Report to an unauthorized person.
- 22 • By May 2024, as a result of Plaintiff’s communication with the City about these
23 issues, the City had commenced an investigation into Plaintiff’s issues, including but
24 not necessarily limited to an investigation by Investigator Teri Torgeson.
- 25 • By email dated June 30, 2024, Plaintiff notified Defendant City employees Lieutenant
26 Lisa Springer, Officer-in-Charge, Internal Affairs Division; Alica Cabrera, City
27 Attorney; and Lieutenant Christopher G. Beauchamp, SFPD, of all of the relevant
28

1 theories and facts of his claim arising from the City’s disclosure of the Sealed Report
2 to an unauthorized person.

- 3 • By email dated August 29, 2024, Plaintiff sent Lt. Beauchamp another detailed
4 description of the underlying events concerning his Claim, and this email was
5 forwarded to Springer, Cabrera, and Steven Betz.
- 6 • By letter dated September 19, 2024, Defendant City, through City Attorneys David
7 Chiu and Jennifer Choi, notified Substack, the platform that was hosting the Sealed
8 Report, that it was in violation of Penal Code § 851.92(c) and Substack’s Acceptable
9 Use Policy and instructed Substack to “immediately remove the Incident Report and
10 its contents from your website and ensure that the index to postings no longer allows
11 for the Incident Report to be viewed or downloaded ... by no later than September 23,
12 2024.” This letter from the Defendant City identifies the blog posts, which first
13 appeared on September 14, 2023, that posted the Sealed Report.
- 14 • Between September 24 and 26, 2024, Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s representative
15 communicated to the City all relevant theories and facts of his claim, including
16 correspondence on September 26, 2024 that laid out in detail all of the theories and
17 facts.
- 18 • On October 3, 2024, Plaintiff’s representative sent correspondence to David Chiu, the
19 San Francisco City Attorney, that communicated the relevant theories and facts of
20 Plaintiff’s claims.
- 21 • By letters dated October 3, 2024, the Defendant City, through City Attorneys David
22 Chiu and Jennifer Choi notified Substack and Jack Poulson, through their respective
23 counsel, that they were violating the Penal Code. These letters specifically identified
24 by URL Poulson’s blog posts that disseminated the Sealed Report.

25 18. Accordingly, as of October 28, 2024, Defendant City had already been put on notice of
26 Plaintiff’s theories and the underlying facts such that Defendant City was able to fully investigate
27 Plaintiff’s claims.
28

1 unauthorized person. Moreover, California’s public policy safeguarding the privacy of an arrest that
2 did not lead to a conviction is also set forth in Labor Code § 432.7 and by the California Supreme
3 Court. *See Loder v. Municipal Court*, 17 Cal.3d 859, 868 (1976).

4 27. Pursuant to California Rule of Court, Rule 2.551(h)(1), “[a] sealed record must not be
5 unsealed except on order of the court.”

6 28. By Order of a California Court dated January 7, 2025, the Superior Court in San
7 Francisco County held that “The Incident Report has already been sealed by order of Judge Gold. ...
8 Here, the Incident Report is sealed, thus it and material contained in it cannot be publicly disclosed in
9 any court filing. Any party seeking to publicly disclose material from the Incident Report must first
10 obtain an unsealing order from Judge Gold.”

11 29. No party has ever sought to challenge or challenged Judge Gold’s Sealing Order and it
12 remains unchanged as of the date of this filing.

13 30. The Sealed Report included private, identifying information about Plaintiff, the
14 woman identified in the Sealed Report, and a potential witness – including, names, email address,
15 phone number, home address, and a physical description of both Blackman and the woman identified
16 in the Sealed Report. Indeed, the City admitted that the Sealed Report included private, identifying
17 information that was required as a matter of law to be sealed. (*See First Amendment Coalition et al. v.*
David Chiu et al., Case No. 24-cv-08343-RFL, Doc. #17)

18 **Defendants Repeatedly Released The Sealed Report and/or Its Contents To Unauthorized**
19 **Individuals.**

20 31. Plaintiff did not know and could not have known that prior to May 3, 2022, Newton
21 Oldfather, a private attorney at Lewis & Llewellyn, LLP involved at that time in an adversarial
22 proceeding against Plaintiff’s employer., who had served as an attorney for the San Francisco City
23 Attorney’s Office and the Department of Police Accountability from November 2012 until April
24 2021, obtained the case number of an incident in which Plaintiff was involved in 2021.

25 32. Upon information and belief, an employee of the City provided Oldfather with this
26 case number.
27
28

1 33. Plaintiff did not know and could not have known that three months after the Sealing
2 Order was issued, Defendants released the unredacted arrest report on May 17, 2022, without a stamp
3 indicating that it was sealed, to Oldfather, who was not authorized to receive the Sealed Report.

4 34. At the time Defendants released the unredacted Sealed Report to Oldfather, Oldfather,
5 along with attorney Kenneth Nabity, was representing former employees of Plaintiff's prior employer
6 in a civil action pending in Santa Clara County Superior Court against Plaintiff's employer (the
7 "Santa Clara Litigation").

8 35. Oldfather requested *on two separate occasions* – first on May 3, 2022 (the "Initial
9 Request") and then on May 9, 2022 (the "Second Request") – a copy of the sealed Report. Both
10 requests included the case number, which upon information and belief was not publicly available at
11 that time.

12 36. Oldfather made his Second Request before he received a response to his Initial
13 Response.

14 37. Oldfather did not receive a response to his Initial Request (made on May 3) until July
15 21, 2022. On that day, Daniel Leung, of the SFPD, sent an email to Oldfather in connection with
16 Oldfather's Initial Request for the Sealed Report that read: "Dear Newton Oldfather: We have
17 received your request for Incident Report No. [XXX]. In order to process the request, please provide
18 authorization from the party named in the report. Your request will be processed upon receipt."

19 38. Leung did not release the report to Oldfather, who did not have authorization from
20 Plaintiff to make this Request.

21 39. This communication from Leung to Oldfather, in response to Oldfather's May 3, 2022
22 Initial Request for the arrest report, demonstrated that the City knew or should have known that the
23 arrest report was not to be released to anyone without authorization.

24 40. However, on May 9, 2022, at 1:00 AM (*six days after Oldfather's initial request and*
25 *prior to getting the response from Leung on July 21, 2022 to his Initial Request*), Oldfather made his
26 Second Request to the SFPD for the Sealed Report.

27 41. Defendants have failed to provide any explanation for Oldfather's making a Second
28 Request for the Sealed Report six days after his initial request and before the City responded to his
Initial Request.

1 42. On May 16, 2022 (one week after the May 9 request and prior to the SFPD responding
2 to Oldfather’s May 3 request), Defendant Bryan wrote to Oldfather: “We have received your report
3 request, but due to the nature of the report we must route the request to the investigative unit for final
4 release/approval. Please be patient as this may add several days to our processing time.”

5 43. Defendants have failed to provide any explanation as to why the investigative unit
6 gave final release and approval to authorize the release of an unredacted Sealed Report to an
7 unauthorized person.

8 44. On May 17, 2022, Bryan wrote to Oldfather that the SFPD received his request dated
9 May 9, 2022, that his request has been processed, and that the documents he requested have been
10 made available to him via the San Francisco Public Records Portal.

11 45. The Sealed Report that the SFPD provided to Oldfather was not redacted. Among
12 other things, it included Plaintiff’s name and personal identifying information; the name, home
13 address, and physical identifying information of the woman referred to in the Sealed Report, and the
14 name and home address of the woman who made the complaint to the SFPD.

15 46. Upon information and belief and based on the facts known to Plaintiff, the SFPD’s
16 policy and practice, consistent with California law, prohibit the SFPD from releasing identifying
17 information about a potential victim and/or a witness to an unauthorized person.

18 47. California Penal Code §§ 832.7(b)(5) and (6) require sealing documents to remove
19 personal data or information to preserve the anonymity of complainants and witnesses and to protect
20 confidential information of which disclosure would cause an unwarranted invasion of personal
21 privacy.

22 48. In pleadings filed in *First Amendment Coalition et al. v. David Chiu et al.*, Case No.
23 24-cv-08343-RFL, Doc. #17, the City asserted that the dissemination of the Sealed Report “is
24 contrary to California law,” referring to California Panel Code § 851.92(b)(2)(5).

25 49. The unredacted Sealed Report that the SFPD released to Oldfather had a unique
26 watermark identifier, but it was *not* stamped “ARREST SEALED: DO NOT RELEASE OUTSIDE
27 OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTOR” or any words to that affect.

28 50. Bryan’s correspondence with Oldfather made no reference to Oldfather’s Initial
Request or to Oldfather’s needing authorization from Plaintiff to obtain the Sealed Report.

1 51. Defendants have never provided any explanation for the release of the unredacted
2 Sealed Report to an unauthorized person.

3 52. According to a Sworn Declaration of Jack Poulson filed under seal in San Francisco
4 Superior Court, after Poulson received the Sealed Report, in or around September 2023, he “phoned
5 the San Francisco Police Department’s Crime Information Services Unit at 415-575-7232 and, after
6 providing the incident report number (210-844-280), asked for and received confirmation of each
7 pertinent detail in the report, including: the name of the reporting officer, the street address and unit
8 number at which the arrest took place, the names of the arrested individual and his alleged victim, as
9 well as the alleged victim’s age and statement to the police The SFPD did not inform [Poulson]
10 that the Incident Report had been sealed.”

11 53. On September 14, 2023, Poulson, who published a blog on Substack, disseminated the
12 Sealed Report in its unredacted form. Prior to Poulson’s publication, Plaintiff did not know, and
13 could not have reasonably known, that Defendants had released the Sealed Report to anyone without
14 Plaintiff’s authorization.

15 54. Plaintiff had no knowledge at the time of Poulson’s September 14, 2023 blog post how
16 Poulson received and became in possession of the Sealed Report or that the City had disseminated the
17 unredacted Sealed Report to any third party.

18 55. The Sealed Report included information in which Plaintiff had a reasonable
19 expectation of privacy, including identifying information about Plaintiff and the woman who was also
20 referred to in the Sealed Report, based on the Sealing Order, the applicable sections of the Penal
21 Code, and California’s Labor Code § 432.7, which prohibits the dissemination of documents or
22 information concerning an arrest that did not lead to conviction.

23 56. As soon as Plaintiff learned of Poulson’s post, he requested that Poulson and Substack
24 remove the post, and he also requested that the City, through its power pursuant to Penal Code
25 §851.92(c) among other things, fine Poulson and Substack if they fail to remove the Sealed Report
26 and the information contained in it.

27 57. In or around late 2023 or early 2024, an acquaintance of Plaintiff inquired through the
28 SFPD about the Sealed Report. The SFPD confirmed to this individual the existence of the Sealed
Report and the contents of the Sealed Report.

1 58. In or around spring 2024, a family member of Plaintiff inquired through the SFPD
2 about the Sealed Report. The SFPD confirmed to Plaintiff’s daughter the existence of the Sealed
3 Report and the contents of the Sealed Report.

4 59. Throughout 2024, Plaintiff made repeated requests, many of which are alleged herein,
5 to the City and the SFPD to enforce the Sealing Order, pursuant to which the City was prohibited
6 from releasing the Sealed Report, and to investigate the facts that led to the City unlawful release of
7 the Sealed Report, including to a former City attorney.

8 60. In September 2024, Plaintiff and the woman identified in the Sealed Report jointly met
9 with Sgt. Degand of the SFPD to request, on behalf of both of them, that the City take action to stop
10 the dissemination of the Sealed Report. During this meeting, Sgt. Degand told Plaintiff and the
11 woman identified in the Sealed Report that the City knew that the report had been sealed by the
12 Sealing Order and that it and the information contained in it should not have been released to any
13 unauthorized party.

14 61. In or around September 2024, the SFPD told Plaintiff and the woman identified in the
15 Sealed Report that the SFPD would investigate the release of the Sealed Report and, in particular, its
16 release to Oldfather.

17 62. In or around September 2024, Deputy City Attorney Alicia Cabrera committed to
18 Plaintiff’s counsel Jim Hunter that she would provide frequent updates regarding the investigation
19 into the unauthorized release of the Sealed Report to a former City employee and that the
20 investigation was only weeks away from completion.

21 63. Despite these representations to report back on investigatory findings, the City never
22 provided Plaintiff or counsel any further updates on its investigation into the unlawful dissemination
23 of this sealed information, including the dissemination to a former City employee.

24 64. In letters sent by the City to Substack and Poulson (referred to herein), the City
25 recognized that Poulson and Substack were in violation of Penal Code § 851.92(c), but the City
26 refused to fine either, even after Substack and Poulson refused to abide by the City’s demand to
27 remove the Sealed Report by a date certain.

28 //

1 **Plaintiff Was Forced To Commence A Legal Action To Try To Stop The Unlawful**
2 **Dissemination Of The Sealed Report.**

3 65. When the City failed to use its power under Penal Code § 851.92(c) to penalize the
4 parties who were disseminating the Sealed Report, , on October 3, 2024, Plaintiff commenced an
5 action in state court against Poulson, Tech Inquiry, Inc. (Poulson’s website that publishes his blogs),
6 Substack, and Amazon Web Services seeking enforcement of Judge Gold’s Sealing Order, the
7 removal of the Sealed Report, and damages flowing from these entities unlaw conduct.

8 66. A California State Court, after determining that Judge Gold’s Sealing Order remained
9 in effect, dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against these entities for injunctive and monetary damages
10 based on a determination that Plaintiff’s claims were prohibited by California’s anti-SLAPP statute
11 (CCP § 425.16).

12 **Plaintiff Has Suffered Severe Injuries.**

13 67. Plaintiff has suffered severe harm as a result of Defendants’ actions described herein.
14 Amongst other things, Plaintiff’s employment ended on December 10, 2023; Plaintiff’s reputation
15 amongst his friends, family and business associates has been forever altered; Plaintiff has suffered
16 severe emotional distress; Plaintiff has been unable to find subsequent comparable employment,
17 resulting in significant lost employment compensation and benefits; and Plaintiff has been forced to
18 spend money to cure this situation that will haunt him the rest of his life.

19 **FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF**

20 **NEGLIGENCE PER SE – BREACH OF MANDATORY DUTIES**

21 **(Against All Defendants)**

22 ***Pursuant to Gov. Code, §§ 815.6, 820***

23 68. Plaintiff incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained in the
24 foregoing paragraphs as though set forth fully herein.

25 69. Defendants, and each of them, were at all times relevant herein, subject to mandatory
26 and non-delegable duties, including but not limited to, duties set forth Penal Code § 851.92(b)(4),
27 Penal Code § 852.92(b)(5) and in the Sealing Order.

28 70. California Penal Code § 851.92(b)(4) directs that “a police investigative report related
to the sealed arrest *shall*, only as to the person whose arrest was sealed, be stamped ‘ARREST

1 SEALED: DO NOT RELEASE OUTSIDE THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SEC TOR,’ and shall note
2 next to the stamp the date the arrest was sealed and the section pursuant to which the arrest was
3 sealed.” The responsible local law enforcement agency shall ensure that this note is included in all
4 master copies, digital or otherwise, of the police investigative report related to the arrest that was
5 sealed.” Pen. Code 851.92(b)(3).

6 71. California Penal Code § 851.92(b)(5) provides that “Arrest records, police
7 investigative reports, and court records that are sealed under this section shall not be disclosed to any
8 person or entity except the person whose arrest was sealed or a criminal justice agency. Nothing shall
9 prohibit disclosure of information between criminal history providers.”

10 72. According to the Sealing Order, the Sealed Report “shall be sealed under the
11 provisions of section 851.91, and the arrest deemed not to have occurred.” California Penal Code §
12 166 prohibits any person from disobeying a court order.

13 73. The language of each Penal Code §§ 851.92(b)(4), 851.92(b)(5), and the Sealing Order
14 affirmatively imposes a duty and provides implementing guidelines.

15 74. Defendants violated these provisions of the Penal Code by the conduct described
16 herein. Specifically, and among other things, Defendants failed to include the required stamp and
17 note on the Sealed Report when the unredacted Sealed Report was released to Oldfather; released the
18 Sealed Report and its contents on multiple occasions to unauthorized individuals, including releasing
19 the unredacted Sealed Report to Oldfather at or around the same time that Defendants acknowledged
20 that Oldfather was not an authorized recipient and only after approval was sought and received from
21 the “investigative unit”; and failing to abide by the Sealing Order by this same conduct.

22 75. The City failed and refused to enforce the prohibition on releasing the Sealed Report
23 set forth in the Penal Code and the Sealing.

24 76. When Defendants violated these sections of the Penal Code and the Sealing Order,
25 they were acting within the course of their employment.

26 77. Plaintiff is in the class of persons protected by these sections of the Penal Code and the
27 Sealing Order.

28 78. Penal Code §§ 851.91 and 851.92 and the Sealing Order were enacted to protect
individuals who were arrested without a conviction.

EXHIBIT B

Respondents' Motion for Judicial Notice

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City Attorney
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Chief Trial Deputy
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ELECTRONICALLY
FILED

Superior Court of California,
County of San Francisco

06/30/2025
Clerk of the Court

BY: JAMES FORONDA
Deputy Clerk

**EXEMPT FROM FILING FEES
PURSUANT TO GOVERNMENT
CODE SECTION 6103**

8 Attorneys for Defendant
CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO

10 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

11 COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO

12 UNLIMITED JURISDICTION

13 MAURY BLACKMAN, an individual,

14 Plaintiff,

15 vs.

16 THE CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN
FRANCISCO, DIANE BRYAN; and DOES 1-
17 25, inclusive,

18 Defendants.

Case No. CGC-25-624793

**REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE IN
SUPPORT OF CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN
FRANCISCO'S SPECIAL MOTION TO
STRIKE PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT AND
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES**

Hearing Date: July 25, 2025
Hearing Judge: Hon. Christine Van Aken
Time: 9:00 a.m.
Place: Dept. 301

Date Action Filed: April 25, 2025
Trial Date: Not Set.

23 TO THE COURT, ALL PARTIES TO THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

24 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT on July 25, 2025, at 9:00 a.m. or as soon thereafter as this
25 matter may be heard, in Department 301 of the Superior Court for the County of San Francisco,
26 located at 400 McAllister Street, San Francisco, California, Defendant the City and County of San
27 Francisco ("the City") will, and hereby does, request this Court take judicial notice of the records and
28 information referenced below and attached hereto, which are described below.

1 The City hereby requests that the Court take judicial notice of the following pursuant to
2 California Evidence Code sections 452, and 453:

3 **Media**

4 1. Attached hereto as **Exhibit A** is a true and correct copy of the Wall Street Journal's
5 article, *Premise Data Taps new CEO for Gig-Based Data Collection Startup*, published on February 6,
6 2018 at 7:30 AM ET.

7 2. Attached hereto as **Exhibit B** is a true and correct copy of the Wall Street Journal's
8 article, *App Taps Unwitting Users Abroad to Gather Open-Source Intelligence*, published on June 24,
9 2021.

10 3. Attached hereto as **Exhibit C** is a true and correct copy of the Wall Street Journal's
11 article, *Gig App Gathering Data for U.S. Military, Others Prompt Safety Concerns*, published on
12 March 5, 2022.

13 4. Attached hereto as **Exhibit D** is a true and correct redacted and highlighted copy of the
14 Declaration of Jack Poulson In Support of Defendant Jack Poulson's Special Motion to Strike in *John*
15 *Doe (Maury Blackman) v. Substack, Inc., et al.* (San Francisco Superior Court, Case No. CGC-24-
16 618681), filed on December 6, 2024.

17 **Other Lawsuits and Judicial Admissions by Blackman**

18 5. Attached hereto as **Exhibit E** are true and correct redacted copies of pleadings filed by
19 Premise Data Corporation in Santa Clara Superior Court. The two cases were later consolidated:

20 a. Steffen Weiss's Third-Party Response In Support of Notice of Related Case in *Premise*
21 *Data Corporation v. Alex Pompe* (Santa Clara Superior Court, Case No. 19CV346678),
22 filed on October 21, 2020.

23 b. Stipulation and Order to Consolidate Related Actions in *Premise Data Corporation v.*
24 *Alex Pompe* (Santa Clara Superior Court, Case No. 19CV346678) and *Premise Data*
25 *Corporation v. David Mendelson, et al.* (Santa Clara Superior Court, Case No.
26 21CV385478), filed on August, 24, 2022.

27 c. Declaration of Kenneth Naby In Opposition to Premise Data Corporation's Ex Parte
28 Application and In Support of Application to Lodge Conditionally Under Seal in

1 *Premise Data Corporation v. Alex Pompe, et al.* (Santa Clara Superior Court, Case No.
2 19CV346678), filed on October 18, 2023.

3 6. Attached hereto as **Exhibit F** is a true and correct redacted copy of the Order to Seal
4 Report 210-844-280, dated February 17, 2022.

5 7. Attached hereto as **Exhibit G** is a true and correct redacted and highlighted copy of the
6 Memorandum of Points and Authorities In Support of Premise Data Corporation’s Ex Parte
7 Application for an Order Specially Setting a Closed Hearing and Requiring Responses be Lodge
8 Conditionally Under Seal in *Premise Data Corporation v. Alex Pompe, et al.* (Santa Clara Superior
9 Court, Case No. 19CV346678) filed on April 4, 2024.

10 8. Attached hereto as **Exhibit H** is a true and correct redacted copy of the Declaration of
11 Seth K. Kugler In Support of Premise Data Corporatio’s Ex Parte Application to Shorten Time in
12 *Premise Data Corporation v. Alex Pompe, et al.* (Santa Clara Superior Court, Case No. 19CV346678),
13 filed on April 17, 2024.

14 9. Attached hereto as **Exhibit I** is a true and correct redacted copy of the Declaration of
15 Dhaivat H. Shah In Support of Premise Data Corporation’s Motion for Protective Order and Sanctions
16 in *Premise Data Corporation v. Alex Pompe, et al.* (Santa Clara Superior Court, Case No.
17 19CV346678), filed on April 22, 2024.

18 10. Attached hereto as **Exhibit J** are true and correct redacted copies of the Government
19 Claim and notices from the City:

20 a. Government Claim filed by Maury Blackman on September 12, 2024.

21 b. Notice of Insufficiency from the City, dated September 13, 2024.

22 c. Notice of Denial of Claim from the City, dated October 28, 2024.

23 11. Attached hereto as **Exhibit K** is a true and correct copy of the Complaint in *John Doe*
24 (*Maury Blackman*) *v. Substack, Inc., et al.* (San Francisco Superior Court, Case No. CGC-24-618681),
25 filed on October 3, 2024.

26 12. Attached hereto as **Exhibit L** is a true and correct redacted and highlighted copy of the
27 Declaration of Maury Blackman In Opposition to Defendants’ Special Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s
28

1 Complaint in *John Doe (Maury Blackman) v. Substack, Inc., et al.* (San Francisco Superior Court,
2 Case No. CGC-24-618681), filed on December 23, 2024.

3 13. Attached hereto as **Exhibit M** is a true and correct highlighted copy of the Declaration
4 of Maury Blackman In Futher Support of Plaintiff's Motion to Seal in *John Doe (Maury Blackman) v.*
5 *Substack, Inc., et al.* (San Francisco Superior Court, Case No. CGC-24-618681), filed on December
6 27, 2024.

7 14. Attached hereto as **Exhibit N** is a true and correct redacted and highlighted copy of the
8 Declaration of Maury Blackman in *John Doe (Maury Blackman) v. Substack, Inc., et al.* (San
9 Francisco Superior Court, Case No. CGC-24-618681), filed on January 14, 2025.

10 15. Attached hereto as **Exhibit O** is a true and correct highlighted copy of the Order
11 Granting Motions to Strike Complaint by Substack, Inc., Amazon Web Services, Inc., Jack Poulson,
12 and Tech Inquiry, Inc. in *John Doe (Maury Blackman) v. Substack, Inc., et al.* (San Francisco Superior
13 Court, Case No. CGC-24-618681), filed on February 14, 2025.

14 **Public Records Requests**

15 16. A true and correct redacted copy of the log of PRA Requests related to the Blackman
16 Report, attached as **Exhibit 1** to the Declaration of Linda Caravelli filed concurrently herewith.

17 17. The copies of each Incident Report Request and Public Records Request for the
18 Blackman Report are attached, with redactions of the individual's name and contact information, are
19 authenticated and attached as **Exhibit 2** to the Declaration of Linda Caravelli filed concurrently
20 herewith:

- 21 a. Incident Report Request Detail Record (#R030311-122721) made by Maury Blackman
22 on December 27, 2021 for the Blackman Report.
- 23 b. Public Records Request Detail Record (#P063296-022322) made by Steffen Weiss on
24 February 23, 2022 for the Blackman Report.
- 25 c. Incident Report Request Detail Record (#R010166-050322) made by Newton Oldfather
26 on May 3, 2022 for the Blackman Report.
- 27 d. Incident Report Request Detail Record (#R011205-051622) made by Newton Oldfather
28 on May 16, 2022 for the Blackman Report.

- 1 e. Incident Report Request Detail Record (#R026514-100323) made by David S. on
2 October 3, 2023 for the Blackman Report.
- 3 f. Incident Report Request Detail Record (#R026487-100323) made by Jake L. for the
4 Blackman Report.
- 5 g. Public Records Request Detail Record (#P130942-101623) made by Rick K. on behalf
6 of Whitestar Group on October 16, 2023 for the distribution records for the Blackman
7 Report.
- 8 h. Public Records Request Detail Record (#P131324-101823) made by David S. on
9 October 18, 2023 for the distribution records for the Blackman Report.
- 10 i. Incident Report Request Detail Record (#R028934-102623) made by David C. on
11 October 26, 2023 for the Blackman Report.
- 12 j. Public Records Request Detail Record (#P132664-102723) made by David S. on
13 October 27, 2023 for any communications between SFPD and Newton Oldfather in
14 response to Mr. Oldfather’s request for the Blackman Report.
- 15 k. Incident Report Request Detail Record (#R032984-120623) made by Bret C. on
16 December 6, 2023 for the Blackman Report.
- 17 l. Incident Report Request Detail Record (#T011581-061324) made by Teri Torgeson, in
18 his official capacity for the Department of Police Accountability, on June 13, 2024 for
19 the Blackman Report.
- 20 m. Incident Report Request Detail Record (#T013233-060425) made by David M. on June
21 4, 2025 for the Blackman Report.

ARGUMENT

22

23 The Court may take judicial notice of **Exhibits A through D** because the media reports
24 regarding Plaintiff and his Company demonstrate the public interest and dates of when that attention
25 began, which is “not reasonably subject to dispute and . . . capable of immediate and accurate
26 determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy.” (Evid. Code, § 452(h).) The
27 Court may take judicial notice of matters of public record and documents that are readily verifiable,
28 including public records and government documents available from reliable sources on the internet,

1 such as websites run by governmental agencies. (See *Reyn's Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc.* (9th
2 Cir. 2006) 442 F.3d 741, 746, fn. 6; see *Gerritsen v. Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc.* (C.D. Cal. 2015)
3 112 F.Supp.3d 1011, 1033-1034 [“the court can take judicial notice of ‘[p]ublic records and
4 government documents available from reliable sources on the Internet,’ such as websites run by
5 governmental agencies”].)

6 The media’s articles are provided for the nonhearsay purpose of demonstrating public interest,
7 warnings and awareness and notice by Plaintiff. (See *Sonoma Cnty. Emps.’ Ret. Assn. v. Superior Ct.*
8 (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 986, 1006.) Courts may take judicial notice of publications introduced to
9 indicate what was in the public realm at the time, not whether the contents of those articles were in
10 fact true and not subject to reasonable dispute. (*Sexton v. Apple Studios LLC* (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th
11 183, 193-194 (granting judicial notice of government public health postings and media articles during
12 the pandemic); *Seelig v. Infinity Broadcasting Corp.* (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 798, 807, fn. 5); *Von*
13 *Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena* (9th Cir. 2010) 592 F.3d 954, 960 [taking judicial
14 notice of the articles related to public knowledge]; see also *Heliotrope Gen. Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.*
15 (9th Cir. 1999) 189 F.3d 971, 981 fn. 118 [taking judicial notice “that the market was aware of the
16 information contained in news articles submitted by the defendants”].)

17 The Court may take judicial notice of **Exhibits E, G through I, and K through O**, filings in
18 related cases because they are “[r]ecords of . . . any court of this state.” (Evid. Code, § 452(d)(1).)

19 The Court may take judicial notice of **Exhibits F and J**, the Government Claim of Plaintiff and
20 the City’s response, the Public Records Request Act, and the records related to the Hall of Justice
21 Order to Seal the Maurice Blackman Incident Report as official acts of the State and the United States.
22 (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (c).) In *Inns-by-the-Sea v. California Mutual Ins. Co.*, the court granted
23 judicial notice of the orders, including government orders restricting the movement of citizens, city
24 employees, and the operation of City functions to redirect all resources in responding to the pandemic
25 and ensuring the safety of City workers and related contractors. ((2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 688, 693,
26 citing *Cruz v. County of Los Angeles* (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 1131, 1134, [“under Evid. Code, § 452,
27 subd. (c), ‘judicial notice may be taken of “[o]fficial acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial
28 departments of the United States and of any state in the United States,” . . . [which] includes judicial

1 notice of official acts of a county”]; *see also Givens v. Newsom* (E.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2021, No. 22-cv-
2 00852-JAM-CKD) 2021 WL 4553643, at *2 [taking judicial notice of Governor’s executive orders
3 regarding the state of emergency].) Further, the Court may take judicial notice of these records as “not
4 reasonably subject to dispute and . . . capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to
5 sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy.” (Evid. Code, § 452(h).)

6 Finally, for any matter specified in Evidence Code section 452, a trial court must take judicial
7 notice if the requesting party gives the adverse party sufficient notice of the request and “[f]urnishes
8 the court with sufficient information to enable it to take judicial notice of the matter.” (Evid. Code, §
9 453(a)(b).)

10 Dated: June 30, 2025

11 DAVID CHIU
12 City Attorney
13 JENNIFER CHOI
14 Chief Trial Deputy
15 ZUZANA S. IKELS
16 Deputy City Attorney

17 By: /s/ Zuzana S. Ikels
18 ZUZANA S. IKELS

19 Attorneys for Defendant(s)
20 CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

Exhibit F

Arrest Seal Pursuant to Penal Code section(s):

851.87 851.90 851.91 851.92 1000.4 1001.9

Court #: 21012756

Date: 2.17.2022

**ARREST SEALED: DO NOT
RELEASE OUTSIDE OF THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTOR**



Report # 210 - 844 - 280

Please ask to speak to a Crime Information Services supervisor at (415) 575-7232 if you are trying to obtain this report. Thank you.

ORDER TO SEAL RECORDS

ORDER TO SEAL RECORDS FROM THE MUNICIPAL / SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA IN THE CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO BY THE PETITIONER.

SEAL OR REDACT ON THIS DATE: 2.17.2022
COURT NUMBER: 21012756 SF #: 701819

NAME: Blickman, Delwin DATE OF BIRTH: [REDACTED]

REQUEST FOR SEALING AND OR REDACTING OF POLICE REPORTS S.F.P.D., CIS UNIT-1245 3RD ST., SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94158.

<u>210</u>	<u>844</u>	<u>280</u>	SEAL	<u>X</u>
			REDACT	
			SEAL	
			REDACT	
			SEAL	
			REDACT	
			SEAL	
			REDACT	

RECEIVED THE SEALING / REDACTION REQUEST FROM /S.F.P.D. IDENTIFICATION UNIT ON 10.15.22

RECEIVED AND PROCESSED BY: K. VELLA S.F.P.D.
CIS UNIT. DATE: DEC 14 2022 C.I.S.

EXHIBIT C

Respondents' Motion for Judicial Notice

1 DAVID CHIU, State Bar #189542
City Attorney
2 JENNIFER CHOI, State Bar #184058
Chief Trial Deputy
3 ZUZANA S. IKELS, State Bar # 208671
Deputy City Attorney
4 Fox Plaza
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5 San Francisco, California 94102-5408
Telephone: (415) 355-3307
6 Facsimile: (415) 554-3837
E-Mail: Zuzana.Ikels@sfcityatty.org

7
8 Attorneys for Defendant
CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO

ELECTRONICALLY
FILED

Superior Court of California,
County of San Francisco

06/30/2025
Clerk of the Court

BY: JAMES FORONDA
Deputy Clerk

**EXEMPT FROM FILING FEES
PURSUANT TO GOVERNMENT
CODE SECTION 6103**

9
10 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

11 COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO

12 UNLIMITED JURISDICTION

13 MAURY BLACKMAN, an individual,

14 Plaintiff,

15 vs.

16 THE CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN
FRANCISCO, DIANE BRYAN; and DOES 1-
17 25, inclusive,

18 Defendants.

Case No. CGC-25-624793

**DECLARATION OF DIANE BRYAN IN
SUPPORT OF CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN
FRANCISCO'S SPECIAL MOTION TO
STRIKE PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT AND
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES**

[Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16]

Hearing Date: July 25, 2025
Hearing Judge: Hon. Christine Van Aken
Time: 9:00 a.m.
Place: Dept. 301

Date Action Filed: April 25, 2025
Trial Date: Not Set.

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26 I, DIANE BRYAN, declare as follows:

27 1. Except where otherwise indicated, the following facts are known to me personally, and
28

1 if called upon as a witness, I would testify to them competently.

2 2. I began working in the Crime Information Services Unit (“CISU”) department of the
3 San Francisco Police Department in 2016. I have a Bachelor’s Degree from San Francisco State
4 University with a double major in corporate finance and financial services.

5 3. CISU is the San Francisco Police Department’s (“SFPD”) responsible entity for
6 processing police incident reports requested from the public, law enforcement agencies and other
7 authorized governmental organizations. An “incident report” is a police report written by a police
8 officer which can be related to, as just examples, an arrest, the response to a public report of a crime, a
9 traffic collision, a domestic violence incident, a medical emergency, a public protest, or a multitude of
10 different police-related calls for service. CISU also processes local criminal background checks for
11 law enforcement and governmental agencies who are entitled to that information under the law.

12 4. The process by which CISU is responsible for, among other things, responding to the
13 public’s request for police records is through the California Public Records Act (“CPRA”). The most
14 common method to request an incident report from CISU is through SFPD’s online portal, which we
15 refer to as the “GovQA” portal. The GovQA portal requires a report requestor to create an online
16 account and provide contact information as well as information regarding the nature of their CPRA
17 request.

18 5. The online GovQA portal is used to track the request, facilitate communication between
19 the requestor and CISU, and can also be used as a method to transmit and/or receive an approved
20 report or notify the requestor of a denial of their request. The portal timestamps when a request is
21 made, CISU’s response, and all subsequent communications. In addition to using the GovQA online
22 portal, members of the public can also make CPRA requests by filling out a request in person at the
23 CISU front counter at SFPD headquarters located at 1245 3rd Street, in San Francisco. Although there
24 is a general email address for CISU (sfpd.cisu@sfgov.org), it is not used for requesting reports, but
25 only for general inquiry, to ensure that we can monitor and track all report requests.

26 6. I process anywhere from 60-80 requests a day from the public. My process of
27 responding to report requests depends on the type of record requested, the type of requestor
28

1 (victim/suspect/attorney) and the SFPD department involved. Before we release a particular record, we
2 make determinations as to whether the requested records are subject to or exempt from disclosure,
3 which include, as examples, whether the report relates to an ongoing, active investigation, criminal
4 prosecution, juvenile records, sexual crimes, if there are privacy, government or legal issues that
5 outweigh the public disclosure, or the existence of court orders. Thus, we work with the investigative
6 unit(s) assigned to the incident report to obtain authorization to release the record once it is no longer
7 an active case.

8 7. In order to obtain and receive a requested police report, CISU requires the requestor to
9 upload a copy of a Valid Identification card (any current ID, including a valid driver's license, S.F.
10 City I.D. card, a state-issued I.D. card, or a passport (originating country OK) along with their request.

11 8. According to the GovQA database related to Maurice Blackman, on December 27,
12 2021, a requestor named Maurice Blackman requested a copy of the Police Incident Report related to
13 Mr. Blackman on the date of December 21, 2021. Before being released, CISU first sought
14 authorization from the SFPD's Special Victims Unit so that it could be released without interfering
15 with a possibly open and active investigation. On February 13, 2022, SVU authorized the release of
16 the incident report to Mr. Blackman, and CISU in turn provided a copy of the report to Mr. Blackman
17 on February 14, 2022.

18 9. On May 3, 2022, a requester identifying themselves as Newton Oldfather submitted a
19 CPRA request for a release of an Incident Report which occurred on "12/22/2021" as to "Maurice
20 Delwin Blackman." Mr. Oldfather's stated reason for the information was an "Attorney Investigation."
21 On July 21, 2022, our office sent back a form email to Mr. Oldfather requesting that he "provide
22 authorization from the party named in the report." Requesting an authorization letter from a client is
23 CISU's standard operating procedure when a requestor identifies themselves as an attorney or as
24 acting on behalf of a client. See [https://www.sanfranciscopolice.org/get-service/request-police-](https://www.sanfranciscopolice.org/get-service/request-police-incident-report-copy)
25 [incident-report-copy](https://www.sanfranciscopolice.org/get-service/request-police-incident-report-copy). This authorization is required by CISU because the production and redaction
26 guidelines differ when the requestor is the victim as opposed to the suspect or a non-related party.
27
28

1 10. When requested as an attorney must provide/upload a photo of his or her business card
2 and State Bar Number. In addition, the attorney must provide written documentation that he/she is the
3 attorney for the person requesting the information in the form of a retainer agreement, letter on law
4 firm letterhead stating that the victim/suspect/etc is a client, or a letter signed by the client, designating
5 the lawyer as his/her representative. Based on a review of our records, Mr. Oldfather did not respond
6 to CISU's request for proof of authorization on May 3, 2022.

7 11. On May 9, 2022, a requester again identified as Newton Oldfather submitted another
8 CPRA request via the GovQA online portal with an Incident Report Number and identified Maurice
9 Delwin Blackman as the name listed on the report. In contrast to the earlier May 3, 2022 request made
10 by Newton Oldfather that was still pending, this request by Newton Oldfather did not identify himself
11 as an attorney in the request. (see the "May 9, 2022 CPRA Request"). Since the Newton Oldfather that
12 made this new May 9, 2022 request did not identify himself as an attorney, this new request was
13 treated as a public request and accordingly CISU made no demand for an authorization letter from
14 Newton Oldfather for the new, May 9, 2022 request.

15 12. As is CISU standard practice, each day CISU members are randomly assigned a
16 number of public or law enforcement PRA requests to process. I was randomly assigned Newton
17 Oldfather's May 9, 2022 PRA request along with a number of additional random public requests to
18 process. Because Mr. Oldfather's May 9, 2022 PRA request did not state that it was being made by an
19 attorney or on behalf of a client, we did not need, nor did we request proof of authorization from Mr.
20 Oldfather.

21 13. On May 16, 2022, I routed Mr. Oldfather's May 9, 2022 PRA request to the SFPD's
22 Special Victim's Unit for release approval because the incident report requested involved a domestic
23 violence incident. SVU authorized the release of the requested incident report to Mr. Oldfather, which
24 CISU provided via the GovQA portal on May, 17, 2022.

25 14. I have never met, spoken with or had any contact whatsoever with a Newton Oldfather,
26 other than responding to one of the two PRA requests (the May 9, 2022 request) that he submitted via
27 the GovQA online portal. I have no relationship, business or personal, with Mr. Oldfather. Likewise, I
28

1 have never met, spoken with or had any contact whatsoever with Plaintiff Maurice Blackman. I have
2 no relationship, business or personal, with Mr. Blackman. My knowledge about these two individuals
3 is limited to this litigation and the claims asserted by Mr. Blackman.

4 15. As of May 2022, CISU had not received any order or directives from the Hall of Justice
5 Criminal Court related to Mr. Blackman's incident as documented in SFPD incident report. I am not
6 including the number of the incident report given the allegations in this lawsuit. The CISU department
7 processes thousands of court orders related to SFPD incident reports. A court's order and instructions
8 can differ as to a particular report depending upon which California Penal Code is cited as the sealing
9 code. When CISU receives a Court Order, our office date-stamps both the date that the court order is
10 received as well as the date that CISU processes the order. We attach those sealing instructions, with
11 those dates, on top of the incident report in our records system, so that the CISU department is notified
12 of the court's sealing instruction as to said record.

13 16. Attached as Exhibit F to the Request for Judicial Notice is a true and correct copy of the
14 sealing order instructions related to the Incident Report that is now affixed to the Blackman Incident
15 Report. The first page states: "Arrest Sealed: Do Not Release Outside of the Criminal Justice Sector",
16 pursuant to California Penal Code Section 851.91, which refers to a sealing order that was delivered
17 from the Hall of Justice – Criminal Court. At the bottom of the second page, entitled "Order to Seal
18 Records," it shows that CISU received the sealing instruction order on October 15, 2022, and CISU
19 reviewed and processed the instructions on December 14, 2022, which was five months after the May
20 9, 2022 PRA request, and unknown to CISU at the time it was processed and provided the requested
21 report.

22 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is
23 true and correct, and that I sign this declaration on June 30, 2025 in San Francisco, California.

24 
25 _____
26 DIANE BRYAN

EXHIBIT D

Respondents' Motion for Judicial Notice

1 DAVID CHIU, State Bar #189542
City Attorney
2 JENNIFER CHOI, State Bar #184058
Chief Trial Deputy
3 ZUZANA S. IKELS, State Bar # 208671
Deputy City Attorney
4 Fox Plaza
1390 Market Street, Sixth Floor
5 San Francisco, California 94102-5408
Telephone: (415) 355-3307
6 Facsimile: (415) 554-3837
E-Mail: Zuzana.Ikels@sfcityatty.org

ELECTRONICALLY
FILED

Superior Court of California,
County of San Francisco

09/05/2025
Clerk of the Court

BY: DANIEL DIAZ
Deputy Clerk

8 Attorneys for Defendant
CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO

**EXEMPT FROM FILING FEES
PURSUANT TO GOVERNMENT
CODE SECTION 6103**

10 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

11 COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO

12 UNLIMITED JURISDICTION

13 MAURY BLACKMAN, an individual,

14 Plaintiff,

15 vs.

16 THE CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN
FRANCISCO, DIANE BRYAN; and DOES 1-
17 25, inclusive,

18 Defendants.

Case No. CGC-25-624793

NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER

Date Action Filed: April 25, 2025

Trial Date: Not Set.

PROOF OF SERVICE

I, KASSY ADAMS, declare as follows:

I am a citizen of the United States, over the age of eighteen years and not a party to the above-entitled action. I am employed at the City Attorney’s Office of San Francisco, Fox Plaza Building, 1390 Market Street, Sixth Floor, San Francisco, CA 94102.

On September 5, 2025, I served the following document(s):

NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER

on the following persons at the locations specified:

David Marek, Esq.
Ami Sanghvi, Esq.
THE MAREK LAW FIRM, INC.
228 Hamilton Avenue
Palo Alto, CA 94301

Telephone: (650) 460-7148

david@marekfirm.com
ami@marekfirm.com

Attorneys for Plaintiff Maury Blackman


in the manner indicated below:

BY ELECTRONIC MAIL: Based on a court order or an agreement of the parties to accept electronic service, I caused the documents to be served electronically through File & ServeXpress in portable document format ("PDF") Adobe Acrobat.

BY ELECTRONIC MAIL: I caused a copy of such document to be transmitted *via* electronic mail in portable document format ("PDF") Adobe Acrobat from the electronic address: kassy.adams@sfcityatty.org.

I declare under penalty of perjury pursuant to the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed September 5, 2025, at San Francisco, California.



KASSY ADAMS

EXHIBIT A


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FILED
Superior Court of California
County of San Francisco

SEP 02 2025

CLERK OF THE COURT

BY:  Deputy Clerk

**SUPERIOR COURT OF STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO
CIVIL UNLIMITED JURISDICTION**

MAURY BLACKMAN, an individual,

Plaintiff,

v.

THE CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN
FRANCISCO, DIANE BRYAN; DOES 1-
25, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No.: CGC-25-624793

**ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND
DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS'
SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT**

(Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16)

1 Defendants City and County of San Francisco (“CCSF”) and Diane Bryan’s Special Motion to
2 Strike under the Anti-SLAPP Statutes came on for hearing on August 11, 2025. David Marek and
3 The Marek Law Firm, Inc. appeared for Plaintiff Maury Blackman. Zuzana S. Ikels and the San
4 Francisco City Attorney appeared for Defendants. Following the hearing, the court took the motion
5 under submission.

6 Upon consideration of the documents and materials filed in support of and in opposition to the
7 special motion to strike, the arguments presented and the record on the motion and good cause
8 appearing, Defendants’ special motion to strike is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.

9 On December 21, 2021, police responded to a report of domestic violence where they encountered
10 and arrested Plaintiff Maury Blackman. Responding officers wrote an incident report documenting
11 their investigation and Blackman’s arrest. On February 17, 2022, Judge Carolyn Gold ordered the
12 incident report sealed. It took some time for news of the sealing order to get to the San Francisco
13 Police Department.

14 Defendant Diane Bryan works in the San Francisco Police Department’s Crime Information
15 Services Unit (CISU), which processes and responds to public records requests. Plaintiff alleges that
16 sometime before May 3, 2022, Newton Oldfather requested the incident report. On May 9, 2022,
17 Oldfather requested the report again. Eight days later, Bryan released the full incident report.
18 Oldfather, according to Plaintiff, was a deputy city attorney until April 2021, he somehow obtained
19 the incident number from Plaintiff’s December 2021 arrest, and he artfully persuaded Bryan to
20 wrongly give him the police report in response to his CPRA requests so he could use it in litigation in
21 which he was defending employees sued by their former employer Premise Data Corporation;
22 Plaintiff Blackman was Premise Data’s CEO and the inference is Oldfather intended to use the
23 incident against Blackman and Premise Data, perhaps to embarrass one or both of them. (Compl.
24 paras. 31, 34.)

25 Fast forward, “in or around 2023, Jack Poulson[, a journalist,] telephoned CISU and provided the
26 incident report and “asked for and received confirmation of each pertinent detail in the report.”
27 (Compl. para. 52.) “On September 14, 2023, Poulson, who published a blog on Substack,
28 disseminated the [incident report] in its unredacted form. Prior to Poulson’s publication, Plaintiff did

1 not know, and could not have reasonably known, that Defendants had released the [incident report] to
2 anyone without Plaintiff's authorization." (Compl. para. 53.) "Plaintiff has suffered severe harm as a
3 result of Defendant's actions []. Amon[g] other things, Plaintiff's employment ended on December
4 10, 2023; Plaintiff's reputation amongst his friends, family and business associates has been forever
5 altered; Plaintiff has suffered severe emotional distress; Plaintiff has been unable to find subsequent
6 comparable employment, resulting in significant lost employment compensation and benefits; and
7 Plaintiff has been forced to spend money to cure the situation that will haunt him the rest of his life."
8 (Compl. para. 67.)

9 "In or around late 2023 or early 2024, an acquaintance of Plaintiff inquired through the SFPD
10 about the [incident report]. The SFPD confirmed to this individual the existence of the [incident
11 report] and the contents of the [incident report]." (Compl. para. 57.)

12 "In or around spring 2024, a family member of Plaintiff inquired through the SFPD about the
13 [incident report]. The SFPD confirmed to Plaintiff's daughter the existence of the [incident report] and
14 the contents of the [incident report]." (Compl. para. 57.)

15 On September 12, 2024—a year after Poulson's publication and more than nine months after he
16 lost his job allegedly as a result of Defendants' disclosures, Plaintiff filed a claim for damages with
17 CCSF in accordance with the Government Claims Act. On September 13, 2024, CCSF mailed
18 Plaintiff a Notice of Insufficiency stating the claim failed to state the accrual date. On October 28,
19 2024, CCSF mailed Plaintiff a Notice of Action Upon Claim, informing him his claim for damages
20 against CCSF was denied.

21 Plaintiff now is suing CCSF and Bryan. In his complaint, Plaintiff contends that CCSF and Bryan
22 breached their duty to follow sealing laws and the order signed by Judge Gold when they released the
23 incident report to Oldfather and acknowledged its existence discussed its contents pursuant to the
24 separate inquiries by Paulson, Plaintiff's acquaintance and Plaintiff's daughter. (See Compl. paras.
25 74, 88 & 96.) Also, Plaintiff alleges that CCSF failed to punish the publishers of the incident report.
26 Plaintiff alleges causes of action for (1) negligence per se, (2) negligence, and (3) public disclosure of
27 private facts. Defendants now move to strike the entire complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute, Code
28 of Civil Procedure section 425.16. As discussed below, their motion succeeds in part and fails in part.

1 **Evidentiary Rulings**

2 Plaintiff's request for judicial notice is ruled on as follows: The court grants the request as to
3 Exhibits A, B and C. As to the court filing, notice is limited to the purposes allowed and does not, for
4 example, extend to the truth of the facts asserted.

5 Defendants' request for judicial notice is ruled on as follows. The court grants the request as to
6 Exhibits A, B and C as to the existence of the articles, but, of course, not as to the truth of the matters
7 asserted. Plaintiff relevance objection is overruled. The court grants the request as to Exhibit D,
8 which is unopposed. The court grants the request as to Exhibit E; Plaintiff's relevance objection is
9 overruled. The court grants the request as to Exhibit F. The court denies the request as to Exhibits G,
10 H & I. The court grants the request as to Exhibit J, which is unopposed. The court denies the request
11 as to Exhibit K. The court grants the request as to Exhibits L, M & N; Plaintiff's relevance objections
12 are overruled. The court grants the request as to Exhibit O, which is unopposed.

13
14 **Anti-SLAPP Analysis**

15 "SLAPP" is an acronym for Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, which are lawsuits
16 designed to chill the exercise of speech and petition rights. "The anti-SLAPP statute helps 'combat
17 lawsuits designed to chill the exercise of free speech and petition rights'" (Park v. Board of Trustees
18 of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1060.) Section 425.16 of the Code of Civil
19 Procedure, specifically, provides for a special motion to strike "[a] cause of action against a person
20 arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person's right of petition or free speech under
21 the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue.' (Code
22 Civ. Proc., 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)" (Cabrera v. Alam (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1077, 1085.)

23 In deciding a special motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute, the court undertakes a two-
24 step analysis. The first step addresses whether a claim "arises from protected activity." (Park, supra, 2
25 Cal.5th at 1062.) A claim "arises from protected activity" when "protected activity" forms a basis for
26 the defendant's liability. (Id.; see Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1010
27 [focus at this step is identifying the alleged protected acts and determining whether they supply the
28 basis for any claim].) On prong one, the moving party bears the burden of establishing that the

1 challenged allegations or claims arise from protected activity in which the defendant has engaged.
2 (Bonni, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1009.) To satisfy the requirements of the first prong, the defendant must
3 show that protected activity constitutes the “wrongful act forming the basis for ... liability” on that
4 claim. (C.W. Howe Partners Inc. v. Mooradian (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 688, 701.)

5 “Protected activity,” in turn, is statutorily defined. To meet prong one, defendants generally must
6 show that plaintiff’s claims arise from: (1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a
7 legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (2)
8 any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or
9 review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by
10 law, (3) any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum
11 in connection with an issue of public interest, or (4) any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise
12 of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a
13 public issue or an issue of public interest. (Code Civ. Proc., 425.16, subd. (e)(1)-(4).) The court
14 construes the anti-SLAPP statute broadly and considers “the pleadings and supporting and opposing
15 affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based” to determine whether the
16 claims implicate protected petitioning activity under section 425.16(e). (Equilon Enters. v. Consumer
17 Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 67; Code Civ. Proc., 425.16, subs. (a) & (b)(2).) The “critical
18 consideration” of the prong one test is “whether the cause of action is based on the defendant’s
19 protected free speech or petitioning activity.” (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 89.) “The
20 anti-SLAPP statute’s definitional focus is not the form of the plaintiff’s cause of action but, rather,
21 the defendant’s activity that gives rise to his or her asserted liability – and whether that activity
22 constitutes protected speech or petitioning.” (Id. at 92.) If the defendant fails to satisfy this burden,
23 then the special motion to strike must be denied. (City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4th 69,
24 76.)

25 If the court finds the moving party has carried its burden on prong one the analysis moves to the
26 second prong. There, the court must decide whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a probability of
27 prevailing on the challenged cause of action. (City of Cotati, supra, 29 Cal.4th at 76.) “The plaintiff
28 must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima

1 facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is
2 credited.” (Wilson v. Parker, Covert & Chidester (2002) 28 Cal.4th 811, 821 (citation modified).) In
3 deciding whether a plaintiff has met this burden, “the trial court considers the pleadings and
4 evidentiary submissions of both the plaintiff and the defendant; though the court does not weigh the
5 credibility or comparative probative strength of competing evidence, it should grant the motion if, as
6 a matter of law, the defendant's evidence supporting the motion defeats the plaintiff's attempt to
7 establish evidentiary support for the claim.” (Id.) On this step, the court does not weigh evidence or
8 resolve conflicting factual claims. (See Billauer v. Escobar-Eck (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 953, 962.) The
9 court “accept[s] as true all evidence favorable to the plaintiff.” (Overstock.com, supra, 151
10 Cal.App.4th at 699.) “Nonetheless, a plaintiff opposing an anti-SLAPP motion cannot rely on
11 allegations in the complaint, but must set forth evidence that would be admissible at trial.” (Id.)

12 Defendant can defeat a claim by showing that it is untimely. (Traditional Cat Assn., Inc. v.
13 Gilbreadth (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 392, 399.) It is Plaintiff's burden to demonstrate timeliness.
14 Plaintiff must also defeat litigation privilege arguments and other legal defenses. (Kashian v.
15 Harriman (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 892, 926-927.)

16 Where, as here, a plaintiff alleges both protected and unprotected activity in connection with a
17 cause of action as framed by the complaint, a moving defendant carries their Prong One burden if
18 they identify a claim (or claims) for relief that is (are) based on the protected activity. (Baral v.
19 Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 395-396.) If they do so, then the analysis moves to Prong Two for the
20 claim based on the protected activity, even if that claim does not constitute a “cause of action” as
21 framed by the complaint. Notably, though, allegations of protected activity that “merely provide
22 context,” are “merely incidental,” or “collateral” are not subject to section 426.16; allegations of
23 protected activity are subject to an anti-SLAPP special motion to strike only if they, in fact, support a
24 claim for relief. (Id. at p. 394, internal quotations omitted.)

25 ///

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27 ///

28

1 **Threshold Issue: Illegal Conduct**

2 As a threshold issue, Plaintiff claims that the anti-SLAPP statutes do not apply to illegal conduct,
3 Defendants' disclosure of the incident report and its contents violated a slew of Penal Code sections,
4 and, therefore, Defendants cannot claim anti-SLAPP protection.

5 “[W]here a defendant brings a motion to strike under section 425.16 based on a claim that the
6 plaintiff's action arises from activity by the defendant in furtherance of the defendant's exercise of
7 protected speech or petition rights; but either the defendant concedes, or the evidence conclusively
8 establishes, that the assertedly protected speech or petition activity was illegal as a matter of law, the
9 defendant is precluded from using the anti-SLAPP statute to strike the plaintiff's action.” (Flatley v.
10 Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, 320.)

11 Here, Defendants have not conceded that the assertedly protected speech or petition activity was
12 illegal as a matter of law. Nor does the record conclusively establish as a matter of law that
13 Defendants' actions related to the incident report illegal. For example, Plaintiff claims Defendants
14 violated Penal Code, section 11142, which makes it unlawful for “[a]ny person authorized to receive
15 a record or information obtained from a record who knowingly furnishes the record or information to
16 a person who is not authorized by law to receive the record or information.” This scienter requirement
17 is not met. Defendant Bryan declares that she and her office had no knowledge of the sealing order
18 when they released the records. (Bryan Decl., par. 15.) Criminal liability would also be unreasonable
19 when the sealing order was not received until October 15, 2022, as Bryan states. (Id. at par. 16.)
20 Plaintiff provides no evidence to the contrary. The cover pages added to the incident report show that
21 SFPD received the sealing order on October 15, 2022, and then did not process it until December 14,
22 2022. (RJN, Ex. F, p. 2.) As far as the rest of the Penal Code sections Plaintiff argues were broken,
23 Plaintiff had the burden to conclusively establish, as a matter of law, that those were knowingly
24 violated. Plaintiff did not meet that burden.

25 Plaintiff argues that ignorance of the law is no excuse. This maxim applies when a defendant
26 claims ignorance as a defense to criminal liability. Here, by contrast, Defendants are arguing that
27 knowledge of the sealed status of the incident report is an element of criminal liability, and here this
28 element has not been established because the only evidence on point before the court demonstrates

1 Defendants did not know about the sealing order. Plaintiff has failed to prove as a matter of law that
2 Defendants' actions related to the incident report were criminal.

3 At the hearing, Defendants argued that the Flatley analysis does not occur until the second prong
4 of an anti-SLAPP analysis. The Supreme Court in Flatley stated that a threshold question on prong
5 one is whether a defendant's conduct was undisputably illegal. (Flatley, supra, 39 Cal.4th at 316.) If a
6 defendant disputes illegality and it "cannot be resolved within the first step [it] must be raised by the
7 plaintiff in connection with the plaintiff's burden to show a probability of prevailing on the merits."
8 (Id.) Plaintiff here argues that the conduct at issue is exempted from protected activity as a threshold
9 matter. Thus, the court must discuss it first. (Cross v. Cooper (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 357, 385, as
10 modified on denial of reh'g (Aug. 4, 2011).) The court finds the conduct at issue here is not
11 indisputably illegal. Thus, the court turns to prong one.

12
13 **Prong One**

14 Defendants here contend Plaintiff's claims arise from speech or petitioning activity under any and
15 every subdivision of section 425.16(e)— (e)(1), (e)(2,) (e)(3) and (e)(4). As framed by the complaint,
16 Plaintiff alleges both protected and unprotected activity in connection with his causes of action. The
17 court must, thus, conduct the Baral analysis.

18 Notably, prior to the hearing on the motion, the court issued a tentative ruling that did not include
19 a Baral analysis. Upon further review, it is clear Plaintiff's claims are mixed—arising from a number
20 of allegations involving discrete conduct, some of which is protected activity and some of which is
21 not (or at least Defendants do not argue that it is). Thus, a Baral analysis is required.

22 First, Plaintiff presents claims arising from his allegation Defendants failed to punish publishers
23 of the incident report. Defendants do not contend that this conduct (or inaction) is protected speech or
24 petitioning activity under the anti-SLAPP statutes. Thus, to the extent such allegations inform a cause
25 of action, the cause of action survives this particular motion. (See Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1009
26 [defendant bears initial burden of establishing allegations or claims arise from protected activity].)

27 Second, Plaintiff presents claims arising from his allegation regarding Bryan's release of the
28 sealed incident report. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges Oldfather knocked on Bryan's door hoping to get

1 information on Plaintiff and Bryan agreed to give Oldfather, a member of the CCSF family, the
2 sealed incident report in order to aid Oldfather's defense of his clients in the Premise Data litigation.
3 Subdivision (e)(2) of section 425.16 provides that "'act in furtherance of a person's [constitutional]
4 right of petition or free speech ... in connection with a public issue' includes ... any written or oral
5 statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative,
6 executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law." (Code Civ. Proc.,
7 section 425.16(e)(2).) As framed by Plaintiff, Bryan was engaged in petitioning activity, i.e.,
8 conspiring and collaborating with Oldfather to promote his and his clients' interests in the Premise
9 Data litigation. Bryan's conduct, as alleged, was protected activity under subdivision (e)(2).

10 Bryan's conduct, again as alleged by Plaintiff, was also protected activity under subdivision
11 (e)(4). Subdivision (e)(4) of section 425.16 provides that an "'act in furtherance of a person's
12 [constitutional] right of petition or free speech ... in connection with a public issue' includes ... any
13 other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional
14 right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest." Courts use a
15 nested two-part test to determine whether activity is protected under subdivision (e)(4)'s broad scope.
16 (FilmOn.com Inc. v. DoubleVerify Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 133.) The first part of the test calls courts to
17 determine what public issue is implicated by the purportedly protected activity. (Id. at 148; Geiser v.
18 Kuhns (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1238, 1254 (holding that FilmOn's first prong is only not met when "an
19 expressive activity, viewed in context, cannot reasonably be understood as implicating a public
20 issue.")) Here, the public issue purportedly implicated is the Premise Data litigation, which the
21 record demonstrates was a matter of public interest covered by the press. It is also true that domestic
22 violence is a matter of public concern, and the incident report indicated that Plaintiff, the CEO of a
23 prominent company with government contracts who was alleged to be involved in covert employee
24 surveillance, was investigated himself for domestic violence.

25 The second part of the test is to determine whether the activity functionally contributes to public
26 discussion of the issue. (FilmOn.com, 7 Cal.5th at 149-150.) Bryan's disclosure, according to
27 Plaintiff's allegation, led to widely distributed, international press reports regarding Plaintiff's
28 involvement in a domestic dispute and investigation of him for domestic violence.

1 Collondrez v. City of Rio Vista (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 1039 is on point. There, a terminated
2 police officer sued a city for disclosing his personnel information to media outlets that requested the
3 information by CPRA request. The Court of Appeal held that “the disclosures were made to
4 journalists pursuant to CPRA requests, were published in news media, and concerned police
5 misconduct—undoubtedly an issue of public interest. [Those CPRA responses] therefore fall within
6 section 425.16, subdivisions (e)(3)...and (e)(4)...” (Collondrez, supra, 61 Cal.App.5th at 1049–1050
7 (citation modified).) This is because “[r]eporting the news [qualifies] as an exercise of free speech.
8 Reporting the news requires the assistance of newsgathering and other related conduct and activity,
9 which are acts undertaken in furtherance of the news media's right to free speech. Such conduct is
10 therefore protected conduct under the anti-SLAPP statute. (Id.) Similarly, here, if, as Plaintiff alleges,
11 Bryan conspired and collaborated with Oldfather to get the incident report to a journalist for
12 international publication, then she was engaged in protected activity under subdivision (e)(4).

13 Thus, as to the causes of action based on Bryan’s conduct, Defendants have carried their burden
14 on prong one.

15 Third, Plaintiff presents claims arising from his allegations regarding an unidentified SFPD
16 officer’s 2023 statements to journalist Poulson in which the officer confirmed the contents of the
17 incident report. The unidentified officer’s alleged conduct is clearly protected activity under
18 subdivision (e)(4). If, as alleged, the unidentified officer confirmed the contents of the police report
19 for a journalist who presumably intended to publish a story about it, the officer’s conduct falls under
20 the broad language of subdivision (e)(4). Under Baral, the unidentified officer’s alleged conduct
21 implicated a public issue, alleged domestic violence by Plaintiff, a prominent CEO. And the officer’s
22 alleged conduct functionally contributed to public discussion of the issue because, according to
23 Plaintiff, it was a necessary predicate to Poulson’s publication of the story.

24 Iloh v. Regents of University of California (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 947 is on point. There, the
25 Court of Appeal found that a reporter who requested records from a university could benefit from
26 anti-SLAPP protections because it is newsgathering under (e)(3) and (e)(4). (Iloh v. Regents of
27 University of California (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 947, 956.) The use of the CPRA to publish in
28 furtherance of the right to a free press is makes the CPRA request and response protected activity.

1 Without that constitutional hook, the request is a run-of-the-mill exercise of the public's right to its
2 records. Even if outside the CPRA context, the unidentified officer's responses to Poulson's questions
3 are reasonably understood as protected activity under (e)(3) and (e)(4).

4 Prior to the hearing, the court issued a tentative ruling denying Defendants' special motion to
5 strike in full on prong one based largely on *evidence* submitted by Defendants discrediting Plaintiff's
6 claims. At the hearing, Defendants argued the prong one analysis must be focused on Plaintiff's
7 allegations. The court agrees. The question on prong one is whether plaintiff's claims arise from
8 protected activity. The analysis should be focused on plaintiff's causes of action and *allegations*
9 because they largely define plaintiff's claims. The parties' evidentiary submissions may add context
10 and illuminate the nature of the claims but the prong one analysis best starts from plaintiff's causes of
11 action and allegations and whether plaintiff's claims, *as alleged*, arise from defendant's protected
12 activity. If, as here, analysis of the allegations reveals that a claim arises from protected speech or
13 petitioning activity, the prong one analysis is complete. Surely, using Defendant's evidence submitted
14 to disprove the claims (prong two evidence) to recast Plaintiff's claims as not arising for protected
15 activity because, for example, certain allegations are untrue, would subvert the intent behind the anti-
16 SLAPP statute, which is to eliminate—not preserve—claims arising from protected activity (prong
17 one) that lack minimal merit (prong two).

18 Fourth, Plaintiff presents claims arising from his allegations regarding an unidentified SFPD
19 officer's 2023/2024 statements to Plaintiff's acquaintance in which the officer confirmed the
20 existence and contents of the incident report. Here, nothing about the allegations regarding this
21 interaction suggests that this unidentified officer was engaged in protected petitioning or speech
22 activity. Nothing links this interaction to the Premise Data litigation. And nothing links it to the news
23 reports. Defendants seem to almost concede the point by not making a specific prong one argument
24 regarding this interaction. Defendants failed to carry their burden.

25 Defendants do argue that their motion should lead to a judgment against Plaintiff on all claims,
26 thus they are contending, sotto voce perhaps, that this unidentified officer's response was protected
27 activity. To accept such a contention would be to hold that every response to a public inquiry,
28 presumably including every CPRA response, is protected activity, meaning that every agency could

1 respond to a CPRA enforcement action by bringing a special motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP
2 statute, section 425.16. It would follow that every party requesting public records would have to
3 decide whether it wants to risk responsibility for the agency's attorney's fees or forgo enforcement.
4 Such a scenario would certainly chill CPRA conduct. Nothing suggests the legislature intended such a
5 result under the CPRA or the anti-SLAPP statute. Indeed, the fees provisions of the CPRA, which
6 make it difficult for an agency to recover fees, are strong evidence of a contrary legislative intent.
7 This is perhaps why no known court has ever adopted the position advocated by Defendants. This
8 court declines to be the first.

9 Fifth, Plaintiff presents claims arising from his allegations regarding an unidentified SFPD
10 officer's Spring 2024 statements to Plaintiff's daughter in which the officer confirmed the existence
11 and contents of the incident report. As with the 2023/2024 statements, nothing about the allegations
12 regarding this interaction suggests that this unidentified officer was engaged in protected petitioning
13 or speech activity. Here, again, Defendants seem to almost concede the point by not making no
14 specific prong one argument regarding this interaction. Defendants failed to carry their burden.

15 In sum, Defendants carried their prong one burden as to Bryan's actions and the unidentified
16 SFPD officer's 2023 statements to journalist Poulson and, therefore, the court will move on to the
17 prong two analysis under Baral as to these allegations. Defendants failed to carry their burden as to
18 the City's alleged non-punishment of publishers of the incident report, the unidentified SFPD
19 officer's alleged 2023/2024 statements to Plaintiff's acquaintance, and the unidentified SFPD
20 officer's alleged Spring 2024 statements to Plaintiff's daughter. Thus, the court will not conduct the
21 prong two analysis as to these allegations.

22
23 **Prong Two**

24 The court moves on to prong two, where it must decide whether, as to his causes of action arising
25 from protected activity, Plaintiff has demonstrated a probability of prevailing. (Civ. Code Proc.,
26 section 425.16, subd. (b).) Plaintiff has not met his burden of proof on prong two for at least three
27 independent reasons: (1) Plaintiff did not set forth any evidence establishing a prima facie case of any

1 cause of action, (2) the claims based on protected activity are all time-barred, and (3) the litigation
2 privilege bars liability on the causes of action arising from Bryan's conduct.

3 ***A. Plaintiff failed to meet his evidentiary burden of showing a prima facie case for negligence***
4 ***per se, negligence or public disclosure of private facts.***

5 Plaintiff failed to demonstrate how his evidence shows a probability that he will prevail on his
6 meets the elements of any of his causes of action, whether negligence per se, negligence or public
7 disclosure of private facts.

8 Take the first cause of action, negligence per se under Government Code, section 815.6. That
9 section states, "[w]here a public entity is under a mandatory duty imposed by an enactment that is
10 designed to protect against the risk of a particular kind of injury, the public entity is liable for an
11 injury of that kind proximately caused by its failure to discharge the duty unless the public entity
12 establishes that it exercised reasonable diligence to discharge the duty." The elements of a claim
13 under that section are: "(1) an enactment must impose a mandatory duty; (2) the enactment must be
14 meant to protect against the kind of risk of injury suffered by the party asserting section 815.6 as a
15 basis for liability; and (3) breach of the mandatory duty must be a proximate cause of the injury
16 suffered." (*San Mateo Union High School Dist. v. County of San Mateo* (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 418,
17 428.)

18 Plaintiff has not demonstrated as to Bryan's conduct, she or CCSF breached a mandatory duty.
19 Plaintiff, in fact, fails to show that Defendants' conduct was a violation of Penal Code section
20 851.92(b)(4) or (5). First, those sections of the Penal Code exempt criminal justice agencies from
21 disclosure liability. (Pen. Code, section 851.92(c).) Defendant Bryan, a member of CISU and the
22 SFPD, is exempted from the statute, as is CCSF. This alone shows there was no evidence that would
23 support the breach of a mandatory duty.

24 Moreover, the statute refers to a "sealed arrest" and this term must be understood in the context of
25 the statute as a whole. A "sealed arrest" is an incident report that is stamped with the admonishment
26 outlined in (b)(4) or otherwise clearly marked as sealed. The legislature did not intend to punish
27 people under this section for the dissemination of a record that was not clearly marked as sealed.
28 Essentially, the stamp and admonishment create a knowledge requirement. Here, there is no evidence

1 that when Bryan disclosed the incident report to Oldfather there was a stamp or admonishment noting
2 the record was sealed; indeed, the only evidence in the record is the incident report at the time had *no*
3 such marking. Therefore, Plaintiff failed to meet his evidentiary burden to show a prima facie case of
4 negligence per se as to Defendant Bryan's disclosure.

5 To interpret the Penal Code otherwise would be contrary to the keystone democratic principle of
6 public access to public records. If public employees risk punishment for disclosures even absent
7 knowledge of sealing, most, if not all, will err on the side of non-disclosure, which is opposite the
8 directive of the CPRA and all public access laws of which the court is aware. Plaintiff has provided
9 no—and the court is unaware of any—evidence the legislature intended any of the cited Penal Code
10 provisions to displace the keystone public access principle.

11 Nor has Plaintiff presented any evidence that would show Bryan's conduct caused him injury.
12 Even in a negligence per se case, Plaintiff still has the burden to prove causation. (*David v.*
13 *Hernandez* (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 578, 584.) Here, Plaintiff states that “[b]ut for Defendants’
14 conduct, Plaintiff would not have suffered the injuries caused by the disclosure of the Sealed Report.”
15 (Opposition, 8.) Not only has Plaintiff failed to back that statement up with competent, admissible
16 evidence, but the facts submitted show that the reputational harm Plaintiff endured was caused by
17 Poulson, whose liability is not at issue in this lawsuit. Further, Plaintiff has not alleged, let alone
18 submitted facts to show the chain of causation between Bryan's release of the incident report to
19 Oldfather and the eventual publication of the report. Plaintiff's declaration shows that the article
20 publishing the report was published on September 14, 2023. (Blackman Decl., Paragraph 5.) He
21 further declares that the incident report was released on May 17, 2022. (*Id.* at Paragraph 6(b).)
22 However, in all of Plaintiff and Defendants' evidence, nowhere does Plaintiff prove the report
23 travelled from Oldfather's hands to Poulson's. Instead, Poulson's declaration establishes that he
24 received the report in an encrypted, unsolicited, and confidential message. (Defendants' RJN, Exhibit
25 D.) There is no evidence the email came from Oldfather or anyone associated with him.

26 Switching to the unidentified SFPD officer's 2023 statements to Poulson, Plaintiff presented no
27 evidence the incident report allegedly considered by the unidentified officer was marked as sealed.
28 Nor has Plaintiff identified evidence supporting a finding that the officer's alleged statements caused

1 him injuries. Poulson does not declare that the officer's statement led him to publish his story or the
2 incident report itself. Though, of course, the court is to construe all evidence in favor of Plaintiff, he
3 provides no evidence to show the officer's alleged statements were a proximate cause of the incident
4 report being published. Indeed, Plaintiff's only evidence in defense of this motion is Blackman's
5 declaration, which doesn't do the job. Without establishing any causal links, Plaintiff has not met his
6 evidentiary burden on prong two as to the negligence per se cause of action. The same is true for the
7 general negligence cause of action, which also fails if causation is not shown.

8 Plaintiff failed to carry his burden as to his negligence claims based on the protected activity. He
9 failed to show Bryan's alleged conduct involved a breach of her duty to use due care or caused him
10 injury. (See *Ladd v. County of San Mateo* (1996) 12 Cal.4th 913, 917 [“ ‘The elements of a cause of
11 action for negligence are well established. They are “(a) a legal duty to use due care; (b) a breach of
12 such legal duty; [and] (c) the breach as the proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury.” ’ ”].) He
13 failed as well to show the unidentified officer's 2023 statements to Poulson, in fact, breached a duty
14 to use due care or caused him injury.

15 As noted above, Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated a slew of Penal Code provisions. However,
16 Plaintiff in his papers on this motion does not demonstrate a specific violation of any statute, let alone
17 one that could ground a mandatory duty claim or even a private right of action. Thus, he has failed to
18 carry his burden. Moreover, the court is confident that an enforceable duty would include a
19 requirement that the disclosing party knew the information was sealed, and there is no evidence
20 Bryan or the unidentified officer knew the information they allegedly disclosed was sealed.

21 Plaintiff also fails to meet his burden to show a prima facie case for the tort of public disclosure of
22 private facts. “The elements of this tort are: (1) public disclosure (2) of a private fact (3) which would
23 be offensive and objectionable to the reasonable person and (4) which is not of legitimate public
24 concern.” (*Moreno v. Hanford Sentinel, Inc.* (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1129–1130 (citation
25 modified).) Plaintiff does not discuss these elements at all. On this evidence, where Plaintiff has made
26 no effort to argue the merits of his claims, the court finds Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of
27 establishing a prima facie case to public disclosure of private facts. If the time-bar and litigation
28 privilege did not preclude liability, Plaintiff has also failed to meet his burden of proof on prong two

1 as to the causes of action arising from the allegations regarding Bryan’s conduct and the unidentified
2 SFPD officer’s September 2023 statements to Poulson.

3 ***B. Plaintiff’s claims are time-barred under the Government Code’s claim-filing requirements.***

4 “Before a complaint for damages against a public entity can be filed in court, a claim must first be
5 filed with the entity in accordance with the Tort Claims Act, and rejected.” (*Rason v. Santa Barbara*
6 *City Housing Authority* (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 817, 822; Gov. Code, section 945.4.) The claim has to
7 be presented to the public entity “not later than six months after the accrual of the cause of action.”
8 (Gov. Code, section 911.2(a).) Here, Plaintiff filed his complaint a year after Poulson’s publication
9 and nine months after he lost his job, allegedly as a result of Defendants’ disclosures. Plaintiff has not
10 demonstrated he filed a timely claim.

11 Plaintiff does not dispute that his claim was filed late, only that Defendants waived untimeliness
12 by not sending a notice of insufficiency. (Compl., pars. 17-20; Opposition, 14; *Phillips v. Desert*
13 *Hosp. Dist.* (1989) 49 Cal. 3d 699, 705–06 citing Gov. Code, section 911.3 (b).)

14 A public entity only waives the untimeliness defense to a claim if it fails to give written notice of
15 the claim’s insufficiency. (*Phillips, supra*, 49 Cal.3d at 705.) On September 13, 2024, Defendant
16 CCSF mailed Plaintiff a Notice of Insufficiency stating that the claim failed to state the accrual date.
17 Here, Defendants attach proofs of service for both the denial of the claim and the Notice of
18 Insufficiency. Plaintiff denies receiving the notice. However, the requirement is not to ensure
19 Plaintiff’s receipt of the notice, only to provide it. Otherwise, all claimants would simply declare they
20 did not receive the notice. Defendants’ proof of service is sufficient to establish that they provided
21 notice.

22 Plaintiff claims that the denial of the claim CCSF later sent also waives the defense, citing *Lowry*
23 *v. Port San Luis Harbor Dist.* (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 211, 218. In *Lowry*, the Court of Appeal found
24 that the public entity that denied the claim impliedly granted the application to present a late claim by
25 ruling on the claim. (*Id.*) First, Plaintiff never applied to present a late claim, though it appears that he
26 knew his claim was, in fact, untimely. Second, CCSF denied the claim and provided notice that the
27 claim was insufficient because there was no accrual date listed in the claim. It would be unfair to
28 deem the defense waived when CCSF was deprived of the opportunity to calculate if the limitations

1 period had run. Third, it would be a bizarre result to allow a claimant to game the time requirement
2 by simply omitting the accrual date. Thus, CCSF did not waive this defense.

3 As stated above, Plaintiff does not dispute that the claim is barred under the six-month
4 presentation requirement in Government Code section 911.2(a). (Opposition, 14: 5-7.) Instead, he
5 asserts that the rationale behind the requirement is satisfied by his previous correspondence with
6 CCSF. However, the rationale behind the claim requirement is not mere notice. Instead, the rationale
7 “is to provide the public entity sufficient information to enable it to adequately investigate claims and
8 to settle them, if appropriate, without the expense of litigation.” (*Phillips v. Desert Hospital Dist.*
9 (1989) 49 Cal.3d 699, 705.) That rationale is not satisfied by Plaintiff’s early requests for CCSF to
10 investigate the disclosure, nor by attempting to force them into taking further action against
11 publishers of the incident report. The rationale is only satisfied if Plaintiff put CCSF on notice of his
12 lawsuit against them. Plaintiff presented no substantial evidence that he did this. Accordingly, his
13 causes of action arising from protected activity are time-barred under Government Code section
14 911.2(a).

15 ***C. The litigation privilege bars Plaintiff’s causes of action against Defendant Bryan.***

16 As discussed above, Bryan’s actions were a statement made in connection with the litigation
17 Oldfather was engaged in with Plaintiff’s company. Therefore, her actions benefit from the litigation
18 privilege under Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b). The privilege applies to “any communication
19 (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by
20 law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that have some connection or logical relation
21 to the action.” (*Kashian, supra*, 98 Cal.App.4th at 912.) It applies to “any communication, not just a
22 publication, having “some relation” to a judicial proceeding, and to *all* torts...” (*Id.* at 913.) Doubts
23 about whether it applies are resolved in favor of applying it. (*Adams v. Superior Court* (1992) 2
24 Cal.App.4th 521.)

25 Bryan’s disclosure was made in relation to Oldfather’s litigation. Defendants do not dispute this,
26 though they disclaim that Bryan was working together with Oldfather to advance the litigation.
27 However, motives, morals, ethics, or intent are not relevant to the inquiry. (*Silberg v. Anderson*
28 (1990) 50 Cal.3d 205, 220.) It is enough that Bryan’s disclosure was made to an attorney working on

1 a case before a court, and then subsequently was used in that litigation. Thus, the litigation privilege
2 bars liability as to Bryan.

3 Given the above findings that Plaintiff's causes of action arising from Defendant's protected
4 activity lack merit, the court declines to reach Defendant's remaining Prong Two arguments.

5
6 **Stricken Paragraphs**

7 Under *Baral*, "[a]llegations of protected activity supporting the stricken claim are eliminated from
8 the complaint, unless they also support a distinct claim on which the plaintiff has shown a probability
9 of prevailing." (*Baral, supra*, 1 Cal.5th at 392.) Here, the stricken claims are those that reference
10 Byran's disclosure of the incident report and CCSF's disclosure of the incident report to Poulson.
11 These claims do not support separate surviving claims because Plaintiff has not shown a probability
12 of prevailing on any of his three causes of action arising from protected activity.

13 The stricken claims are as follows:

- 14 1. Paragraph 1: Plaintiff commenced this action because Defendants repeatedly released a sealed
15 arrest report or its contents to unauthorized individuals, ~~including a former City employee~~
16 ~~who was engaged in an adversarial proceeding against Plaintiff's employer~~, in violation of
17 California Penal Code §§ 851.91(b)(4) and (5), a valid Court Order sealing the arrest report,
18 and the California Constitution.
- 19 2. Paragraphs 31 through 45, 51 through 56 in their entirety.
- 20 3. Paragraph 59: Throughout 2024, Plaintiff made repeated requests, many of which are alleged
21 herein, to the City and the SFPD to enforce the Sealing Order, pursuant to which the City was
22 prohibited from releasing the Sealed Report, and to investigate the facts that led to the City
23 unlawful release of the Sealed Report, ~~including to a former City attorney.~~
- 24 4. Paragraph 61: In or around September 2024, the SFPD told Plaintiff and the woman identified
25 in the Sealed Report that the SFPD would investigate the release of the Sealed Report ~~and, in~~
26 ~~particular, its release to Oldfather.~~
- 27 5. Paragraph 62: In or around September 2024, Deputy City Attorney Alicia Cabrera committed
28 to Plaintiff's counsel Jim Hunter that she would provide frequent updates regarding the

- 1 investigation into the unauthorized release of the Sealed Report to a former City employee
2 and that the investigation was only weeks away from completion.
- 3 6. Paragraph 63: Despite these representations to report back on investigatory findings, the City
4 never provided Plaintiff or counsel any further updates on its investigation into the unlawful
5 dissemination of this sealed information, including the dissemination to a former City
6 employee.
- 7 7. Paragraph 67 to the extent the claimed damages were caused by Bryan's actions and the
8 unidentified SFPD officer's 2023 statements to journalist Poulson.
- 9 8. Paragraph 74: Defendants violated these provisions of the Penal Code by the conduct
10 described herein. Specifically, and among other things, Defendants failed to include the
11 required stamp and note on the Sealed Report when the unredacted Sealed Report was
12 released to Oldfather; released the Sealed Report and its contents on multiple occasions to
13 unauthorized individuals, including releasing the unredacted Sealed Report to Oldfather at or
14 around the same time that Defendants acknowledged that Oldfather was not an authorized
15 recipient and only after approval was sought and received from the "investigative unit"; and
16 failing to abide by the Sealing Order by this same conduct.
- 17 9. Paragraphs 68, 75, 76, 79, 81 and 83 to the extent they refer to Bryan's actions and the
18 unidentified SFPD officer's 2023 statements to journalist Poulson
- 19 10. Paragraph 82: Defendants did not exercise reasonable diligence in discharging its ministerial
20 duties established by these enactments. Among other things, Defendants repeatedly violated
21 these sections of the Penal Code and did so after seeking and obtaining approval from the
22 investigative unit, evidencing that it did not exercise reasonable diligence discharging these
23 duties. In addition, Defendants' release of the unredacted Sealed Report to Oldfather, after his
24 Initial Request was denied because he lacked authorization, demonstrates that the City, by its
25 conduct or failure to enact sufficient safeguards, benefitted a former City employee to the
26 detriment of Plaintiff, who was entitled to protection under the law.
- 27 11. Paragraphs 84 through 90 to the extent they refer to Bryan's actions and the unidentified
28 SFPD officer's 2023 statements to journalist Poulson

1 12. Paragraph 88: Defendants breached their duty of care owed to Plaintiff by among other things
2 repeatedly releasing the Sealed Report and information contained in it to unauthorized
3 individuals and failing to take all possible action to retrieve the Sealed Report and information
4 contained in it, ~~including but not limited to releasing the Sealed Report to Oldfather, a former~~
5 ~~City employee, to be used against Plaintiff at the same time the City knew Oldfather needed~~
6 ~~but did not have authorization to obtain the Sealed Report.~~

7 13. Paragraphs 91 through 102 to the extent they refer to Bryan's actions and the unidentified
8 SFPD officer's 2023 statements to journalist Poulson

9 14. Paragraph 99 in its entirety.


10 In other words, where the complaint makes or relies on allegations regarding Bryan's actions and
11 the unidentified SFPD officer's 2023 statements to journalist Poulson alleges there was an
12 unauthorized disclosure of the incident report to various individuals, those references are stricken.
13 Where Plaintiff alleges or relies on allegations regarding disclosures, only Plaintiff's allegations of
14 CCSF's wrongful disclosure to Plaintiff's daughter and his acquaintance survive this motion to strike.
15 For example, in Paragraph 74, Plaintiff states that CCSF violated the penal code when they "released
16 the sealed incident report and its contents on multiple occasions to unauthorized individuals." That
17 allegation only survives as it relates to the above disclosures to Plaintiff's daughter and acquaintance.
18 To the extent Plaintiff alleges causes of action based on CCSF's non-punishment of individuals who
19 published the incident report, such claims survive this motion.

20 **Bryan Dismissed as Defendant**

21 For the clarity of the parties, this means that no claims against Defendant Bryan survive this
22 motion. Defendant Bryan is dismissed from this action.

23 IT IS SO ORDERED.

24
25 Dated: Sept. 2, 2025

26
27 
HONORABLE JOSEPH M. QUINN
JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT

I, the undersigned, certify that I am an employee of the Superior Court of California, County Of San Francisco and not a party to the above-entitled cause and that on September 02, 2025 I served AN ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFF 'S COMPLAINT the foregoing on each counsel of record or party appearing in propria persona by causing a copy thereof to be enclosed in a postage paid sealed envelope and deposited in the United States Postal Service mail box located at 400 McAllister Street, San Francisco CA 94102-4514 pursuant to standard court practice.

Date: September 02, 2025 By: MADELLE MACADANGDANG

DAVID MAREK
THE MAREK LAW FIRM
228 HAMILTON AVENUE
PALO ALTO, CA 94301

ZUZANA J. IKELS
DEPUTY CITY ATTORNEY
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SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94102-5408

EXHIBIT E

Respondents' Motion for Judicial Notice




Criminal Victimization, 2024

Susannah N. Tapp, PhD, and Emilie J. Coen, DrPH, *BJS Statisticians*

In 2024, the rate of violent victimization in the United States was 23.3 victimizations per 1,000 persons age 12 or older (figure 1). This rate was higher than the rate in 2020 (16.4 per 1,000 persons) and 2021 (16.5 per

1,000 persons) and was similar to the rate in 2022 and 2023. Violent victimization includes rape or sexual assault, robbery, aggravated assault, and simple assault. The rate of violent victimization reported to police followed a similar trend.

FIGURE 1
Rate of violent victimization and violent victimization reported to police, 1993–2024



Note: Estimates for 2006 should not be compared to other years. See *Criminal Victimization, 2007* (NCJ 224390, BJS, December 2008) for more information on changes to the 2006 National Crime Victimization Survey. See table 1 for definitions and appendix table 1 for estimates, standard errors, and 95% confidence intervals.

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, National Crime Victimization Survey, 1993–2024.

HIGHLIGHTS

- In 2024, 1.45% of persons age 12 or older experienced at least one violent victimization, similar to 2023.
- A larger percentage of persons ages 12 to 17 experienced one or more violent crimes in 2024 (1.95%) than in 2023 (1.45%).
- In 2024, there were 23.3 violent victimizations per 1,000 persons age 12 or older in the United States.
- The rate of violent victimizations reported to police was 11.2 per 1,000 persons age 12 or older in 2024.
- There were no significant changes in the rates of domestic violence, intimate partner violence, or stranger violence from 2023 to 2024.
- Veterans experienced 455,240 violent victimizations in 2024, which was similar to 2023.
- There were 13.1 million property victimizations in 2024.
- Property crime rates in rural areas decreased from 2023 (56.5 per 1,000 households) to 2024 (48.3 per 1,000).

Findings are based on the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS), a self-report survey administered annually from January 1 to December 31. Annual NCVS estimates are based on the number and characteristics of crimes that respondents experienced during the prior 6 months, excluding the month in which they were interviewed. Therefore, the 2024 survey covers crimes experienced from July 1, 2023 to November 30, 2024, with March 15, 2024, as the middle of the reference period. Crimes are classified by the year of the survey and not by the year of the crime. To make reliable comparisons over time, this report examines only NCVS data collected since the survey's 1993 redesign. Because the NCVS relies on self-reported survey data, estimates may not include victimizations not reported to NCVS interviewers.

NCVS data can be used to produce:

- **Victimization estimates**—The total number of times that persons or households were victims of crime. For personal crimes, the number of victimizations is the number of victims of that crime. Each crime against a household is counted as having a single victim: the affected household.
- **Incident estimates**—The number of specific criminal acts involving one or more victims.
- **Prevalence estimates**—The number or percentage of unique persons who were crime victims, or of unique households that experienced crime.

See *Measurement of crime in the National Crime Victimization Survey* in the *Methodology* for more information. Use the interactive NCVS Dashboard (N-DASH) at <https://ncvs.bjs.ojp.gov> to view additional estimates and graphics.

Victimization estimates

Victimizations reflect the total number of times that persons or households were victims of crime. There were 6.7 million violent victimizations of persons age 12 or older in the United States in 2024 (**table 1**). This was not significantly different from the number in 2023 but was larger than the number of violent victimizations 5 years before, in 2020 (4.6 million).¹

Victimization rates measure the extent to which violent and property victimizations occur in a specified population during a specified time. In 2024, the rate of violent victimization was 23.3 victimizations per 1,000 persons age 12 or older, which was not significantly different from the rate in 2023. There were also no significant changes from 2023 to 2024 in the rates of specific types of violent crime.

From 2023 to 2024, there were no statistically significant changes in the rates of domestic violence (violent victimizations that were committed by current or former intimate partners or family members), intimate partner violence (violent victimizations that were committed by current or former spouses, boyfriends, or girlfriends), and stranger violence. Neither violent crime with an injury nor with a weapon changed significantly during this period. However, the rates increased from 2020 to 2024 for intimate partner violence (1.7 per 1,000 persons age 12 and older in 2020 to 2.7 per 1,000 in 2024), violent victimization by a stranger (7.1 to 10.8 per 1,000) and violent victimization with a weapon (3.4 to 5.4 per 1,000).

¹In this report, statistical significance is reported at both the 90% and 95% confidence levels. All comparisons made in text are statistically significant unless otherwise stated. See figures and tables for testing on specific findings.

TABLE 1
Number and rate of violent victimizations, by type of crime, 2020–2024

Type of violent crime	2020		2021		2022		2023		2024*	
	Number	Rate per 1,000 ^a	Number	Rate per 1,000 ^a	Number	Rate per 1,000 ^a	Number	Rate per 1,000 ^a	Number	Rate per 1,000 ^a
Total violent crime^b	4,558,150 †	16.4 †	4,598,310 †	16.5 †	6,624,950	23.5	6,419,060	22.5	6,671,640	23.3
Rape/sexual assault ^c	319,950 †	1.2 †	324,500 †	1.2 †	531,810	1.9	481,020	1.7	560,890	2.0
Robbery	437,260 †	1.6 ‡	464,280	1.7	694,860	2.5	731,620	2.6	642,150	2.2
Assault	3,800,950 †	13.7 †	3,809,530 †	13.6 †	5,398,290	19.1	5,206,430	18.3	5,468,600	19.1
Aggravated assault	812,180 †	2.9 †	766,330 †	2.7 †	1,540,110	5.5	1,273,200	4.5	1,341,950	4.7
Simple assault	2,988,770 †	10.7 †	3,043,190 †	10.9 †	3,858,180	13.7	3,933,230	13.8	4,126,640	14.4
Violent crime excluding simple assault^d	1,569,390 †	5.6 †	1,555,110 †	5.6 †	2,766,770	9.8	2,485,830	8.7	2,544,990	8.9
Selected characteristics of violent crime^e										
Domestic violence ^f	856,750	3.1	910,880	3.3	1,370,440	4.9	1,165,890	4.1	1,110,040	3.9
Intimate partner violence ^g	484,830 ‡	1.7 ‡	473,730 †	1.7 †	951,930	3.4	629,820	2.2	782,900	2.7
Stranger violence	1,973,200 †	7.1 †	2,056,150 †	7.4 †	2,994,270	10.6	3,233,400	11.4	3,091,500	10.8
Violent crime with an injury	1,160,920	4.2	975,340	3.5	1,412,290	5.0 ‡	1,312,760	4.6	1,145,260	4.0
Violent crime with a weapon	938,740 †	3.4 †	895,560 †	3.2 †	1,798,150	6.4	1,505,690	5.3	1,542,210	5.4

Note: Details may not sum to totals due to rounding. Includes threatened, attempted, and completed occurrences of crimes. See appendix table 2 for standard errors.

*Comparison year.

†Difference with comparison year is significant at the 95% confidence level.

‡Difference with comparison year is significant at the 90% confidence level.

^aRate is per 1,000 persons age 12 or older. See appendix table 19 for person populations.

^bExcludes homicide because the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) is based on interviews with victims.

^cSee *Methodology* for details on the measurement of rape or sexual assault in the NCVS.

^dIncludes rape or sexual assault, robbery, and aggravated assault.

^eViolent crime categories such as domestic violence and violent crime with an injury are not mutually exclusive from other violent crime categories or other selected characteristics.

^fIncludes the subset of violent victimizations that were committed by current or former intimate partners or family members.

^gIncludes the subset of violent victimizations that were committed by current or former spouses, boyfriends, or girlfriends.

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, National Crime Victimization Survey, 2020–2024.

2024 NCVS instrument redesign and split sample

The National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) was last redesigned in 1992. Much has changed since that time, both in the level of public acceptance of surveys and in the nature of crime. To address this, the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) conducted a multiyear effort to improve the efficiency, reliability, and utility of the NCVS. Through this effort, BJS redesigned the entire survey instrument, which includes a household roster, a victimization screener, and a detailed crime incident report. For more information about the NCVS instrument redesign, see <https://bjs.ojp.gov/programs/ncvs/instrument-redesign>.


BJS coordinated with the U.S. Census Bureau to administer both the legacy instrument and the redesigned instrument concurrently in 2024, using a split-sample design (figure 2). The sample was divided so that approximately half of the households were interviewed using the redesigned instrument and half were interviewed using the legacy instrument. This design allows BJS to report criminal victimization data during the phase-in and produce two sets of victimization estimates for 2024. It will also allow for the continued production of year-to-year comparisons of victimization estimates, which is critical to understanding changes in crime and victimization in the United States and is a strength of the NCVS data collection.

In a typical year, NCVS data are obtained from a nationally representative sample of about 240,000 persons in approximately 150,000 households. The NCVS sample design has two stages. For more information on the NCVS sample design, see *National Crime Victimization Survey, 2016: Technical Documentation* (NCJ 251442, BJS, December 2017).

- The first stage of sampling involves the definition, stratification, and selection of primary sampling units (PSU), which are defined as large metropolitan areas, counties, or groups of counties.
- The second stage of sampling occurs at the housing unit level. Within the PSUs selected, the sampling process identifies addresses to be included in the sample, and interviews are conducted with persons and households at those addresses.

The 2024 split sample was applied to the second-stage sample selection. The sample was randomly split so that half of the NCVS sample cases in each PSU received the

FIGURE 2
2024 split-sample design



legacy instrument and half received the redesigned instrument. This allowed the total 2024 sample—both the sample that received the legacy instrument and the sample that received the redesigned instrument—to be similar to recent years.

This report focuses on statistics that were produced with data collected from the 2024 legacy instrument.

Splitting the sample in half while continuing to produce nationally representative estimates results in a decrease in estimate precision during the instrument transition period. For the 2024 collection year, BJS will archive two sets of data files: one for the 2024 legacy data and one for the 2024 redesigned data. Each of these sets of data files will include weights that adjust the half sample to known population totals. The sample that received the legacy instrument included 109,341 persons age 12 or older in 69,396 households. Because NCVS weights are adjusted to known population totals for each half of the sample, weights in 2024 were greater than in a typical year, leading to more variation in estimates and higher standard errors. Despite the loss of estimate precision in 2024, BJS and the U.S. Census Bureau determined that the stability gained from maintaining the current sample size over the long term outweighed the loss of statistical precision.

For more information about the instrument redesign methodology and split sample, see *Update on the NCVS Instrument Redesign* (NCJ 304055, BJS, March 2022), *Update on the NCVS Instrument Redesign: Operational Pilot Test and Split Sample* (NCJ 306051, BJS, June 2023) and <https://bjs.ojp.gov/programs/ncvs/instrument-redesign>.

There were 13.1 million property victimizations in 2024, similar to 2023

Households in the United States experienced 13.1 million property victimizations in 2024, which was comparable to the number in 2023 but larger than the number 5 years before, in 2020 (12.1 million) (table 2). Property crime includes burglary or trespassing, motor vehicle theft, and other types of household theft.

The rate of property victimization remained stable from 2023 to 2024 (97.6 victimizations per 1,000 households) and was also similar to the rate in 2022. There were no significant changes in the rates of specific types of property victimizations between 2023 and 2024. The motor vehicle theft rate increased from 4.3 per 1,000 in 2020 to 6.3 per 1,000 in 2024.

TABLE 2
Number and rate of property victimizations, by type of crime, 2020–2024

Type of property crime	2020		2021		2022		2023		2024*	
	Number	Rate per 1,000 ^a	Number	Rate per 1,000 ^a	Number	Rate per 1,000 ^a	Number	Rate per 1,000 ^a	Number	Rate per 1,000 ^a
Total property crime	12,085,170 †	94.5	11,682,060 †	90.3 †	13,373,330	101.9	13,637,450	102.2	13,069,560	97.6
Burglary/trespassing^b	1,741,250	13.6	1,800,350	13.9 ‡	1,919,930 †	14.6 †	1,746,980	13.1	1,609,650	12.0
Burglary ^c	1,210,640	9.5	1,142,900	8.8	1,324,030 ‡	10.1 ‡	1,202,830	9.0	1,103,790	8.2
Trespassing ^d	530,610	4.1	657,440 †	5.1 †	595,910	4.5	544,140	4.1	505,860	3.8
Motor vehicle theft	545,810 †	4.3 †	558,670 †	4.3 †	716,650	5.5	808,830	6.1	841,120	6.3
Other theft^e	9,798,110 †	76.6	9,323,040 †	72.1 †	10,736,750	81.8	11,081,650	83.1	10,618,790	79.3

Note: Details may not sum to totals due to rounding. Includes threatened, attempted, and completed occurrences of those crimes. See appendix table 3 for standard errors.

*Comparison year.

†Difference with comparison year is significant at the 95% confidence level.

‡Difference with comparison year is significant at the 90% confidence level.

^aRate is per 1,000 households. See appendix table 20 for household populations.

^bCalled household burglary in prior reports. Includes unlawful or forcible entry or attempted entry of places, including a permanent residence, other residence (e.g., a hotel room or vacation residence), or other structure (e.g., a garage or shed). Includes victimizations where the offender stole, attempted to steal, or did not attempt to steal. Excludes trespassing on land.

^cIncludes only crimes where the offender committed or attempted a theft.

^dIncludes crimes where the offender did not commit or attempt a theft. Excludes trespassing on land.

^eIncludes other unlawful taking or attempted unlawful taking of property or cash without personal contact with the victim.

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, National Crime Victimization Survey, 2020–2024.

The rate of violent victimization excluding simple assault increased for persons ages 50 to 64 in 2024

From 2023 to 2024, the violent victimization rate increased for persons ages 35 to 49 (21.2 to 27.1 per 1,000 persons) and for persons in households earning \$200,000 or more (15.7 to 22.1 per 1,000) (table 3). The rate of violent victimization by sex, race or Hispanic origin, or marital status did not change significantly from 2023 to 2024.

The rate of violent victimization excluding simple assault increased from 2023 to 2024 for persons ages 50 to 64 (6.2 to 9.1 per 1,000 persons) and persons in households earning \$200,000 or more (4.0 to 8.0 per 1,000). During the same period, the rate decreased in households earning \$25,000 to \$49,999, from 10.2 per 1,000 persons to 6.5 per 1,000.

TABLE 3
Rate of violent victimization, by type of crime and demographic characteristics of victims, 2023 and 2024

Victim demographic characteristic	Total violent crime ^a		Violent crime excluding simple assault ^b	
	2023	2024*	2023	2024*
Total	22.5	23.3	8.7	8.9
Sex				
Male	20.8	24.7	6.9	8.2
Female	24.2	21.9	10.5	9.6
Race/Hispanic origin				
White ^c	22.5	22.1	8.3	8.6
Black ^c	26.9	23.4	12.3	11.2
Hispanic	21.3	23.5	8.5	7.9
Asian/Native Hawaiian/Other Pacific Islander ^{c,d}	10.7	11.5	4.5	3.4
Other ^{c,e}	50.4	90.2	17.6	31.0
Age				
12–17	21.4	29.3	5.4	9.6
18–24	43.9	34.8	24.1	15.5
25–34	33.2	31.7	12.6	11.3
35–49	21.2 †	27.1	7.1	9.8
50–64	19.9	20.4	6.2 ‡	9.1
65 or older	7.8	7.5	3.5	2.2
Marital status				
Never married	33.8	32.5	14.8	12.8
Married	12.0	12.5	3.4	4.7
Widowed	9.0	14.8	3.3	6.8
Divorced	32.7	33.4	12.3	13.0
Separated	43.1	74.7	15.6	17.7
Household income				
Less than \$25,000	39.0	38.3	18.7	23.4
\$25,000–\$49,999	23.9	22.4	10.2 †	6.5
\$50,000–\$99,999	21.4	23.5	8.3	8.0
\$100,000–\$199,999	17.4	17.7	5.1	5.7
\$200,000 or more	15.7 ‡	22.1	4.0 ‡	8.0

Note: Rates are per 1,000 persons age 12 or older. See appendix table 19 for person populations. See appendix table 4 for standard errors.

*Comparison year.

†Difference with comparison year is significant at the 95% confidence level.

‡Difference with comparison year is significant at the 90% confidence level.

^aIncludes rape or sexual assault, robbery, aggravated assault, and simple assault. Excludes homicide because the National Crime Victimization Survey is based on interviews with victims.

^bIncludes rape or sexual assault, robbery, and aggravated assault.

^cExcludes persons of Hispanic origin (e.g., “white” refers to non-Hispanic white persons and “black” refers to non-Hispanic black persons).

^dIncludes persons who identified as Asian only or Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander only. Categories are not shown separately due to small numbers of sample cases.

^eIncludes persons who identified as American Indian or Alaska Native only or as two or more races. Categories are not shown separately due to small numbers of sample cases.

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, National Crime Victimization Survey, 2023 and 2024.

Similar to 2023, almost half of violent victimizations were reported to police in 2024

The NCVS collects information on whether crimes were reported or not reported to police and on the reasons why the crime was reported or not reported. Victims may not report a crime for a variety of reasons, including fear of reprisal or getting the offender in trouble, believing that police would not or could not do anything to help, and believing the crime to be a personal issue or too trivial to report. Reporting to police may occur during or immediately following a criminal incident or at a later date. Police may be notified by the victim or a third party (including witnesses; other victims; household members; or nonpolice officials, such as school officials or workplace managers), or police may have been at the scene of the incident.

Approximately 48% of violent victimizations were reported to police in 2024, which was not significantly different from the percentage in 2023 (table 4). The percentage of rape or sexual assault victimizations reported to police decreased significantly, from 46% in 2023 to 24% in 2024. A greater percentage of robbery victimizations were reported to police in 2024 (73%) than in 2023 (42%). In addition, the percentage of aggravated assaults, violent crimes excluding simple assault, domestic violence victimizations, and violent crimes with a weapon that were reported to police all increased from 2023 to 2024.

In 2024, 30% of property victimizations were reported to police. This percentage did not vary from 2023, and there were no significant differences between 2023 and 2024 in the percentages of specific types of property victimizations reported.

TABLE 4
Percent of victimizations reported to police, by type of crime, 2023 and 2024

Type of crime	2023	2024*
Total violent crime^a	44.7%	47.9%
Rape/sexual assault ^b	46.0 †	23.6
Robbery	42.4 †	73.4
Assault	44.9	47.4
Aggravated assault	57.1 ‡	69.1
Simple assault	40.9	40.4
Violent crime excluding simple assault^c	50.6% ‡	60.2%
Selected characteristics of violent crime^d		
Domestic violence ^e	47.7% †	64.5%
Intimate partner violence ^f	47.2	60.8
Stranger violence	44.9	50.6
Violent crime with an injury	50.8	60.0
Violent crime with a weapon	56.3 †	70.1
Total property crime	29.9%	30.5%
Burglary/trespassing ^g	42.7	40.7
Burglary ^h	42.2	40.7
Trespassing ⁱ	43.9	40.7
Motor vehicle theft	72.4	75.0
Other theft ^j	24.8	25.4

Note: See appendix table 5 for standard errors.

*Comparison year.

†Difference with comparison year is significant at the 95% confidence level.

‡Difference with comparison year is significant at the 90% confidence level.

^aExcludes homicide because the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) is based on interviews with victims.

^bSee *Methodology* for details on the measurement of rape or sexual assault in the NCVS.

^cIncludes rape or sexual assault, robbery, and aggravated assault.

^dViolent crime categories such as domestic violence and violent crime with an injury are not mutually exclusive from other violent crime categories or other selected characteristics.

^eIncludes the subset of violent victimizations that were committed by current or former intimate partners or family members.

^fIncludes the subset of violent victimizations that were committed by current or former spouses, boyfriends, or girlfriends.

^gCalled household burglary in prior reports. Includes unlawful or forcible entry or attempted entry of places, including a permanent residence, other residence (e.g., a hotel room or vacation residence), or other structure (e.g., a garage or shed). Includes victimizations where the offender stole, attempted to steal, or did not attempt to steal. Excludes trespassing on land.

^hIncludes only crimes where the offender committed or attempted a theft.

ⁱIncludes crimes where the offender did not commit or attempt a theft. Excludes trespassing on land.

^jIncludes other unlawful taking or attempted unlawful taking of property or cash without personal contact with the victim.

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, National Crime Victimization Survey, 2023 and 2024.

A larger percentage of violent victimizations involving victims in households earning less than \$25,000 were reported to police in 2024 than in 2023

From 2023 to 2024, the percentage of violent victimizations reported to police increased for both

victims in households earning less than \$25,000 (39% to 56%) and more than \$200,000 (35% to 49%) (table 5). The percentage of violent victimizations reported to police did not change significantly from 2023 to 2024 by sex, race or Hispanic origin, or age.

TABLE 5
Percent and rate of violent victimizations reported to police, by demographic characteristics of victims, 2023 and 2024

Victim demographic characteristic	Percent		Rate per 1,000 ^a	
	2023	2024*	2023	2024*
Total	44.7%	47.9%	10.1	11.2
Sex				
Male	45.7%	49.7%	9.5	12.3
Female	43.8	46.0	10.6	10.1
Race/Hispanic origin				
White ^b	41.9%	48.0%	9.4	10.6
Black ^b	55.7	50.7	15.0	11.9
Hispanic	47.8	48.0	10.2	11.3
Asian/Native Hawaiian/Other Pacific Islander ^{b,c}	29.3	40.1	3.1	4.6
Other ^{b,d}	44.7	46.4	22.5	41.9
Age				
12–17	23.4%	21.9%	5.0	6.4
18–24	36.3	49.7	15.9	17.3
25–34	41.5	39.6	13.8	12.6
35–49	50.6	57.7	10.7 ‡	15.6
50–64	55.5	54.4	11.0	11.1
65 or older	58.4	57.6	4.6	4.3
Marital status				
Never married	39.8%	39.9%	13.5	13.0
Married	48.0	56.2	5.8	7.0
Widowed	47.3 †	82.5	4.2	12.2
Divorced	56.4	67.3	18.5	22.5
Separated	55.3	18.7 !	23.9	14.0
Household income				
Less than \$25,000	39.3% †	56.4%	15.3	21.6
\$25,000–\$49,999	53.7	42.7	12.8	9.6
\$50,000–\$99,999	41.1	43.6	8.8	10.3
\$100,000–\$199,999	49.7	50.6	8.6	9.0
\$200,000 or more	34.6 ‡	48.9	5.4 †	10.8

Note: See appendix table 6 for standard errors.

*Comparison year.

†Difference with comparison year is significant at the 95% confidence level.

‡Difference with comparison year is significant at the 90% confidence level.

! Interpret data with caution. Estimate is based on 10 or fewer sample cases, or coefficient of variation is greater than 50%.

^aRates are per 1,000 persons age 12 or older. See appendix table 19 for person populations.

^bExcludes persons of Hispanic origin (e.g., “white” refers to non-Hispanic white persons and “black” refers to non-Hispanic black persons).

^cIncludes persons who identified as Asian only or Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander only. Categories are not shown separately due to small numbers of sample cases.

^dIncludes persons who identified as American Indian or Alaska Native only or as two or more races. Categories are not shown separately due to small numbers of sample cases.

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, National Crime Victimization Survey, 2023 and 2024.

In 2024, there were 11.2 violent victimizations reported to police per 1,000 persons age 12 or older

There were no significant differences between 2023 and 2024 in the rate of total violent crime and the rates of specific types of violent crime reported to police (table 6). The rate of property crime reported to police in 2024 (29.8 per 1,000 households) was consistent with the rate in 2023. Following the same trend as violent crime, there were no significant differences in the rates of specific types of property crime reported to police between 2023 and 2024.

The rate of unreported rape or sexual assault increased from 2023 (0.9 per 1,000 persons age 12 or older) to 2024 (1.4 per 1,000), while the rate of unreported robbery decreased (1.5 to 0.6 per 1,000). There were decreases from 2023 to 2024 in the rates of unreported violent crime with an injury (2.1 to 1.4 per 1,000) and violent crime with a weapon (2.3 to 1.5 per 1,000).

TABLE 6
Rate of victimizations reported and not reported to police, by type of crime, 2023 and 2024

Type of crime	Reported to police		Not reported to police	
	2023	2024*	2023	2024*
Total violent crime^a	10.1	11.2	11.8	11.6
Rape/sexual assault ^b	0.8	0.5	0.9 ‡	1.4
Robbery	1.1	1.6	1.5 †	0.6
Assault	8.2	9.1	9.5	9.6
Aggravated assault	2.6	3.2	1.8	1.3
Simple assault	5.6	5.8	7.7	8.3
Violent crime excluding simple assault^c	4.4	5.3	4.1	3.3
Selected characteristics of violent crime^d				
Domestic violence ^e	2.0	2.5	2.0	1.4
Intimate partner violence ^f	1.0	1.7	1.1	1.1
Stranger violence	5.1	5.5	6.1	5.2
Violent crime with an injury	2.3	2.4	2.1 ‡	1.4
Violent crime with a weapon	3.0	3.8	2.3 ‡	1.5
Total property crime	30.6	29.8	70.0	66.4
Burglary/trespassing ^g	5.6	4.9	7.4	7.0
Burglary ^h	3.8	3.4	5.1	4.8
Trespassing ⁱ	1.8	1.5	2.3	2.2
Motor vehicle theft	4.4	4.7	1.6	1.5
Other theft ^j	20.6	20.2	61.0	57.8

Note: Rates are per 1,000 persons age 12 or older for violent crime and per 1,000 households for property crime. See appendix table 19 for person populations and appendix table 20 for household populations. See appendix table 7 for standard errors.

*Comparison year.

†Difference with comparison year is significant at the 95% confidence level.

‡Difference with comparison year is significant at the 90% confidence level.

^aExcludes homicide because the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) is based on interviews with victims.

^bSee *Methodology* for details on the measurement of rape or sexual assault in the NCVS.

^cIncludes rape or sexual assault, robbery, and aggravated assault.

^dViolent crime categories such as domestic violence and violent crime with an injury are not mutually exclusive from other violent crime categories or other selected characteristics.

^eIncludes the subset of violent victimizations that were committed by current or former intimate partners or family members.

^fIncludes the subset of violent victimizations that were committed by current or former spouses, boyfriends, or girlfriends.

^gCalled household burglary in prior reports. Includes unlawful or forcible entry or attempted entry of places, including a permanent residence, other residence (e.g., a hotel room or vacation residence), or other structure (e.g., a garage or shed). Includes victimizations where the offender stole, attempted to steal, or did not attempt to steal. Excludes trespassing on land.

^hIncludes only crimes where the offender committed or attempted a theft.

ⁱIncludes crimes where the offender did not commit or attempt a theft. Excludes trespassing on land.

^jIncludes other unlawful taking or attempted unlawful taking of property or cash without personal contact with the victim.

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, National Crime Victimization Survey, 2023 and 2024.

The violent victimization rate for veterans remained consistent from 2023 to 2024

Veterans experienced 455,240 violent victimizations in 2024, a rate of 28.7 per 1,000 veterans, which was not significantly different from the number or rate in 2023 (table 7).² The violent victimization rate for U.S. citizens in 2024 (24.0 per 1,000 U.S. citizens) also remained similar to the 2023 rate, as did the rate for non-U.S. citizens (13.4 per 1,000 non-U.S. citizens).

Property crime rates in rural areas decreased from 2023 to 2024

In 2024, the rate of property crime in rural areas decreased from 56.5 per 1,000 households in 2023 to 48.3 per 1,000 in 2024 (table 8). The property crime rates in urban and suburban areas remained consistent. There were no significant changes in the rates of violent crime and violent crime excluding simple assault from 2023 to 2024 in urban, suburban, or rural locations.

²Veterans are defined as persons currently or previously on active duty. Most NCVS respondents who are veterans were previously on active duty.

TABLE 7
Number and rate of violent victimizations, by veteran and citizenship status of victims, 2023 and 2024

Victim veteran and citizenship status	2023		2024*	
	Number	Rate per 1,000 ^a	Number	Rate per 1,000 ^a
Total violent crime^b	6,419,060	22.5	6,671,640	23.3
Veteran status^c				
Veteran ^d	328,520	20.2	455,240	28.7
Nonveteran ^e	5,449,400	22.6	5,271,440	21.7
Citizenship status				
U.S. citizen	6,170,250	23.1	6,393,810	24.0
U.S.-born citizen ^f	5,891,840	24.4	6,179,240	25.6
Naturalized U.S. citizen	278,410	11.1	214,570	8.5
Non-U.S. citizen	188,010	11.4	244,310	13.4

Note: Details may not sum to totals due to rounding and missing data. See appendix table 8 for standard errors.

*Comparison year.

^aRate is per 1,000 persons age 12 or older.

^bIncludes rape or sexual assault, robbery, aggravated assault, and simple assault. Excludes homicide because the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) is based on interviews with victims.

^cIncludes persons age 18 or older.

^dVeterans include persons currently or previously on active duty. Because the NCVS is a household-based survey and active-duty military personnel are more likely to be out of the household at the time of data collection, most veterans in the sample are former active-duty military personnel.

^eNonveterans include persons who never served in the U.S. Armed Forces or who completed training in the Reserves or National Guard only.

^fIncludes persons born in the United States, in a U.S. territory, or abroad to U.S. parents.

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, National Crime Victimization Survey, 2023 and 2024.

TABLE 8
Rate of victimization, by type of crime and location of residence, 2023 and 2024

Location of residence ^d	Total violent crime ^a		Violent crime excluding simple assault ^b		Total property crime ^c	
	2023	2024*	2023	2024*	2023	2024*
Urban ^e	29.6	34.0	12.3	11.8	192.3	181.6
Suburban ^f	23.3	23.3	8.7	9.2	98.1	96.1
Rural ^g	15.3	16.7	6.4	6.2	56.5 ‡	48.3

Note: Rates are per 1,000 persons age 12 or older for violent crime and per 1,000 households for property crime. See appendix table 9 for standard errors.

*Comparison year.

‡Difference with comparison year is significant at the 90% confidence level.

^aIncludes rape or sexual assault, robbery, aggravated assault, and simple assault. Excludes homicide because the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) is based on interviews with victims.

^bIncludes rape or sexual assault, robbery, and aggravated assault.

^cIncludes burglary, trespassing, motor vehicle theft, and other theft.

^dSee *Methodology in Criminal Victimization, 2019* (NCJ 255113, BJS, September 2020) for details on the revised measurement of location of residence in the NCVS.

^eAll census blocks within cities or U.S. Census-designated places that meet certain criteria based on their population and density. See *Methodology in Criminal Victimization, 2019* (NCJ 255113, BJS, September 2020).

^fAll other census blocks not classified as urban or rural. See *Methodology in Criminal Victimization, 2019* (NCJ 255113, BJS, September 2020).

^gAll census blocks not in U.S. Census Bureau-defined urbanized areas or urban clusters. See *Methodology in Criminal Victimization, 2019* (NCJ 255113, BJS, September 2020).

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, National Crime Victimization Survey, 2023 and 2024.

In 2024, victims of intimate partner violence received assistance from a victim service provider in 22% of violent victimizations, similar to 2023

Victim service providers (VSPs) are public or private organizations that assist crime victims. Victims received VSP assistance in 8% of violent victimizations in 2024, similar to 2023 (table 9). From 2023 to 2024, the proportion of violent victimizations where VSP assistance was received did not change significantly for simple assault, violent crime excluding simple assault, intimate partner violence, violent crime with an injury, or violent crime with a weapon.

Approximately 75% of firearm victimizations were reported to police in 2024

Of the approximately 6.7 million violent victimizations in 2024, about 660,000 (10%) involved a firearm, which was not significantly different from the number in 2023 (table 10). Firearm victimizations are violent victimizations where the offender possessed, showed, or used a firearm. About 75% of firearm victimizations were reported to police in 2024, consistent with 2023.

TABLE 9
Percent of violent victimizations for which victims received assistance from a victim service provider, by type of crime, 2023 and 2024

Type of crime	2023	2024*
Total violent crime^a	8.5%	8.3%
Simple assault	7.7	6.7
Violent crime excluding simple assault^b	9.7%	10.9%
Selected characteristics of violent crime^c		
Intimate partner violence ^d	22.6%	22.1%
Violent crime with an injury	19.1	22.8
Violent crime with a weapon	7.6	6.6

Note: See appendix table 10 for standard errors.

*Comparison year.

^aIncludes rape or sexual assault, robbery, aggravated assault, and simple assault. Excludes homicide because the National Crime Victimization Survey is based on interviews with victims.

^bIncludes rape or sexual assault, robbery, and aggravated assault.

^cViolent crime categories such as intimate partner violence and violent crime with an injury are not mutually exclusive from other violent crime categories or other selected characteristics.

^dIncludes the subset of violent victimizations that were committed by current or former spouses, boyfriends, or girlfriends.

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, National Crime Victimization Survey, 2023 and 2024.

TABLE 10
Firearm violence, 2023 and 2024

	2023	2024*
Total violent victimizations^a	6,419,060	6,671,640
Firearm victimizations		
Number	575,340	658,870
Percent	9.0%	9.9%
Rate ^b	2.0	2.3
Firearm victimizations reported to police		
Number	428,740	491,770
Percent	74.5%	74.6%

Note: Includes violent crimes in which the offender possessed, showed, or used a firearm. See appendix table 11 for standard errors.

*Comparison year.

^aIncludes rape or sexual assault, robbery, aggravated assault, and simple assault. Excludes homicide because the National Crime Victimization Survey is based on interviews with victims.

^bRate is per 1,000 persons age 12 or older. See appendix table 19 for person populations.

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, National Crime Victimization Survey, 2023 and 2024.

Incident estimates

An incident is a specific criminal act involving one or more victims.³ In 2024, there were 6.1 million violent incidents involving victims age 12 or older in the United States (table 11).

Persons ages 18 to 29 made up 18% of the population but were victims in 27% of violent incidents in 2024

Patterns varied in the demographic characteristics of victims and offenders (as perceived by victims) involved in violent incidents. In 2024, the share of violent incidents involving male and female victims was similar to the share of males and females in the U.S. population. The percentage of violent incidents involving male offenders (76%) was 1.5 times the percentage of males in the population, and the percentage of violent incidents with female offenders (19%) was less than half of the percentage of females in the population.

³Tables 11 through 13 present incident-level data on victims and offenders. Offender characteristics in the NCVS are based on victims' perceptions of offenders.

In 2024, Asian persons or Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander persons were victims (4%) or offenders (3%) in a smaller proportion of violent incidents than their representation in the population (7%). The share of violent incidents involving white offenders (47%) was smaller than the share of white persons in the population (60%). The proportion of violent incidents with black offenders (28%) was larger than the proportion of black persons in the population (12%).

The percentage of violent incidents involving victims ages 18 to 29 (27%) was larger than the age group's share of the population (18%). The shares of incidents where the victims (61%) or offenders (66%) were age 30 or older were smaller than this age group's proportion of the population (73%).

TABLE 11

Number and percent of violent incidents, by demographic characteristics of population, victims, and offenders, 2024

Demographic characteristic	Population ^a	Number of violent incidents		Percent of population ^{a*}	Percent of violent incidents		Percent ratio	
		Victim	Offender ^b		Victim	Offender ^b	Victim-to-population	Offender-to-population
Total	286,373,220	6,075,830	6,075,830	100%	100%	100%	1.0	1.0
Sex								
Male	140,346,260	3,058,040	4,214,150	49.0%	50.3%	75.6% †	1.0	1.5
Female	146,026,960	3,017,790	1,077,360	51.0	49.7	19.3 †	1.0	0.4
Both male and female offenders	~	~	281,260	~	~	5.0	~	~
Race/Hispanic origin								
White ^c	170,855,150	3,421,720	2,316,030	59.7%	56.3%	46.9% †	0.9	0.8
Black ^c	35,012,630	773,420	1,371,630	12.2	12.7	27.7 †	1.0	2.3
Hispanic ^d	53,539,670	1,160,980	795,750	18.7	19.1	16.1	1.0	0.9
Asian/Native Hawaiian/Other Pacific Islander ^{c,e}	20,569,310	231,220	131,570	7.2	3.8 †	2.7 †	0.5	0.4
Other ^{c,f}	6,396,460	488,500	106,120	2.2	8.0 †	2.1	3.6	1.0
Multiple offenders of various races ^g	~	~	222,030	~	~	4.5	~	~
Age								
11 or younger ^h	~	~	39,120!	~	~	0.8%!	~	~
12–17	25,687,710	721,460	437,050	9.0%	11.9%	8.7	1.3	1.0
18–29	51,911,950	1,667,460	860,880	18.1	27.4 †	17.1	1.5	0.9
30 or older	208,773,550	3,686,910	3,320,330	72.9	60.7 †	66.0 †	0.8	0.9
Multiple offenders of various ages	~	~	371,020	~	~	7.4	~	~

Note: Details may not sum to totals due to rounding and missing data for offender characteristics. An incident is a specific criminal act involving one or more victims. Offender characteristics are based on victims’ perceptions of offenders. See appendix table 12 for standard errors and 95% confidence intervals.

*Comparison group.

†Difference with comparison group is significant at the 95% confidence level.

~Not applicable.

! Interpret data with caution. Estimate is based on 10 or fewer sample cases, or coefficient of variation is greater than 50%.

^aThe National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) population represents persons age 12 or older living in noninstitutionalized residential settings in the United States.

^bIncludes incidents in which the perceived offender characteristics were reported. The sex of the offender was unknown in 8% of incidents, the race or Hispanic origin of the offender was unknown in 19% of incidents, and the age of the offender was unknown in 17% of incidents.

^cExcludes persons who identified, or offenders who were perceived, as being of Hispanic origin (e.g., “white” refers to non-Hispanic white persons and “black” refers to non-Hispanic black persons).

^dIncludes single offenders perceived to be of Hispanic origin and multiple-offender groups where all offenders were perceived to be of Hispanic origin.

^eIncludes victims who identified, or offenders who were perceived, as Asian only or Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander only. Categories are not shown separately due to small numbers of sample cases.

^fIncludes victims who identified, or offenders who were perceived, as American Indian or Alaska Native only or as two or more races. Categories are not shown separately due to small numbers of sample cases.

^gIncludes multiple-offender groups of offenders perceived to be of two or more races or groups where one offender was perceived to be Hispanic and one offender was perceived to be one or more races.

^hWhile the NCVS does not survey victims age 11 or younger, victims may report the offender to be age 11 or younger.

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, National Crime Victimization Survey, 2024.

In 2024, in about 4.2 million of the 6.1 million violent incidents in the United States, the offender was male (table 12). More violent incidents with male victims involved male offenders (2,389,160 incidents) than female offenders (302,550) or both male and female offenders (80,220). A larger number of violent incidents with female victims involved male offenders (1,824,990) than female offenders (774,800) or both male and female offenders (201,040).

Based on victims' perceptions of offenders' race or Hispanic origin, more violent incidents involving white victims were committed by white offenders (1,706,750 incidents) than by offenders who were black, of Hispanic origin, of some other race, or of an unknown race (table 13). A greater number of incidents involving black victims were committed by black offenders (402,960) than by white offenders (57,370).

TABLE 12
Number of violent incidents, by sex of victims and offenders, 2024

Victim sex	Total violent incidents	Offender sex			
		Male*	Female	Both male and female	Unknown ^a
Male	3,058,040	2,389,160	302,550 †	80,220 †	286,100 †
Female	3,017,790	1,824,990	774,800 †	201,040 †	216,960 †

Note: Details may not sum to totals due to rounding. An incident is a specific criminal act involving one or more victims. Offender sex is based on victims' perceptions of offenders. See appendix table 13 for standard errors.

*Comparison group.

†Difference with comparison group is significant at the 95% confidence level.

^aIncludes incidents where the victim did not know the offender's sex.

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, National Crime Victimization Survey, 2024.

TABLE 13
Number of violent incidents, by race or Hispanic origin of victims and offenders, 2024

Victim race/Hispanic origin	Total	Offender race/Hispanic origin				
		White ^{a*}	Black ^a	Hispanic ^b	Other ^{a,c}	Unknown ^d
White ^a	3,421,720	1,706,750	536,120 †	271,410 †	262,120 †	645,320 †
Black ^a	773,420	57,370	402,960 †	121,880 !	54,360 !	136,850
Hispanic	1,160,980	334,770	288,130	274,230	36,930 †	226,920
Other ^{a,c}	719,720	217,140	144,420	128,240 !	106,310 !	123,600

Note: Details may not sum to totals due to rounding. An incident is a specific criminal act involving one or more victims. Offender race or Hispanic origin is based on victims' perceptions of offenders. See appendix table 14 for standard errors.

*Comparison group.

†Difference with comparison group is significant at the 95% confidence level.

! Interpret data with caution. Estimate is based on 10 or fewer sample cases, or coefficient of variation is greater than 50%.

^aExcludes persons who identified, or offenders who were perceived, as being of Hispanic origin (e.g., "white" refers to non-Hispanic white persons and "black" refers to non-Hispanic black persons).

^bIncludes single offenders perceived to be of Hispanic origin and multiple-offender groups where all offenders were perceived to be of Hispanic origin.

^cIncludes persons who identified or were perceived as Asian only, Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander only, American Indian or Alaska Native only, or two or more races; and persons in multiple-offender incidents perceived as various races, including incidents where one or more offenders were perceived as Hispanic and as two or more races. Categories are not shown separately due to small numbers of sample cases. Of the 6,075,800 violent incidents in 2024, a total of 719,720 involved victims who identified as Asian only, Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander only, American Indian or Alaska Native only, or two or more races.

^dIncludes persons whose race or Hispanic origin was unknown to the victim.

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, National Crime Victimization Survey, 2024.


Prevalence estimates

Prevalence reflects the number or percentage of unique persons or households that were victimized at least once during a given period.⁴ An estimated 1.45% of persons age 12 or older experienced one or more violent

⁴The Bureau of Justice Statistics has transitioned to a new prevalence estimation method called the One Victimization Adjustment Method. For details on the new method, see *Methodology* and *A New Measure of Prevalence for the National Crime Victimization Survey* (NCJ 307554, BJS, April 2024).

victimizations in 2024, which was not significantly different from 2023 (figure 3). In 2024, the prevalence of violent crime was significantly lower than 32 years before in 1993 (4.34%), but higher than 10 years ago in 2015 (1.14%) and 5 years ago in 2020 (1.12%). Violent crime excluding simple assault followed a similar trend to that of violent crime, with 0.60% of persons experiencing at least one victimization in 2024, down from 1.88% in 1993.

FIGURE 3
Percent of persons age 12 or older who were victims of violent crime and violent crime excluding simple assault, 1993–2024



Note: Estimates for 2006 should not be compared to other years. See *Criminal Victimization, 2007* (NCJ 224390, BJS, December 2008) for more information on changes to the 2006 National Crime Victimization Survey. Estimates may not match those previously published due to the development of a new weight for prevalence. For more information, see *A New Measure of Prevalence for the National Crime Victimization Survey* (NCJ 307554, BJS, April 2024). See table 1 for definitions and appendix table 15 for estimates, standard errors, and 95% confidence intervals.

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, National Crime Victimization Survey, 1993–2024.

In 2024, 0.60% of persons age 12 or older were victims of violent crime excluding simple assault

In addition to the prevalence of overall violent crime, the percentages of persons age 12 or older who were victims of rape or sexual assault, aggravated assault, simple assault, and violent crime excluding simple assault were

larger in 2024 than 5 years before, in 2020 (table 14). Over this 5-year period, there were also increases in the prevalence of stranger violence (0.54% to 0.77%) and violent crime with a weapon (0.28% to 0.36%). A total of 416,580 persons experienced one or more violent victimizations by an intimate partner in 2024, which was more than in 2023 (296,260).

TABLE 14
Number and percent of persons who were victims of violent crime, by type of crime, 2020–2024

Type of violent crime	Number of persons ^a					Percent of persons ^b				
	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024*	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024*
Total violent crime^c	3,125,900 †	3,065,930 †	4,256,880	3,861,360	4,152,060	1.12% †	1.10% †	1.51%	1.36%	1.45%
Rape/sexual assault ^d	221,180 †	215,440 †	397,830	284,080	389,370	0.08 †	0.08 †	0.14	0.10	0.14
Robbery	374,550 ‡	350,090 †	481,010	443,950	508,660	0.13	0.13 †	0.17	0.16	0.18
Assault	2,616,930 †	2,576,160 †	3,507,610	3,273,230	3,429,550	0.94 †	0.92 †	1.24	1.15	1.20
Aggravated assault	670,870 †	679,170 †	1,054,760	863,210	898,520	0.24 †	0.24 †	0.37	0.30	0.31
Simple assault	2,018,050 †	1,979,940 †	2,555,420	2,528,690	2,630,600	0.73 †	0.71 †	0.91	0.89	0.92
Violent crime excluding simple assault^e	1,239,440 †	1,225,190 †	1,880,450	1,530,990	1,721,460	0.45% †	0.44% †	0.67%	0.54%	0.60%
Selected characteristics of violent crime^f										
Domestic violence ^g	542,210	531,550	717,450	569,000	595,550	0.19%	0.19%	0.25%	0.20%	0.21%
Intimate partner violence ^h	300,760 ‡	279,270 †	432,390	296,260 ‡	416,580	0.11	0.10 †	0.15	0.10 ‡	0.15
Stranger violence	1,502,080 †	1,546,360 †	2,163,800	2,040,670	2,209,150	0.54 †	0.55 †	0.77	0.72	0.77
Violent crime with an injury	809,180	714,000 ‡	924,520	837,450	888,270	0.29	0.26 ‡	0.33	0.29	0.31
Violent crime with a weapon	789,820 †	768,120 †	1,184,490	995,740	1,019,120	0.28 †	0.28 †	0.42	0.35	0.36

Note: Details may not sum to totals because a person may experience multiple types of crime. Estimates may not match those previously published due to the development of a new weight for prevalence. For more information, see *A New Measure of Prevalence for the National Crime Victimization Survey* (NCJ 307554, BJS, April 2024). See appendix table 16 for standard errors.

*Comparison year.

†Difference with comparison year is significant at the 95% confidence level.

‡Difference with comparison year is significant at the 90% confidence level.

^aNumber of persons age 12 or older who experienced at least one violent victimization during the year.

^bPercentage of persons age 12 or older who experienced at least one violent victimization during the year. See appendix table 19 for person populations.

^cExcludes homicide because the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) is based on interviews with victims.

^dSee *Methodology* for details on the measurement of rape or sexual assault in the NCVS.

^eIncludes rape or sexual assault, robbery, and aggravated assault.

^fViolent crime categories such as domestic violence and violent crime with an injury are not mutually exclusive from other violent crime categories or other selected characteristics.

^gIncludes the subset of violent victimizations that were committed by current or former intimate partners or family members.

^hIncludes the subset of violent victimizations that were committed by current or former spouses, boyfriends, or girlfriends.

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, National Crime Victimization Survey, 2020–2024.

The number (371,390 to 501,590) and percentage (1.45% to 1.95%) of persons ages 12 to 17 who experienced one or more violent crimes increased from 2023 to 2024 (table 15). In households earning \$200,000 or more, the prevalence of violent crime increased from

313,670 persons age 12 or older in 2023 to 446,940 in 2024. There were no significant changes from 2023 to 2024 in the number or percentage of persons who experienced one or more violent crimes within any other demographic characteristic.

TABLE 15
Number and percent of persons who were victims of violent crime, by demographic characteristics of victims, 2023 and 2024

Victim demographic characteristic	Number of persons ^a		Percent of persons ^b	
	2023	2024*	2023	2024*
Total	3,861,360	4,152,060	1.36%	1.45%
Sex				
Male	1,938,300	2,085,260	1.38%	1.49%
Female	1,923,060	2,066,800	1.33	1.42
Race/Hispanic origin				
White ^c	2,259,080	2,490,480	1.32%	1.46%
Black ^c	550,680	541,480	1.58	1.55
Hispanic	692,120	730,910	1.33	1.37
Asian/Native Hawaiian/ Other Pacific Islander ^{c,d}	173,290	182,570	0.85	0.89
Other ^{c,e}	186,180	206,620	3.10	3.22
Age				
12–17	371,390 ‡	501,590	1.45% ‡	1.95%
18–24	666,370	598,570	2.16	1.97
25–34	771,260	862,280	1.71	1.92
35–49	898,720	1,015,510	1.42	1.58
50–64	790,690	843,810	1.28	1.37
65 or older	362,910	330,290	0.62	0.55
Marital status				
Never married	2,006,400	2,257,870	1.89%	2.10%
Married	1,077,040	1,010,230	0.83	0.78
Widowed	108,880	82,380	0.71	0.54
Divorced	545,710	623,020	1.99	2.25
Separated	105,200	150,600	2.15	2.94
Household income				
Less than \$25,000	794,950	851,340	2.22%	2.55%
\$25,000–\$49,999	889,310	713,690	1.52	1.31
\$50,000–\$99,999	1,086,620	1,249,420	1.22	1.41
\$100,000–\$199,999	776,810	890,670	1.08	1.16
\$200,000 or more	313,670 ‡	446,940	1.08	1.34

Note: Details may not sum to totals due to rounding and missing data. Violent crime categories include rape or sexual assault, robbery, aggravated assault, and simple assault. Excludes homicide because the National Crime Victimization Survey is based on interviews with victims. Estimates may not match those previously published due to the development of a new weight for prevalence. For more information, see *A New Measure of Prevalence for the National Crime Victimization Survey* (NCJ 307554, BJS, April 2024). See appendix table 17 for standard errors.

*Comparison year.

‡Difference with comparison year is significant at the 90% confidence level.

^aNumber of persons age 12 or older who experienced at least one violent victimization during the year.

^bPercentage of persons age 12 or older who experienced at least one violent victimization during the year. See appendix table 19 for person populations.

^cExcludes persons of Hispanic origin (e.g., “white” refers to non-Hispanic white persons and “black” refers to non-Hispanic black persons).

^dIncludes persons who identified as Asian only or Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander only. Categories are not shown separately due to small numbers of sample cases.

^eIncludes persons who identified as American Indian or Alaska Native only or as two or more races. Categories are not shown separately due to small numbers of sample cases.

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, National Crime Victimization Survey, 2023 and 2024.

The prevalence of motor vehicle theft was higher in 2024 than 5 years prior, in 2020

In 2024, about 9.8 million households in the country experienced one or more property victimizations (burglary or trespassing, motor vehicle theft, or other household theft), similar to the number of households in 2023 (table 16). There were no significant changes

from 2023 to 2024 in the percentage of households experiencing any type of property crime. While the number of households that experienced burglary or trespassing did not change from 2020 to 2024, the number that experienced motor vehicle theft and other household theft increased. The prevalence of motor vehicle theft increased from 0.37% in 2020 to 0.58% in 2024.

TABLE 16
Number and percent of households that experienced property crime, by type of crime, 2020–2024

Type of property crime	Number of households ^a					Percent of households ^b				
	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024*	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024*
Total property crime	9,086,230 †	8,812,620 †	9,994,930	10,221,830	9,823,900	7.10%	6.81% †	7.61%	7.66%	7.34%
Burglary/trespassing^c	1,411,150	1,369,940	1,474,140	1,343,180	1,357,570	1.10%	1.06%	1.12%	1.01%	1.01%
Burglary ^d	977,330	891,030	1,008,390	905,000	943,900	0.76	0.69	0.77	0.68	0.71
Trespassing ^e	459,430	518,300	497,280	467,920	459,000	0.36	0.40	0.38	0.35	0.34
Motor vehicle theft	476,580 †	520,770 †	680,930	749,950	772,410	0.37% †	0.40% †	0.52%	0.56%	0.58%
Other theft^f	7,589,250 †	7,296,150 †	8,285,670	8,574,200	8,278,340	5.93%	5.64% †	6.31%	6.43%	6.18%

Note: Details may not sum to totals because a household may experience multiple types of crime. See *Methodology* for details on how the household weighting adjustment changed in the National Crime Victimization Survey. Estimates may not match those previously published due to the development of a new weight for prevalence. For more information see *A New Measure of Prevalence for the National Crime Victimization Survey* (NCJ 307554, BJS, April 2024). See appendix table 18 for standard errors.

*Comparison year.

†Difference with comparison year is significant at the 95% confidence level.

^aNumber of households that experienced at least one property victimization during the year.

^bPercentage of households that experienced at least one property victimization during the year. See appendix table 20 for household populations.

^cCalled household burglary in prior reports. Includes unlawful or forcible entry or attempted entry of places, including a permanent residence, other residence (e.g., a hotel room or vacation residence), or other structure (e.g., a garage or shed). Includes victimizations where the offender stole, attempted to steal, or did not attempt to steal. Excludes trespassing on land.

^dIncludes only crimes where the offender committed or attempted a theft.

^eIncludes crimes where the offender did not commit or attempt a theft. Excludes trespassing on land.

^fIncludes other unlawful taking or attempted unlawful taking of property or cash without personal contact with the victim.

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, National Crime Victimization Survey, 2020–2024.

Methodology

Survey coverage

The Bureau of Justice Statistics' (BJS) National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) is an annual data collection carried out by the U.S. Census Bureau. The NCVS is a self-report survey that is administered annually from January 1 to December 31. Annual NCVS estimates are based on the number and characteristics of crimes that respondents experienced during the prior 6 months, excluding the month in which they were interviewed. Therefore, the 2024 survey covers crimes experienced from July 1, 2023 to November 30, 2024, with March 15, 2024, as the middle of the reference period. Crimes are classified by the year of the survey and not by the year of the crime.

The NCVS is administered to persons age 12 or older from a nationally representative sample of U.S. households. It collects information on nonfatal personal crimes (rape or sexual assault, robbery, aggravated assault, simple assault, and personal larceny (purse snatching and pocket picking)) and household property crimes (burglary or trespassing, motor vehicle theft, and other types of theft).

The survey collects information on threatened, attempted, and completed crimes. It collects data on both crimes reported and not reported to police. Unless specified otherwise, estimates in this report include threatened, attempted, and completed crimes. In addition to providing annual-level and change estimates on criminal victimization, the NCVS is the primary source of information on the nature of criminal victimization incidents.

Survey respondents provide information about themselves (e.g., age, sex, race, Hispanic origin, marital status, education level, and income) and whether they experienced a victimization. For each victimization incident, respondents report information about the offender (e.g., victim-offender relationship and perceived age, sex, race, and Hispanic origin of offender(s)), characteristics of the crime (e.g., time and place of occurrence, use of weapons, nature of injury, and economic consequences), whether the crime was reported to police, reasons the crime was or was not reported, and experiences with the criminal justice system.

Household information, including household-level demographics (e.g., income) and property victimizations committed against the household (e.g., burglary or trespassing), is typically collected from the reference person. The reference person is any responsible adult (age 18 or older) member of the household who is unlikely to permanently leave the household. Because an owner or renter of the sampled housing unit is normally the most responsible and knowledgeable household member, this person is generally designated as the reference person and household respondent. However, a household respondent does not have to be one of the household members who owns or rents the unit.

In the NCVS, a household is defined as a group of persons who all reside at a sampled address. Persons are considered household members when the sampled address is their usual place of residence at the time of the interview and when they do not have another primary place of residence. Once selected, households remain in the sample for 3.5 years, and all eligible persons in these households are interviewed every 6 months, for a total of seven interviews.

First interviews are typically conducted in person, with subsequent interviews conducted either in person or by phone. New households rotate into the sample on an ongoing basis to replace outgoing households that have been in the sample for the full 3.5-year period. The sample includes persons living in group quarters, such as dormitories, rooming houses, and religious group dwellings, and excludes persons living on military bases or in institutional settings, such as correctional or hospital facilities.

Measurement of crime in the National Crime Victimization Survey

NCVS data can be used to produce several types of estimates, including victimization, incident, and prevalence rates. Victimization rates measure the extent to which violent and property victimizations occur in a specified population during a specified time. Victimization numbers show the total number of times that persons or households are victimized by crime. For crimes affecting persons, NCVS victimization rates are estimated by dividing the number of victimizations that occur during a specified time (T) by the population at risk for those victimizations and then multiplying the rate by 1,000.

$$\text{Victimization rate } \tau = \frac{\text{Number of victimizations experienced by a specified population } \tau}{\text{Number of unique persons (or households) in the specified population } \tau} \times 1,000$$

For *victimization rates*, each victimization represents one person (for personal crimes) or one household (for property crimes) affected by a crime.⁵ Every victimization experienced by a person or household during the year is counted. For example, if one person experiences two violent crimes during the year, both are counted in the victimization rate. If one household experiences two property crimes, both are counted in the victimization rate. Victimization estimates are presented in figure 1 and tables 1 through 10 in this report.

Incident rates are another measure of crime. The number of incidents is the number of specific criminal acts involving one or more victims. If every victimization had one victim, the number of incidents would be the same as the number of victimizations. If there was more than one victim, the incident estimate is adjusted to compensate for the possibility that the incident could be reported several times by multiple victims and thus be overcounted. For example, if two persons were robbed during the same incident, this crime would be counted as one incident and two victimizations. Incident estimates are presented in tables 11 through 13 in this report.

Prevalence rates are a third measure that reflects a population's risk of experiencing one or more criminal victimizations. They describe the level of victimization, like victimization rates, but are based on the number of unique persons or households in the population experiencing at least one victimization during a specified time. Prevalence estimates are presented in figure 3 and tables 14 through 16 in this report.

The key distinction between a victimization rate and a prevalence rate is whether the numerator consists of the number of victimizations or the number of unique victims. For example, a person who experienced two robberies within the past year would be counted twice in the victimization rate but only once in the prevalence rate. Prevalence rates are estimated by dividing the number of unique victims or victimized households in the specified population by the total number of persons or households in the population and multiplying the rate by 100, yielding the percentage of the population victimized at least once in a period.

⁵In the NCVS, personal crimes are personal larceny (purse snatching and pocket picking) and violent victimizations (rape or sexual assault, robbery, aggravated assault, and simple assault). Homicide is not included because the NCVS is based on interviews with victims. Property crimes are burglary or trespassing, motor vehicle theft, and other theft.

$$\text{Prevalence rate } \tau = \frac{\text{Number of unique victims (or victimized households) in a specified population } \tau}{\text{Number of unique persons (or households) in the specified population } \tau} \times 100$$

In *Criminal Victimization* reports prior to 2023, estimates of prevalence were calculated using the person and household weights. Beginning in 2023, estimates of prevalence were calculated using the One Victimization Adjustment Method. For more information about measuring prevalence in the NCVS, see *A new measure of prevalence in Criminal Victimization, 2023* (NCJ 309335, BJS, September 2024), *National Crime Victimization Survey: Prevalence Estimation Methods* (NCJ 308745, BJS, April 2024), and *A New Measure of Prevalence for the National Crime Victimization Survey* (NCJ 307554, BJS, April 2024).

Nonresponse and weighting adjustments

The 2024 NCVS legacy data file includes 69,396 household interviews. Overall, 60% of eligible households completed interviews. Within participating households, interviews with 109,341 persons were completed in 2024, representing an 81% unweighted response rate among eligible persons from responding households.

Victimizations that occurred outside of the United States were excluded from this report. In 2024, about 0.7% of the unweighted victimizations occurred outside of the United States.

NCVS data are weighted to produce annual estimates of victimization for persons age 12 or older living in U.S. households. Because the NCVS relies on a sample rather than a census of the entire U.S. population, weights are designed to adjust to known population totals and to compensate for survey nonresponse and other aspects of the complex sample design.

NCVS data files include person, household, victimization, and incident weights. Person weights provide an estimate of the population represented by each person in the sample. Household weights provide an estimate of the household population represented by each household in the sample. After proper adjustment, both person and household weights are also typically used to form the denominator in calculations of crime rates.

For personal crimes, the incident weight is derived by dividing the person weight of a victim by the total number of persons victimized during an incident, as reported by the respondent. For property crimes measured at the household level, the incident weight and the household weight are the same because the victim of a property crime is considered to be the household as a

whole. The incident weight is most frequently used when examining offender demographics.

Victimization weights used in this report account for the number of persons victimized during an incident and for high-frequency repeat victimizations (i.e., series victimizations). Series victimizations are similar in type to one another but occur with such frequency that a victim is unable to recall each individual event or describe each event in detail. Survey procedures allow NCVS interviewers to identify and classify these similar victimizations as series victimizations and to collect detailed information on only the most recent incident in the series.

The weighting counts series victimizations as the actual number of victimizations reported by the victim, up to a maximum of 10. Doing so produces more reliable estimates of crime levels than counting such victimizations only once, while the cap at 10 minimizes the effect of extreme outliers on rates.

According to the 2024 data, series victimizations accounted for 1.5% of all victimizations and 4.0% of all violent victimizations. Additional information on the enumeration and survey procedures of series victimizations is detailed in *Methods for Counting High-Frequency Repeat Victimizations in the National Crime Victimization Survey* (NCJ 237308, BJS, April 2012).

Revised 2016 data file

For 2016, BJS increased the NCVS sample size to facilitate the ability to produce state-level victimization estimates for the 22 most populous states. At the same time, the sample was adjusted to reflect the U.S. population counts in the 2010 decennial census. These changes resulted in a historically large number of new households and first-time interviews in the first half of 2016 and produced challenges in comparing 2016 results to data from prior years.

Working with the U.S. Census Bureau, BJS subsequently devised the methodology that was used to create the revised 2016 NCVS data file. The result was revised criminal victimization estimates that were nationally representative for 2016 and could be compared with prior and future years. For more information, see the *National Crime Victimization Survey revised 2016 estimates* text box (pp. 3–4) and *Methodology* (pp. 15–18) in *Criminal Victimization, 2016: Revised* (NCJ 252121, BJS, October 2018).

Changes to the household weighting adjustment in 2017

The 2017 NCVS weights included a new adjustment so household weights reflected independent housing unit totals available internally at the U.S. Census Bureau. This new adjustment was applied only to household weights and did not affect person weights. Historically, the household weights were adjusted to reflect independent totals for the person population. This new weighting adjustment improves on the prior one and better aligns the number of estimated households in the NCVS with other U.S. Census Bureau household survey estimates.

Due to this new adjustment, the 2017 NCVS estimate for the number of households was about 8% lower than the 2016 NCVS estimate. As a result, the estimate of the number of households affected by property crime was also about 8% lower. When making comparisons of property crime at the household level between 2017 and other years, it is necessary to compare victimization or prevalence rates. Rates are unaffected by this change in weighting methodology because both the numerator and denominator are equally affected.

Comparisons of the number of households that were victimized in 2017 and in prior years are inappropriate due to this change in weighting methodology. For more information on weighting in the NCVS, see *Nonresponse and weighting adjustments* in this report and *National Crime Victimization Survey, 2016: Technical Documentation* (NCJ 251442, BJS, December 2017).

Weighting adjustments in 2020

The 2020 NCVS weights included an additional adjustment to address the impact of modified field operations due to COVID-19. For more information on the weighting adjustments applied in 2020, see the *Source and Accuracy Statement for the 2020 National Crime Victimization Survey* in the NCVS 2020 Codebook (<https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/web/NACJD/studies/38090/datadocumentation>) and *National Crime Victimization Survey, 2016: Technical Documentation* (NCJ 251442, BJS, December 2017).

Beginning in 2020, BJS incorporated another factor to moderate the contribution of outlier weights on NCVS estimates. For more information on this methodology, see the *Source and Accuracy Statement for the 2020 National Crime Victimization Survey* in the NCVS 2020 Codebook (<https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/web/NACJD/studies/38090/datadocumentation>) and *National Crime Victimization Survey: Assessment of Outlier Weights* (NCJ 302186, BJS, October 2021).

Split-sample design in 2024

BJS coordinated with the U.S. Census Bureau to conduct a split-sample design in 2024 as part of the implementation of the NCVS redesigned instrument. This split-sample design concurrently administered the legacy instrument to half of the 2024 sample and the redesigned instrument to the other half of the 2024 sample. This design allows BJS to report criminal victimization data during the phase-in and produce two sets of victimization estimates for 2024. It also allows for the continued production of year-to-year comparisons between victimization estimates, which is critical to understanding changes in crime and victimization in the United States and a strength of the NCVS data collection. For more information about the instrument redesign methodology and split sample, see *Update on the NCVS Instrument Redesign* (NCJ 304055, BJS, March 2022), *Update on the NCVS Instrument Redesign: Operational Pilot Test and Split Sample* (NCJ 306051, BJS, June 2023) and <https://bjs.ojp.gov/programs/ncvs/instrument-redesign>.

Standard error computations

When national estimates are derived from a sample, as with the NCVS, caution must be used when comparing one estimate to another or when comparing estimates over time. Although one estimate may be larger than another, estimates based on a sample have some degree of sampling error. The sampling error of an estimate depends on several factors, including the amount of variation in the responses and the size of the sample. When the sampling error around an estimate is taken into account, estimates that appear different may not be statistically significant.

One measure of the sampling error associated with an estimate is the standard error. The standard error may vary from one estimate to the next. Generally, an estimate with a smaller standard error provides a more reliable approximation of the true value than an estimate with a larger standard error. Estimates with relatively large standard errors have less precision and reliability and should be interpreted with caution.

For complex sample designs, there are several methods that can be used to generate standard errors around a point estimate (e.g., numbers, percentages, and rates). These include direct variance estimation and generalized variance function (GVF) parameters.

BJS uses a specialized version of Balanced Repeated Replication (BRR) estimation using Fay's method to generate standard errors around the victimization estimates.⁶ BRR estimation is a type of direct replication variance estimation. Under replicate variance estimation, a set of replicate weights (e.g., the NCVS typically has a set consisting of 160 replicate weights) is used to capture the sampling variance. Fay's method is used for surveys that have rare outcomes in which the entire sample is necessary to properly estimate the variance. The standard errors for victimization and incident estimates in this report were estimated using BRR and differ from those reported in prior *Criminal Victimization* reports, which used GVF parameters. (See appendix tables 2 through 14). Year-to-year statistically significant differences may also vary from previous reports.

For prevalence estimates, BJS uses BRR and Taylor Series Linearization (TSL) methods to generate standard errors around these estimates. The TSL method directly estimates variances through a linearized function by combining variance estimates from the stratum and primary sampling units (PSUs) used to sample households and persons.⁷ In the NCVS, the design parameters used for computing TSL variances are PSEUDOSTRATA (stratum) and HALFSAMPLE (PSU). These design parameters are available for all years except the first half of 1993 and all of 2016; therefore, BRR methods were used for 2016 prevalence estimates. The standard errors for prevalence estimates in this report were estimated using TSL (see figure 3 and appendix tables 15 through 18).

Another method used to produce standard errors for NCVS estimates is through GVF parameters. The U.S. Census Bureau produces GVF parameters for BJS, which account for aspects of the NCVS's complex sample design and represent the curve fitted to a selection of individual standard errors, using a specialized version of BRR based on Fay's method. The standard errors for figure 1 were estimated using GVFs.

⁶Wolter, K. M. (2007). *Introduction to variance estimation* (2nd ed.). Springer.

⁷Ibid.

GVEs express the variance as a function of the expected value of the survey estimate.⁸ The GVE parameters are generated by fitting estimates and their relative variance to a regression model, using an iterative weighted least-squares procedure where the weight is the inverse of the square of the predicted relative variance. For more information on GVEs, see the most recent version of the *National Crime Victimization Survey, 2016: Technical Documentation* (NCJ 251442, BJS, December 2017). GVE parameters are available in the data documentation published with the NCVS public use files through the National Archive of Criminal Justice Data (<https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/web/NACJD/series/95>).

Direct variance estimation (e.g., BRR and TSL) is generally considered more accurate than GVEs in terms of how closely the variance estimate approximates the true variance. With direct variance estimation, each estimate is generated based on the outcome being estimated rather than being generated based on a generalized function.

BJS conducted statistical tests to determine whether differences in estimated numbers, percentages, and rates in this report were statistically significant once sampling error was taken into account. Using statistical analysis programs developed specifically for the NCVS, all comparisons in the text of this report were tested for significance. The primary test procedure was the Student's t-statistic, which tests the difference between two sample estimates. Findings described in this report as increases or decreases passed a test at either the 0.05 level (95% confidence level) or 0.10 level (90% confidence level) of significance. Figures and tables in this report should be referenced for testing on specific findings.

Estimates and standard errors of the estimates in this report may be used to generate a confidence interval around the estimate as a measure of the margin of error. The following example illustrates how standard errors may be used to generate confidence intervals:

Based on the 2024 NCVS, the rate of violent victimization in 2024 was 23.3 victimizations per 1,000 persons age 12 or older. (See table 1.) Using the BRR method of direct variance estimation, BJS

determined that the estimated victimization rate has a standard error of 1.52. (See appendix table 2.) A confidence interval around the estimate is generated by multiplying the standard error by ± 1.96 (the t-score of a normal, two-tailed distribution that excludes 2.5% at either end of the distribution). Therefore, the 95% confidence interval around the 23.3 estimate from 2024 is $23.3 \pm (1.52 \times 1.96)$ or (20.31 to 26.28). In other words, if BJS used the same sampling method to select different samples and computed an interval estimate for each sample, it would expect the true population parameter (rate of violent victimization) to fall within the interval estimates 95% of the time.

Confidence intervals for flagged estimates should be interpreted with caution, as large standard errors may result in a lower bound estimate of less than zero. For this report, BJS also calculated a coefficient of variation (CV) for all estimates, representing the ratio of the standard error to the estimate. CVs (not shown in tables) provide another measure of reliability and a means for comparing the precision of estimates across measures with differing levels or metrics.

NCVS measurement of rape or sexual assault

The NCVS uses a two-stage measurement approach in the screening and classification of criminal victimization, including rape or sexual assault. In the first stage of screening, survey respondents are administered a series of short-cue screening questions designed to help them think about different experiences they may have had during the reference period. (See NCVS-1/basic screen questionnaire at <https://bjs.ojp.gov/data-collection/ncvs#surveys-0>.)

This design improves respondents' recall of events, particularly for incidents that may not immediately come to mind as crimes, such as those committed by family members and acquaintances. Respondents who answer affirmatively to any of the short-cue screening items are subsequently administered a crime incident report (CIR) designed to classify incidents into specific crime types. (See NCVS-2/CIR at <https://bjs.ojp.gov/data-collection/ncvs#surveys-0>.)

⁸Ibid.

First stage of measurement. Two short-cue screening questions are specifically designed to target sexual victimization:

1. Other than any incidents already mentioned, has anyone attacked or threatened you in any of these ways—
 - a. with any weapon, such as a gun or knife
 - b. with anything like a baseball bat, frying pan, scissors, or stick
 - c. by something thrown, such as a rock or bottle
 - d. by grabbing, punching, or choking
 - e. any rape, attempted rape, or other type of sexual attack
 - f. any face-to-face threats
 - g. any attack or threat or use of force by anyone at all? Please mention it even if you are not certain it was a crime.
2. Incidents involving forced or unwanted sexual acts are often difficult to talk about. Other than any incidents already mentioned, have you been forced or coerced to engage in unwanted sexual activity by—
 - a. someone you did not know
 - b. a casual acquaintance
 - c. someone you know well?

With regard to sexual victimization, respondents may screen into a CIR if they respond affirmatively to other short-cue screening questions. For instance, a separate screening question cues respondents to think of attacks or threats that took place in specific locations, such as at home, work, or school. Respondents who recall a sexual victimization that occurred at home, work, or school and answer affirmatively would be administered a CIR even if they did not respond affirmatively to the screening question targeting sexual victimization.

Second stage of measurement. The CIR is used to collect information on the attributes of each incident. The key attributes of sexual violence that are used to classify a victimization as a rape or sexual assault are the type of attack and physical injury suffered. Victims are asked if “the offender hit you, knock[ed] you down, or actually attack[ed] you in any way”; if “the offender TR[IE]D to attack you”; or if “the offender THREATEN[ED] you with harm in any way?” The survey participant is classified as a victim of rape or

sexual assault if they respond affirmatively to one of these three questions and then respond that the completed, attempted, or threatened attack was:

- rape
- attempted rape
- sexual assault other than rape or attempted rape
- verbal threat of rape
- verbal threat of sexual assault other than rape
- unwanted sexual contact with force (grabbing, fondling, etc.)
- unwanted sexual contact without force (grabbing, fondling, etc.).

If the victim selects one of the following response options to describe the attack, they are also classified as a victim of rape or sexual assault if the injuries suffered as a result of the incident are described as:

- rape
- attempted rape
- sexual assault other than rape or attempted rape.

Coercion. The CIR does not ask respondents if psychological coercion was used, nor make any explicit reference to the victim being unable to provide consent (e.g., in incidents involving drug or alcohol use). One screening question targeted to rape and sexual assault asks respondents if force or coercion was used to initiate unwanted sexual activity.

The final classification of incidents by the CIR results in the following definitions of rape and sexual assault used in the NCVS:

Rape. Coerced or forced sexual intercourse. Forced sexual intercourse means vaginal, anal, or oral penetration by the offender(s). This category could include incidents where the penetration was from a foreign object such as a bottle. It includes attempted rape, threatened rape, male and female victims, and incidents involving victims and offenders who are the same sex or different sexes.

Sexual assault. A wide range of victimizations separate from rape, attempted rape, or threatened rape. These crimes include attacks or threatened attacks involving unwanted sexual contact between the victim and offender. Sexual assaults may or may not involve force and include such things as grabbing or fondling.

The table *Classification of rape and sexual assault in the National Crime Victimization Survey* outlines how different types of sexual violence are categorized in the NCVS. For more information on how these crimes are classified, see the section *Measuring Rape and Sexual Assault* in the NCVS data documentation published with the NCVS public use files through the National Archive of Criminal Justice Data (<https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/web/ICPSR/series/95>).

Classification of rape and sexual assault in the National Crime Victimization Survey

Measure	Element of sexual violence
Completed rape	Type of attack = rape Type of injury = rape
Attempted rape	Type of attack = attempted rape Type of injury = attempted rape
Threatened rape	Type of threat = verbal threat of rape with weapon
Sexual assault	Type of attempted attack/threat = verbal threat of rape Type of attack = sexual assault other than rape or attempted rape Type of injury = sexual assault other than rape or attempted rape Type of attempted attack/threat = unwanted sexual contact with force Type of attempted attack/threat = unwanted sexual contact without force Type of attempted attack/threat = verbal threat of sexual assault other than rape

Note: Victim is determined to be present in all measures of rape and sexual assault.

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, National Crime Victimization Survey, 2024.

APPENDIX TABLE 1

Estimates, standard errors, and 95% confidence intervals for figure 1: Rate of violent victimization and violent victimization reported to police, 1993–2024

Year	Total violent victimization				Violent victimization reported to police			
	Rate per 1,000 persons age 12 or older	Standard error	95% confidence interval		Rate per 1,000 persons age 12 or older	Standard error	95% confidence interval	
			Lower bound	Upper bound			Lower bound	Upper bound
1993	79.8 †	2.93	74.02	85.51	33.8 †	2.02	29.88	37.81
1994	80.0 †	2.72	74.70	85.37	32.4 †	1.65	29.16	35.62
1995	70.7 †	2.41	65.96	75.40	28.9 †	1.58	25.82	32.02
1996	64.7 †	2.63	59.56	69.88	26.1 †	1.62	22.93	29.27
1997	61.1 †	2.78	55.61	66.52	25.6 †	1.74	22.19	29.03
1998	54.1 †	2.61	49.01	59.26	24.6 †	1.65	21.32	27.78
1999	47.2 †	2.34	42.61	51.80	20.3 †	1.49	17.40	23.24
2000	37.5 †	1.98	33.60	41.38	17.2 †	1.35	14.59	19.88
2001	32.6 †	1.67	29.35	35.88	16.0 †	1.15	13.73	18.22
2002	32.1 †	2.07	28.01	36.11	16.3 †	1.40	13.54	19.02
2003	32.1 †	1.68	28.79	35.39	15.2 †	1.21	12.87	17.62
2004	27.8 †	1.34	25.19	30.46	14.0 ‡	1.00	12.05	15.95
2005	28.4 †	1.63	25.21	31.62	13.0	1.07	10.90	15.11
2006	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
2007	27.2 ‡	1.55	24.18	30.26	12.2	1.11	10.06	14.40
2008	25.3	1.60	22.21	28.49	11.8	1.04	9.72	13.79
2009	22.3	1.31	19.74	24.88	9.8	1.03	7.82	11.86
2010	19.3 ‡	1.44	16.46	22.11	9.9	1.01	7.87	11.84
2011	22.6	1.38	19.86	25.28	11.1	0.97	9.16	12.95
2012	26.1	1.20	23.77	28.46	11.5	0.87	9.84	13.24
2013	23.2	1.62	20.00	26.34	10.6	1.08	8.46	12.68
2014	20.1	1.22	17.70	22.50	9.2	0.85	7.58	10.91
2015	18.6 †	1.16	16.31	20.85	8.6 ‡	0.84	6.99	10.29
2016	19.7 ‡	0.95	17.80	21.54	8.6 ‡	0.68	7.29	9.97
2017	20.6	1.03	18.59	22.61	9.2	0.71	7.85	10.63
2018	23.2	1.30	20.64	25.75	9.9	0.82	8.28	11.50
2019	21.0	1.15	18.74	23.25	8.6 ‡	0.72	7.17	9.99
2020	16.4 †	0.90	14.64	18.15	6.6 †	0.62	5.37	7.80
2021	16.5 †	0.82	14.86	18.08	7.5 †	0.59	6.37	8.67
2022	23.5	0.96	21.59	25.34	9.7	0.68	8.41	11.06
2023	22.5	1.10	20.38	24.69	10.1	0.81	8.48	11.65
2024*	23.3	1.78	19.80	26.79	11.2	1.26	8.70	13.62

Note: Standard errors were generated using generalized variance function parameters. This differs from tables 1 and 6 in this report, for which standard errors were calculated using balanced repeated replication. See appendix table 19 for person populations.

*Comparison year.

†Difference with comparison year is significant at the 95% confidence level.

‡Difference with comparison year is significant at the 90% confidence level.

-- Estimates for 2006 should not be compared to other years. See *Criminal Victimization, 2007* (NCJ 224390, BJS, December 2008) for information on changes to the 2006 National Crime Victimization Survey.

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, National Crime Victimization Survey, 1993–2024.

APPENDIX TABLE 2**Standard errors for table 1: Number and rate of violent victimizations, by type of crime, 2020–2024**

Type of violent crime	2020		2021		2022		2023		2024	
	Number	Rate per 1,000	Number	Rate per 1,000	Number	Rate per 1,000	Number	Rate per 1,000	Number	Rate per 1,000
Total violent crime	219,870	0.79	204,884	0.73	253,599	0.90	293,551	1.03	436,800	1.52
Rape/sexual assault	50,445	0.18	38,791	0.14	50,993	0.18	85,634	0.30	98,768	0.34
Robbery	54,778	0.20	55,135	0.20	79,954	0.28	95,605	0.34	95,748	0.33
Assault	198,848	0.72	198,046	0.71	231,387	0.82	249,218	0.88	426,077	1.49
Aggravated assault	73,767	0.27	59,066	0.21	124,588	0.44	119,646	0.42	171,932	0.60
Simple assault	169,905	0.61	182,987	0.66	185,591	0.66	208,928	0.74	377,333	1.32
Violent crime excluding simple assault	105,983	0.38	82,925	0.30	155,866	0.55	184,090	0.65	223,757	0.78
Selected characteristics of violent crime										
Domestic violence	95,903	0.34	93,801	0.34	128,644	0.46	139,612	0.49	159,238	0.56
Intimate partner violence	60,582	0.22	56,820	0.20	108,690	0.39	89,370	0.31	131,492	0.46
Stranger violence	141,274	0.51	117,001	0.42	154,853	0.55	242,220	0.85	268,213	0.94
Violent crime with an injury	148,513	0.53	84,792	0.30	114,574	0.41	118,740	0.42	121,318	0.42
Violent crime with a weapon	79,478	0.29	65,300	0.23	139,386	0.49	141,391	0.50	173,674	0.61

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, National Crime Victimization Survey, 2020–2024.

APPENDIX TABLE 3**Standard errors for table 2: Number and rate of property victimizations, by type of crime, 2020–2024**

Type of property crime	2020		2021		2022		2023		2024	
	Number	Rate per 1,000	Number	Rate per 1,000	Number	Rate per 1,000	Number	Rate per 1,000	Number	Rate per 1,000
Total property crime	269,002	2.12	234,445	1.77	270,771	2.03	278,885	2.09	344,592	2.54
Burglary/trespassing	85,621	0.67	80,585	0.63	100,863	0.78	92,736	0.69	114,582	0.85
Burglary	74,843	0.58	60,851	0.47	86,894	0.67	81,839	0.61	96,563	0.72
Trespassing	42,362	0.33	49,836	0.39	49,088	0.37	47,637	0.36	51,722	0.38
Motor vehicle theft	40,609	0.32	40,093	0.31	48,490	0.37	46,849	0.35	72,671	0.54
Other theft	235,643	1.86	206,654	1.55	229,279	1.71	244,332	1.84	289,351	2.13

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, National Crime Victimization Survey, 2020–2024.

APPENDIX TABLE 4

Standard errors for table 3: Rate of violent victimization, by type of crime and demographic characteristics of victims, 2023 and 2024

Victim demographic characteristic	Total violent crime		Violent crime excluding simple assault	
	2023	2024	2023	2024
Total	1.03	1.52	0.65	0.78
Sex				
Male	1.27	2.22	0.58	1.01
Female	1.35	1.94	1.10	1.09
Race/Hispanic origin				
White	1.35	1.64	0.77	0.94
Black	3.39	3.75	2.48	2.90
Hispanic	2.30	3.77	1.35	1.59
Asian/Native Hawaiian/Other Pacific Islander	1.82	2.55	1.36	1.01
Other	7.96	26.93	4.11	11.71
Age				
12–17	3.46	6.00	1.06	2.71
18–24	4.90	7.09	4.43	3.96
25–34	3.18	3.44	2.09	2.00
35–49	1.68	3.25	0.88	1.65
50–64	1.88	2.16	0.61	1.44
65 or older	0.93	1.50	0.74	0.62
Marital status				
Never married	2.07	2.98	1.52	1.59
Married	0.90	1.26	0.44	0.73
Widowed	1.56	5.89	0.73	3.36
Divorced	2.91	4.74	1.57	2.95
Separated	10.10	26.46	3.37	7.23
Household income				
Less than \$25,000	3.22	4.79	2.16	4.18
\$25,000–\$49,999	2.45	3.82	1.50	1.00
\$50,000–\$99,999	1.92	3.27	1.27	1.39
\$100,000–\$199,999	1.93	2.38	1.07	0.93
\$200,000 or more	1.79	3.60	0.79	2.43

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, National Crime Victimization Survey, 2023 and 2024.

APPENDIX TABLE 5

Standard errors for table 4: Percent of victimizations reported to police, by type of crime, 2023 and 2024

Type of crime	2023	2024
Total violent crime	2.09%	2.72%
Rape/sexual assault	8.15	7.07
Robbery	6.45	5.29
Assault	2.28	3.09
Aggravated assault	4.47	5.51
Simple assault	2.61	4.02
Violent crime excluding simple assault	3.34%	4.04%
Selected characteristics of violent crime		
Domestic violence	5.58%	5.97%
Intimate partner violence	6.61	7.81
Stranger violence	3.06	3.97
Violent crime with an injury	4.18	5.13
Violent crime with a weapon	4.15	4.63
Total property crime	0.78%	1.10%
Burglary/trespassing	2.53	3.03
Burglary	3.15	3.95
Trespassing	3.70	4.37
Motor vehicle theft	2.91	3.73
Other theft	0.83	1.22

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, National Crime Victimization Survey, 2023 and 2024.

APPENDIX TABLE 6**Standard errors for table 5: Percent and rate of violent victimizations reported to police, by demographic characteristics of victims, 2023 and 2024**

Victim demographic characteristic	Percent		Rate per 1,000	
	2023	2024	2023	2024
Total	2.09%	2.72%	0.63	0.95
Sex				
Male	3.12%	4.41%	0.80	1.59
Female	2.83	3.67	0.91	1.04
Race/Hispanic origin				
White	2.48%	3.39%	0.69	0.93
Black	5.74	7.18	2.34	2.62
Hispanic	4.97	7.21	1.49	2.70
Asian/Native Hawaiian/Other Pacific Islander	8.16	11.34	1.10	1.88
Other	7.30	14.55	5.62	18.91
Age				
12–17	5.06%	5.25%	1.00	1.61
18–24	4.83	9.74	2.76	5.25
25–34	4.97	5.19	2.15	1.87
35–49	3.18	5.98	1.15	2.73
50–64	3.87	4.81	1.51	1.48
65 or older	5.34	9.04	0.81	1.38
Marital status				
Never married	2.86%	4.00%	1.27	1.79
Married	3.93	4.60	0.62	0.98
Widowed	8.65	9.68	0.86	5.78
Divorced	4.19	5.60	2.08	4.02
Separated	11.87	9.54	8.64	5.91
Household income				
Less than \$25,000	3.50%	5.24%	1.75	3.60
\$25,000–\$49,999	4.37	7.30	1.57	1.98
\$50,000–\$99,999	3.49	4.96	1.06	1.82
\$100,000–\$199,999	5.39	5.96	1.50	1.80
\$200,000 or more	5.71	7.49	1.03	2.70

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, National Crime Victimization Survey, 2023 and 2024.

APPENDIX TABLE 7**Standard errors for table 6: Rate of victimizations reported and not reported to police, by type of crime, 2023 and 2024**

Type of crime	Reported to police		Not reported to police	
	2023	2024	2023	2024
Total violent crime	0.63	0.95	0.77	1.02
Rape/sexual assault	0.25	0.16	0.12	0.29
Robbery	0.17	0.31	0.30	0.11
Assault	0.55	0.93	0.66	0.96
Aggravated assault	0.32	0.55	0.25	0.26
Simple assault	0.44	0.81	0.59	0.94
Violent crime excluding simple assault	0.42	0.61	0.44	0.44
Selected characteristics of violent crime				
Domestic violence	0.29	0.49	0.37	0.24
Intimate partner violence	0.16	0.42	0.26	0.20
Stranger violence	0.50	0.72	0.60	0.54
Violent crime with an injury	0.28	0.33	0.27	0.23
Violent crime with a weapon	0.36	0.54	0.30	0.27
Total property crime	1.05	1.26	1.61	2.13
Burglary/trespassing	0.44	0.46	0.52	0.65
Burglary	0.34	0.40	0.50	0.55
Trespassing	0.23	0.21	0.23	0.30
Motor vehicle theft	0.27	0.46	0.22	0.28
Other theft	0.85	1.09	1.50	1.88

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, National Crime Victimization Survey, 2023 and 2024.

APPENDIX TABLE 8**Standard errors for table 7: Number and rate of violent victimizations, by veteran and citizenship status of victims, 2023 and 2024**

Victim veteran and citizenship status	2023		2024	
	Number	Rate per 1,000	Number	Rate per 1,000
Total violent crime	293,551	1.03	436,800	1.52
Veteran status				
Veteran	64,865	3.98	90,441	5.46
Nonveteran	282,639	1.17	331,115	1.36
Citizenship status				
U.S. citizen	287,090	1.08	432,815	1.62
U.S.-born citizen	277,952	1.16	430,429	1.77
Naturalized U.S. citizen	66,605	2.64	53,324	2.08
Non-U.S. citizen	29,136	1.78	44,142	2.46

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, National Crime Victimization Survey, 2023 and 2024.

APPENDIX TABLE 9**Standard errors for table 8: Rate of victimization, by type of crime and location of residence, 2023 and 2024**

Location of residence	Total violent crime		Violent crime excluding simple assault		Total property crime	
	2023	2024	2023	2024	2023	2024
Urban	2.36	5.27	1.42	1.92	7.89	11.17
Suburban	1.24	1.66	0.78	1.00	2.47	3.22
Rural	2.63	3.38	1.83	1.31	3.06	3.81

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, National Crime Victimization Survey, 2023 and 2024.

APPENDIX TABLE 10**Standard errors for table 9: Percent of violent victimizations for which victims received assistance from a victim service provider, by type of crime, 2023 and 2024**

Type of crime	2023	2024
Total violent crime	1.09%	1.38%
Simple assault	1.15	1.45
Violent crime excluding simple assault	1.97%	2.59%
Selected characteristics of violent crime		
Intimate partner violence	5.18%	7.80%
Violent crime with an injury	3.47	5.34
Violent crime with a weapon	1.93	2.23

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, National Crime Victimization Survey, 2023 and 2024.

APPENDIX TABLE 11**Standard errors for table 10: Firearm violence, 2023 and 2024**

	2023	2024
Total violent victimizations	293,551	436,800
Firearm victimizations		
Number	89,879	122,454
Percent	1.29%	1.65%
Rate	0.32	0.43
Firearm victimizations reported to police		
Number	84,779	115,606
Percent	4.72%	6.89%

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, National Crime Victimization Survey, 2023 and 2024.

APPENDIX TABLE 12

Standard errors and 95% confidence intervals for table 11: Number and percent of violent incidents, by demographic characteristics of population, victims, and offenders, 2024

Demographic characteristic	Number of violent incidents		Percent of violent incidents					
			Victim			Offender		
			Standard error	95% confidence interval		Standard error	95% confidence interval	
Lower bound	Upper bound	Lower bound		Upper bound				
Total	390,494	390,494	~	~	~	~	~	~
Sex								
Male	258,432	300,094	2.91%	44.58%	56.08%	2.96%	69.77%	81.47%
Female	267,799	190,883	2.91	43.92	55.42	2.89	13.62	25.05
Both male and female offenders	~	76,793	~	~	~	1.34	2.40	7.69
Race/Hispanic origin								
White	248,988	281,032	3.05%	50.30%	62.34%	3.74%	39.46%	54.24%
Black	123,726	168,741	2.00	8.78	16.68	3.22	21.39	34.10
Hispanic	188,309	140,565	2.68	13.82	24.40	2.59	10.98	21.22
Asian/Native Hawaiian/Other Pacific Islander	51,173	41,114	0.84	2.15	5.47	0.84	1.01	4.32
Other	147,613	30,991	2.18	3.74	12.34	0.62	0.93	3.37
Multiple offenders of various races	~	68,178	~	~	~	1.34	1.85	7.14
Age								
11 or younger	~	18,958	~	~	~	0.38%	0.02%	1.53%
12–17	150,783	76,395	2.18%	7.56%	16.18%	1.48	5.78	11.60
18–29	233,065	117,417	3.03	21.46	33.43	2.26	12.66	21.58
30 or older	225,333	288,240	2.92	54.91	66.45	2.62	60.87	71.20
Multiple offenders of various ages	~	110,419	~	~	~	1.99	3.45	11.31

~Not applicable.

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, National Crime Victimization Survey, 2024.

APPENDIX TABLE 13

Standard errors for table 12: Number of violent incidents, by sex of victims and offenders, 2024

Victim sex	Total violent incidents	Offender sex			
		Male	Female	Both male and female	Unknown
Male	258,432	239,152	66,016	28,742	70,040
Female	267,799	146,341	181,154	70,222	49,854

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, National Crime Victimization Survey, 2024.

APPENDIX TABLE 14

Standard errors for table 13: Number of violent incidents, by race or Hispanic origin of victims and offenders, 2024

Victim race/Hispanic origin	Total violent incidents	Offender race/Hispanic origin				
		White	Black	Hispanic	Other	Unknown
White	248,988	203,763	81,462	58,808	50,430	79,782
Black	123,726	19,748	93,005	73,398	29,488	48,338
Hispanic	188,309	120,279	118,528	62,453	15,089	51,653
Other	152,472	103,065	37,728	76,492	62,096	38,412

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, National Crime Victimization Survey, 2024.

APPENDIX TABLE 15

Estimates, standard errors, and 95% confidence intervals for figure 3: Percent of persons age 12 or older who were victims of violent crime and violent crime excluding simple assault, 1993–2024

Year	Total violent crime						Violent crime excluding simple assault					
	Number of persons		Percent of persons				Number of persons		Percent of persons			
	Estimate	Standard error	Estimate	Standard error	95% confidence interval		Estimate	Standard error	Estimate	Standard error	95% confidence interval	
				Lower bound	Upper bound					Lower bound	Upper bound	
1993	9,153,050	151,730	4.34%	0.068%	4.206%	4.474%	3,958,680	86,358	1.88%	0.040%	1.798%	1.956%
1994	9,426,150	231,004	4.42	0.100	4.226	4.619	3,996,690	117,638	1.88	0.053	1.771	1.980
1995	8,652,530	204,208	4.02	0.086	3.855	4.191	3,377,900	109,617	1.57	0.048	1.476	1.665
1996	8,023,270	189,347	3.69	0.080	3.537	3.850	3,112,430	106,979	1.43	0.048	1.339	1.526
1997	7,758,890	272,684	3.53	0.102	3.329	3.730	3,077,170	125,358	1.40	0.053	1.295	1.504
1998	7,204,430	258,617	3.25	0.109	3.033	3.461	2,681,800	133,282	1.21	0.057	1.097	1.321
1999	6,570,720	208,309	2.93	0.099	2.732	3.120	2,525,010	94,477	1.12	0.044	1.038	1.211
2000	5,689,530	227,962	2.51	0.094	2.324	2.693	2,163,370	109,910	0.95	0.046	0.863	1.044
2001	5,241,270	206,792	2.29	0.079	2.131	2.442	1,953,420	100,805	0.85	0.044	0.766	0.938
2002	4,888,300	192,200	2.11	0.074	1.965	2.257	1,662,990	81,616	0.72	0.035	0.650	0.786
2003	4,875,970	182,532	2.04	0.067	1.906	2.170	1,761,670	92,644	0.74	0.035	0.668	0.805
2004	4,781,770	202,139	1.98	0.076	1.830	2.127	1,740,580	99,656	0.72	0.040	0.641	0.799
2005	4,621,120	203,538	1.89	0.072	1.749	2.031	1,715,430	96,668	0.70	0.038	0.627	0.776
2006	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
2007	4,214,130	165,012	1.68	0.065	1.555	1.812	1,544,380	89,669	0.62	0.036	0.545	0.688
2008	4,027,930	145,292	1.60	0.057	1.486	1.708	1,485,380	81,650	0.59	0.033	0.524	0.654
2009	3,674,790	152,111	1.45	0.057	1.335	1.558	1,368,810	79,617	0.54	0.030	0.479	0.598
2010	3,270,650	154,048	1.28	0.059	1.161	1.394	1,299,430	90,207	0.51	0.035	0.439	0.576
2011	3,700,190	161,603	1.44	0.057	1.326	1.548	1,427,500	75,721	0.55	0.028	0.500	0.609
2012	4,309,900	155,660	1.65	0.056	1.534	1.756	1,540,740	89,486	0.59	0.033	0.523	0.653
2013	3,663,620	134,392	1.39	0.049	1.289	1.482	1,377,710	71,387	0.52	0.026	0.470	0.572
2014	3,402,070	131,048	1.28	0.049	1.180	1.371	1,448,370	78,791	0.54	0.029	0.486	0.601
2015	3,077,310	139,241	1.14	0.050	1.044	1.240	1,278,890	73,843	0.47	0.028	0.420	0.529
2016	3,503,720	137,474	1.29	0.048	1.192	1.382	1,372,720	77,442	0.50	0.028	0.449	0.559
2017	3,589,440	127,223	1.32	0.046	1.227	1.407	1,416,090	73,825	0.52	0.027	0.467	0.573
2018	3,893,100	133,408	1.41	0.046	1.324	1.504	1,624,430	81,353	0.59	0.029	0.534	0.646
2019	3,673,650	127,899	1.33	0.045	1.239	1.414	1,455,060	75,211	0.53	0.027	0.473	0.578
2020	3,125,900	129,697	1.12	0.047	1.031	1.217	1,239,440	79,483	0.45	0.029	0.389	0.503
2021	3,065,930	113,092	1.10	0.041	1.018	1.178	1,225,190	69,342	0.44	0.025	0.390	0.488
2022	4,256,880	161,615	1.51	0.054	1.402	1.614	1,880,450	96,196	0.67	0.033	0.601	0.731
2023	3,861,360	135,216	1.36	0.048	1.261	1.450	1,530,990	69,836	0.54	0.025	0.489	0.585
2024	4,152,060	206,510	1.45	0.070	1.312	1.588	1,721,460	121,901	0.60	0.042	0.518	0.684

Note: Estimates may not match those previously published due to the development of a new weight for prevalence. For more information, see *A New Measure of Prevalence for the National Crime Victimization Survey* (NCJ 307554, BJS, April 2024). See table 1 for definitions.

--Estimates for 2006 should not be compared to other years. See *Criminal Victimization, 2007* (NCJ 224390, BJS, December 2008) for more information on changes to the 2006 National Crime Victimization Survey.

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, National Crime Victimization Survey, 1993–2024.

APPENDIX TABLE 16

Standard errors for table 14: Number and percent of persons who were victims of violent crime, by type of crime, 2020–2024

Type of crime	Number of persons					Percent of persons				
	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
Total violent crime	129,697	113,092	161,615	135,216	206,510	0.047%	0.041%	0.054%	0.048%	0.070%
Rape/sexual assault	27,196	28,841	38,478	31,114	61,250	0.010	0.010	0.013	0.011	0.021
Robbery	41,034	34,354	50,228	36,069	64,023	0.015	0.012	0.018	0.013	0.023
Assault	116,162	102,621	137,991	127,342	185,301	0.042	0.037	0.047	0.045	0.063
Aggravated assault	54,678	47,879	63,089	57,804	85,152	0.020	0.017	0.022	0.020	0.030
Simple assault	100,305	85,508	114,372	117,812	165,807	0.036	0.031	0.039	0.042	0.057
Violent crime excluding simple assault	79,483	69,342	96,196	69,836	121,901	0.029%	0.025%	0.033%	0.025%	0.042%
Selected characteristics of violent crime										
Domestic violence	48,441	45,248	54,458	42,021	65,080	0.018%	0.016%	0.019%	0.015%	0.023%
Intimate partner violence	32,653	30,299	40,024	26,495	57,187	0.012	0.011	0.014	0.010	0.020
Stranger violence	92,760	76,763	105,845	109,303	152,239	0.034	0.028	0.037	0.039	0.052
Violent crime with an injury	56,999	50,614	66,777	55,269	83,350	0.021	0.018	0.023	0.019	0.029
Violent crime with a weapon	61,583	50,115	73,519	60,817	84,715	0.022	0.018	0.026	0.021	0.029

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, National Crime Victimization Survey, 2020–2024.

APPENDIX TABLE 17

Standard errors for table 15: Number and percent of persons who were victims of violent crime, by demographic characteristics of victims, 2023 and 2024

Victim demographic characteristic	Number of persons		Percent of persons	
	2023	2024	2023	2024
Total	135,216	206,510	0.048%	0.070%
Sex				
Male	90,265	125,536	0.066%	0.089%
Female	79,224	147,496	0.054	0.098
Race/Hispanic origin				
White	95,524	164,308	0.055%	0.093%
Black	52,237	66,062	0.150	0.191
Hispanic	62,892	73,805	0.120	0.137
Asian/Native Hawaiian/ Other Pacific Islander	25,881	38,561	0.126	0.187
Other	24,556	38,416	0.382	0.593
Age				
12–17	44,245	81,421	0.169%	0.303%
18–24	58,302	75,652	0.184	0.247
25–34	52,638	82,279	0.116	0.181
35–49	60,958	92,420	0.097	0.144
50–64	44,572	72,611	0.072	0.121
65 or older	32,564	42,978	0.055	0.072
Marital status				
Never married	89,902	156,558	0.084%	0.144%
Married	57,620	81,511	0.044	0.063
Widowed	14,853	20,335	0.097	0.133
Divorced	42,536	68,839	0.157	0.243
Separated	16,404	36,486	0.331	0.712
Household income				
Less than \$25,000	50,478	86,086	0.136%	0.250%
\$25,000–\$49,999	56,155	64,805	0.097	0.119
\$50,000–\$99,999	53,462	112,214	0.061	0.125
\$100,000–\$199,999	65,161	84,990	0.089	0.106
\$200,000 or more	33,715	72,182	0.112	0.209

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, National Crime Victimization Survey, 2023 and 2024.

APPENDIX TABLE 18

Standard errors for table 16: Number and percent of households that experienced property crime, by type of crime, 2020–2024

Type of property crime	Number of households					Percent of households				
	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
Total property crime	208,025	173,520	193,876	185,208	271,020	0.144%	0.124%	0.133%	0.120%	0.188%
Burglary/trespassing	61,492	65,072	62,386	51,995	82,855	0.047%	0.050%	0.049%	0.039%	0.060%
Burglary	49,541	50,583	47,302	44,396	71,857	0.038	0.039	0.037	0.033	0.053
Trespassing	34,038	41,417	38,961	30,505	47,897	0.026	0.032	0.030	0.023	0.035
Motor vehicle theft	37,578	34,095	41,595	49,675	70,353	0.029%	0.026%	0.031%	0.037%	0.052%
Other theft	182,700	154,749	168,827	169,401	242,157	0.128%	0.113%	0.115%	0.112%	0.172%

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, National Crime Victimization Survey, 2020–2024.

APPENDIX TABLE 19**Population of persons age 12 or older, by demographic characteristics, 2020–2024**

Demographic characteristic	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
Total	278,082,260	279,188,570	282,304,640	284,857,030	286,373,220
Sex					
Male	135,260,190	135,863,650	138,308,540	139,949,880	140,346,260
Female	142,822,080	143,324,920	143,996,100	144,907,150	146,026,960
Race/Hispanic origin					
White ^a	171,267,760	171,158,580	171,625,260	171,573,780	170,855,150
Black ^a	33,688,820	33,938,330	34,448,440	34,813,560	35,012,630
Hispanic	48,640,170	49,402,220	50,873,240	52,113,170	53,539,670
Asian/Native Hawaiian/ Other Pacific Islander ^{a,b}	18,867,300	19,293,190	19,681,580	20,351,610	20,569,310
Other ^{a,c}	5,618,230	5,396,250	5,676,110	6,004,920	6,396,460
Age					
12–17	24,992,970	24,905,640	25,875,630	25,586,570	25,687,710
18–24	29,353,220	29,130,230	29,483,540	30,797,620	30,280,480
25–34	45,294,090	45,260,400	44,673,480	44,981,190	44,879,550
35–49	61,393,010	61,448,170	62,718,200	63,324,080	64,368,460
50–64	62,477,170	62,284,210	62,912,810	61,923,060	61,460,740
65 or older	54,571,810	56,159,930	56,640,980	58,244,520	59,696,280
Marital status^d					
Never married	99,468,100	101,747,930	104,122,530	105,908,590	107,140,320
Married	129,399,370	127,458,620	128,793,660	129,616,320	129,728,030
Widowed	15,350,940	15,760,770	15,255,090	15,281,970	15,142,370
Divorced	27,280,860	27,374,380	27,523,050	27,419,630	27,672,400
Separated	4,810,270	4,770,190	4,909,160	4,894,830	5,109,670
Household income					
Less than \$25,000	41,849,120	41,846,630	38,445,470	35,790,580	33,401,030
\$25,000–\$49,999	66,271,710	64,861,660	61,575,030	58,586,650	54,519,490
\$50,000–\$99,999	88,752,540	88,155,100	88,540,080	89,260,250	88,435,240
\$100,000–\$199,999	60,852,220	62,121,610	68,027,520	72,096,720	76,661,880
\$200,000 or more	20,356,680	22,203,560	25,716,540	29,122,830	33,355,570

^aExcludes persons of Hispanic origin, (e.g., “white” refers to non-Hispanic white persons and “black” refers to non-Hispanic black persons).

^bIncludes persons who identified as Asian only or Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander only. Categories are not shown separately due to small numbers of sample cases.

^cIncludes persons who identified as American Indian or Alaska Native only or as two or more races. Categories are not shown separately due to small numbers of sample cases.

^dEstimates do not sum to totals because of missing data on marital status.

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, National Crime Victimization Survey, 2020–2024.

APPENDIX TABLE 20**Population of households, 2020–2024**

	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
Total	127,945,770	129,319,230	131,259,550	133,420,050	133,888,000

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, National Crime Victimization Survey, 2020–2024.




The Bureau of Justice Statistics of the U.S. Department of Justice is the principal federal agency responsible for measuring crime, criminal victimization, criminal offenders, victims of crime, correlates of crime, and the operation of criminal and civil justice systems at the federal, state, tribal, and local levels. BJS collects, analyzes, and disseminates reliable statistics on crime and justice systems in the United States, supports improvements to state and local criminal justice information systems, and participates with national and international organizations to develop and recommend national standards for justice statistics. Kevin M. Scott, PhD, is the acting director.

This report was written by Susannah N. Tapp, PhD, and Emilie J. Coen, DrPH. Alexandra Thompson and Stephanie Mueller verified the report.

Eric Hendrixson edited the report. Jeffrey Link produced the report.

September 2025, NCJ 310547




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EXHIBIT F

Respondents' Motion for Judicial Notice



Great Minds Think Data with Maury Blackman



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
business, data, economy, information, politics

© Maury Blackman

Maury Blackman is a serial entrepreneur who has led high-growth tech companies for more than 25 years. Maury is also an active investor, board member, and advisor to many tech companies. Great Minds Think Data shares exclusive insightful interviews from the most influential industry leaders in the world, covering prominent topics at the intersection of data and the worlds of business, politics, and economics. Maury and his guests explore how commercial businesses and governments can use real-time data to make actionable decisions.

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10/13/2025

Google, Growth, and Getting Seen – The SEO Playbook with Joy Hawkins

In the final installment of the *Google and Growth* series, host **Maury Blackman** sits down with **Joy Hawkins**, one of the most recognized experts in local search and the founder of **Sterling Sky**, **LocalU**, and the **Local Search Forum**.

Joy breaks down what small businesses really need to know about SEO in 2025 – from how Google’s local algorithm works to what actually moves the needle in local rankings. She shares insider insights on reviews, proximity, on-page optimization, and the biggest myths holding businesses back from being seen online.

Whether you’re a local business owner trying to stand out on Google Maps or a marketer looking to sharpen your SEO playbook, this conversation delivers practical, no-nonsense advice straight from one of the most trusted voices in the industry.

You’ll learn:

- What really drives local SEO rankings today
- How to avoid the biggest SEO mistakes small businesses make
- The impact of reviews and proximity on visibility
- Where SEO is headed with AI and the future of Google Search

Guest: Joy Hawkins – Founder of Sterling Sky, LocalU, and the Local Search Forum. Columnist at Search Engine Land and Google Business Profile Product Expert.

Host: Maury Blackman, CEO and technologist exploring the intersection of data, growth, and small business innovation.

Results Per Page

10

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



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
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
09/30/2025

AI Innovators in Government: Gavin Baum-Blake of City Detect

In this episode, we explore the intersection of artificial intelligence and local government with Gavin Baum-Blake, CEO of City Detect. Discover how this innovative company is revolutionizing municipal inspections by utilizing AI and computer vision to monitor neighborhood health. Learn about the challenges faced by local governments, the importance of data in decision-making, and how City Detect's technology is transforming code enforcement, speeding up inspections from months to mere weeks. Join us as we delve into the future of public service and the role of technology in fostering healthier communities.



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08/29/2025

Why Your Reputation Is Your #1 Asset — Michael Yules of GatherUp

In Part 2 of *Google & Growth: A Series for Small Business*, host Maury Blackman sits down with Michael





Yules, CEO of GatherUp, to explore how reviews and reputation have become the lifeblood of small business growth. Building on Part 1's discussion with Brad Wetherall about the importance of a complete digital footprint, this episode takes a closer look at why a Google Business Profile is often a company's most valuable asset — and how reputation isn't just part of marketing anymore, it *is* marketing.

Yules shares his insights on the evolution of online reviews, explaining how the focus has shifted from sheer volume to quality, authenticity, and consistency. He highlights common mistakes small businesses make that erode trust — from ignoring their Google Business Profile to relying on fake reviews — and outlines practical strategies for generating authentic feedback.

The conversation also covers the shift from a brick-and-mortar-first world to a digital-first one, where traditional trust signals like storefronts and signage are being replaced by online credibility. Yules and Blackman dive into how AI and generative search are reshaping reputation management, why diversification across multiple review platforms matters, and how businesses can prepare for a future where AI agents may become the primary decision-makers in search.

At the heart of the episode is a simple but powerful takeaway: consistently ask your customers for feedback and reviews. As Yules puts it, “people do not do things that you don't ask them to do” — and building trust online starts with that ask.





08/17/2025

The Data Behind the Stars: how Google Reviews Shape Trust,



Commerce, and Deception.


In this episode, we explore the complex world of Google Reviews with industry experts Brad Weatherall and Curtis Boyd. Discover the impact of online reviews on businesses and consumers alike. We delve into the advantages and pitfalls of Google's review ecosystem, discussing how fraudulent activities can undermine trust and the measures being taken to combat them. Join us for an insightful conversation about the intersection of data, power, and the digital marketplace.



07/31/2025

Trailer

Coming soon... new episodes of Great Minds Think Data



11/23/2022


2022 Midterms - The Global Rethink, Social Media, and Electoral Impact

My guest today is Frank Luntz, one of the world's most renowned and sought-after communications consultants and pollsters. We're also joined today by Lanny Davis who is a lifelong democrat and well-known as the




former White House Special Counsel to President Clinton.

Today we will explore and unpack the driving forces behind the 2022 midterms, social media's impact on the electorate, and finally what the most recent post-midterm Premise Poll reveals about former President Trump's 3rd run for President.



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


11/02/2022

Newt Gingrich - How the "Politics of Life" Drives Election Outcomes

With the 2022 Midterms a week away, my guest today is Newt Gingrich. The former speaker of the house and Time Magazine's 1995 "Man of the Year" led a revolution in 1994 as the co-author and architect of the contract with America. Under his leadership republicans swept the election, ending four decades of democratic control of the house. Two decades later, Newt remains a force in US politics through his speaking, writing, and his production company Gingrich360. In our conversation we focus on how political issues percolate to the top and become primary drivers of election outcomes, his thoughts on the upcoming midterms, and finally the US's current standing as a world leader.





10/11/2022

Larry Summers - The Inconvenient Truth of Economic Policy


My guest today is Larry Summers. Larry is one of America's leading economists. In addition to serving as 71st Secretary of the Treasury in the Clinton Administration, Dr. Summers served as Director of the White House National Economic Council in the Obama Administration, as President of Harvard University, and as the Chief Economist of the World Bank.

In today's episode, we will explore with Larry his thoughts leading up to his opinion piece in the Washington Post back in February 2021 and his thoughts on our current economic conditions, and most importantly how we should think about navigating the turbulent seas ahead. Some important topics covered include Inflation, the Keystone pipeline, Student Loan Forgiveness, and the Federal Reserve's purpose, structure, and decision-making.



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09/22/2022

John Rendon - War in Ukraine, China, and the 2024 Presidential Election

My guest today is John Rendon, one of the world's thought leaders in international and military affairs. John began his career in Democratic Party politics with George McGovern's 1972 presidential campaign. He lat-




er served as the Executive Director and Political Director of the Democratic National Committee and managed President Carter's 1980 Democratic convention in New York.

Today, John is considered to be the world's leading pioneer in the use of strategic communications as an element of national power and one of the first thought leaders to harness the power of emerging technologies in support of real-time information management. He has served as an executive communications consultant to the White House, the U.S. Department of Defense, the National Security community, and to the leadership of Fortune 500 companies.

In today's episode, we tapped John's knowledge to break down the War in Ukraine, its impact on the European community, and the growing nexus between Russia and China. We also discussed the upcoming midterm elections and theoretical matchups for the 2024 Presidential election that include how Liz Cheney's entrance into the race would increase the likelihood of another Trump Presidency.

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08/11/2022

Alex Gladstein - Is Bitcoin The Next World's Currency?

My guest today is Alex Gladstein, Chief Strategy Officer at the Human Rights Foundation and author of the book



"Check your Financial Privilege". Today's episode focuses on how Bitcoin is changing the landscape of the financial services industry and offers hope to many people who were born into a weaker financial system. The episode illustrates how Americans (which is only 4% of the world population) enjoy financial privilege from the dominant U.S. dollar system while 2 billion people live with double-digit inflation every day. Most of us think of Bitcoin as an investment opportunity, but there's ample data that shows bitcoin is fast becoming a transaction platform to move money across borders, protect savings from inflation, and pay for services in many countries around the world. Lastly, Alex emphasized the crypto world's famous mantra "Not your keys, not your coins".

0:41 – Intro to Bitcoin and Alex Gladstein

3:50 – Financial Privilege and The Evolution of Global Currencies

23:40 – The U.S. Economy's Power

27:06 – Bitcoin as a Solution and Currency for the World

36:44 – Bitcoin's Impact in Countries with Lacking Financial Infrastructure

46:46 – Responding to Bitcoin Criticisms and Spreading Financial Freedom

57:00 – Alex's Three Insights for the World



Showing 1 to 10 of 12 Episodes


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EXHIBIT G

Respondents' Motion for Judicial Notice


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A POSCAST HOSTED BY MAURY BLACKMAN

From Data to Decisions - Stories That Shape the World.

Great Minds Think Data shares exclusive insightful interviews from the most influential industry leaders in the world, covering prominent topics at the intersection of data and the worlds of business, politics, and economics. Maury and his guests explore how commercial businesses and governments can use real-time data to make actionable decisions.



Great Minds Think Data with Maury Blackman
The Data Behind the Stars: how Google Reviews Shape Trust, Commerce, and


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


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
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Great Minds Think Data with Maury Blackman

2022 Midterms - The Global Rethink, Social Media, and Electoral Impact

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About Maury Blackman

Maury Blackman is a veteran technology executive with over 25 years of experience leading high-growth companies at the intersection of civic innovation, market intelligence, and emerging technologies. Known for scaling transformative businesses and building mission-driven teams, his career spans some of the most dynamic sectors in tech and public policy.

In 2025, Maury Blackman joined The Transparency Company as co-founder and CEO, bringing with him a proven track record of building and scaling high-growth Govtech and compliance-based platforms. Under this expanded leadership, The Transparency Company was relaunched with a national vision: to empower regulators, honest businesses, and consumers with tools that restore trust in the \$500 billion online review economy.

Previously, Maury was CEO of Premise Data, where he led its transformation into a global intelligence platform blending machine learning and human networks to deliver real-time insights to Fortune 500s, government agencies,

and NGOs.

Before Premise, Maury served as Chairman and CEO of Accela, a civic technology pioneer that reimagined how governments deliver digital services. Under his leadership, Accela became a core digital infrastructure provider for cities and counties striving to meet the rising expectations of citizens in a digital-first era. His work at Accela earned him Ernst & Young's Northern California Entrepreneur of the Year Award in 2016.

Maury began his career after graduating from the University of Houston and serving as a commissioned officer in the United States Army Reserves, where he developed the discipline and decision-making skills that continue to guide his leadership.

In addition to leading The Transparency Company, Maury is also the Managing Director of Pierpoint Ventures, where he invests in and advises early-stage technology startups building the future.

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EXHIBIT H

Respondents' Motion for Judicial Notice

ATTORNEY OR PARTY WITHOUT ATTORNEY STATE BAR NUMBER: 290686
NAME: David Marek
FIRM NAME: The Marek Law Firm
STREET ADDRESS: 228 Hamilton Avenue
CITY: Palo Alto STATE: CA ZIP CODE: 94301
TELEPHONE NO.: 917-721-5042 FAX NO.:
EMAIL ADDRESS: david@marekfirm.com
ATTORNEY FOR (name): Plaintiff Maury Blackman

FOR COURT USE ONLY
ELECTRONICALLY FILED
Superior Court of California, County of San Francisco
10/01/2025
Clerk of the Court
BY: DANIEL DIAZ
Deputy Clerk
CASE NUMBER: CGC-25-624793

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO
STREET ADDRESS: 400 McAllister Street
MAILING ADDRESS:
CITY AND ZIP CODE: San Francisco, CA 94102
BRANCH NAME: CIVIL UNLIMITED

PLAINTIFF/PETITIONER: MAURY BLACKMAN
DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT: THE CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, ET. AL.

REQUEST FOR DISMISSAL

A conformed copy will not be returned by the clerk unless a method of return is provided with the document.

This form may not be used for dismissal of a derivative action or a class action or of any party or cause of action in a class action. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 3.760 and 3.770.)

- 1. TO THE CLERK: Please dismiss this action as follows:
a. (1) [x] With prejudice (2) [] Without prejudice (3) [] Without prejudice and with the court retaining jurisdiction (Code Civ. Proc., § 664.6)
b. (1) [] Complaint (2) [] Petition
(3) [] Cross-complaint filed on (date): by (name):
(4) [] Cross-complaint filed on (date): by (name):
(5) [x] Entire action of all parties and all causes of action
(6) [] Other (specify)*:

2. (Complete in all cases except family law cases.)
The court [x] did [] did not waive court fees and costs for a party in this case. (This information may be obtained from the clerk. If court fees and costs were waived, the declaration on the back of this form must be completed.)

Date: October 1, 2025

David Marek
(TYPE OR PRINT NAME OF [x] ATTORNEY [] PARTY WITHOUT ATTORNEY)

David Marek (SIGNATURE)

* If dismissal requested is of specified parties only, of specified causes of action only, or of specified cross-complaints only, so state and identify the parties, causes of action, or cross-complaints to be dismissed

Attorney or party without attorney for
[x] Plaintiff/Petitioner [] Defendant/Respondent
[] Cross-Complainant

3. TO THE CLERK: Consent to the above dismissal is hereby given.†
Date:

(TYPE OR PRINT NAME OF [] ATTORNEY [] PARTY WITHOUT ATTORNEY)

† If item 1a(3) is checked, all parties must sign.
If a cross-complaint—or Response—Marriage/Domestic Partnership (form FL-120) seeking affirmative relief—is on file, the attorney for cross-complainant (respondent) must sign this consent if required by Code of Civil Procedure section 581(i) or (j).

(SIGNATURE)
Attorney or party without attorney for
[] Plaintiff/Petitioner [] Defendant/Respondent
[] Cross-Complainant

[] Check here and use form MC-025 or a separate page for additional signatures. Include date, printed name, and party information.

- 4. [] Dismissal entered as requested on (date):
5. [] Dismissal entered on (date): as to only (name):
6. [] Dismissal not entered as requested for the following reasons (specify):
7. a. [] Attorney or party without attorney notified on (date):
b. [] Attorney or party without attorney not notified. Filing party failed to provide
[] a copy to be conformed [] means to return conformed copy

DISMISSAL ENTERED
10/01/2025
By: DANIEL DIAZ
Deputy Clerk

Date: Clerk, by , Deputy

PLAINTIFF/PETITIONER: MAURY BLACKMAN DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT: THE CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, ET. AL.	CASE NUMBER: CGC-25-624793
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COURT'S RECOVERY OF WAIVED COURT FEES AND COSTS

If a party whose court fees and costs were initially waived has recovered or will recover \$10,000 or more in value by way of settlement, compromise, arbitration award, mediation settlement, or other means, the court has a statutory lien on that recovery. The court may refuse to dismiss the case until the lien is satisfied. (Gov. Code, § 68637.)

Declaration Concerning Waived Court Fees

1. The court waived court fees and costs in this action for *(name)*: The City and County of San Francisco
2. The person named in item 1 is *(check one below)*
 - a. not recovering anything of value by this action.
 - b. recovering less than \$10,000 in value by this action.
 - c. recovering \$10,000 or more in value by this action. *(If item 2c is checked, item 3 must be completed.)*
3. All court fees and court costs that were waived in this action have been paid to the court *(check one)*: Yes No

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the information above is true and correct.

Date: October 1, 2025

David Marek

(TYPE OR PRINT NAME OF ATTORNEY PARTY MAKING DECLARATION)



(SIGNATURE)