COLLABORATIVE REFORM INITIATIVE

An Assessment of the Calexico Police Department

Kenneth A. Bouche ▪ Robert L. Davis ▪ Stephen C. Grant ▪ Christi L. Gullion
Arnette F. Heintze ▪ Will D. Johnson III ▪ Edward Medrano
COLLABORATIVE REFORM INITIATIVE

An Assessment of the Calexico Police Department

Kenneth A. Bouche ■ Robert L. Davis ■ Stephen C. Grant ■ Christi L. Gullion
Arnette F. Heintze ■ Will D. Johnson III ■ Edward Medrano

COPS
Community Oriented Policing Services
U.S. Department of Justice

HILLARD HEINTZE
This project was supported by cooperative agreement number 2014-CR-WX-K006 awarded by the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, U.S. Department of Justice. The opinions contained herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. References to specific agencies, companies, products, or services should not be considered an endorsement by the author(s) or the U.S. Department of Justice. Rather, the references are illustrations to supplement discussion of the issues.

This document contains preliminary analysis that is subject to further review and modification. It may not be quoted or cited and should not be disseminated further without the express permission of Hillard Heintze or the U.S. Department of Justice. Any copyright in this work is subject to the government’s unlimited rights license as defined in FAR 52-227.14. The reproduction of this work for commercial purposes is strictly prohibited. Non governmental users may copy and distribute this document in any medium, either commercial or noncommercial, provided that this copyright notice is reproduced in all copies. Nongovernmental users may not use technical measures to obstruct or control the reading or further copying of the copies they make or distribute. Nongovernmental users may not accept compensation of any manner in exchange for copies. All other rights reserved.

The Internet references cited in this publication were valid as of the date of this publication. Given that URLs and websites are in constant flux, neither the author(s) nor the COPS Office can vouch for their current validity.

Recommended citation:

Copyright © 2016 Hillard Heintze LLC. The U.S. Department of Justice reserves a royalty-free, non-exclusive, and irrevocable license to reproduce, publish, or otherwise use, and authorize others to use, this publication for Federal Government purposes. This publication may be freely distributed and used for noncommercial and educational purposes only.

Published 2016
### Contents

#### Acknowledgments

Collaborative Reform team ................................................................. v

#### Executive Summary

Collaborative Reform Initiative .......................................................... 1
Notable events during the assessment .................................................. 2
Technical assistance goals ................................................................. 2
Assessment approach and team .......................................................... 3
Observations and recommendations ...................................................... 3
Key themes ....................................................................................... 3
Key observations .............................................................................. 8

#### Introduction

Calexico: An overview of the police department ...................................... 12
COPS Office Collaborative Reform Initiative ......................................... 14

1. Methodology—Approach and Actions Taken ....................................... 15

Independent and objective evaluation and analysis ................................ 15
Documents: A sampling of items requested and reviewed ......................... 16

2. Leadership, Supervision, and Accountability ....................................... 19

Strategic planning ............................................................................ 19
Staffing and organization .................................................................... 20
Performance evaluations, employee recognition, and discipline ................ 20
Supervision, communication, and leadership training .............................. 20
Findings and recommendations .......................................................... 21

3. Community Engagement and Community Policing ............................ 27

Strategy and integration ..................................................................... 27
Interaction with the community ........................................................... 27
Community policing training, problem-solving techniques, and transparency ......................................................................................... 28
Community-Police Advisory Commission .............................................. 28
Communication and strategic messaging ............................................... 28
Findings and recommendations .......................................................... 29

4. Internal Affairs: The Complaint and Disciplinary Process .................. 37

Purpose, culture, and mindset ............................................................. 37
Complaint intake ................................................................................ 38
Complaint assignment ........................................................................ 39
Investigative process .......................................................................... 40
Case management ................................................................................ 41
Case disposition .................................................................................. 42
COLLABORATIVE REFORM INITIATIVE
An Assessment of the Calexico Police Department

Findings and recommendations ............................................42

5. Early Intervention Tools and Practices ........................................55
Development of tools and practices .........................................55
Accountability and transparency ............................................56
Findings and recommendations ............................................56

6. Criminal Investigations .....................................................59
Department policy and investigations manual ........................59
Criminal investigations knowledge, skills, and training ............60
Staffing and case management .............................................61
Findings and recommendations ............................................62

7. Patrol .............................................................................77
Deployment and staffing .....................................................77
Supervision ..........................................................................78
Equipment and support functions .........................................79
Communications and dispatch ..............................................79
Findings and recommendations ............................................80

8. Crime Analysis ...............................................................93
System development ............................................................93
Information sharing ............................................................93
Findings and recommendations ............................................94

9. Additional Areas of Focus ................................................97
Policy guidance .................................................................97
Training ...............................................................................97
Equipment ...........................................................................98
Property and evidence .........................................................98
Findings and recommendations ............................................98

10. Final Consideration .......................................................105

Appendices ........................................................................107
Appendix A. Issues and concerns voiced by the community ........107
Appendix B. Acronyms, abbreviations, and initialisms ..............109
Appendix C. Findings and recommendations .........................110

About Hillard Heintze .........................................................133
About the COPS Office .......................................................134
 Acknowledgments

Many individuals and organizations contributed greatly to this report. First and foremost, the authors express their gratitude to the hardworking team at the U.S. Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office) for sponsoring this report. COPS Office Director Ronald L. Davis, Deputy Director Robert E. Chapman, Assistant Director Matthew Scheider, and Program Managers Melissa Bradley and George Fachner made this report possible in every way. We are also thankful for the substantive and technical reviews we received from representatives of the U.S. Department of Justice.

This project could not have been completed without the significant contribution from the Calexico community, the Calexico Police Department (CPD), former Calexico City Manager Richard Warne, former Calexico Chief of Police Michael Bostic, and CPD consultant Betty Kelepecz. We thank you and are grateful for your tremendous contribution to making this collaborative reform project possible.

 Collaborative Reform team

Kenneth A. Bouche, Senior Law Enforcement Expert
Robert L. Davis, Senior Project Lead and Law Enforcement Expert
Stephen C. Grant, Senior Technical Communications Expert
Christi L. Gullion, Project Manager and Law Enforcement Expert
Arnette F. Heintze, Senior Law Enforcement Expert
Will D. Johnson III, Law Enforcement Expert
Edward Medrano, Law Enforcement Expert
Executive Summary

Across the United States, government leaders are bringing a new level of emphasis—and often urgency—to aligning best practices in law enforcement with the needs, expectations, and constitutional rights of the communities their police agencies serve. As recently outlined by the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, the principal focus of this community policing strategic effort is to advance meaningful solutions to help law enforcement agencies and communities strengthen trust and collaboration while ushering the nation into the next phase of community-oriented policing.

In the fall of 2014, a young man alleged that he had been kidnapped and beaten by members of the Calexico Police Department (CPD). The City of Calexico terminated the employment contract of the then Chief of Police, Pompeyo Tabarez. Also in the fall of 2014, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) launched an investigation into possible criminal misconduct by several CPD officers, raided the department, and seized computer hard drives and documents.

The city's newly hired Chief of Police, Michael Bostic, identified issues related to the lack of ongoing criminal investigations, internal investigations, and general police operations including his belief that city council members and members of the Calexico Police Officers’ Association were interfering with ongoing investigations. Among other actions, the chief terminated the employment of several CPD officers based on their alleged use of seized assets to buy surveillance equipment to extort the city council.

Collaborative Reform Initiative

Shortly after the chief’s arrival at the CPD, he and City Manager Richard Warne requested assistance from the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) in police reform and assessment of the CPD through the DOJ’S Office of Community Oriented Policing Services’ (COPS Office) Collaborative Reform Initiative for Technical Assistance (CRI-TA).

The CRI-TA program was established in 2011 in response to requests from the law enforcement community for a proactive, nonadversarial, and cost-effective form of technical assistance for agencies with significant law enforcement-related issues. It provides the DOJ with a middle ground between formal investigation and consent decree monitoring through the Civil Rights Division and smaller-scale resources and assistance currently provided by the DOJ. The COPS Office uses assessment and technical assistance providers to coordinate this work and in this case engaged Hillard Heintze to provide the assessment and technical assistance.


Notable events during the assessment

The city manager and chief of police were open and receptive to change. The chief’s actions included the following:

- He had a private vendor conduct a management study addressing deployment, beat structure, workload, and audit of all CPD policies, training, operations, oversight, and accountability.
- He assigned 38 internal investigations not being properly investigated nor completed in a timely manner to outside investigators for appropriate and timely completion and independence of outcome.
- He implemented many more newly written policies, memos, and planning documents related to community policing, patrol and investigations, training, and strategies for reform across many areas.

On September 15, 2015, the Calexico City Council voted 3–2 to place City Manager Warne on paid administrative leave with a 30-day notice to terminate. On November 30, 2015, the council placed Chief Bostic on administrative leave until December 5, 2015, at which time his employment was terminated. On December 1, 2015, the City of Calexico named Reynaldo Gomez as its interim chief of police. At the time he became chief, this assessment was completed and the report was in production. Chief Gomez has indicated his interest in continuing the process.

On October 28, 2015, the California Joint Powers Insurance Authority (JPIA) executive board voted 7–2 to cancel the City of Calexico’s insurance coverage and workers compensation program. As a result, the City lost its current liability insurance coverage, workers compensation program, and building insurance on January 1, 2016. As of July 1, 2016, the City will no longer be a member of the JPIA, which creates liability and insurance issues the City must address if it is to protect the city and its employees from civil liability exposure.

Because of the instability of leadership in the CPD, the department has been suspended from two county executive boards—the Imperial Valley Drug Coalition Executive Board and the Imperial County Narcotic Task Force Executive Board, which puts the CPD at a disadvantage in terms of its ability to gain important information that would be useful in its efforts to combat drug crime.

Technical assistance goals

The principal objective of this engagement, as mutually established by the DOJ and the City of Calexico, was to improve CPD policies, procedures, practices, training, and operations related to community engagement, community-oriented policing, accountability and oversight, transparency, and internal and external investigations, taking into account national standards, best practices, current and emerging research, and community expectations. Specifically, the DOJ and the City agreed the initiative would address the following goals:

- Improve departmental accountability and oversight systems, processes, and procedures including internal affairs, early intervention systems, and citizens’ complaints.
- Conduct a review and assessment of all of the CPD’s written internal affairs policies, procedures, and practices surrounding the intake and investigation of misconduct complaints particularly with respect to internal affairs training, citizen access and interaction, investigative process, disciplinary review process, outcomes, reporting, and transparency. Improve departmental training across all levels.
• Institute a community policing strategy to improve community engagement and sustain organizational change throughout the department.

• Perform an assessment to determine the current status of the department in terms of police operations, policies and procedures, and compare that to national best practices.

Assessment approach and team

The assessment team’s methodology on this engagement was based on the core elements essential to supporting an independent and objective evaluation and analysis of police department management, administration, operations, and outcomes:

• Rigorous document review

• Interviews and solicitation of multiple viewpoints from members of the community as well as of the department and city government

• Ride-alongs with officers and direct observation of personnel engaged in the course of addressing their duties

• Analysis and review of available data, either in full or through representative sampling

The Hillard Heintze assessment team included nationally recognized law enforcement subject matter experts in community engagement, community-oriented policing, procedural justice, accountability and oversight, transparency, use of force and complaint investigations, internal affairs, early intervention, criminal investigations, training and supervision, ethics, and civil rights.

Observations and recommendations

The assessment team has identified nine key observations. These range in focus from the critical need for reform in addressing community-oriented policing as well as the case for stronger leadership and accountability to the importance of strategic planning and organizational alignment across department operations. These key observations are supported in detail by 94 findings and 169 recommendations that highlight the most important opportunities for the City of Calexico and the CPD to address in order to guide the department up the path toward true community-oriented policing.

Key themes

Leadership, supervision, and accountability

To evaluate matters of leadership, supervision, and accountability within the CPD, the assessment team reviewed the department’s policies and training or lack thereof related to these areas. The assessment team also conducted interviews with department personnel of all ranks including command, seeking insights into leadership in terms of communication, strategy, guidance, field supervision, personnel management and support, and overall department operations. In addition, the team attended roll-call briefings, reviewed department-related memos or other directives beyond policies, and examined supervisors’ logs and reports related to their job functions.
Four principal needs related to CPD leadership emerged that require immediate attention within the department:

1. Develop a strategic plan.
2. Address acute staffing and organization issues.
3. Improve performance evaluations, employee recognition, and discipline.
4. Strengthen supervision, communication, and leadership training.

The following are culled from the report’s findings and recommendations related to leadership, supervision, and accountability:

**Finding.** Communication between supervisors and employees is inconsistent and unclear, and mentoring to provide direction and guidance does not regularly occur. *(8)*

**Recommendation.** Establish clear and consistent communication between leadership and supervisors and employees. *(8.1)*

**Recommendation.** Develop a mentoring plan to provide direction and guidance to employees. *(8.2)*

**Finding.** CPD lieutenants do not receive the appropriate training, performance standards, and other tools required to be effective leaders. *(10)*

**Recommendation.** Conduct internal employee evaluations of lieutenants and sergeants. Use these surveys to identify leadership gaps and strengths. *(10.1)*

**Recommendation.** Identify key tasks for lieutenants that are closely aligned with organizational goals. *(10.3)*

**Recommendation.** Train lieutenants on how to provide leadership guidance while balancing their organizational responsibilities. *(10.4)*

**Recommendation.** Hold lieutenants accountable for providing leadership guidance while balancing their organizational responsibilities. *(10.5)*

**Community engagement and community policing**

Instilling a new ethic and commitment to community engagement and community policing requires clearly understanding the agency’s existing capabilities in these areas and identifying the potential obstacles to prioritization.

To gain this insight, the assessment team engaged in extensive discussions with community members and department personnel of all ranks including command and asked questions related to community policing efforts, strategies, and community engagement in all aspects of department operations. The team assessed the department’s overall receptiveness, understanding, and application of community-oriented policing and reviewed CPD policies and training from these perspectives. Team members also attended roll-call briefings, examined department-related memos and other directives beyond policies, and reviewed supervisors’ logs and reports related to their job function.

The following are culled from the report’s findings and recommendations related to community engagement and community policing:
Finding. The department has not defined an integrated plan to embed community policing principles and tactics deeply within its core operations. (11)

Recommendation. Re-evaluate the department’s mission, vision, and values statements to ensure they reflect a commitment to community policing. (11.1)

Recommendation. Develop a comprehensive community policing strategy. (11.3)

Finding. CPD employees do not receive community policing training. (15)

Recommendation. Develop a training program for employees that introduces the community policing philosophy and corresponding operational practices. (15.1)

Recommendation. Encourage CPD officers to engage community members in conversation on a daily basis on their regular beats. (15.2)

Internal affairs

To gain insights into CPD’s internal affairs complaint and disciplinary processes, the assessment team reviewed CPD policy and training related to these areas; interviewed CPD personnel and community stakeholders; and reviewed records, including disciplinary outcomes, complaint forms, investigation files, and disciplinary record logs.

The following are culled from the report’s findings and recommendations related to internal affairs:

Finding. The CPD has not yet embraced a guardian culture and mindset to build public trust and legitimacy. The department needs to adopt procedural justice as a guiding principle for its interactions with residents. (21)

Recommendation. Adopt procedural justice as a guiding principle for the organization, as implementation of procedural justice is critical to building public trust. (21.1)

Finding. The CPD does not sufficiently make complaint forms accessible to the public and does not comply with department policy requiring a complaint form to be available in the lobby of the police facility. (22)

Recommendation. Make personnel complaint forms more accessible. Offer multiple opportunities and methods for the public to commend or raise a complaint about an officer. (22.1)

Finding. CPD policy is not clear on the process for assigning and investigating citizen complaints. (27)

Recommendation. Develop an internal affairs standard operating procedure manual to clearly communicate roles and responsibilities for each rank in the complaint process. (27.1)

Early intervention tools and practices

During its review of the CPD’s internal affairs and disciplinary processes, the assessment team also evaluated the agency’s ability to implement an early intervention system (EIS), which is a software tool used by law enforcement agencies to track and analyze key work-related data points that assist in identifying personnel who may be at risk of engaging in misconduct. Some of these data points include the filing of a citizen complaint, sick leave usage, courtroom attendance, and performance evaluations. EIS systems afford an agency the ability to engage in proactive counseling and mentoring with an employee to help prevent
misconduct. The assessment team did not find any evidence of an operational EIS program at the CPD. The team also determined that the technological systems needed to support an EIS system are essentially non-existent at the CPD, nor did the CPD have any EIS flags or practices in place.

The following are culled from the report’s findings and recommendations related to early intervention tools and practices:

**Finding.** The department does not use any early intervention tools. (40)

**Recommendation.** Develop an early intervention system. (40.1)

**Recommendation.** Develop a policy that explains the purpose of early intervention tools and defines how they are used effectively. (40.2)

**Recommendation.** Train all staff on early intervention tools to ensure they have the proper technological resources for adoption and usage. (40.3)

**Recommendation.** Define early intervention processes and practices in a standard operating procedure (SOP). (40.4)

### Criminal investigations

The assessment team’s approach to this area involved a rigorous review of the entire investigations process. This included case management, tracking, supervisory oversight of the investigations, training related to investigations, policies, manuals, and the quality of the investigations as a whole. It also centered on in-depth interviews with investigators, including detectives from the department’s Investigations Services Division, patrol officers who have investigative responsibilities, and CPD command staff.

The following are culled from the report’s findings and recommendations related to criminal investigations:

**Finding.** The CPD does not have an investigations operations manual, policy, or department directive that ensures a comprehensive, professional criminal investigations process. (42)

**Recommendation.** Develop an investigations operations manual and patrol procedures policy that directs the criminal investigations process. (42.1)

**Finding.** Patrol officers and field supervisors have substantial discretion in conducting investigations—including the authority to pursue, follow up, file criminal charges, or close the investigation—despite a lack of knowledge and training on how to do so. (43)

**Recommendation.** Change the current practice of having patrol officers routinely conduct extensive criminal investigations until officers are trained and competent, and leverage the policies and written procedures already in place at the department that clearly establish parameters and boundaries for patrol-based investigations. (43.1)

**Finding.** The investigative skills required of patrol officers are generally not commensurate with their level of training. (48)

**Recommendation.** Provide patrol officers with basic investigation, crime-scene processing, and evidence collection training. (48.1)
Finding. The CPD does not have a systematic method for the distribution of cases to the detectives. Because of the lack of procedures and direction, employees do not understand or apply the appropriate methods of case assignment and distribution to ensure the necessary controls for case management accountability. (53)

Recommendation. Train and assign a supervisor to Investigations Services for direct supervision of the detectives and investigation case management. (53.1)

Patrol

To conduct an assessment of the CPD's patrol function, the assessment team reviewed all of the department's policies and manuals as well as training records and training materials related to patrol. In addition, we interviewed members of the community regarding calls for service and other interactions with patrol officers. Also interviewed were department personnel—including patrol officers and patrol supervisors—and CPD command staff, focusing in particular on patrol deployment, strategies, and overall patrol functions. We also conducted a review and assessment of the entire patrol unit, including patrol officers' and supervisors' activity logs, reports, and observations during roll-call briefings and ride-alongs with patrol officers and supervisors.

The following are culled from the report's findings and recommendations related to patrol:

Finding. The absence of permanent sergeants in the Patrol Division results in inadequate supervision over patrol personnel. (66)

Recommendation. Require at least one regular sergeant to be on duty at all times. (66.1)

Finding. In the absence of crime data, patrol personnel currently conduct random patrols rather than using a targeted approach. (71)

Recommendation. Internally develop or outsource the creation of a basic crime analysis platform. (71.1)

Finding. Patrol officers determine what their individual priorities are for their shifts rather than coordinating efforts to work as a team to address community concerns and crime problems. (72)

Recommendation. Give patrol officers detailed direction supported by crime data on where they should patrol. (72.1)

Finding. The CPD has conflicting and uncoordinated policies regarding the requirements for use of force options authorized by the department. (77)

Recommendation. Develop a new use of force options policy that supersedes the current conflicting and uncoordinated policies. (77.1)

Recommendation. Conduct an annual review of the department's policies regarding use of force options. (77.2)

Crime analysis

Over the course of this assessment, it was concluded that the CPD currently lacks crime analysis capabilities and does not currently use CPD internal systems to share crime information within the department nor with the community it serves.
The following are culled from the report’s findings and recommendations related to crime analysis:

**Finding.** CPD internal systems are not being used to share even the most basic crime information—internally or with the community. *(85)*

**Recommendation.** Establish an internal process for information sharing that provides the CPD with a method for communicating crime data, wanted suspect information, and other criminal intelligence to enhance crime control and community policing strategies. *(85.1)*

**Recommendation.** Establish a method to share crime and quality-of-life information with the community and engage them in the department’s crime reduction strategy. *(85.2)*

**Key observations**

**Key observation 1: Instability in leadership**

The lack of stable leadership over the CPD since 2014 has contributed to a crisis of public confidence and legitimacy in the department and, more broadly, municipal management. With the departures of former City Manager Warne and former Chief Bostic, since 2014 the City of Calexico has had three city managers and three chiefs of police.

The CPD requires wide-ranging and in-depth reforms—especially in several crucial areas—to align its policies, practices, and operations with national best practices in law enforcement and the tenets of community-oriented policing.

Collaborative reform requires strong leadership and advocacy within the department. Until their termination in the winter of 2015, former City Manager Warne and former Chief Bostic served in this crucial role—as evidenced by their request for DOJ assistance, their positive vision for the department, the progressive changes they had already made, their understanding of the key challenges ahead, and their openness to change and willingness to receive technical assistance to transform the CPD.

Also central to reform at the most strategic level is the need for (1) an organizational strategic plan that aligns with the department’s overall goals and objectives, (2) strong choices by the city council in the selection of individuals to serve as the new city manager and chief of police who have excellent leadership skills and strong personal commitments to reform, (3) timely approval of a budget and resources these new leaders will require, and (4) the reinstatement of city insurance.

**Key observation 2: Areas of strength**

Like police agencies across the country, the CPD’s greatest assets should be the men and women who support and deliver its services to the residents and communities of Calexico every day.

These employees are committed to the CPD and the city. Many are open to change and external assistance, to increasing transparency with the media and public, and to finding ways to advance reforms despite the city’s political climate. However, to maintain the support of its employees, the City needs to make a much stronger commitment to fund and improve areas addressed throughout this report.
Key observation 3: A lack of supervision and accountability

The single greatest challenge for the CPD today is leadership—and related to this is the need to provide staff with proper guidance, clear performance expectations, and management support.

This observation is based on our identification of critical deficiencies related to areas such as supervisory training and accountability, staffing shortages and contingency planning, performance evaluations, discipline, and commendations as well as the need for a strategic plan that establishes a hierarchy of goals and engages all agency functions and personnel.

Key observation 4: Absence of community policing practices

The CPD needs to embed community policing more deeply into all of its core operations, activities, and training.

Although initial community policing efforts have begun, including a new mission, vision, and values that include community policing values, true community policing by the department is nonexistent. Focused and sustained attention is needed, for example, on accountability; programs, principles, and strategy; problem solving and training; methods of community engagement; and aligning technology and various CPD systems with the mission of community-oriented policing.

Key observation 5: Poorly functioning Internal Affairs

The department’s Internal Affairs unit lacks major operational components required of an effective and professional Internal Affairs function.

Key deficiencies include the CPD’s rudimentary system to investigate and implement disciplinary procedures; documentation of core Internal Affairs processes and protocols; personnel training; complaint intake and filing procedures; classification notification and accountability; and investigative authority, consistency, timeliness, and oversight.

Key observation 6: No early intervention practices

The department does not use an early intervention system or tool to monitor, detect, and address inappropriate behavior by its officers.

The department needs to develop standard early intervention operating procedures, train staff on early intervention practices and procedures, and track early intervention data and supervisory actions for oversight and accountability. This tracking can be done through automated reporting systems or, in the case of a smaller department like the CPD, even simple reporting and review tools that capture basic early intervention data.

Key observation 7: Criminal investigations lack basic controls and oversight

The CPD’s Criminal Investigations unit lacks appropriate oversight, operational policies, internal communication, and investigative controls.
The department’s Criminal Investigations function needs immediate support in addressing insufficient staffing and training; case management, classification, assignment, and routing; policies, notification, and response procedures; internal controls, monitoring communications, and management of property and evidence.

**Key observation 8: Patrol operations lack resources and coordination**

The CPD’s patrol strategy should take into account deployment and beat structure staffing needs, crime data and information sharing, community policing strategies, and problem-solving efforts to enable a more effective patrolling practice.

Current obstacles to mounting effective patrol operations include the need for more sergeants and less dependence on temporary officers in charge; poor radio and other communications connectivity in approximately half the police vehicles; officer safety issues; communications and dispatch capabilities, particularly with respect to calls for service; and manual log completion requirements that prevent officers from focusing on higher-value patrol activities. Additional areas requiring the department’s attention include the need to update the department’s Manual of Policy and Procedure, address ongoing system and equipment requirements, and improve management of the Property and Evidence unit.

**Key observation 9: No crime analysis and information sharing internally or externally**

The department does not currently have a crime analysis capability, nor does it routinely share crime and quality of life information with the community.

For the department to properly incorporate intelligence-led policing into its response activities, it needs to establish a crime analysis capability and share basic crime data with its internal units as well as with the community.
Introduction

Calexico is a border city of approximately 39,000 people in California’s Imperial County about 120 miles east of San Diego. It is surrounded “on three sides by lettuce and alfalfa fields and on the fourth by the fence dividing the United States from Mexico. It is the kind of town where everybody knows everybody.” The Calexico Police Department (CPD) employs approximately 30 sworn officers and 19 civilians for a total of 49 personnel.

In October 2014, a young man alleged he had been kidnapped and beaten by police in Calexico. On October 13, 2014, former Chief of Police Pompeyo Tabarez was fired, and Michael Bostic—who had retired as assistant chief of the Los Angeles Police Department in 2007 after 34 years of service—was hired as interim chief of the CPD. The City provided no explanation for the firing of the former police chief. The new chief placed four officers on administrative leave, fired two others, and replaced the investigations unit.

Agents from the San Diego and Imperial County Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) offices raided CPD on October 30, 2014. During the raid, the FBI seized documents and computer hard drives to investigate allegations of criminal misconduct by several officers. No charges were filed and no arrests made. As of April 2016, the FBI’s investigation is ongoing, no charges have yet been filed, and no arrests have been made.

In April 2015, Chief Bostic and City Manager Richard Warne requested support from the Collaborative Reform Initiative for Technical Assistance (CRI-TA) led by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office). This initiative entailed a thorough, independent assessment of the department’s policies, practices, and responsiveness to the community to ensure it is adhering to national standards and community expectations. The DOJ selected Hillard Heintze to conduct this review.

To begin addressing concerns with the department’s prior practices, Chief Bostic also asked a private vendor to conduct an internal management audit of the CPD. This vendor’s report, published in June 2015, confirmed deficiencies in many areas of the department and allowed Bostic to take some initial steps to correct them as the COPS Office began the CRI-TA assessment. Details of this report and of the deficiencies corrected by Bostic are described in more detail throughout this report.

Voices from the Community

• “Two years ago, CPD officers went rogue.”
• “Some want Chief Bostic fired so the terminated officers will come back.”
• “Blue Flame is watching us right now.” (The Calexico Blue Flame Society is a Facebook page that typically posts critical statements about leadership at the CPD and the city council.)

5. Figures were accurate at the time of the assessment.
On September 15, 2015, City Manager Warne was placed on paid administrative leave by the Calexico City Council based on a 3–2 vote, with a 30-day notice to terminate. On October 28, 2015, the California Joint Powers Insurance Authority (JPIA) executive board voted to move to cancel the City of Calexico’s insurance coverage and workers compensation program. The City will no longer be a member of the JPIA as of July 1, 2016. On December 5, 2015, Chief Bostic’s employment was terminated.

On December 1, 2015, the City of Calexico named Reynaldo Gomez as its new Chief of Police. Gomez was previously with the CPD for 20 years before becoming chief of the Calipatria Police Department from 2000 to 2009. Chief Gomez’s contract has been extended from six months to one year. Former Chief Bostic’s termination prolonged the instability in CPD leadership, and the department was subsequently suspended from two county drug enforcement boards: the Imperial County Narcotic Task Force Executive Board and the Imperial Valley Drug Coalition Executive Board.

Calexico: An overview of the police department

The CPD serves the City of Calexico. It is responsible for preserving the peace, responding to law enforcement service requests, and protecting life and property within the city limits. Personnel are available 24 hours a day, seven days a week to prevent and investigate criminal activity, apprehend suspects and violators, investigate traffic accidents, and provide animal control services. Officers are responsible for special investigations, crime analysis, training as well as records and evidence management and storage. The department also provides dispatch services to the Calexico Fire Department. Personnel operate the Dispatch Center in the department 24/7.

According to the City’s website, the CPD “contributes to the safety and security of the community by apprehending those who commit criminal acts; developing community partnerships to prevent, reduce or eliminate neighborhood problems and by providing police services that are fair, unbiased, judicious and respectful of the dignity of the individual.”

The CPD employs 49 personnel—30 sworn officers and 19 civilians—and is divided into the Operations Services Division and the Administrative Services Division.

The Operations Services Division consists of the patrol, investigation, special investigations, traffic, and reserve officer and school resource officer functions. Uniformed officers respond to calls for service as well as proactively patrol city streets monitoring for criminal conduct and traffic violations. Detectives conduct criminal investigations, and the Special Investigations unit includes the department’s participation in various task forces. Officers assigned to traffic duties perform traffic-related enforcement in the community.


10. Interview with Chief Reynaldo Gomez.


13. Figures were accurate at the time of the assessment. According to current chief Reynaldo Gomez, the number of sworn officers has been significantly diminished to 19.
The Administrative Services Division consists of Communications/Dispatch, Records, Evidence, Building Maintenance, and Animal Control units. The Communications/Dispatch unit’s eight full-time public safety dispatchers, including one dispatch supervisor, currently work a 12-hour shift. The Records unit’s three full-time records clerks handle all reports generated by officers in addition to processing numerous requests from other law enforcement agencies, insurance companies, and members of the community. This unit also processes automated fingerprint requests and performs other clerical duties.

In the Fiscal Year 2015–2016 budget, former Chief Bostic submitted a proposed organizational chart that identified the suggested positions and structure of the CPD (see figure 1). This proposed reorganization is commendable. It reflects an emphasis on community policing with a dedicated division headed by a lieutenant and support in this area with staff, policy, survey, and volunteer branches. With individual sergeants dedicated to internal affairs, recruitment and background checks, and training reporting directly to him, Bostic’s chart highlights the importance he placed on each of these areas. Last, this chart provides staffing numbers that are not only consistent with the needs of the department but also well thought out and distributed among the various units and divisions. It should be noted that making this organizational chart a reality would require significant investment in hiring and promoting the right personnel, and that what Bostic dealt with during his tenure was a challenge compared to what his proposed organizational plan would have provided.

**Figure 1. Organizational chart submitted by Chief Michael Bostic in 2015**

*At the time of this assessment, this organizational chart has yet to be approved by city administration.*
COPS Office Collaborative Reform Initiative

Since 2011, the COPS Office has engaged local law enforcement agencies in CRI-TA. The COPS Office's CRI-TA fact sheet describes the initiative.14 As the fact sheet notes, in 2013, the COPS Office initiated CRI-TA work in the Spokane (Washington) Police Department and the Philadelphia Police Department. In 2014, the COPS Office initiated efforts in the St. Louis County (Missouri), Fayetteville (North Carolina), and Baltimore Police Departments. In 2015, CRI-TA was launched in the Salinas (California) Police Department.15 In addition to Salinas, the CPD was selected for CRI-TA assessment in 2015.

All CRI-TA reports are publicly available on the COPS Office website.16

---
15. Ibid.
1. Methodology—Approach and Actions Taken

**Independent and objective evaluation and analysis**

A neutral, independent, third-party expert perspective was essential to the assessment team’s approach. An independent and objective assessment

- avoids some of the political issues, departmental intrigue, and latent resistance to long-standing issues, both internal and external to the police department;
- brings a fresh outlook to issues, some of which may have escaped resolution over long periods of time;
- frames analysis, insights, and recommendations in terms of best and promising professional practices, industry standards, and research currently being developed in leading police departments around the nation which are tailored to address the needs of the Calexico Police Department (CPD) and the Calexico community.

**Document review**

The assessment team reviewed current duty manuals, written policies and procedure manuals, orders and guidelines, training lesson plans, and planning documents to understand the formal, written codes governing the CPD’s operations with respect to the objectives of this initiative. The team assessed each document for its comprehensiveness, clarity, and consistency with national standards, best and emerging practices, and current research on the topic. Although policies and documentation across law enforcement agencies vary widely, this assessment team reviewed documents for each objective to determine whether the policies in their current form meet standards that would ensure compliance with all laws and to determine how they compare to best practices recognized by progressive law enforcement agencies.

**Interviews and solicitation of multiple viewpoints**

The team worked with the CPD to ensure that interview participants were generally representative of the department. They included stakeholders such as Mayor John Moreno, city council members, and other elected officials; former CPD Chief Michael Bostic; representative members of all ranks within the CPD; officials of the Calexico Police Officers Association (CPOA); community leaders from faith-based organizations, school districts, nonprofit organizations, and social service organizations; and leaders from other local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies in the greater Calexico area.

The team conducted outreach to the Calexico community to identify key community stakeholders to interview. We relied on a snowballing technique in which we engaged key community stakeholders for initial interviews and, in the process, identified other participants through that engagement. In general, team members interviewing community members sought to understand their perceptions of the CPD, its operations, its strengths and weaknesses, and whether the department was meeting community expectations. The team did not solicit personal information during the interview process.

The department interviews comprised multiple individual group meetings with all command level personnel and supervisors as well as almost all of the 30 sworn officers and 19 civilian personnel, the latter either interviewed at the department or on ride-alongs during their shifts. The assessment team contacted approximately 75 key community stakeholders and community leaders by e-mail and invited them to be interviewed individually or in their community groups.
Ride-alongs and direct observation

When applicable, the assessment team directly observed CPD operations in real time, including ride-alongs, observations of training, and critical incident reviews. These activities gave team members a first-hand experience of the operating environment for CPD officers. In addition, the team attended community meetings and forums to understand issues important to community members and their relationship to the department.

Issues and concerns voiced by the community

In addition to the team’s gathering of community views through interviews, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office) and Hillard Heintze held a community listening session on July 20, 2015 from 6:30 to 8:30 p.m. at the Women’s Improvement Club in Calexico. Approximately 50 community members attended. Introductions were made by Matthew Scheider of the COPS Office and Robert Davis of Hillard Heintze. After they explained collaborative reform and the respective roles that Hillard Heintze and the COPS Office performed in the process, they opened the floor to the community members to express their viewpoints.

Community listening session flyers were distributed throughout the city of Calexico, including at schools, churches, city and other government agencies, retail stores, and libraries and on various CPD and government agencies’ and community groups’ websites. These flyers provided the e-mail address calexicoinfo@hillardheintze.com for any community members who wanted to be interviewed. In addition to this listening session, assessment team members interviewed approximately 20 more community members individually. The major themes that emerged during these interviews and the community listening session included, for example, engagement with the CPD, the quality of policing services, management of the department, and corruption within the agency. Appendix A provides additional details.

Data analysis and review

In general the team used data—to the extent they were available—to generate statistical trends and patterns that helped contextualize the CPD’s operations. The team’s data analysis focused on CPD documentation, case reports, and operations relevant to investigations, internal affairs, training, and patrol as well as CPD transparency, accountability, and oversight. For example, we examined citizen complaints, internal affairs dispositions, critical incident outcomes, training evaluations, and deployment and staffing efforts. The analysis was exploratory and inductive in nature but also driven by findings from the document review, interviews, or direct observations by team members.

Documents: A sampling of items requested and reviewed

The Hillard Heintze assessment team reviewed current duty manuals, written policies, and procedures including the CPD’s written policies and procedures manuals as well as written orders and guidelines to determine whether the policies in their current form met standards that would ensure compliance with all laws and to determine how they compare to best practices recognized by progressive law enforcement agencies.

Throughout our time in Calexico, we worked with our department liaison to request, receive, and conduct a review of written documents that will help us to prepare for the assessment. The data we gleaned from these documents guided our on-site conversations with key stakeholders as well as our overall approach to our assessment. These written documents included the following:
• CPD organizational chart
• Job rotation policies
• Duty Manual and General Orders Manual
• Department policies and procedures, special orders related to internal affairs, early intervention systems, complaints, disciplinary review process, patrol, CompStat, and criminal intelligence and investigations
• CPD internal affairs manual or handbook
• Data for last five years on crime statistics
  • Number of calls for service by type
  • Number of crimes by Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Report category
  • Number of arrests by type
  • Number of sworn personnel by rank
  • Number of nonsworn personnel
  • Number of citizen-initiated complaints
  • Number of department-initiated complaints
• Written materials documenting CPD community policing strategies, policies, and procedures
• Logs and reports documenting training for CPD personnel for last five years
• Training materials and lesson plans on the following
  • Criminal investigations
  • Internal affairs
  • Early intervention system or tools
  • Community policing
  • Patrol
  • Criminal intelligence or CompStat
  • Use of any department-issued weapons
  • Critical incident training
  • Crisis intervention training
  • De-escalation techniques
  • Report writing
  • Evidence collection and processing
  • Procedural justice and bias-free policing
  • Stress and anger management
  • Communications
  • Video and audio taping policies and procedures
• Supervisors’ course
• Command officers’ course
• Leadership and management training
• CPD staff wellness
• Formal discipline and evaluation process for CPD personnel, including an Early Intervention System, if applicable
• Communications policies, practices, and procedures
• CPD publications generated or created for community outreach and engagement
• Procedures outlining how the City stakeholders, CPD command staff, and the community is notified about the CPD’s investigations and complaints, as well as the subsequent status of the ongoing Internal Affairs investigations
• Disciplinary outcomes for misconduct and investigations cases involving CPD personnel over the last three years
• Report writing guidelines and exemplars, with a focus on investigation reporting
• Reports generated by the City of Calexico, the mayor’s office, the CPOA, and any civilian review committee assessments or reports over the last five years that address CPD issues of concern including investigations; complaints; improved policing; recruitment, hiring, and staffing; early intervention systems; community engagement; and concerns
• Copies of reports for the various internal assessments currently underway or completed within the City of Calexico to address the CPD’s issues of concern
• Hiring requirements and testing processes for CPD personnel, as well as promotional processes and recruiting and marketing materials
2. Leadership, Supervision, and Accountability

Leadership is at the core of the Calexico Police Department’s (CPD) issues and extends across vital areas such as organizational transformation, strategic planning, implementation of procedural justice and community-oriented policing, personnel management and mentoring, and delivery of services to the community.

To evaluate matters of leadership, supervision and accountability with the CPD, the assessment team reviewed the department’s policies and training or lack thereof related to these areas. The assessment team also conducted interviews of department personnel of all ranks including command, seeking insights into leadership in terms of communication, strategy, guidance, field supervision, personnel management and support, and overall department operations. In addition, the team attended roll-call briefings, reviewed department-related memos and other directives beyond policies, and examined supervisors’ logs and reports related to their job function as a supervisor.

Four principal issues related to CPD leadership emerged that require immediate attention within the department:

1. The need to develop a strategic plan
2. The need to address acute staffing and organization issues
3. The need to improve performance evaluations, employee recognition, and discipline
4. The need to strengthen supervision, communication, and leadership training.

Each of these areas is addressed in the following sections.

Strategic planning

It is almost impossible for any law enforcement agency to meet its mission and goals consistently year after year without a strategic plan. Such a roadmap is vital if the department is to identify the specific work tasks required of all its members, specify how progress in implementing the plan should be measured and managed, and prioritize the actions and timelines driving the achievement of each task. To be effective at addressing issues of community trust and concerns, the creation of the strategic plan should include the participation and input of representatives of the department’s officers and staff, City Hall, community groups, and additional stakeholders such as the American Civil Liberties Union and members of the public.

Voices from the Community: Perceptions of Department Leadership

- “There is comfort with the new environment based on Chief Bostic and City Manager Richard Warne.”
- “The community thinks things are good now, but fears things going back to how it was before Chief Bostic.”
- “Some do not like the chief because he is an outsider.”
- “The community are fearful that the terminated officers are chipping away to get back into the department.”
- “It is sensible to have the Department of Justice here.”
- “The Calexico Blue Flame Society still has terminated officers posting hate on its Facebook page. Chief Bostic is trying to work with the attorney to take down the page.”
**Staffing and organization**

The department’s current challenges related to staffing shortages—from hiring to retention—need to be immediately addressed if the CPD is going to be effective in implementing reform. Doing so requires attention not just to planning and funding but also to operational staffing matters such as deployment, shifts, activity logs, and reporting. Hiring could be greatly accelerated if the city council approved a budget for the CPD, which it has not done as of April 2016.

**Performance evaluations, employee recognition, and discipline**

During the assessment team’s review of the department’s disciplinary review process and related performance evaluations, the team conducted interviews of personnel, supervisors, and command staff; attended roll-call briefings to observe how performance expectations were conveyed to personnel; and reviewed performance evaluations. In the process, the team determined that performance evaluations are not completed consistently, with sufficient care, or clearly enough to properly explain goals and expectations to personnel.

Most law enforcement agencies conduct evaluations at least yearly, but it is not uncommon to encounter agencies that do so more often. While based on many factors, the frequency of evaluations is not as important as their quality and the commitment to complete them in a mutually understood timeframe. The appropriate communication of employee expectations is a critical component for successful management of police personnel and requires honest and transparent communication between the employee and the person conducting the evaluation. The documentation used to relay evaluation findings is also an important part of the process; it should be used as a tool to summarize the matters appraised and to memorialize expectations and goals that were shared and discussed.

Evaluations measure employee performance against expectations and provide constructive feedback for areas of improvement. Performance evaluations also provide an opportunity for the supervisors and leaders to acknowledge exceptional performance and provide recognition to employees for a job well done.

**Supervision, communication, and leadership training**

First-line supervisors must set the standards and expectations for their shift or unit in a manner that advances the mission and goals of the department. The assessment team did not uncover any evidence during its review that this is occurring in the department.

Interviews with CPD personnel further indicated that mentoring and guidance are rarely extended to employees. Supervisors are not able to provide such guidance because they have not received the training themselves. Research on procedural justice indicates that “officers who feel respected by their supervisors are more likely to understand why decisions were made; more likely to accept, support, and voluntarily comply with those decisions, including departmental policies; and less likely to challenge the decisions.”

---

Findings and recommendations

Strategic planning

Finding 1
The CPD lacks a formal, written strategic plan to guide the leadership’s priorities regarding crime reduction, community policing, personnel management, support, problem solving, and other appropriate expectations and department-wide policing efforts.

Recommendation 1.1
Develop a 90-day interim strategic plan.

The interim plan should address policing efforts and priorities in the interim until a more long-term strategic plan can be developed.

Recommendation 1.2
Develop a long-term strategic plan.

This plan should include the entire department’s participation to gain buy-in and support. Consider including the community’s feedback to promote engagement and support.

Staffing and organization

Finding 2
The CPD does not have plan-driven approach to resolve the staffing shortage of officers and supervisors.

Recommendation 2.1
Develop a strategic hiring and promotional plan to properly staff and supervise police operations.

Because of the complexities of conducting such a staffing analysis for a police agency—and the sensitive issues that accompany any increase in personnel or the promotion of current staff—consider seeking an outside expert to assist in this process. Ensure this effort includes close collaboration with the city manager and the City’s human resources department.

Finding 3
The CPD does not have a contingency plan in place in the event that it does not achieve its hiring goals.

Without the necessary personnel, the department will not reach its goals and objectives. CPD leaders have not developed an alternative course of action in the event that the hiring objectives required by the department are not met, which represents an extremely likely scenario in today’s hiring environment for police officers.
**Recommendation 3.1**

Contract supervisors and patrol personnel from another agency until personnel shortages are addressed. Continue this arrangement until the CPD has resolved the most critical deficiencies.

**Performance evaluations, employee recognition, and discipline**

**Finding 4**

The performance evaluation system for personnel is highly subjective, and employees are not provided with sufficient direction or clarity on performance standards. Most notably, the performance appraisal system does not evaluate performance related to community policing efforts.

The primary goal of a performance appraisal is to ensure that employees are aware of the expectations the organization has of them. During our interviews with employees, many stated that they were not clear about what their supervisors expected of them. Many viewed the evaluations as merely an administrative “check the box” exercise rather than a mentoring opportunity intended to enhance personal performance.

Employees are rated individually and graded by “Level of Value to Department” on the following scale: (1) outstanding, (2) competent, (3) satisfactory, (4) improvement needed, and (5) unsatisfactory. The form provides five lines for comments and two for goals. The basis for evaluation points is not standardized, and the appraisal does not consider any quantitative performance indicators. More important, there does not seem to be any nexus between the performance areas evaluated and organizational goals and priorities or the mission, vision, and values of the organization.

Not surprisingly—and consistent with the CPD’s lack of community policing efforts—the evaluation process does not contain any metrics related to evaluating principles of community-oriented policing.

**Recommendation 4.1**

Reform the current performance appraisal process.

Implement a performance appraisal system that is transparent and clearly defines expectations of employees and the criteria by which they will be evaluated. Include employee participation and feedback.

**Recommendation 4.2**

Ensure that performance evaluations match job expectations, activities, and the nature of police work. Integrate both quantitative measures such as crime data as well as qualitative measures such as community policing efforts.

Tie evaluations directly to meaningful outcomes for personnel such as promotions and reassignments.

**Recommendation 4.3**

Train CPD supervisors to complete performance evaluations.

This training should include how to observe, evaluate, report, and communicate about personnel performance as well as how to correct problematic or potentially problematic behavior when necessary.

---

20. Ibid.
Recommendation 4.4
Allow CPD officers and civilian employees an opportunity to provide their opinions on their own performance or respond to the evaluations provided by their supervisors.\(^{21}\)
This type of involvement can also improve discussions regarding areas of weak performance or issues where additional training may be needed.

Recommendation 4.5
Implement metrics that create baseline performance expectations for CPD members.
Use these to measure performance related to community policing, which will help the department assess its community policing activities at the individual, unit, and organizational levels.\(^{22}\)

Finding 5
Performance evaluations are inconsistent, and many employees have not received yearly evaluations.
Performance evaluations are neither consistent nor timely, leaving a void in employee expectations. Most employees reported that evaluations were not taken seriously, lacked substantive feedback, and were generally completed as a formality. Many employees had not been evaluated in several years. Several evaluations the team reviewed lacked meaningful depth and insight. Supervisors also acknowledged that performance evaluations were not completed timely because of their lack of priority and accountability. The CPD and the assessment team understand and agree that the performance evaluation system needs improvement.

Recommendation 5.1
Require that all personnel files be reviewed by supervisors who have overseen the employee’s work. Any employee with a missing evaluation should have an interim evaluation conducted as soon as possible.
To ensure performance evaluations are relevant, make them consistent and meaningful. Conduct evaluations at least annually.

Recommendation 5.2
Establish employee expectations through clearly defined, understood, consistent, and timely performance evaluations.
Improvement of the performance evaluation process through recommendations as specifically outlined in these recommendations will contribute to this understanding and accountability for employee expectations.

---
\(^{21}\) Ibid.
Finding 6

Internal auditing procedures are not in place to ensure evaluations are done in a timely fashion.

Without an internal audit process to ensure timeliness of evaluations, supervisors are not held accountable for completing their employees’ evaluations, and officers do not receive feedback for areas of improvement.

Recommendation 6.1

Develop an internal auditing process to ensure evaluations are conducted in a timely manner so supervisors can be held accountable for completion of employee evaluations as scheduled.

Although such audit evaluations should take place at least annually, many agencies stagger their deadlines for completing evaluations quarterly depending on an employee’s start date or unit. Such agencies then conduct audits of those evaluations the next quarter, thereby making sure their audit schedule continues quarterly. The CPD could conduct such audits either quarterly or annually, audited by a command officer selected by the chief or the chief’s designee—internal or external, perhaps from the City or another agency.

Finding 7

The CPD provides limited and inconsistent rewards or acknowledgements for good behavior and job performance.

Employees feel there is so much attention focused on discipline and accountability that the department does not take time to reward or acknowledge good behavior and job performance. However, the assessment team has been told that former Chief Michael Bostic regularly acknowledged good behavior and work performance. The perception among department personnel that good job performance is rarely noticed or acknowledged may be due, in part, to a culture that existed in previous police administrations in which internal investigations were initiated even for minor violations, along with the length of time it took to either adjudicate these complaints or to dismiss them.

Recommendation 7.1

Develop policies and procedures that formalize, communicate, and champion positive employee behaviors.

In addition, other changes emerging from this report will improve morale that may result in employees hearing and accepting the current efforts to recognize good behavior and work performance.

Supervision, communication, and leadership training

Finding 8

Communication between supervisors and employees is inconsistent and unclear, and mentoring to provide direction and guidance does not regularly occur.

Employees reported that supervisors do not spend the time necessary to mentor and guide them, provide a targeted approach to patrol, or consistently communicate the discipline process. Without clear feedback and an understanding of what is expected of them, employees are unable to correct inappropriate behaviors and improve their performance.
Recommendation 8.1
Establish clear and consistent communication between leadership and supervisors and employees.

This should include both two-way communication between supervisors and their direct subordinates and messaging from the top down to the rank and file. Such communication can be verbal, electronic, or written in memos to ensure such communication is consistent and understood.

Recommendation 8.2
Develop a mentoring plan to provide direction and guidance to employees.

Such a plan should include feedback on their performance, areas for improvement, and other appropriate guidance.

Finding 9
Crime analysis, coordination, and information sharing are insufficient and inadequately used among the units and throughout the CPD. The responsibility for guiding these efforts falls directly on the department’s leadership, including supervisors.

Criminal investigation detectives, patrol officers, and their supervisors are not adequately aligning and coordinating their efforts to share critical information outside their workgroups. Furthermore, without supervisory understanding of the issues, patrol personnel are not using information learned from the various units within the department to produce strategies for problem solving, community policing, crime reduction, and community engagement. These deficiencies are critical because they undermine decision making at every level of the department.

Recommendation 9.1
Initiate specific protocols for information sharing and coordination among patrol officers, detectives, and other personnel and units through all supervisory ranks in the department.

Although some individuals are taking the initiative to share information on cases they are investigating, the department as a whole does not undertake regular, consistent information sharing with any frequency. Combining resources and sharing information relating to crime analysis among officers will lead to better community policing strategies, more effective crime reduction, and higher rates of solved investigations. Such protocols may include a regular distribution of crime strategies, efforts, and other messages that are used in roll-call briefings and regular unit meetings and posted in the department for constant review.

Recommendation 9.2
Conduct regular meetings across units or with supervisors to discuss crime trends, strategies, and other issues for targeted problem solving.

This may include assigning personnel to collect, analyze, and disseminate crime data and other trends on a regular basis for discussion at such meetings.
Finding 10

**CPD lieutenants do not receive the appropriate training, performance standards, and other tools required to be effective leaders.**

Instead, these lieutenants reportedly focus significant time on disciplinary issues. As a result, they are losing the trust and confidence of employees, and their professional relationships are strained. Employees believe lieutenants spend too much time on administrative duties—compiling monthly reports, conducting internal investigations, and handling special projects such as body-worn camera policies and procedures.

The assessment team confirmed through interviews, observations, ride-alongs, and reviews of patrol operations that lieutenants are addressing these administrative duties rather than engaging and leading their personnel. In other agencies, an overriding organizational structure balances these administrative tasks against supervisory tasks. Many officers stated during our interviews that they largely interacted with a lieutenant only regarding negative disciplinary or performance issues.

**Recommendation 10.1**

*Conduct internal employee evaluations of lieutenants and sergeants. Use these surveys to identify leadership gaps and strengths.*

**Recommendation 10.2**

*Use the information gathered from leadership assessments to develop a strategic plan that provides direction for the department’s overall goals and organizational transformation.*

Such a plan could help increase confidence in the leadership team and ignite an internal process for mentorship and employee development.

**Recommendation 10.3**

*Identify key tasks for lieutenants that are closely aligned with organizational goals.*

This process should include a clear delineation of administrative and command responsibilities to ensure lieutenants are spending time with employees and keeping them apprised of the goals of both the organization and the unit (e.g., Patrol, Investigations).

**Recommendation 10.4**

*Train lieutenants on how to provide leadership guidance while balancing their organizational responsibilities.*

Community and operational projects assigned to lieutenants should include structured time in the field with the officers and sergeants. Examples include serving as a leader and mentor, partnering on goal accomplishment, and building professional relationships.

**Recommendation 10.5**

*Hold lieutenants accountable for providing leadership guidance while balancing their organizational responsibilities.*

Tie such leadership responsibilities to lieutenants’ performance evaluations and other accountability measures.
3. Community Engagement and Community Policing

Instilling a new ethic, commitment, and focus on community engagement and community policing first requires a clear understanding of the agency’s existing capabilities in these arenas as well as an early identification of the potential obstacles to prioritizing this in the months and years ahead.

To gain this insight, the assessment team engaged in extensive discussions with community members and Calexico Police Department (CPD) personnel of all ranks including command and asked questions related to community policing efforts, strategies, and community engagement in all aspects of department operations. The team assessed the department’s overall receptiveness, understanding, and application of community-oriented policing and reviewed CPD policies and training from these perspectives. Members also attended roll-call briefings, examined department-related memos and other directives beyond policies, and reviewed supervisors’ logs and reports related to their job function. Key themes emerging from this assessment priority—from strategy and integration to communication and strategic messaging—are outlined in the following sections.

**Strategy and integration**

In order for a department’s community policing strategy and efforts to be successful, it must develop and integrate a formal community policing plan. The CPD has not yet developed such a plan. The assessment team specifically reviewed former Chief Michael Bostic’s new mission, vision, and values statement created in December 2014, which was a good step forward, but there has been no further integration or operationalization regarding the idea. We also reviewed an Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office) grant from 2009, which predates Bostic’s tenure, in which the CPD attempted to begin community policing efforts; those efforts were soon discontinued.

**Interaction with the community**

Although the CPD has no formal community policing efforts or written community policing plan, the assessment team hoped to find that interaction with the community including establishing community partnerships or engaging with the community through community groups and community meetings. However, the assessment team found that although officers were receptive to the idea of community policing principals and strategies, they had no knowledge on how to apply such principles and strategies, and there has been no effort to attend community group meetings nor establish community partnerships.

**Voices from the Community: Engagement with the CPD**

- “We appreciate and welcome the city manager’s efforts to reform the department.”
- “We have concerns about potentially losing Chief Bostic if he were ever terminated.”
- “Chief Bostic was one of the few leaders . . . trying to make positive changes in the department.”
- “Some community members have allegedly been noted on the Blue Flame Society Facebook page if they speak out against [the] CPD at city council meetings.”
Community policing training, problem-solving techniques, and transparency

Although the assessment team planned to review the CPD’s training and curriculum related to community policing, it found no such training related to community policing, procedural justice, or fair and impartial policing. In addition, other than the newly revised mission, vision, and values statement in December 2014 by former Chief Bostic, the CPD has not provided any community policing or problem-solving efforts or techniques in written form—nor did our assessors hear this guidance during roll-call briefings. This observation was also corroborated during the interviews of department personnel and members of the community. The department does not share with the community any information on, for example, traffic stops, efforts to prevent racial profiling, or community policing or problem-solving plans or strategies.

Community-Police Advisory Commission

Rather than a police commission in the traditional sense, the City of Calexico has a police advisory board (authorized by ordinance) consisting of five commissioners—one appointed by each member of the city council. The board refers to itself as the Community-Police Advisory Commission. Its purpose is to receive citizen complaints regarding the department or any of its officers and to develop recommendations on improving the department’s relations with the community. The assessment team did not find any evidence that this has taken place nor that this advisory commission regularly collaborated or even interacted with the department or its personnel.

Communication and strategic messaging

Honest and transparent communication from a law enforcement agency to its community tends over time to deepen trust, reinforce legitimacy, and broaden community support. This assessment team commends former Chief Bostic for his honesty in acknowledging what was taking place in the department before he arrived and during the early phase of his tenure. He initiated communication and strategic messaging as outlined in the sections that follow. These efforts should continue. Such outreach from the very top of the department directly and indirectly encourages feedback from citizens on many levels.

The CPD can point to a few examples of a nascent focus on these issues:

- Proposed new mission, vision, and values statements. These were advanced by former Chief Bostic in December 2014, distributed throughout the department in January 2015, discussed at staff meetings, and prominently posted throughout CPD headquarters.

- Community forums and town hall meetings. These were held by former Chief Bostic throughout 2015 to inform the community on the status of the department’s operations. In addition, on October 13, 2015, former Chief Bostic wrote a letter to the community about the progress of the prior year, which was published in the Imperial Valley Press and on the newspaper’s website.23

- COPS Office Grant in 2009. In 2009, the CPD attempted to develop stronger community practices through a COPS Office grant. Information gleaned from our interviews suggested that these efforts began to bear fruit but were soon discontinued. The closest example of an organized community group that the CPD can claim to have an association with is the Community-Police Advisory Commission. This commission, however, does not routinely engage in community policing efforts.

23. Michael Bostic, “To the Citizens of Calexico,” Imperial Valley Press, last modified October 20, 2015, [http://www.ivpressonline.com/opinion/voiceofthepeople/to-the-citizens-of-calexico/article_1d590c77-3d1e5-b21c-b64a189036c.html](http://www.ivpressonline.com/opinion/voiceofthepeople/to-the-citizens-of-calexico/article_1d590c77-3d1e5-b21c-b64a189036c.html).
These efforts are laudable and should be continued and expanded in line with the findings and recommendations that follow.

**Findings and recommendations**

**Strategy and Integration**

**Finding 11**

The CPD has not defined an integrated plan to embed community policing principles and tactics deeply within its core operations.

The last of the three major objectives regarding community policing from the final report of the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing emphasizes organizational transformation, which is the alignment of organizational management, structure, personnel, and information systems to support community partnerships and proactive problem solving.24 The concept of community policing has not been an organizational priority for the CPD; it is reflected in the newly revised mission, vision, and values statement, but significant formal efforts to accomplish this vision have not yet been institutionalized, and community policing has not been established as the CPD’s organizational philosophy.

Despite little evidence of an ongoing dialogue with the community, during ride-alongs assessors observed that patrol personnel were community oriented and respectful to those with whom they came in contact. Employees also demonstrated a high degree of motivation to serve and, if properly led, appear able to apply community-policing principles. The department, however, still needs to establish informal community policing efforts to build community trust and enhance partnerships.

While former Chief Bostic’s proposed mission, vision, and values statements appropriately include the terms “community policing” and “community partnerships,” they do not sufficiently promote community policing strategies by the department to support problem-solving techniques and organizational transformation. These statements could reflect community policing’s three key components: community partnerships, organizational transformation, and problem solving.25

---

**Recommendation 11.1**

*Re-evaluate the department’s mission, vision, and values statements to ensure they reflect a commitment to community policing.*

Craft the statements to be easily understood by the community and put into action by the entire department. The department should outline key community policing components to include “the alignment of organizational management, structure, personnel, and information systems to support community partnerships and proactive problem solving” and “collaborative partnerships between the law enforcement agency and the individuals and organizations they serve to develop solutions to problems and increase trust in police.”

**Recommendation 11.2**

*Conduct research among internal and external stakeholders to identify the key needs of the community and the current level of trust and confidence in police services.*

The community must have an active voice in the development of policing priorities. Understanding the community’s needs is the first step toward building an effective community policing strategy.

**Recommendation 11.3**

*Develop a comprehensive community policing strategy.*

Capture the strategy in written form, promote it internally and externally, and include short-, medium-, and long-term goals for institutionalizing community-oriented policing in the department. Establish internal staffing and responsibility for developing, promoting, and maintaining a viable community policing program.

**Interaction with the community**

**Finding 12**

*The CPD does not meet with established neighborhood watch programs or community groups regularly.*

We encountered constituents who want to be engaged with the department to help positively influence the methods used to protect their neighborhoods.

Community-police partnership represents one of the three major pillars of community policing. The other two pillars are problem solving and organizational transformation. Community-police partnerships are collaborative partnerships between the law enforcement agency and the individuals and organizations they serve to develop solutions to problems and increase trust in police.

Several informal opportunities to build partnerships with long-standing community groups and local programs exist that would require very little investment by the CPD and would help develop community-police partnerships.

---

26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
In addition, pillar four of the final report of the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing is Community Policing and Crime Reduction, which places an important emphasis on building positive relationships with community members.  

**Recommendation 12.1**

*Provide direction to patrol officers to begin identifying key stakeholders within their beats.*

This process of identifying key stakeholders can be developed through regular proactive neighborhood communications while on patrol, including a door-to-door campaign and ongoing methods to remain personally connected to the community. After identifying key stakeholders, begin informal communications regarding the creation of a neighborhood watch or community meeting group.

**Recommendation 12.2**

*Build community partnerships with individuals, organizations, and businesses willing to assist the department with a community engagement campaign and specify this if possible within the strategy document.*

These partnerships can open a dialogue and build trust and collaboration between the police and the greater Calexico community. Develop a cadre of community stakeholders from these sessions who can be engaged as more sophisticated community policing programs are created.

**Recommendation 12.3**

*Continue to expand the use of community events such as “Coffee with a Cop” or similar programs to create informal opportunities for the community to get to know their police officers and employees.*

**Recommendation 12.4**

*Form a community advisory group to meet with the chief of police once per month.*

This monthly meeting will help the CPD share information with the community related to internal affairs and department policies as well as solicit support for community policing efforts.

**Finding 13**

**The CPD needs to incorporate problem-solving techniques when resolving crime and quality of life concerns.**

Without directed problem-solving techniques, the core concepts of community policing cannot be achieved. Police and community relations can be strengthened only with the help and engagement of both the police and the community. The second of the three major objectives regarding community policing from the final report.

---

28. President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, Final Report (see note 1)
30. Based on the assessment team’s recommendation, the chief is considering instituting this advisory group with members selected by him, including members of the faith-based community and others, for the purpose of exchanging information and to gauge the willingness of key stakeholders to collaborate with the police department to improve partnerships and problem solving.
The President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing emphasizes problem solving, which is the process of engaging in the proactive and systematic examination of identified problems to develop and evaluate effective responses.31

**Recommendation 13.1**

*Integrate problem-solving techniques into the process of resolving crime and quality-of-life concerns.*

Develop the mechanisms and training to work with community residents to identify problems and collaborate on implementing solutions that produce meaningful results for the community.

**Recommendation 13.2**

*Communicate the tenets of problem solving to the entire department.*

Start with the Community Policing Self-Assessment Tool32 to understand, teach, and implement the SARA (scanning, analysis, response, and assessment) model throughout the agency. Make community-based problem solving every employee's responsibility. Communicate to employees and the community steps the department is taking to improve partnerships and problem solving. This communication about key highlights relating to strategy, execution, and outcomes will strengthen partnerships and institutionalize the community policing philosophy throughout the department.

**Finding 14**

*The CPD is not following policy 402.5, which requires the collection of traffic stop data and the annual reporting of efforts to prevent racial profiling. Department leadership acknowledges this nonadherence to policy.*

While the absence of data is not evidence of biased police practices, the department does not follow its own policies or best practices to collect, review, and report on indicators of bias-based policing for problem identification and mitigation. The absence of these data prevents the organization's leadership from determining if racial profiling or other discriminatory practices exist in the department.

**Recommendation 14.1**

*Collect and analyze data to produce the racial bias policing report required annually by CPD policy.*33

Incorporate this racial bias policing report into the recommended annual Internal Affairs report (recommendation 26.2 on page 47). Use these data to identify potential patterns of undesirable behavior or policy violations that may require additional training in areas such as unconscious bias or procedural justice, which have not previously been delivered in the department.

**Recommendation 14.2**

*Incorporate procedural justice and implicit bias training into the department's training plan and use.*

As a result of this training, data collected will be properly analyzed through the lens of these two principles.

---

Finding 15

**CPD employees do not receive community policing training.**

The CPD has not invested in training personnel on the principles of community policing. This deficit helps explain why personnel do not fully understand the value of community policing and are not acquainted with how to incorporate the principles into their daily activities.

Community members expressed in comments during the July 20, 2015 community listening session that CPD officers did not stop and talk to pedestrians, and community members emphasized the need for more community engagement.

**Recommendation 15.1**

*Develop a training program for employees that introduces the community policing philosophy and operational practices.*

Ensure that the ultimate goal of this training program is institutionalizing the community policing process throughout the organization. Such a program can include training officers on how to implement community policing, scheduling and facilitating community meetings, and attending and participating in community events.\(^{34}\) One good resource is the Center for Problem-Oriented Policing, which has many community policing and problem-oriented policing materials for best practices, including training curriculums, modules, and manuals.\(^{35}\)

**Recommendation 15.2**

*Encourage CPD officers to engage community members in conversation on a daily basis on their regular beats.*

Combining problem identification and problem-solving strategies in daily activities of patrol, answering calls, and simply talking to pedestrians on the street will begin the initial process of community policing and community engagement. This practice will also develop needed community partnerships at an individual level and build trust within the community.

Community-Police Advisory Commission

Finding 16

**The Community-Police Advisory Commission does not have a well-defined mission or purpose and is ineffective, specifically with respect to collaboration with the CPD.**

The Community-Police Advisory Commission’s purpose is to receive citizen complaints regarding the department or any of its officers and to provide recommendations to improve the department’s relations with the community; however, no strategy or framework exists to guide this important activity. The assessment team identified no evidence that the commission was accepting, analyzing, or issuing recommendations on citizen complaint investigations, and therefore it is unclear whether its purpose was to recommend actions against officers or simply departmental policy changes based on citizen complaints.

In addition, ongoing and effective collaboration between the department and the commission was not evident during site visits. Interviews with commission members, the chief of police, and the city manager demonstrated a clear lack understanding of the role of the commission and the efforts it plays in increasing police transparency and accountability. Although the commission does not have any regulatory control over police operations, it can play an important advisory role in promoting the advancement of trust between the police and community.

**Recommendation 16.1**

Evaluate the strategic purpose of a Community-Police Advisory Commission, and develop a written framework that outlines the purpose, goals, and expectations for the group.

Given that the commission’s apparent purpose is to provide recommendations to the CPD designed to improve the department’s relations with the community, such a documented framework would be beneficial to both parties. The framework should include improving communication and cooperation between the commission and the CPD’s administration.

**Recommendation 16.2**

Ensure that independent oversight is built into efforts to identify and resolve underlying systemic problems within law enforcement.

Maintain focus on reducing and preventing misconduct and enhancing accountability as well as promoting effective policing and developing strategies for positive organizational change.36

The commission and the CPD must work collaboratively to achieve this effort. Although there are several models of civilian oversight to choose from, Calexico should create a model that supports review without political intervention. Any oversight board should be structured to avoid being controlled solely by the department, the city government, or any individual community group. The oversight should include, at a minimum, the authority to audit and monitor the activities of the department as well as accountability to the community through an annual report of the commission’s activity. The model also must require that the department comply fully with requests for data, files, and general access to department records.

---

Communication and strategic messaging

Finding 17

Although honest and transparent communication by CPD leaders and other city officials during press conferences and community meetings should continue, such messaging has not shed enough light on the positive aspects of the CPD’s activities.

It is understandable and commendable that the department was being transparent under the leadership of former Chief Bostic regarding the discovery of internal corruption and operational problems. Yet, after appropriate measures have been taken to improve accountability and handle problem employees, public messaging should continue to positively reinforce the CPD’s efforts. Some CPD personnel expressed concerns that ongoing negative public statements from former Chief Bostic about the state of the CPD continue to impact the morale of the rank-and-file members of the CPD. Many of them understand why department and city officials needed to inform the community about the problems at the CPD, but they question why positive developments are not shared just as frequently.

More positive messaging had been generated in 2015 because of the efforts by former Chief Bostic and the local press as outlined in “Communication and strategic messaging” on page 28, and these efforts should continue. Other city leaders should follow the example of the chief and the CPD.

Recommendation 17.1

Develop and enact a collaborative community-based communications strategy.

The strategy should include communications processes, policies, and mechanisms to establish a culture of transparency and accountability in order to build trust and legitimacy within the community.37

Recommendation 17.2

Acknowledge the past and look to the future by developing a clear and consistent message to the community that building trust is a top priority for the department. Such messaging to the community should continue to be frequent and transparent about the progress of reforms and efforts to build community trust.

CPD administrators and city officials need to reinforce the positive steps underway to build a competent, responsive, and professional organization focused on improving the quality of life for the community of Calexico. This message can be delivered at community meetings and events, press conferences, and city council meetings when appropriate and in regular daily interactions with community members and stakeholders.

Recommendation 17.3

Track the community’s level of trust in the CPD through annual community surveys.38

Partner with local colleges to conduct surveys that measure the effectiveness of policing strategies and assess any positive or negative trends in the community’s view of the CPD.

37. President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, Final Report (see note 1).
38. Ibid.
Finding 18

The CPD does not have the ability to update its own website as that duty lies with the City. The department website lacks community engagement information, safety tips, partnership opportunities, and crime information.

The chief has been told explicitly by the City that the department cannot have its own website or social media outlets, which has a negative impact on the department’s ability to conduct proactive communication with the Calexico community.

Recommendation 18.1
Secure from the city the authorization to publish crime data and alerts on the website and via social media.

The city should support the CPD in this effort.

Recommendation 18.2
Develop a social media presence to promote partnerships and other popular platforms to engage the community, including younger residents.

The city should similarly support the CPD in this regard.
4. Internal Affairs: The Complaint and Disciplinary Process

Why is it so vital that the Calexico Police Department (CPD) ensure its internal affairs unit embrace best practices in its operations? Why is it so critical that this unit demonstrate an unwavering commitment to ensuring that every single complaint it investigates be addressed in a thorough, fair, objective, and timely manner?

First, because in many ways—both transparent and invisible—the ethics and integrity of the CPD reside in its internal audit division. Second, because when this ethical center of the agency is strong and purposeful in carrying out its responsibilities, the attention of the department’s leaders can extend beyond mere complaint investigation to deterrence and prevention. And third, because when an agency’s internal affairs unit is strong, community trust in the law enforcement agency grows—and this trust, as so many leading progressive policing and public safety agencies are learning across the country, is enormously important if the agency is to be effective in preventing and solving crimes.

To gain insights into the CPD’s internal affairs complaint and disciplinary processes, the assessment team reviewed CPD policies and training related to these areas; interviewed CPD personnel and community stakeholders; and reviewed records including disciplinary outcomes, complaint forms, investigation files, and disciplinary record logs. The details of these reviews are outlined in the following sections.

Purpose, culture, and mindset

Ineffective management of the complaint and internal affairs investigative processes can undermine the disciplinary process and over time can erode public trust and confidence. In the vast majority of cases, the outcome of the disciplinary system in an organization is education of personnel rather than discipline. As such, the execution and management of the disciplinary process models organizational values to employees.39

A key recommendation from the final report of the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing is adopting procedural justice as a guiding principle for internal and external policies and practices. A disciplinary process that is procedurally fair, transparent, and unbiased—and that allows employees to have a voice in the process—strengthens the desired organizational core values of procedural justice.40 One of the most tangible internal organizational systems to model procedural justice is the disciplinary system, because the disciplinary system is often a source of conflict between management and labor and a source of mistrust between the police and the community—particularly in communities of color.41

Before former Chief Michael Bostic’s arrival at the CPD and at the request of former City Manager Richard Warne, a management review of the CPD’s internal investigations and other issues was conducted by an outside entity.42 Although the report is not publicly available, the assessment team’s review of it revealed concerns about internal investigations that were elicited from witnesses in interviews conducted during other CPD misconduct investigations. The review revealed that the Internal Affairs unit’s controls were dis-

mal and that many investigations had not been completed. Investigations were inconsistently adjudicated, and outcomes favored those officers aligned with certain supervisors. Additional findings in this management review report included poor internal affairs investigation tracking, the possibility that the statute of limitations would run out prior to officers receiving discipline, the initiation of investigations against officers by Bostic’s predecessor for minor violations when circumstances did not appear to warrant them, and employees remaining on administrative leave for extended periods of time before their cases were completed without any apparent urgency to complete investigations.

Upon his arrival, former Chief Bostic received a copy of the management review report with its findings. After his own review of the complaint investigations process and control log, he found that investigations were in various stages of completion. Some had been initiated and put aside, others had been completed without notifying the officers, and still others had been logged but not investigated.

As a result of the management review report’s findings and his own corroboration of this complaint process issue, former Chief Bostic engaged independent investigators to examine the complaint investigations that had not been appropriately completed or that had arisen from prior investigations. Those investigations are now on hold under Chief Reynaldo Gomez.

To balance the needs of all stakeholders, it is important for the CPD to foster an environment where expectations are clear for both line and supervisory staff as well as the community. This environment must include communication about specific training, effective supervision, and clear guidance on complaint reception and investigation.43

**Complaint intake**

This phase of the assessment involved examining the CPD’s complaint intake process, including procedures for department members to file internal complaints as well as for the public to file complaints both in the lobby of the department and online. An assessment was made concerning the quality and accessibility of the actual complaint forms used. Gaining the public’s trust that concerns will be received and investigated in a thorough, fair, and objective manner by their police department is critical for building and maintaining public trust.

The acceptance of all community complaints is critical for many reasons. First, it is difficult to establish a baseline of community complaints if all complaints are not documented. Second, the ability to summarily adjudicate a complaint without any documentation undermines the integrity of the process.

CPD policy outlines the following exceptions to accepting a personnel complaint:44

- Complaints shall not be prepared unless the alleged misconduct or job performance is of a nature that, if true, would normally result in disciplinary action.
- When an uninvolved supervisor or the shift sergeant determines that the reporting person is satisfied that their complaint required nothing more than an explanation regarding the proper or improper implementation of department policy or procedure, a complaint need not be taken.

---

43. Stephens, “Police Discipline” (see note 41).
44. Calexico Police Department 2009 Policy Manual 1020.2.3.
When the complainant is intoxicated to the point that his or her credibility appears to be unreliable, identifying information should be obtained and the person should be provided with a personnel complaint form to be returned when the complainant is sober.

Depending on the urgency and seriousness of the allegations involved, complaints from juveniles should generally be taken only with their parents or guardians present and after the parents or guardians have been informed of the circumstances prompting the complaint.

This language suggests that the complainant must furnish proof that the alleged misbehavior was indeed misconduct before a complaint can even be filed. Because police misconduct is often hidden under the guise of performing lawful police activities, the weaknesses in these policies need to be corrected.

**Complaint assignment**

CPD policy does not provide clear direction for the roles and responsibilities of those tasked with the oversight of complaint investigations. For instance, the term “commanding officer” is not defined in policy, used within the department, or referenced in the Fiscal Year 2015–2016 budget’s proposed organizational chart. Although listed in earlier organizational charts, the commanding officer positions have consistently been represented as “vacant” in those charts. The specific commanding officer level responsible for oversight of complaint investigations needs to be defined.

Supervisors and managers are vital participants in the effectiveness of the disciplinary system. They should actively participate in and be held accountable for management of the entire process.45

Determining the facts of the alleged misconduct and arriving at a fair and transparent outcome for all parties is the role of the person performing the supervisory function in the department. Outcomes may include additional training, employee coaching, written admonishments, suspensions, or termination. Supervisory accountability can be broadly defined as organizational response to employee misconduct or community concerns. Supervisors in the organization must be accountable for their decisions and the decisions of their subordinates as they manage the organizational response to employee misconduct.

Complementary to department policy, the CPD should provide extensive and ongoing supervisor training to all members on their roles and the department’s expectations of their performance as recommended in chapter 2 on page 19. At present, the only performance management and disciplinary process training supervisors receive is in conjunction with their initial promotion.

In addition, the CPD does not currently have or use any complaint or disciplinary process standard operating procedures (SOP) that would help provide guidance and consistency in these processes and responsibilities for those tasked with performing an internal affairs investigation. Personnel complaints fall into the following three categories:46

- **Informal.** A matter in which the complainant is satisfied that appropriate action has been taken by a supervisor of a rank higher than the accused employee. Informal complaints need not be documented on a personnel complaint form, and the responsible supervisor shall have the discretion to handle the complaint in any manner consistent with this policy.


• **Formal.** A matter in which the complainant requests further investigation or in which a supervisor determines that further action is warranted. Such complaints may be investigated by a supervisor of a rank higher than the accused employee or referred to the Internal Affairs unit depending on the seriousness and complexity of the investigation.

• **Incomplete.** A matter in which the complainant either refuses to cooperate or becomes unavailable after diligent follow-up investigation. At the discretion of the assigned supervisor or the Internal Affairs unit, such matters need not be documented as personnel complaints, but they may be subject to further investigation depending on the seriousness of the complaint and the availability of sufficient information.

**Investigative process**

Assessors reviewed policy and training practices and procedures related to internal affairs complaints and the disciplinary process. In addition, two members of the assessment team reviewed a sample of the 2014 complaint investigations including both department-initiated and citizen-initiated complaints. Of the total complaints initiated in 2014, our team reviewed five of 19 department-initiated investigations and two of the nine that were citizen-initiated. The total number of complaints initiated in 2015 was difficult to determine. File inspections revealed multiple complaint logs consisting of loose-leaf paper that did not reconcile but showed that it is possible more than 20 cases were filed. While examination of the yearly log suggested that most of the investigations were being managed by external investigators and were not available, inspection of a random sampling of individual case files reflected improper documentation of who was assigned the case or whether the case was assigned at all. In addition, the files that did exist were not complete and could not be adequately reviewed. The following are some examples:

• The file for complaint 2015.14 indicated that an investigation was completed with an “unfounded” adjudication. However, the actual investigation was not documented in the file for the complaint; that is, there were no investigative documents actually in the investigative file folder.

• An inspection found that three complaints were erroneously placed in the 2015 yearly log file and never investigated. One of these was notarized. Some observers could conclude that these complaints were deliberately misplaced to prevent citizens from pursuing their complaints against the police.

• Document requests to clarify the total number of 2015 investigations were not satisfied before administrative management changes reorganized the department. Therefore, the assessment team reviewed seven complaint investigations from 2014 and examined eight 2015 case files, some of which consisted only of a complaint intake form and others simply of intake notes.

Whether the complaint is categorized as an informal complaint relating to a minor issue or as a formal one requiring a major investigation, the department’s investigative process should be thorough, transparent, and timely. Employees should be notified if they are the subject of a complaint unless this notification would undermine the investigation. At present, employees are notified of a complaint only in accordance with California Government code 3303, also outlined in CPD policy 1020.6. In general, this policy requires that an employee be notified of a complaint when they are subject to an interrogation and the outcome of the investigation may be punitive in nature.
These inconsistencies in the investigative process are due to the CPD’s lack of regular training for handling complaint investigations as well as gaps in policy and the absence of an investigative SOP. In addition, CPD policy imposes a one-year deadline for completing investigations. Generally speaking, the investigative process can be difficult for all parties involved. Complainants are left to wonder if their complaint is being investigated, and employees are anxious that they may come under or already be subject to investigation.

There are also times when the alleged misconduct is so egregious that it is necessary to remove the employee from the workplace while an administrative investigation ascertains the veracity of the allegations. CPD policy currently allows any supervisor in the organization to relieve an employee of duty and place the employee on administrative leave. Interviews with CPD personnel and the review of complaint investigations revealed that some employees had been on administrative leave for months, and the outcome of the investigation was that of a lower-level disciplinary action.

Some of these gaps and weaknesses in internal controls, including notification, inconsistency, and tracking, are long-standing challenges that former Chief Bostic was beginning to reform. New leadership in the CPD should embrace and expand on those efforts.

Case management

The case management process for Internal Affairs investigations needs to be consistent and comprehensive. The administrative file management process, functional reporting areas of the report, and administrative processes of the investigation should be well defined. A consistent departmental approach to administrative investigations can reduce the opportunity for procedural error and decrease employee anxiety by clearly communicating investigative timelines.

CPD policy outlines the content of the administrative investigative report and requires reports to contain the following: 47

- Introduction
- Synopsis
- Summary of allegations
- Evidence as to each allegation
- Conclusion
- Exhibits

A random sampling of 2014 and 2015 Internal Affairs reports suggests that this policy is not being followed. Some required reports were nonexistent or were incomplete because they did not contain all the sections required by policy; in some instances, the cases were effectively completed by outside investigators. (The assessment team’s review of files also supported recommendation 27.1 on page 47 that the CPD needs an Internal Affairs SOP manual to provide specific steps in the investigative process and help define expectations of subject employees.)

Specifically, the review of the internal affairs reports indicates the following:

- There is little to no consistency in file management or documentation. The case folders contain incomplete files (as defined by policy), labeled file jackets with no contents other than blank departmental forms, incomplete file tracking logs, little evidentiary supporting documentation or exhibits, and in some cases no documentation of investigative outcomes.

- The master file tracking log lists every complaint assigned an Internal Affairs unit investigation number, the investigator to whom the case was assigned, the current phase of the case’s investigative process, and whether the lists were incomplete or contained errors. These errors included incorrect case dispositions and missing (blank) information. Also, the Internal Affairs unit’s investigative files should contain date and time stamps for each phase of the investigative process and should identify the organization member responsible for conducting the required task.

- CPD policy states that the division commander shall review all materials in the investigative file.\(^\text{48}\) The investigative case file audit revealed that it is not clear if the CPD is conducting even a cursory management review of the case file. The condition of the files made this evident. The team discovered evidentiary computer disks in the file that, when inspected, were blank and did not contain the evidence as labeled. SOPs should define expectations of the management review process to provide quality assurance and elevate accountability in oversight of the internal investigation process.

\(^{48}\) Calexico Police Department 2009 Policy Manual 340.5.1.

**Case disposition**

Fair and consistent evaluation of potential misconduct is essential to any disciplinary process. In a review of case dispositions of complaint investigations and interviews of CPD personnel regarding disciplinary action, the assessment team found that CPD policy does not outline disciplinary options other than a written reprimand. This leaves personnel with little understanding as to which disciplinary options are available as those options are not communicated routinely to personnel by policy, supervisors, or command staff.

Over the course of this assessment, this Internal Affairs review made apparent the CPD’s need to focus the implementation of a high quality, consistent, and timely Internal Affairs and disciplinary process. This includes communication through policy, training, oversight, and accountability of such processes as well as procedures for conducting these investigations and recommending appropriate and consistent action that is understood by all department personnel.

**Findings and recommendations**

**Purpose, culture, and mindset**

**Finding 19**

**CPD disciplinary policy 340 does not explain the intended purpose of the disciplinary system in the organization.**

The CPD’s current disciplinary policy requires that employees be provided with guidelines on conduct so they can meet the goals of the department and serve the needs of the community. However, the educational purpose and nonpunitive nature of the disciplinary guidelines are not sufficiently clear.
The assessment team is aware that the former chief conducted the independent audit of the internal investigations during his first six months at the CPD and then had outside investigators complete these investigations. Given the importance of addressing this matter, the new chief has not yet revamped this disciplinary system as the former chief intended, but he should do so in the near future as these internal investigations come to a close.

**Recommendation 19.1**
*Include a philosophy and purpose statement in the CPD disciplinary policy.*

Such a statement should reflect the core values of the department and explain to the community and officers how the fair and impartial practice of progressive discipline reinforces those values, corrects behavior, and provides clear expectations of officers.

**Finding 20**
*There is a concern among CPD employees that discipline is inappropriately meted out for minor policy violations and directives.*

A common theme among personnel interviewed was that employees are not recognized for good behavior and performance but are quickly disciplined for even the smallest errors. Employees understand the importance of accountability but fear getting in trouble over minor transgressions that seem to be handled with an overabundance of punitive discipline. According to the interviewees, this situation has caused low morale and apprehension among employees. As the open investigations come to a close, formalizing and implementing the disciplinary process should result in a much-needed boost in morale and increase department transparency to shift the culture of fear that exists for many members.

Employee concerns about management’s overreliance on the discipline system are supported by several factors such as (1) the increasing number of internal complaints, (2) the lack of a systematic training plan,49 (3) the absence of a formalized early warning system, and (4) inconsistencies in the performance management process caused in part by allowing line-level employees to serve in a supervisory role on a routine basis.

**Recommendation 20.1**
*Formalize the disciplinary process, and hold managers and supervisors accountable to discuss expectations with their employees.*

Evaluate the CPD’s current policies regarding employee recognition and discipline, and develop a common philosophy to achieve employee compliance with rules and regulations while ensuring a nontoxic working environment. Also helpful would be providing specific policies, procedures, and protocols in the CPD’s Duty Manual as well as in a guidebook that could be distributed to supervisory personnel. Such materials, if properly used, would also assist in ensuring consistency in the disciplinary process. Specific training should also be provided to supervisors outlining the proper steps to take to document both positive and negative work behaviors within employees’ performance appraisals.

---

49. Sanchez and Koenig, Management Study (see note 8).
Finding 21

The CPD has not yet embraced a guardian culture and mindset to build public trust and legitimacy. The department needs to adopt procedural justice as a guiding principle for its interactions with residents.

The CPD officers will not effectively implement procedural justice in the community if the department does not adhere to procedural justice internally. As stated in the final report of the President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing, "behavior is more likely to conform to culture than rules."

Recommendation 21.1

Adopt procedural justice as a guiding principle for the organization, as implementation of procedural justice is critical to building public trust.

Although there are many ways to infuse procedural justice as a guiding principle into the whole organization, full implementation would involve adding the principles to CPD policies, trainings, roll-call briefings, mentoring and supervisory relations, community policing and engagement efforts, and overall internal and external messaging.

Complaint intake

Finding 22

The CPD does not sufficiently make complaint forms accessible to the public and is not in compliance with department policy requiring a complaint form to be available in the lobby of the police facility.

Recommendation 22.1

Make personnel complaint forms more accessible. Offer multiple opportunities and methods for the public to commend or raise a complaint about an officer.

This should include (1) allowing the public to file a complaint on the department's website to streamline the complaint submission process and help build public trust and (2) filing complaints in person or by mail and anonymously. Also, make complaint forms available at City Hall, the public library, and other public buildings.

Finding 23

The CPD does not provide any public education materials explaining how to commend or complain about a department employee.

A key way for a department to provide transparency in the way it handles discipline cases is to provide detailed written information to the public that explains the processes for receiving and investigating complaints. To assist in this effort, many agencies make available a brochure that provides an overview of the internal affairs investigation process. These materials, provided in multiple languages, also explain how to file a complaint as well as how to commend an employee.

51. Ibid.
52. Ibid.
Recommendation 23.1
Develop and distribute a public education brochure explaining how to commend or complain about a police employee.

Make this public brochure available on the department’s website and distribute it to local churches and social service organizations.

Recommendation 23.2
Make the brochure available in the languages spoken in the community and the local schools.

These brochures should include information about the internal affairs investigation process and the disposition of complaints.

Finding 24
The CPD’s policy regarding accepting complaints from the community states that complaints “may” be accepted. This is overly subjective regarding the exceptions authorizing the denial of a complaint.

Currently, CPD policy outlines the situations in which a complaint about CPD personnel should not be accepted. This allows officers to use their own discretion as to whether to accept a complaint. The language suggests the complainant bears an unnecessary burden to prove the alleged action was misconduct before a complaint can even be filed. In addition, it gives supervisors the discretion to talk a complainant out of filing a complaint.

Recommendation 24.1
Accept all citizen complaints—including anonymous ones—at face value regardless of their subjective merit.

Recommendation 24.2
Create and implement formal policies and procedures outlining specific steps employees must take to ensure complaints are received, documented, and investigated appropriately and in a timely manner.

These policies and procedures should include key steps including specifying the following:

- Who is responsible for accepting a complaint and the requirement that the complaint is to be forwarded immediately to a supervisor
- The time frame for filing a complaint
- Whether a complainant is required to speak to a supervisor
- Whether complaints may be submitted by mail
- How complaints may be submitted anonymously
- Which complaints will be investigated by internal audit rather than a unit supervisor or manager
- Mandatory time frames for the completion of complaint investigations

55. Calexico Police Department 2009 Policy Manual 1020.2.3.
• How complainants are to be notified of the outcome of an investigation
• When it is appropriate or required that certain kinds of complaints be investigated by an outside agency
• The length of time Internal Affairs investigative reports must be maintained

Complaint assignment

Finding 25

The CPD policy outlining the internal affairs process uses terms like “commanding officer” and “divisional commander,” which are not clearly defined.

Recommendation 25.1

Use the actual department ranks in CPD policy regarding the Internal Affairs process to clearly assign tasks and accountability.

Ensure the policy provides clear guidance on the roles and responsibilities for supervisors and managers to investigate officer misconduct. Have the CPD policy regarding Internal Affairs clearly assign tasks and accountability within the division and how, if necessary, investigations transition from the chain of command to the Internal Affairs unit or vice versa. The department also needs to work with the city’s Legal and Human Resources personnel to determine processes for having serious misconduct allegations or complaints against upper-level management employees handled by external agencies or experts as well as to determine the process for identifying qualified outside attorneys or experts to handle such cases.

Finding 26

Informal complaints and the organizational response to these complaints are not required to be documented.

Department policy states that informal complaints do not need to be documented on a personnel complaint form. No public reporting of complaints is currently provided. Law enforcement agencies are required to report annually to the California Department of Justice statewide summary information on the number of noncriminal and criminal (misdemeanor and felony) complaints reported by the public and the number of complaints that were sustained. Such complaint data is published in an annual California Department of Justice report titled Crime and Delinquency in California.

Recommendation 26.1

Develop a new initial complaint form that can be used to document all complaints, both informal and formal, and comply with department policy and state law.

58. “The annual report of the department provided for in Section 13010 shall contain statistics showing all of the following: . . . (5)(A)(i) Citizen complaints received by law enforcement agencies under Section 832.5. (ii) Citizen complaints alleging criminal conduct of either a felony or misdemeanor. (iii) Citizen complaints alleging racial or identity profiling, as defined in subdivision € of Section 13519.4. These statistics shall be disaggregated by the specific type of racial or identity profiling alleged, such as based on a consideration of race, color, ethnicity, national origin, religion, gender identity or expression, sexual orientation, or mental or physical disability. (B) The statistics reported under this paragraph shall provide, for each category of complaint identified under subparagraph (A), the number of complaints within each of the following disposition categories: (i) “Sustained,” . . . (ii) “Exonerated,” . . . (iii) “Not sustained,” . . . (iv) “Unfounded,” . . . (C) The reports under subparagraphs (A) and (B) shall be made available to the public and disaggregated for each individual law enforcement agency.” California Penal Code § 13012(5), http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-bin/displaycode?section=pen&group=12001-13000&file=13000-13014.
Recommendation 26.2

Publish an annual public report of complaints to increase transparency and accountability with the community and within the department.

Finding 27

**CPD policy is not clear on the process for assigning and investigating citizen complaints.**

The CPD policy concerning the roles and responsibilities of immediate supervisors and Internal Affairs in the complaint process is confusing and conflicting. The policy states that an employee’s immediate supervisor is responsible for investigating complaints against their employees. However, the policy also states that formal complaints should be forwarded to the commanding officer to take action or to Internal Affairs for investigation.59

Recommendation 27.1

Develop an Internal Affairs SOP manual to clearly communicate roles and responsibilities for each rank in the complaint process.

Many agencies use an SOP manual to communicate technical processes within the organization and to supplement general policy manual guidance. A written directive is needed that delineates categories of complaints with information on which complaints may be investigated by the employee’s supervisor and which must be investigated by Internal Affairs. This is also a best practice and required under Commission on Accreditation of Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA) accreditation standards.60 Complaints that do not rise to the level of misconduct or minor policy violations should be investigated and addressed by field supervisors, although written policies should also require supervisors to notify their chain of command of the complaints handled at a lower level and the actions taken to handle them.

Finding 28

**A written directive delineating policy violations by category does not exist.**

The CPD does have written guidelines that define policy violations by category: informal, formal, and incomplete.61 However, the CPD does not have a process in place to provide effective guidance for supervisors on how to use each category.

The present version of the CPD policy manual does not organize policy violations into a classification system that provides staff a reasonable understanding on whether a violation is major or minor. Examples of minor policy violations include reporting late for work, not wearing a seat belt when required, or missing a required court date. Examples of major violations include failing to take a report when contacted by an alleged crime victim, failure to book evidence, or violations of another person’s civil rights.

Staff members have not received guidance on how to determine whether field supervisors or Internal Affairs should handle the investigation. This lack of guidance prompts hesitancy in the supervisory decision-making process. A classification system could be incorporated into the existing policy’s terms for informal and formal complaints to assist with this organizational challenge.

59. Calexico Police Department 2009 Policy Manual 1020.2.3.
Recommendation 28.1

Develop a written directive that outlines and categorizes policy violations to communicate to employees the seriousness of a violation and to define clear investigative roles for supervisors in administrative investigations.

Finding 29

The incomplete personnel complaint classification, as defined by departmental policy, states that incomplete complaints are instances where “the complaining party either refuses to cooperate or becomes unavailable after [a] diligent follow-up investigation.”62 This classification is ineffective because it is more closely aligned with a complaint disposition than with the nature of an allegation.

Personnel complaints should be classified based on the nature of the allegation rather than the outcome of the investigation; the classification of incomplete is an outcome. Other complaint dispositions include unfounded, exonerated, not sustained, and sustained. Given that the complaint classification of incomplete is not aligned with the nature of an allegation and is more consistent with a final disposition classification, it provides an investigator an opportunity to make a decision on the complaint investigation outcome before conducting an appropriate investigation.

Recommendation 29.1

Remove the incomplete classification related to personnel complaints from CPD policy.

When a complainant refuses to cooperate after the complaint is filed the complaint can be closed administratively. However, as the CPD policy is written, the incomplete complaint gives no guidance as to whether the complaint was accepted or who would investigate the allegation. “Incomplete” is a retrospective term that can only be used after the complaint is filed and diligent attempts have been made to investigate the allegation. For example, rather than having a use of force complaint classified as as incomplete, it should be classified as a use of force complaint with an incomplete finding, thereby allowing the actual allegation to be known.

Finding 30

Informal complaints are not tracked or analyzed in the department.

Police departments often receive information regarding objectionable officer behavior or actions that should not be dismissed simply because the potential complainant refuses to file a formal complaint. All formal investigations are assigned an administrative investigation number for tracking and accountability, but this is not done for informal complaints. Informal complaints are not currently tracked for accountability and oversight, but the CPD should track them.

---

Recommendation 30.1

Develop a numbering system—separate from the system tracking formal complaints—to track all informal complaints received and investigated by the department.

These complaints should be included in the department’s annual report. Such a tracking system would allow the CPD to comprehensively report all complaints, both formal and informal, to the community.

Investigative process

Finding 31

**CPD policy does not require employees to be notified when they are subject to an administrative investigation.**

Recommendation 31.1

Notify employees when they are subject to a formal investigation, unless this notification would jeopardize the department’s ability to investigate employee misconduct successfully.63

CPD policy should reflect the requirement that employees be notified of a complaint filed against them regarding their performance.

Finding 32

**CPD policy does not explain how long internal investigations can reasonably take to complete.**

Currently, CPD policy states that investigations should be completed within one year of discovery.64 However, many law enforcement agencies have a policy that sets a 30-day time frame for the completion of the investigation from the date the complaint is received.65 Even if a 30-day time period is not feasible, a routine standard of one year from discovery is not a reasonable period of time to complete an internal investigation. The possibility that some investigations may be extended beyond one year also risks precluding the department from implementing certain types of discipline per California law.66

Recommendation 32.1

Require a specific and more reasonable period of time for internal investigations to be completed.

The CPD should determine what is reasonable with its staffing and resource allocations, but investigations should be completed as quickly as possible. CPD policy should also include the option for the investigator to request an extension from the appropriate supervisor if more time is needed, provided sufficient cause is present to allow this.

---

63. Thurnauer, *Internal Affairs* (see note 56).
65. *Building Trust Between the Police and the Citizens They Serve* (see note 54).
66. “Except as provided in this subdivision and subdivision (q), no punitive action, nor denial of promotion on grounds other than merit, shall be undertaken for any act, omission, or other allegation of misconduct if the investigation of the allegation is not completed within one year of the public agency’s discovery by a person authorized to initiate an investigation of the allegation of an act, omission, or other misconduct.” *California Government Code* § 3304d, http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-bin/displaycode?section=gov&group=03001-04000&file=3300-3313.
Finding 33

**CPD policy currently gives any supervisor the authority to place an employee on indefinite administrative leave during an administrative investigation.**

The assessment team understands that current practice states that only the chief places employees on administrative leave, and at the time of our interview former Chief Bostic had planned to issue an order emphasizing this practice until this policy is revised.

**Recommendation 33.1**

*Give all supervisors the ability to recommend placing an employee on temporary administrative leave.*

Temporary administrative leave should be no longer than three days pending a preliminary assessment of alleged serious misconduct. Thereafter, only the chief should have the authority to place employees on a long-term administrative leave pending the outcome of an administrative investigation.67

**Recommendation 33.2**

*Create and implement detailed policies and procedures outlining the types of incidents that would indicate administrative leave is warranted.*

Typical examples of when administrative leave should be called for in the directives could include the following: (1) an officer-involved shooting, (2) allegations of criminal misconduct, or (3) allegations of serious misconduct.

Finding 34

**The CPD does not provide consistent training for employees and supervisors on the disciplinary process.**

Inconsistent training, gaps in policy, and the absence of an SOP have produced an inconsistent approach to managing the internal investigative functions of the department. Personnel interviews with line and supervisory staff determined that inconsistency in training and approach exists. While some supervisors have attended a basic internal affairs course, it only provided elementary internal investigative skills.

**Recommendation 34.1**

*Develop and provide department-wide disciplinary process training including overall program information and descriptions of roles and responsibilities for each rank.*

This recommendation was validated by a previous management review.68 CPD staff should be trained on the investigative process and policies and the recommended new SOPs. This type of training has been consistently provided in the past but is not part of a recurring training regimen.

---

67. This requirement of only having the chief of police approve administrative leave is currently in a Memorandum of Understanding between the City of Calexico and the Calexico Police Officers Association, but the CPD is in the process of writing this requirement into their policy for the department to understand and follow. Memorandum of Understanding between the City of Calexico and the Calexico Police Officers Association, 2010–2012 MOU Extension.

68. Sanchez and Koenig, Management Study for the Calexico Police Department (see note 8).
Case management

Finding 35

**Administrative Internal Affairs case files and reports are not consistent, contain conflicting information, and are largely incomplete.**

CPD policy outlines the content of the administrative investigation report. Our review of seven Internal Affairs reports from 2014 and eight from 2015 suggests that this policy is not being followed: Significant errors and omissions were observed in every case reviewed. The audit of administrative case files revealed inconsistency regarding file management and documentation in a majority of the files sampled, incomplete files and labeled file jackets with no contents other than blank departmental forms, incomplete file tracking logs, insufficient evidentiary supporting documentation, and in some cases no documentation of investigation outcomes.

**Recommendation 35.1**

Require all Internal Affairs investigation reports to follow the format prescribed in the policy manual.

**Recommendation 35.2**

Train investigators on an Internal Affairs SOP that outlines requirements to be included in every administrative investigation case file.

The SOP should include a list of requirements included in every investigative file. This could include complaint summary; formal initial, interim, and final notifications to the complainant and accused officer(s); evidence (e.g., photos and recordings); names of the complainant, witnesses, and accused officer(s); tracking logs of attempts to locate witnesses and obtain statements and of completion of investigative tasks; allegations and final adjudication; and the outcome of any disciplinary actions.

**Recommendation 35.3**

Require the administrative investigation case file to clearly date and time stamp each phase of the investigation process.

This requirement would assist in the tracking and accountability of each case investigation. The investigation case file should identify which employee is responsible for conducting the procedural tasks of the investigation.

**Recommendation 35.4**

Conduct random and periodic audits of the Internal Affairs unit’s investigation case files to ensure that proper policy and required procedures are being followed and that appropriate documentation is included where necessary.

---

Finding 36

**CPD policy does not outline management responsibilities for reviewing internal investigations.**

CPD policy states that the division commander must review all materials in the investigation file. However, the investigation case file audit revealed that the CPD is not following this policy as there was either insufficient review or no management review at all of the files.

**Recommendation 36.1**

*Develop an administrative file review process and administrative checklist.*

An SOP should define the expectations of the management review process in an effort not only to provide quality assurance to the contents of the investigation but also to elevate management’s accountability in the oversight of the internal investigation process.

Finding 37

**The CPD has not held supervisors and managers accountable for the quality, consistency, and adjudication of internal affairs investigations.**

The investigation case file audit revealed that the CPD was not previously conducting even a cursory management review of the case files. However, Internal Affairs cases that had been lingering from the previous police administration either have been completed successfully or are in the process of being completed through the efforts of an external subject matter expert hired to complete this process. The chief plans to implement controls for internal affairs investigations when those cases are completed, as discussed earlier in this report (see “Investigative process” on page 40 and finding 19 on page 42).

**Recommendation 37.1**

*In the chain-of-command review process, document whether management (i.e., Internal Affairs supervisor, Internal Affairs commanding officer, or the chief) concurs with the findings of the investigation.*

Requiring documentation will ensure management accountability of the review process.

---

**The CPD’s Recent Actions: Discipline Matrix**

The former chief was working with the Calexico Police Officers Association (CPOA) to establish a discipline matrix. At the time of this assessment, the CPOA was reviewing the matrix and was due to return with its suggestions and recommendations.

---

**Recommendation 37.2**

*Clearly articulate in the CPD policy that command recommendations are required to be provided to the chief at the conclusion of the administrative investigation.*

The current policy states that a recommendation regarding further action or disposition should be provided rather than that a recommendation must be provided, allowing such command recommendations to the chief to be optional.

---

**Recommendation 37.3**

Conduct both a current and an ongoing review of file management, documentation, and accuracy within the chain-of-command review process to ensure administrative investigation files are consistent and complete, contain the required information and documentation, and either have no conflicting information or appropriately address and resolve any conflicts.

This review will ensure case investigations are conducted appropriately in accordance with department and national best practice standards.

**Case disposition**

**Finding 38**

**CPD policy does not describe the progressive disciplinary options used by the department.**

The CPD policy manual specifies the procedure for a written reprimand but does not describe any other disciplinary options for management. The policy is not clear about the availability of these options, and interviews with department personnel demonstrated that progressive options such as coaching, verbal counseling, corrective training, and others are not clearly understood. Discipline should be progressive and directed at improving behavior. As currently conducted, discipline is primarily punitive.

**Recommendation 38.1**

Update the department policy to clearly communicate all performance management progressive disciplinary options available to ensure that staff sufficiently understands the disciplinary process and the consequences of any such behaviors.

**Finding 39**

**CPD does not have a formal process to ensure disciplinary sanctions are applied consistently.**

During staff interviews, it was reported that previous disciplinary cases of a similar nature were considered when recommending disciplinary outcomes. However, this type of assessment is dependent on personal knowledge of a previous case rather than on a defined departmental procedure. Even if a manual search for similar investigations was conducted, the files are so poorly kept that accurate information is not necessarily available.

**Recommendation 39.1**

Develop a disciplinary matrix to assist management in communicating organizational consequences for misconduct.

This matrix will also ensure consistency and fairness in applying disciplinary sanctions and enhance adherence to internal procedural justice practices.
Recommendation 39.2

Define clear parameters to ensure fair and consistent application of discipline.

Allow flexibility within defined parameters in the use of the disciplinary matrix to allow for proper consideration of the unique facts for each investigation, including the degree of organizational harm created by the employee misconduct.
5. Early Intervention Tools and Practices

When a police agency such as the Calexico Police Department (CPD) handles its own formal Internal Affairs process, it can create and capture enormous organizational value—in great measure because it requires the department’s rank and file to step up and take on a leadership role in the day-to-day ethical decisions that need to be made. One of the most important phases of this process is early intervention, including identifying the tools and practices to address issues in their infancy before they develop into much more serious incidents and complaints. An early intervention process can be a valuable supervisory management tool to increase agency accountability and help employees meet the agency’s values and mission statement.

Development of tools and practices

The CPD is not using early intervention tools and practices, nor does it have any policies, training, messaging or understanding of how to apply early intervention practices and efforts. Performance evaluations and early intervention tools are critical components for any effective personnel management process. Early intervention tracks various indicators to provide management the opportunity to address potential problems in employee work behaviors in a positive and productive manner. These tools help identify and address employee issues before they rise to a level requiring the use of the disciplinary system by collecting a variety of data and analyzing patterns of activity to identify at-risk officers or groups of officers. The goal is to identify opportunities to reduce risky behaviors, department liability, and citizen complaints.

An analysis of settlement agreements in a number of cities by the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) indicates the following components of early intervention are becoming standard:

- The tools must be maintained and used by supervisors and managers.
- Policies and protocols for data collection, maintenance, analysis, security, and access should be developed.
- Personnel managing the program should have the proper training.
- Threshold criteria for flagging should be developed.
- Follow-up action must be specified.
- Interventions must take place in a timely manner and the outcome must be tracked.
- Intervention progress must be reviewed by a supervisor.

The CPD should incorporate these points into its development and use of early intervention tools, which can be effective even on a rudimentary level.

---

71. Building Trust Between the Police and the Citizens They Serve (see note 54).
72. Stephens, Police Discipline (see note 41).
73. Building Trust Between the Police and the Citizens They Serve (see note 54).
75. Ibid.
Accountability and transparency

During its review of the CPD’s internal affairs and disciplinary processes, the assessment team also evaluated accountability and transparency surrounding annual reporting of complaints and trend data. If allegations of misconduct are determined to be factual following an internal investigation, the CPD has the opportunity to demonstrate to the community and to the organization that the misconduct is unacceptable and inconsistent with organizational values through the effective use of the department’s disciplinary system. Thus, the Internal Affairs process provides the department the opportunity to restore public trust and community legitimacy.76 The department does not currently communicate the outcomes of sustained disciplinary cases to the extent allowable to ensure transparency exists within the department and to build trust.

In addition, CPD policy requires that racial profiling complaints and efforts be reported annually with the hope that this reporting will help reduce any racial bias in policing.77 However, during interviews with community members, neither the state report concerning the reporting of the number of external complaints the department received nor the report about preventing racial profiling were widely known.

Findings and recommendations

Development of tools and practices

Finding 40

The CPD does not use any early intervention tools.

However, the department does seek to create a committee to review officer work behaviors quarterly and have lieutenants review their sergeants, and it intends to outline the requirements of this plan in policy.

An inspection of CPD records revealed that since 2014, there have been 52 internal affairs investigations,78 which represents an average of nearly 1.5 investigations per department employee. Early intervention at the lowest possible level and timely outcomes are important in the disciplinary process.79

Recommendation 40.1

Develop an early intervention system.

Start by creating tools and using organizational data to intervene at the appropriate time to address negative employee performance trends and low-level misconduct. The CPD could benefit from an increased focus on preventing misconduct and intervening at the earliest possible time rather than when employee behaviors result in misconduct that requires a disciplinary response.

**Recommendation 40.2**

*Develop a policy that explains the purpose of early intervention tools and defines how they are used effectively.*

The purpose of early intervention is to assist in the proactive supervision of officers, managers, and the department as a whole. Clearly articulating these expectations presents an opportunity to address potential misconduct before it occurs.

**Recommendation 40.3**

*Train all staff on early intervention tools to ensure they have the proper technological resources for adoption and usage.*

This training should be rank-specific to manage employee expectations.

**Recommendation 40.4**

*Define early intervention processes and practices in an SOP.*

The early intervention process and SOP should include threshold flags that create or allow for the review of a notification; the expected action required in a notification follow-up, including conducting a review of the officer’s activities for a specific period of time; and the approval process to close a notification. This review should use the information as only one source for determining at-risk behavior.

**Recommendation 40.5**

*Track all early intervention reviews or notifications and document all related managerial actions to ensure supervisory oversight, accountability, and consistency of all managerial actions when similar notifications occur.*

Tracking early intervention reviews or notifications is important to ensure all issues are addressed and to have ongoing documentation of which reviews or notifications occurred so they can be periodically reviewed in aggregate for patterns of misconduct, disproportionately high number of incidents of concern, and identification of units or groups that may need further review and assessment. Documentation and review of these matters is important for quality assurance of fair and consistent treatment for all department employees.

The department should also consider conducting a periodic review and audit of all appropriate information about officers, supervisors, and managers to identify any potential patterns of incidents that may indicate that an officer, a group of officers, or a unit may be engaging in at-risk behavior. Again, this review or audit can consist of simple checks and balances to ensure that appropriate early intervention tools are used. If such a pattern is identified, managers and supervisors should conduct a review of the officer’s activities and direct action as appropriate.
Accountability and transparency

Finding 41

The department reports external complaints against employees only as required by California law.

The state requires the department to report the number of citizen complaints against police officers annually.80 This is currently the only report being produced. The Committee on Accreditation of Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA) Standard 52.1.11 requires an annual report,81 but no such CPD report exists. Having law enforcement agencies annually report the number of complaints, outcomes, and trends concerning administrative complaint resolution can improve public trust.82

Recommendation 41.1

Produce and publish an annual report detailing the number of internal investigations, complaints, and findings.

Beyond the required annual complaint report that is provided to the California Department of Justice by state law, expand efforts to comprehensively report to the public the number, type, and outcomes of investigations conducted towards employees to improve public trust and establish legitimacy in the community. This published report should not identify individual employees but rather report trend data and the investigation outcomes.

80. “The annual report of the department provided for in Section 13010 shall contain statistics showing all of the following: . . . (3) The administrative actions taken by law enforcement, judicial, penal, and correctional agencies or institutions, including those in the juvenile justice system, in dealing with criminals or delinquents.” California Penal Code § 13012(a)(3), http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-bin/displaycode?section=pen&group=12001-13000&file=13000-13014.

81. Standards for Law Enforcement Agencies (see note 60).

82. Thurnauer, Internal Affairs (see note 56).
6. Criminal Investigations

The assessment team’s approach to this area involved a rigorous review of the Calexico Police Department’s (CPD) entire investigations process from case management and tracking to supervisory oversight of the investigations, training related to investigations, policies and manuals, and the quality of the investigations as a whole. It also centered on in-depth interviews with investigators, including detectives from the department’s Investigations Services Division, patrol officers who have investigative responsibilities, and CPD command staff.

As an outcome of this effort, the team identified three key areas requiring improvements:

1. The department policy and investigations manual
2. Personnel-related matters related to criminal investigation knowledge, skills, and training
3. Staffing and case management

*Department policy and investigations manual*

The assessment team found that the CPD does not have an investigations operations manual or any similar documents or guiding principles that reflect the mission, responsibilities and processes of Investigations Services. Without written guidance, the Investigations Services Division has continued to handle criminal investigations and their process in a disorganized manner.

One example of the lack of professional investigation of crime comes from a criminal investigations case reviewed internally by the assessment team and is as follows:

In August of 2015, a CPD officer responded to an assault with a deadly weapon call in the City of Calexico. In August of 2015, a CPD officer responded to an assault with a deadly weapon call in the City of Calexico.83 Upon arrival, the officer located a victim who had been seriously assaulted but was conscious and stable. The officer took the preliminary statement from the victim and located evidence at the scene. The victim was transported to a local hospital. Several hours later the officer who took the initial report met the victim at the hospital and showed him a photo identification lineup. The victim identified the suspect from the lineup. Later that same night the officer responded to the suspect’s residence and arrested him for the assault. The officer Mirandized the suspect prior to an interrogation and the suspect provided no incriminating information. The patrol officer booked the suspect into county jail after the arrest and, with the approval of his supervisor, charged the suspect with assault with a deadly weapon.

The suspect was held in county jail for several days and was released because the case filing documentation was never delivered to the district attorney’s office to be filed with the court. The case had not been reviewed by the CPD before the assessment team discovered it, and the detectives had no idea that this incident had occurred. At the time of this report, the suspect remains free and no charges have been filed.

This case illustrates the problems inherent with not having standardized operating procedures for criminal investigations. These include a lack of communication, coordination, and appropriate filing charges considered, as further outlined later in this section. Cases directly filed with the district attorney’s office without review from the Investigations Services Division prevent a coordinated investigative effort and can have serious consequences.

83. Calexico Police Department Criminal Case #C15-14806.
Without standard operating procedures (SOP) for criminal investigations in place, the department confronts the following challenges:

- A patrol officer’s scope of responsibility in a serious case exceeds the reasonable expectations of a patrol officer.
- Poor communication between patrol, detectives, and records personnel results in cases falling through the cracks and missed opportunities to charge felony suspects.
- Records personnel do not process the proper paperwork to have the case submitted to the district attorney’s office to consider filing charges.

To ensure that the appropriate organizational resources are available for assistance during major incidents as well as ensure the department leadership team is kept informed of noteworthy incidents, most agencies have an official internal notification process.

**Criminal investigations knowledge, skills, and training**

The CPD relies on patrol officers to handle most criminal investigations in their entirety. With the exception of major investigations such as homicides, officer-involved shootings, or fatal traffic collisions, the CPD requires its patrol officers to conduct more extensive investigative follow-up than is common in a police agency of its size.

At present, it appears that patrol officers will continue to be held accountable for most preliminary investigations and substantial investigative follow-up. In most cases, patrol officers have the following investigative responsibilities:

- Interviews of victims, witnesses, and other involved parties to a case
- Canvassing the scene for witnesses and evidence
- Collection and preservation of evidence
- Arrest of suspects
- Interrogations of suspects
- Booking of evidence
- Completion of all relevant reports
- Referral of filing of criminal complaints to the district attorney for case filing

Most CPD patrol officers are not properly trained in investigation procedures or evidence collection, and these deficiencies limit the department’s effectiveness in criminal investigations. In fact, only three patrol officers have received any criminal investigative training. Training is limited to what they learned in the basic police academy, during field training, or from on-the-job experience. This helps explain many of the challenges confronting the unit.

In the sample case outlined earlier, the officer responsible for the investigation did not record any of the statements made by the victim or suspect. The suspect was Mirandized and interviewed, but other than the written report by the officers, no other objective evidence of the statements exists. A best practice is for patrol officers to take crime scene photos immediately after the area is stabilized to document the scene in its most natural state prior to further contamination by responding emergency personnel or the elements.

---

84. Confirmed through review of personnel training files.
Crime scene processing and the collection, preservation, and booking of evidence is a specialized field in law enforcement. To be competent in this area, officers require not only specialized training but also equipment and resources. Having all officers trained and equipped to this standard in any department is unlikely, including in the CPD. Therefore, preparing a smaller number of key personnel for these tasks is often the best course of action.

**Staffing and case management**

The CPD has a shortage of criminal investigations staff as currently only two detectives are assigned to the Investigations Services Division, both of whom are temporary. This is partially due to recent staffing changes at the CPD, including terminating the employment of the Investigations Services Division sergeant and several detectives as well as reassigning some detectives to new positions. In addition, the chief has been challenged in hiring more staff including detectives because the budget his predecessor submitted in June 2015 and again in September 2015 has not been approved, as previously noted in key observations 1 and 2 on page 8 and in “Staffing and organization” on page 20.

As former Chief Michael Bostic explained during his interviews, he planned to engage local agencies to determine the feasibility and availability of off-duty supervisors to work overtime at the CPD to increase investigations supervision. The authorized number of investigative personnel at the CPD is five supervisors and, as stated earlier, there are currently only two supervisors assigned. Bostic had six supervisors requested in the budget that had not been approved at the time he was replaced.

The result of these staffing changes and the lack of budget approval has meant patrol officers without training and experience were assigned to handle criminal investigations as there is no systematic method for assigning cases. In addition, there is a lack of case tracking, management, and oversight as a result of the assignment of the Administrative Services lieutenant to manage the daily operations of the Investigations Services Division.

To understand the extent of the problem, we examined the process by which criminal cases travel through the system. The CPD uses an electronic case management system to provide computer-aided dispatch (CAD), report writing, records management, and evidence tracking. In this case management system, when a patrol officer completes an initial crime report, it is electronically routed to a supervisor for approval and further dissemination and investigation. Listed here are some of the most common CPD methods of case distribution:

- The case is forwarded to the Records unit to be filed without any further action.
- The case is forwarded to the Records unit with a recommendation for further action such as a criminal filing with the district attorney.
- The report is referred to the Investigations Services Division for investigation through a queue system currently managed by the Administrative Services lieutenant.
- A supervisor directly assigns the case to a detective, bypassing the lieutenant.
- A detective overrides the Administrative Services lieutenant and directly assigns the case to himself when he becomes aware of it and it has not yet been assigned to him.
Because of the current use of this case management system by the CPD, there are many opportunities for error, various ways to bypass supervisory oversight, and a lack of accountability for all involved CPD personnel. In addition, the Administrative Services lieutenant responsible for case assignment had a backlog of 125 criminal investigation cases in his queue waiting for action, including approval or assignment, dating back to December 2014.

To further illustrate the concerns with such a backlog of case approval and assignment, one of the criminal cases we reviewed involved a sexual assault of a minor reported on April 9, 2015:

- This report had been completed by a patrol officer and approved by the patrol supervisor. The case was then placed in the Administrative Services lieutenant’s queue for assignment to detectives.
- On May 8, 2015, detectives became aware of the unassigned case due to a follow-up call from the victim’s parents regarding the status of the investigation. Detectives were caught off guard because they were not aware they had been assigned a case of this significance.
- A review of the records management system (RMS) revealed this case was sitting in the lieutenant’s queue and in fact had had never been assigned to the detectives.

The CPD needs to address case management and tracking including ensuring a systematic process for dissemination, approval, tracking and accountability by an Investigations Services supervisor. Over the course of this assessment, it was concluded that the CPD currently lacks an investigations policy and operations manual; has no formal communication or consistency with the case routing process; has not trained appropriate personnel in conducting investigations; and lacks staffing and overall case management procedures, oversight, and tracking regarding criminal investigations.

Findings and recommendations

Department policy and investigations manual

Finding 42

The CPD does not have an investigations operations manual, policy, or department directive that ensures a comprehensive, professional criminal investigations process.

The creation and use of a department manual of policies and procedures that includes a dedicated section for the investigations services branch of a police agency is a national best practice.

Recommendation 42.1

Develop an investigations operations manual and patrol procedures policy that directs the criminal investigations process.

This manual should be comprehensive and establish clear roles, expectations, and boundaries for patrol personnel, field supervisors, and detectives. The manual should reflect and incorporate accepted national and state best practices.

Finding 43

**Patrol officers and field supervisors have substantial discretion in conducting investigations—including the decision to pursue, follow up, file criminal charges, or close the investigation—despite a lack of knowledge and training on how to do so.**

Most law enforcement agencies structure case investigation policies to limit the ability of patrol officers to recommend criminal filings for minor status offenses and some misdemeanors. Currently, there are no investigation boundaries for patrol officers as they are permitted to involve themselves in every aspect of any case. The CPD needs to develop training to ensure that patrol officers are sufficiently equipped to conduct investigations as assigned.

**Recommendation 43.1**

*Change the current practice of having patrol officers routinely conduct extensive criminal investigations until officers are trained and competent, and leverage the policies and written procedures already in place at the department that clearly establish parameters and boundaries for patrol-based investigations.*

Finding 44

**Formal communication and case routing processes are lacking for criminal investigations, which can result in missed opportunities for follow-up and investigation.**

As a result, cases can go without being investigated or pursued by the appropriate person or unit.

**Recommendation 44.1**

*Develop clear and consistent policies for criminal case processing and tracking.*

This policy should require supervisor approval before authorizing patrol officers to conduct extensive follow-up investigations. This clarification will prevent detectives from missing critical case or suspect intelligence when cases are filed directly with the district attorney without their review. Requiring supervisory approval ensures that cases involving repeat offenders and series crime cases will be investigated in a coordinated manner with the proper controls, eliminating the hit-or-miss approach to investigation efforts.

Finding 45

**CPD policy 358 outlines when the appropriate division lieutenant should be notified for detective support on a major incident, but the process is not used or understood.**

Although the policy is in place, employees have not been provided with direction and do not share a common understanding of when the appropriate division lieutenant should be notified for detective support.

**Recommendation 45.1**

*Provide clear expectations in CPD policy for detective notifications of significant investigations through roll-call training and ongoing monitoring of compliance.*

This policy will allow patrol officers to understand the boundaries of their duties and the appropriate time to call in a more experienced detective, such as in a serious criminal investigation.
Finding 46

The CPD does not have any policies or written directives regarding rollout procedures for detective support on patrol operations.

Patrol personnel need to understand the protocols regarding when they can request or require the assistance and experience of detectives in their patrol operations.

Recommendation 46.1

Establish a formal case routing process and internal communication system that provides a systematic method for the dissemination and management of criminal case files.

In addition to the importance of rollout procedures for detective notifications on significant criminal investigations, provide direction on when to call out detective support for patrol operations.

Finding 47

Allowing patrol officer to file cases directly with the district attorney undermines the CPD’s criminal investigation process.

The officer investigating a serious crime should also be the reporting officer to the prosecutor, regardless of assignment, provided that the case was reviewed by an experienced supervisor. The supervisor should ensure the appropriate investigative steps were taken, the investigation was properly documented, and the appropriate charges are being recommended.

Recommendation 47.1

Require a supervisor experienced in investigations to review all felony arrests and criminal cases.

This procedure should occur prior to filing charges with the district attorney.

Criminal investigations knowledge, skills, and training

Finding 48

The investigative skills required of patrol officers are generally not commensurate with their level of training.

CPD patrol officers are required to exert considerable effort on investigations, which calls for a well-developed investigative skillset and is generally the responsibility of experienced detectives.86

Recommendation 48.1

Provide patrol officers with basic investigation, crime-scene processing, and evidence collection training.

It would be extremely difficult to have every patrol officer trained to the level of a detective assigned to Investigations Services, but if patrol officers are required to conduct more than preliminary investigations, they should receive more than the basic investigation training received in the academy and during in-service training.

86. Patrol officers investigation practices were identified through interviews of CPD personnel and training files and review of investigation and court files.
Recommendation 48.2
Train select CPD patrol personnel using California Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST)-certified “train-the-trainer” internal affairs courses. Then have them train other CPD personnel.

Finding 49
Officers do not routinely use audio or video recording to document statements of victims, witnesses, or suspects during the investigation process, as determined through personnel interviews and a review of criminal investigations.

Recommendation 49.1
Require all patrol officers and investigators to audio record statements made by victims, witnesses, and suspects, at a minimum, to ensure transparency and the authenticity of documented statements used in the course of a criminal investigation.

CPD policy 368.4.5 currently requires recording for non-English speaking interviews (limited English proficiency or LEP). However, policy should require the recording of statements made by all persons interviewed.

Finding 50
Officers do not routinely take photographs to document evidence at crime scenes or injuries to victims or suspects.

CPD officers are issued digital cameras but do not routinely use them in their investigation procedures. In the cases we reviewed, photographic evidence was often missing. The inconsistency in the use of digital photographs stems from a lack of accountability by supervisors to ensure officers are documenting evidence with their cameras.

One best practice commonly implemented among law enforcement agencies is to select a few patrol personnel and train them to be field crime scene investigators. This practice enhances crime scene investigations and reduces the need for detective rollouts.

Recommendation 50.1
Develop a team of patrol-based crime scene investigators.

The CPD should provide these patrol-based crime scene investigators with the necessary equipment and training to conduct basic crime scene investigation work. These personnel should be spread throughout the patrol teams to provide maximum coverage.

---

87. The California POST Commission offers multiple IA training courses at many locations, for both officers and supervisors or managers, including “Internal Affairs Investigation.” These courses can be found at the California POST Commission’s website in their course catalog with the keywords “internal affairs” and the date range April 12–July 12, 2016. “California POST Course Catalog,” California POST Commission, accessed April 14, 2016, http://catalog.post.ca.gov/SearchMap.aspx?mapLocation=&latLong=&radius=10&mapTitle=internal+affairs&mapFromDate=04%2f12%2f2016&mapToDate=07%2f12%2f2016&mapPresenter=&notWords=&startLenHours=0&endLenHours=0&planI=&planII=&planIII=&planIV=&planV=&planIA=&skillIdOne=0&skillIdTwo=0&skillIdThree=0&skillIdFour=0&skillIdFive=0&pageId=3.

Recommendation 50.2
Train CPD patrol personnel who have been selected to serve as crime scene investigators using California POST-certified “train-the-trainer” internal affairs courses. Then have them train other CPD personnel.

Recommendation 50.3
Establish an audit process that requires supervisors to review reports for the essential investigation and forensic standards to ensure preliminary patrol-based investigations are being conducted effectively.

CPD supervisors should also be held accountable for ensuring that officers document all evidence, including recording statements and photographing evidence. This will result in increased consistency and an increased level of investigation evidence within these criminal investigations.

Staffing and case management

Finding 51
The Investigations Services Division is understaffed given its responsibility and caseload. The CPD would benefit from a workload analysis to evaluate the proper staffing levels needed for the division.

Currently, the CPD has only two detectives assigned to Investigations Services. Because the unit does not have a supervisor, the detectives report directly to the Administrative Services lieutenant. Previously, Investigations Services consisted of two to four detectives and an Investigations Services supervisor, a sergeant, who reported directly to the Operations Services Division lieutenant. Recent staffing changes at the CPD included the termination of employment for the Investigations Services sergeant and some detectives as well as reassignment of others. To provide basic investigation support to the department, two patrol officers were removed from patrol and reassigned to Investigations Services. Only one of these two officers had prior experience with investigations.

Although patrol officers perform the majority of investigation efforts, the detectives are still responsible for major criminal and traffic investigations. The range of investigation responsibility is relatively vast. The CPD recorded 1,800 Part 1 crimes\(^9\) in 2014; 1,651 Part 1 crimes in 2013; and 1,786 Part 1 crimes in 2012.\(^9\) Crime levels such as these are substantial for a city with a population of approximately 39,000 residents.

Recommendation 51.1
Conduct a caseload study to determine proper staffing levels for Investigations Services.

Given the high volume of crime reported in Calexico relative to its population, this caseload study should be a priority.


\(^{90}\) “Return A—Monthly Count of Offenses Known to Police For Dates Between [01/01/12–12/31/14],” internal document (Calexico Police Department, 2015).
Recommendation 51.2

Develop a plan to assign detectives to Investigations Services until this unit reaches its full staffing level.

This will allow so these detectives can begin gaining knowledge and receiving training and experience to fulfill this level of investigative responsibility. Permanently assigning detectives to the Investigations Services Division rather than reassigning patrol officers during times of crisis will eliminate reliance on untrained, inexperienced personnel in these roles and will maintain a consistently high level of experienced investigative personnel.

Figure 2 contains the Part I crime data provided by the CPD based on its internal data collection.

Figure 2. A comparison of Part I crimes, January 2012–June 2015

Table 1 compares the Part I crime data collected by the CPD with data reported by the CPD to the Criminal Justice Statistics Center (CJSC) and similarly to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)—that is, to Uniform Crime Data. There are data discrepancies between the CPD and the CJSC data, particularly as the data apply to assaults.
### Table 1. A comparison of reported offenses, 2012–2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Homicide</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rape</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbery</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggravated assault</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burglary</td>
<td>511</td>
<td>499</td>
<td>369</td>
<td>362</td>
<td>402</td>
<td>393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Larceny</td>
<td>717</td>
<td>680</td>
<td>858</td>
<td>837</td>
<td>922</td>
<td>918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor vehicle theft</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>319</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 shows the Part I crime data broken down in detail by crime category and year provided to the assessment team by the CPD based on its internal data collection.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification of offenses</th>
<th>Offenses reported</th>
<th>Unfounded complaint</th>
<th>Actual offense C2-C3</th>
<th>Offenses cleared</th>
<th>Juvenile cleared</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Criminal homicide</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| a. Murder/non-negligent manslaughter | 2    | 2           | 0                    | 2           | 2               | 1           | 0           | 0   | 0           | 0   | 0
| b. Manslaughter by negligence | 0    | 0           | 0                    | 0           | 0               | 0           | 0           | 0   | 0           | 0   | 0
| 2. Forcible rape            |                   |                     |                      |                 |                 |
| a. Rape by force            | 2    | 1           | 7                    | 2           | 1               | 7           | 1           | 1   | 2           | 0   | 0
| b. Attempt forcible rape    | 0    | 0           | 0                    | 0           | 0               | 0           | 0           | 0   | 0           | 0   | 0
| 3. Robbery                  |                   |                     |                      |                 |                 |
| a. Firearm                  | 37   | 27          | 30                   | 37          | 27              | 30          | 14          | 15  | 8           | 3   | 2
| b. Knife or cutting instrument | 4    | 1           | 1                    | 4           | 1               | 1           | 1           | 1   | 0           | 0   | 0
| c. Other dangerous weapon   | 3    | 3           | 9                    | 3           | 3               | 9           | 2           | 4   | 3           | 0   | 1
| d. Hands, fist, feet, etc.  | 25   | 20          | 15                   | 25          | 20              | 16          | 9           | 9   | 4           | 2   | 1
| 4. Assault                  |                   |                     |                      |                 |                 |
| a. Firearm                  | 187  | 144         | 126                  | 187         | 144             | 126         | 106         | 87  | 77          | 15  | 4
| b. Knife or cutting instrument | 2    | 6           | 4                    | 2           | 6               | 4           | 1           | 6   | 4           | 0   | 0
| c. Other dangerous weapon   | 10   | 10          | 8                    | 10          | 10              | 8           | 2           | 7   | 4           | 0   | 1
| d. Hands, fist, feet, etc.  | 25   | 30          | 22                   | 25          | 30              | 22          | 10          | 18  | 16          | 4   | 2
| e. Other assaults—simple    | 58   | 48          | 40                   | 58          | 43              | 40          | 53          | 44  | 32          | 2   | 0
| 5. Burglary                 |                   |                     |                      |                 |                 |
| a. Forcible entry           | 511  | 369         | 402                  | 510         | 368             | 402         | 85          | 59  | 65          | 11  | 3
| b. Unlawful entry, no force | 49   | 58          | 100                  | 49          | 58              | 100         | 11          | 3   | 9           | 0   | 1
| c. Attempt forcible entry   | 487  | 298         | 284                  | 436         | 297             | 284         | 68          | 50  | 53          | 11  | 2
| 6. Larceny—theft            |                   |                     |                      |                 |                 |
| a. Autos                    | 330  | 250         | 313                  | 328         | 250             | 311         | 8           | 4   | 13          | 2   | 0
| b. Trucks and buses         | 276  | 218         | 246                  | 274         | 218             | 244         | 7           | 3   | 13          | 2   | 0
| c. Other vehicles           | 21   | 12          | 37                   | 21          | 12              | 37          | 1           | 1   | 0           | 0   | 0
| 7. Motor vehicle theft      |                   |                     |                      |                 |                 |
| a. Autos                    | 33   | 20          | 30                   | 33          | 20              | 30          | 0           | 0   | 0           | 0   | 0
| Total                       | 1786 | 1651        | 1800                 | 1782        | 1650            | 1797        | 299         | 268 | 303         | 37  | 16

6. Criminal Investigations
Finding 52

**The CPD needs an organizational and systematic approach to criminal case management.**

The absence of organizational policies, procedures, and internal controls to ensure cases are assigned to the appropriate personnel or divisions leads to dysfunction. The two detectives assigned to Investigations Services are generalists, not specialists. They are responsible for all investigative matters regardless of the type of investigation. CPD detectives are, at a minimum, accountable for

- follow-up on investigations not covered by patrol;
- major case investigations;
- major crime scene investigations and forensics;
- processing of all criminal cases for warrants for named suspects;
- filing of cases with the district attorney;
- serious and fatal collision investigations.

When an officer completes an initial crime report in the department’s records management and evidence tracking system, it is electronically routed to a supervisor for approval, and there are a variety of options for further dissemination of the crime report for further investigation. This can include forwarding the report directly to the Records unit to file without further action, the supervisor directly assigning the case to a detective, the case being referred through the system to a queue managed by the Administrative Services lieutenant, or the detective self-assigning the case without supervisory approval. There are many paths through the CPD records management system and therefore many opportunities for error and a displacement of accountability.

**Recommendation 52.1**

*Conduct an evaluation of the current case classification and assignment procedures.*

Given the varied range of investigative responsibility among the detectives, the amount of reported crime, the numerous criminal cases needing investigation, and the lack of accountability in assigning cases in the records management system, it is important to evaluate the classification and assignment practices of criminal cases to determine how to more efficiently classify and assign cases and to ensure the procedures are being addressed properly.

Finding 53

**The CPD does not have a systematic method for the distribution of cases to the detectives. Because of the lack of procedures and direction, employees do not understand or apply the appropriate methods of case assignment and distribution to ensure the necessary controls for case management accountability.**

CPD employees do not recognize the importance of systems that maintain the integrity of criminal case files. In the absence of an Investigations Services sergeant, the Administrative Services lieutenant has been given the role of managing the day-to-day operations of Investigations Services. This additional responsibility for the lieutenant has caused the rudimentary case assignment and tracking process to go from poor to virtually nonexistent.
Recommendation 53.1
*Train and assign a supervisor to Investigations Services for direct supervision of the detectives and investigation case management.*

Develop a systematic method for distributing cases and ensure the proper methods of case management and tracking are in place, including supervisory oversight.

Finding 54
*In the absence of established procedures, employees have adapted and created their own shortcuts to facilitate case management.*

Because of the lack of tracking, established procedures, and oversight of the case management process, any supervisor who receives a criminal case investigation from the patrol officer who initiated the crime report can decide to either file criminal charges on a case without further review, directly assign the case to a detective and bypass the lieutenant’s making that assignment or reviewing the case, or forward the case to a lieutenant who will then assign it to one of his detectives in the Investigative Services Division. These opportunities for a supervisor to create their own shortcuts potentially allow for inconsistency in the quality of the investigations, lack of supervisory oversight of such investigations or the criminal charges filed, or inexperienced or improperly trained personnel investigating and making decisions in serious criminal cases.

Recommendation 54.1
*Once the new case assignment system has been established, use it to assign specific criminal case responsibilities based on factors such as the detectives’ caseloads and the degree of training and experience required for the given assignment.*

Finding 55
*CPD employees cannot identify an individual who is responsible and accountable for the maintenance of the CAD/RMS system.*

Given all the shortcuts currently allowed including in terms of case assignment, oversight, or lack thereof, the CPD would benefit from having one individual maintain oversight, tracking, and case management and investigation procedures to ensure consistency, quality, and timeliness of the processes.

Recommendation 55.1
*Assign responsibility for maintenance of the CAD/RMS system to one person within the CPD to ensure a lower chance of error and to hold officers and supervisors accountable for their part in the criminal case investigation process, including follow-up and oversight.*
Finding 56

The CPD is not fully using the auditing features and internal control processes available in the CAD/RMS System to improve employee accountability.

A contemporary case management system includes a series of internal controls that ensure cases are assigned to the appropriate personnel or divisions through a series of approval processes that contain an adequate audit trail. The CPD’s failure to use these processes has resulted in an arbitrary method for case assignment and disposition and disorganization in the case management process.

Recommendation 56.1

Develop an audit and inspection schedule of the CAD/RMS System regarding case management and accountability.

A best practice in case management includes accountability systems that incorporate audit and inspection schedules to guarantee that audits and inspections are completed routinely and the information gathered from these reviews is used to enhance the structures in place. The CPD should consider a monthly audit and inspection schedule for 90 days to get the case management process on track and a quarterly audit and inspection schedule thereafter.

Finding 57

Placing responsibility for investigative case assignment and management with the Administrative Services lieutenant has caused a significant backlog of unassigned cases, is inefficient, and lacks proper controls.

Recommendation 57.1

Ensure that the Investigations Services supervisor is responsible for screening, classifying, and assigning cases to the detectives.

This should be established as soon as the department assigns a supervisor to the Investigations Services unit. The supervisor will then be held accountable for the assignment and case management of criminal investigations. This will not only eliminate the backlog of unassigned cases but also ensure that proper controls are in place for case assignment and management of investigations.

Finding 58

There is no supervisory or management oversight of case clearance procedures. There is also no method to monitor investigative performance.

Detectives are not held accountable for their performance. Also, there are no benchmarks for case clearance standards or the number of cases the CPD solves. Once a detective is assigned a case, there are no internal controls to provide accountability regarding the investigative process.
Recommendation 58.1
Ensure case clearance decisions are made by the detectives and reviewed by the detective sergeant. Case clearance decisions should be made by experienced detectives rather than patrol officers.

The required approval of a detective supervisor will provide appropriate oversight for these case clearance decisions. Ensure case clearance decisions comply with the FBI’s Uniformed Crime Clearance guidelines.91

Recommendation 58.2
Establish an inspection and audit plan for follow-up investigations that includes arrests, booking and charge dispositions, investigative case completeness, case categorization, metrics on case management, and overall solvability success.

This plan will provide insight into how case investigations are pursued. It will also assist in providing measurements of the detectives’ case investigation procedures and key performance indicators that provide guidance and a baseline for personnel to allow for improvement of the CPD’s criminal investigations.

Finding 59
There are no policies or procedures establishing how long cases can remain open without follow-up.

The lack of supervision permits detectives to close cases without a review or audit of the investigative actions taken, which makes it practically impossible to measure investigator performance.

Recommendation 59.1
Use the case tracking system capabilities to monitor cases beginning with initiation at the patrol level to case assignment with a detective to ensure proper oversight is in place.

This allows cases to be monitored for appropriate follow-up and investigation and will prevent cases from being closed without proper supervisory review. Institute mandatory case assessment deadlines.

Recommendation 59.2
Ensure that, at a minimum, all felony cases with workable information or suspect identification are reviewed every 30 days for status or disposition.

Require that investigators update the case management system every 30 days with a status update to be reviewed by the supervisor. Given the seriousness of felony cases, have supervisors monitor these cases more regularly regarding the status of the investigation, and identify follow-up procedures to ensure the appropriate investigative procedures are taking place.

Finding 60

The authority to open, close, and reassign cases without supervisor approval, as is the current practice, does not provide sufficient safeguards resulting in arbitrary and discretionary decision making by personnel without appropriate audit controls.

Recommendation 60.1

Establish an internal control process that prevents patrol officers from opening, closing or reassigning a felony case without approval from a supervisor in Investigations Services.

Although this process will provide sufficient safeguards for case investigation procedures and management, it is especially important that if patrol officers are responsible for case investigations they are not making their own decisions on when to close a felony case without supervisory approval. This supervisory oversight is necessary given the lack of experience and training patrol officers have in criminal investigations. In addition, institute a procedure that requires a supervisor to review felony cases before final closure by detectives or the Records division.

Finding 61

Detectives’ scope of responsibility is too broad.

The detectives have been provided too much discretion in their investigative responsibilities. This requires a broad range of investigative training and experience in many areas.

Recommendation 61.1

Define the types of cases that fall within the scope and capabilities of the current detective personnel and outsource those that fall outside those core competencies.

Finding 62

It is unrealistic to require detectives to be competent in all of the required investigative areas.

In addition, the California POST Commission requires that all criminal investigators complete a basic investigation course within twelve months of being assigned as a detective. Only one of the CPD detectives has attended this introductory course. A review of training records revealed that other officers previously assigned to Investigations Services also had not attended the training.

Recommendation 62.1

Require all detective personnel, including supervisors and managers, to complete the POST Commission basic investigative course within their first year of assignment.

Recommendation 62.2

Train appropriate CPD detectives using California POST-certified “train-the-trainer” internal affairs courses. Then have them train other CPD personnel.

Finding 63

Although charged with the added responsibility for crime scene investigation, the detectives have not received any advanced training in investigative procedures, crime scene processing, or forensics.

In addition to the many investigative roles the detectives have, they are also encumbered with the responsibility for advanced crime scene investigation including the identification, collection, and preservation of forensic evidence. As referenced earlier, two detectives have never received any advanced training in crime scene investigation or forensic analysis.

Recommendation 63.1

Require detectives to attend advanced investigative courses in their assigned areas of responsibility.

Recommendation 63.2

Consider hiring a civilian crime scene investigator or forensic specialist or a retired crime scene investigator until staffing levels improve.

Competency in crime scene investigation requires specific formal training and education and places additional burden on the resource-stretched Investigations Services Division. Hiring a crime scene investigator would elevate some of this strain until staffing levels improve.

Recommendation 63.3

Establish a team of patrol officers with more advanced crime scene investigation (CSI) training until personnel within Investigations Services have been trained to the appropriate level of CSI needs.

This will help alleviate the personnel shortage in the Division. Another option would be to hire civilian personnel to fulfill these CSI responsibilities. The team could institute roll-out procedures for CSI personnel to work in partnership with detectives during major case investigations.

Recommendation 63.4

Use release time for appropriate CPD personnel to observe and ride along with other agencies such as the El Centro or San Diego Police Departments temporarily to develop their investigative and CSI skills.

Recommendation 63.5

Outsource investigative and CSI needs to another agency that can provide these services until the proper investigative and CSI skills are developed internally within the CPD.

Another option for the CPD is to contract help from another agency to provide personnel who could work with CPD detectives at the department to assist them with the caseload while simultaneously helping to train them.
7. Patrol

The vast majority of exchanges between a police officer and a citizen occur during patrol operations. By extension, the broader relationship between the agency and the community it serves depends in great measure on the purpose, organization, and processes that govern patrols.

To conduct an assessment of the CPD’s patrol function, the assessment team began by reviewing all of the department’s policies and manuals as well as training records and training materials related to patrol. In addition, we interviewed members of the community regarding calls for service and other interactions with patrol officers, as well as interviewed department personnel including patrol officers and patrol supervisors and CPD command staff to ask questions related to patrol deployment, strategies, and overall patrol functions. We also conducted a review and assessment of the entire patrol unit, including patrol officers and supervisors' activity logs, reports, and observations during roll-call briefings and ride-alongs with patrol officers and supervisors.

This analysis surfaced key issues and opportunities in the following areas:

- Deployment and staffing
- Supervision
- Equipment and support functions
- Communications and dispatch

**Voices from the Community:**

**Quality of Policing Services**
- “CPD officer was drunk when he showed up.”
- “Two of the councilmembers cause trouble, and they ran around with the previous police chief and the terminated officers.”
- “Do not mix politics and the police.”
- “Terminated officers are saying they will come back.”
- “Need open communication with the media.”
- “Need CPD to interact more with the community.”
- “Power and greed are in the City.”
- “All hell broke loose when one of the council members came aboard.”
- “Calexico is a dumping ground.”
- “City council is micromanaging the City and Chief Bostic.”

**Deployment and staffing**

Modern policing requires careful evaluation of deployment and staffing. To determine the most effective and efficient allocation of patrol resources and staffing levels, agencies generally evaluate the number of calls for service, peak service delivery times, crime data and geographic distribution of crimes, officer productivity, quality of life issues, specific community requirements, and other important information.

The staffing model currently used by the CPD is a 3/12 configuration—a three-day work schedule for 12-hour shift patrol deployment. However, because of the limited number of patrol staff, this model does not allow for overlap between shifts, resulting in gaps in police presence during the shift change.
Although current CPD policy requires a fixed staffing level, a department directive was issued on January 16, 2015, as a result of a grievance filed by the Calexico Police Officers Association (CPOA) against the department for changing the fixed staffing level per shift minimum. This new staffing directive allows the appropriate supervisors and commander to determine staffing levels and provides no explanation for the change or guidance for determining those staffing levels. This directive justifies the change in staffing by stating that “an artificial level of staffing, not based on a definable need for service, does not justify the use of City resources beyond the discretion of the chief of police.” The directive goes on to state “over the next few months, as officers begin to properly document their activities on a daily basis and statistics can be gathered to properly develop a professional deployment formula based on the needs of the community, that minimum staffing level will be met whenever possible.”

From an efficiency standpoint—that is, from the perspective of optimizing resources to best complete a given agency’s work and accomplish its objectives—the preferred staffing methodology is one that specifically considers workload, performance objectives, and work schedules.

Following his arrival, former Chief Michael Bostic commissioned a management and deployment study by a private group; this report was finalized on June 23, 2015. The study recommended that a minimum of three patrol officers be deployed per shift, and the department is currently adhering to this recommendation.

**Supervision**

The front-line patrol supervisor is one of the most important leadership positions in any law enforcement agency. Most municipal police departments deploy the greatest number of resources to the patrol function. Currently, the CPD only has two sergeants assigned to the Patrol Division, which does not cover every shift throughout a given week. In addition, these sergeants are not present for the day watch briefing, and therefore half of the patrol officers do not have regular interaction with their supervisors.

The shortage of sergeants requires the patrol unit to employ the use of officers in charge (OIC) on a routine basis when a permanent sergeant is not on duty. The OIC is not a permanent sergeant but an officer selected on the basis of seniority to act in the place of an actual sergeant. In patrol, OICs are used daily in place of a sergeant and are used even more frequently when either of the permanent sergeants takes time off. The OICs within the CPD receive no additional training or guidance for this position, which has resulted in (among other things) a lack of appropriate guidance and supervision that a more experienced and trained permanent sergeant could provide.

Our observations of the manner in which shift briefings were conducted indicated they are underused and ineffective, whether led by a sergeant or an OIC. Currently such briefings consist of reviewing the previous shift log, assigning beats, and reading policy or directives when appropriate. These briefings can make better use of this time by providing direction to patrol, training, and crime analysis information and by communicating other essential agency information.

Directionless and random patrol based on intuition and anecdotal information is a relic of the past and not a modern policing practice. While modern policing provides a great deal of autonomy and discretion, it also includes the integration of a very specific strategy that not only considers crime reduction but also community priorities and quality of life issues.

---

93. Memorandum from former Chief Michael Bostic to the CPOA member officer who filed the grievance, January 15, 2015: Response for Grievance Filed 12/29/2014 Minimum Staffing Patrol Deployment.
Another concern with the two current patrol sergeants’ positions is that they are routinely overwhelmed with administrative tasks, which limits their time in the field to provide supervision for their patrol officers. In order to properly supervise, direct, and mentor employees, supervisors need to have direct contact with them during the performance of their duties. When one of the supervisors was questioned about how often he is in the field, his response was, “when officers call me or when something big happens, otherwise I am in the station doing paperwork.” Patrol supervisors are responsible for many administrative tasks, including the following:

- Sergeants’ daily log (similar to the logs officers are required to keep)
- Overtime usage reports
- Shift logs
- Officer performance statistics and reports
- Training reports
- Basic internal affairs investigations
- Completion of performance evaluations

These administrative tasks need to be evaluated by CPD command staff to determine how best to manage such tasks to allow these supervisors to return to the field to ensure proactive supervision of their patrol officers.

The assessment team learned from former Chief Bostic that he had planned to engage local agencies regarding the availability of off-duty supervisors to work overtime at the CPD in order to increase patrol supervision. It should be noted that absence of an approved Fiscal Year 2015–2016 budget, as noted in key observation 1 on page 8 and “Staffing and organization” on page 20, has also been a factor in the areas of staffing, training, and patrol supervision. Last, Bostic had been attempting to institute a sergeant’s exam, but it was delayed by the city manager’s office for months.

**Equipment and support functions**

Our review included an examination of the CPD’s systems for computer-aided dispatch (CAD) and records management systems (RMS). The department is a member of a multi-agency consortium that uses a comprehensive law enforcement and public safety software that integrates CAD, RMS, mobile data computing, field reporting, mapping, and crime analysis. However, the assessment team was concerned with connectivity issues, the ability to complete daily logs manually, and conflicting use of force policies.

**Communications and dispatch**

Written policies and procedures to which the communications personnel can refer for guidance on prioritizing and assigning calls for service do not exist. Our assessment team observed situations in which officers were dispatched to calls for service without backup because additional officers were not available. This is an officer safety issue. Because of the absence of formal policies and procedures for dispatching operations, communications dispatchers currently use their own discretion to prioritize and assign calls for service.
The assessment team also discovered a department-wide concern regarding the reliability of the primary police radio system. Officers encounter radio dead zones throughout the city and are often challenged in transmitting and receiving information from dispatch.

While the assessment team was interviewing a group of communication dispatchers, they shared a recent story about an officer involved in a physical fight with a suspect that occurred in the downtown area of Calexico. The dispatchers could see on their screens the officer was repeatedly transmitting but heard no voice transmission. The officer’s situation was only discovered because a citizen called the police to report the officer was involved in a physical fight. The dispatchers displayed great concern for the officer’s safety when conveying this story, and their distrust of the radio system was clear.

Over the course of this assessment, it was concluded that the CPD currently lacks appropriate staffing, deployment, and field supervision in patrol; lacks or has conflicting policies and training related to use of force, communications, and dispatch of calls for service; and lacks appropriate use of real-time crime data, information sharing, community policing, and problem-solving communication in the roll-call briefings. As a result, officers are hindered in their ability to direct patrol strategies. The assessment team has provided 20 findings and 36 recommendations in this section related to patrol.

**Findings and recommendations**

**Deployment and staffing**

**Finding 64**

*CPD leaders have not communicated their justification for the current patrol deployment to the department. The CPD’s current deployment levels are based on the third-party study, but there is little knowledge or understanding of this study among patrol unit and other personnel.*

The most important deployment of resources for any police organization focuses on those invested in the agency’s patrol function. To determine the approach used for the deployment of resources and staffing, we reviewed patrol shift schedules, the Manual of Policy and Procedure, department directives, historical patrol deployments, and calls for service. We also conducted interviews with all command staff personnel and supervisors and most patrol personnel.

What was most remarkable about this inquiry was the lack of a common understanding of why and how patrol resources are deployed and what staffing level is appropriate. The CPD Manual of Policy and Procedure Section 216.1 requires a “fixed staffing level” of one sergeant and four patrol units at all times: 24 hours a day, seven days a week. But there is little information available as to why this original staffing level was selected nor is there any clear data to support the use of the 3/12 deployment model. Based on our analysis, the assessment team determined that the CPD used the deployment study’s recommendation of three officers per shift within their existing beat staffing model.

**Recommendation 64.1**

*Re-evaluate deployment and workload internally to determine the appropriate use of resources and staffing to meet organizational and community objectives before making any significant changes to patrol staffing and resources.*

---

Police response is driven by the resources available. Determining the appropriate deployment and staffing level is not an easy endeavor but is a necessary investment to obtain the proper use of resources and to enhance operational effectiveness. There are several approaches to estimating an agency’s most efficient staffing allocation—each with its own advantages and disadvantages. If any significant changes are to be made in the future because of staffing increase or other reasons, the department should re-evaluate its resources and staffing data in their entirety to determine the appropriate deployment needs consistent with available staffing.

**Recommendation 64.2**

Communicate the results of the current patrol deployment and workload structure based on the management and deployment study as well as any significant future changes with the staff and any labor representatives.

Educate personnel to begin building organizational knowledge and commitment regarding the process used to determine resource allocation and staffing. This will show the staff that the resource allocation and staffing levels are based on need and alignment with the department’s goals and objectives.

If the CPD has any significant changes to staffing and resources and decides to change to a deployment and beat structure in the future, base any changes on an appropriate review of data, workload, staffing, and resource allocations and community policing objectives in order to appropriately deploy patrol units.

**Finding 65**

**Because of the current deployment structure and the limited number of supervisors, there is no overlap period to allow supervisors to change shifts and also maintain field presence.**

Patrol officers are divided into four teams with two of the teams assigned to the day shift and two assigned to the night shift. The two teams on each shift have the same start and end times.

**Recommendation 65.1**

Establish an overlap in officer coverage both now and in the new definitive staffing model.

Require the new patrol deployment staffing model to provide patrol coverage during the overlap period either by staggering the start and stop times or in another appropriate way.

**Supervision**

**Finding 66**

**The absence of permanent sergeants in the Patrol Division results in inadequate supervision over patrol personnel.**

Patrol officers are responsible for the most visible elements of law enforcement and assume a variety of important functions such as emergency response, crime prevention and deterrence, reporting crime, traffic services, community caretaking, and community policing. Patrol personnel are engaged in many high-risk behaviors that affect the constitutional rights of community members, such as the detention and arrest of individuals, vehicular pursuits, and the use of physical force up to and including deadly force.

Proper supervision of an area that has a great amount of invested resources and provides extremely visible, high-risk services to an organization requires competent and active supervisors. These responsibilities cannot be met by the two permanent sergeants currently assigned to the patrol division. As noted in finding 68, no permanent supervisor for patrol is present between 3:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m.

**Recommendation 66.1**

*Require at least one regular sergeant to be on duty at all times.*

**Finding 67**

**Patrol sergeants do not attend a day watch patrol briefing. This lack of daily briefing contributes to poor information sharing between sergeants and day watch officers and undermines organizational accountability.**

Because of their assigned work hours, the sergeants are not present for day watch briefing, which results in half of the patrol officers not having regular briefing interaction with their supervisors. This is of note because briefings are a time for supervisors to engage their personnel, deliver department directives, conduct training, set expectations, and build teamwork. The lack of this interaction is detrimental to enhancing performance and accountability within the patrol division.

**Recommendation 67.1**

*Ensure minimum supervisory staffing levels with at least one regular sergeant on duty to engage their personnel at briefings regarding policy, training, and setting expectations and to be available as a resource for patrol officers in the field.*

**Finding 68**

**With only two sergeants assigned to patrol, there is a 12-hour period every day during which there is no supervision present in patrol.**

In order to provide maximum coverage between the four patrol shifts with only two sergeants, they have both been assigned to work a mid-watch, 3:00 p.m. to 3:00 a.m. Therefore, no permanent supervisor for patrol is present between 3:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m.

**Recommendation 68.1**

*Make recruitment a priority and consider promoting an internal candidate to sergeant.*

This priority should be addressed as soon as possible. If recruitment efforts do not result in adding new entry-level police officers (thereby making current officers eligible for promotion to supervisory positions), consider external recruitment of competent supervisors.

**Recommendation 68.2**

*Assign a minimum of four permanent supervisors to the patrol division.*

This recommendation aligns with the management and deployment study recommendation of deploying three patrol officers per shift but simply adding a supervisor to each shift. Assign one sergeant to each patrol team and make an additional one available to cover any absences among the permanent team sergeants. Until permanent supervisors are available, consider contracting with another agency to provide patrol supervision.
Recommendation 68.3
Use release time for appropriate CPD personnel including patrol officers and supervisors to observe and ride along with personnel from other agencies such as the El Centro or San Diego Police Departments to develop their patrol and supervisory skills.

Finding 69
The routine use of untrained OICs places the organization at increased risk, decreases accountability, and results in a lack of necessary oversight of high-risk situations.

The OICs are not sergeants but rather officers selected solely based on seniority. They receive no additional training or guidance for this position. As mentioned in “Supervision” on page 78, the position of supervisor in the patrol division is one of the most important leadership roles in any municipal police agency. Leaving this responsibility to a rotating staff of untrained officers is a significant lapse in organizational accountability and places the agency at extreme risk. In addition, requiring officers who perform the role of OIC to fluctuate back and forth from peer to supervisor of patrol personnel is unreasonable and could potentially be damaging to morale.

Recommendation 69.1
Select an OIC on the basis of training and experience rather than strictly on the basis of seniority until permanent supervisors are available.

Establish a list of officers who are qualified to be an OIC when needed, and provide them with the basic training to fulfill their temporary supervisory role.

Recommendation 69.2
Prioritize either reassignment or hiring to provide more permanent supervisors on all shifts.

This will eliminate the need for OICs except on a limited basis.

Recommendation 69.3
Ensure that if the department is required to use an OIC that officer is properly trained and has adequate experience for the position.

Training should be consistent with any supervisory training given to a permanent supervisor, and experience should be comparable.

Finding 70
Shift briefings are underutilized. These briefings lack training, information sharing, discussion of organizational goals, and personnel mentoring components.

Direct observations and information obtained through employee interviews revealed that shift briefings are not being fully used to communicate important organizational information, training, team building, and direction to patrol personnel. CPD shift briefings primarily consist of a review of the log from the previous shift; assignment of beats based on available personnel; and review of department policies and directives if necessary. Briefing training is minimal with the exception of reading a One Minute Brief, if available.

96. The One Minute Brief is a briefing training produced by the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office to provide information regarding search and seizure best
Recommendation 70.1

Establish a policy requiring information to be provided to patrol officers before every shift.

Use shift briefings to advance organizational goals, provide training, share information, and mentor and develop personnel. Also, create a method for delivery and documentation of informal shift training.

Recommendation 70.2

Leverage opportunities at roll-call briefings for real-time information sharing rather than rote updates.

The briefings should include crime trends and quality-of-life and other community concerns and information sharing from various units.

Recommendation 70.3

Design an internal shift log to share information among patrol shifts.

The log should include department directives, crime information, unusual occurrences, noteworthy community information, and the status of equipment and vehicles.

Recommendation 70.4

Emphasize to supervisors the importance of roll-call briefings to help align officers’ shift activities with the department’s desired outcomes.

Recommendation 70.5

Provide OICs direction on how to handle day or night watch roll-call briefings when they are required to supervise a given shift in the absence of a permanent supervisor.

Finding 71

In the absence of crime data, patrol personnel currently conduct random patrols rather than using a targeted approach.

Some of the components of a well-rounded modern patrol strategy include information sharing regarding crime data and quality-of-life issues, directed patrols, targeted allocation of resources, long-term problem-solving missions, and focused community engagement. CPD leaders spend very little time providing guidance to patrol personnel or allocating resources to establish a coordinated crime reduction strategy for the organization. In addition to providing directed patrol missions for each shift, the Patrol Division commander or patrol supervisor should discuss patrol priorities.

practices and recent court case decisions. An example of a One Minute Brief that was read in shift briefings at the CPD is Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office, “Proposition 47 Changes,” One-Minute Brief (Los Angeles: May 11, 2014), https://www.post.ca.gov/Data/Sites/1/post_docs/resources/Prop47/OneMinuteBrief.pdf.
**Recommendation 71.1**

*Internally develop or outsource the creation of a basic crime analysis platform.*

When CPD leaders understand how to use crime analysis data and are willing to make deployment changes based on them, such a crime analysis platform will provide the CPD with more effective models to deploy resources. Until internal resources are allocated for the dissemination of crime data and directed patrol assignments, use commercially available products to produce and distribute crime analysis information.

**Finding 72**

*Patrol officers determine what their individual priorities are for their shifts rather than coordinating efforts to work as a team to address community concerns and crime problems.*

Without access to crime data and trends to help focus and guide patrol missions, it is not surprising that patrol personnel decide for themselves what is important and where to focus their efforts. The result is a patrol force that is well intentioned but inefficient and ineffective in reducing crime and dealing with quality of life issues in the community.

**Recommendation 72.1**

*Give patrol officers detailed direction supported by crime data on where they should patrol.*

This guidance should be related to organizational goals, community priorities, and the officers’ role in the CPD’s overall public safety strategy and could include providing specific assignments for geographic areas to be patrolled during certain days and hours as well as identifying specific groups or individuals with whom patrol officers should work to address specific neighborhood concerns. Training should be provided so both supervisors and officers understand in what setting such information should be shared (e.g., during roll-call briefings).

**Finding 73**

*Patrol supervisors are overwhelmed with administrative tasks that restrict their time in the field because of the limited number of supervisors currently employed.*

During our interviews with the sergeants and from our observations made on ride-alongs, we discovered that the two supervisors are overwhelmed with administrative tasks such as sergeants’ daily logs, overtime reports, shift logs, and several other reports that prevent them from spending any meaningful time in the field supervising patrol personnel. This results in a lack of direct observation of employee conduct and missed opportunities to provide mentorship and guidance to the workforce.

---

**The CPD’s Recent Actions: New Communications Systems in Police Cars**

The chief has had eight mobile data computer (MDC) systems fixed in older vehicles, and six new cars have been purchased with new systems, which should result in 14 vehicles with working MDCs. Four of those vehicles are out in the streets and three more are in the shop being fully outfitted with MDCs and equipment. In addition, a new MDC has been identified by the officers and is being deployed in all cars this year. This issue was on track to be resolved by the end of 2015.

The assessment team commends former Chief Bostic for listening and responding to the requests of officers and lieutenants. These CPD personnel asked the department if having Ford Explorers rather than Dodge Chargers for official police vehicles was possible. Although there may be only subjective differences between using Ford Explorers and Dodge Chargers as patrol vehicles, as there was no difference in cost the chief agreed to the requests. Switching to Explorers provided a much-needed morale boost for department personnel, who felt CPD administration was listening to their concerns.
Recommendation 73.1
Increase the number of supervisors to share administrative responsibilities across more patrol sergeants.

Approval by the City of the CPD’s yearly budget is a crucial first step in this process. Other ways to increase direct supervision include assigning administrative personnel to duties that currently limit time in the field for supervisors.

Equipment and support functions

Finding 74
The mobile data computer (MDC) system does not provide connectivity to the CAD/RMS system in approximately half of the front-line patrol vehicles.

Every patrol vehicle is equipped with an MDC that is technically connected to the system. Officers use the system to make inquiries in the field from local and state databases such as the Wanted Persons Systems, Department of Motor Vehicles, parole and probation information, restraining orders, and missing person databases. Because the in-car computer terminal is integrated into the CPD system, officers can also make local inquiries regarding crime reports, CAD information, and all other RMS data. The use of an in-car computer terminal for field activities is an industry standard for most police agencies and has become an important component in improving effectiveness and efficiency of patrol personnel.

After the MDC transition, however, the new MDCs encountered difficulty connecting to the CAD/RMS system. In approximately half the patrol vehicles, the MDC did not connect to the CAD/RMS system during our assessment—and CAD/RMS no longer worked in any of the Dodge Charger patrol vehicles.

As a result, dispatch personnel have to provide information verbally to officers in the field. Without connectivity to an in-car computer terminal, calls for service must be broadcast verbally to officers with minimal information, which often results in unclear messaging, delayed communication of time-sensitive information, and time management challenges for field operations. All database inquiries must be transmitted over the radio, which minimizes information sharing, takes up important radio time, and requires dispatch personnel to coordinate information sharing. In addition, officers cannot conduct any field reporting or inquiries in the CPD records management system.

Recommendation 74.1
Engage technical assistance to resolve the MDC connectivity issues with CAD/RMS in all patrol vehicles.

Resolving this problem should be a high priority for CPD.

Finding 75
Officers are required to maintain daily logs and monthly statistics sheets that are completed manually rather than being automated.

The CPD instituted a requirement for patrol officers and supervisors to complete detailed daily logs documenting all of their activities throughout the shift. These logs are mandatory for every shift an officer or supervisor is assigned to work. These logs contain a record of vehicle mileage, every call an officer responds
to, every proactive stop they make, the time they spend on calls—virtually everything they do for an entire 12-hour shift. This data should already be present or could easily be added to the CAD system to automate this entire process. The use of manual logs and the time spent completing them is an inefficient use of an officer’s time.

Former Chief Bostic published an order on December 10, 2014, requiring that all crime reports be completed without delay. Later, in June or July 2015, Bostic learned of a practice among CPD personnel based on the previous chief’s directive not to complete a report on a crime unless evidence was available that could be followed up on (e.g., name and license plate). This resulted in underreporting of crimes. Officers have since been ordered to complete crime reports on all crimes reported whether or not there is sufficient evidence at the time to solve it. Bostic believed this was necessary to ensure all criminal and self-initiated activities were captured.

**Recommendation 75.1**

Re-evaluate the capabilities of the CAD system, and seek out technical assistance in training staff to fully use and understand all its capabilities. This re-evaluation should take place after the new chief believes the culture of capturing all criminal and self-initiated activities has been ensured.

The CAD system can aggregate all information that is required for a daily log and create customized reports for management to review and use for operational decision making. When the chief has ensured all reports are being captured, the CPD should seek technical assistance to understand the CAD system’s capabilities for a more efficient and automated process for completing reports.

**Finding 76**

**Without coverage allowances for report writing at the end of each shift, entire shifts are often spent in the station completing their reports and logs, leaving the City of Calexico without police presence during this time period.**

For the most part, patrol officers write their reports and complete their logs in the station. On several occasions the entire shift was observed inside the station writing reports. We acknowledge officer statements that reports take two hours to complete and that staff shortages are certainly contributing to this burden, but in our experience such reports should take an average of 15 minutes to complete. Furthermore, we believe crime levels are likely still underreported given these burdensome manual reporting requirements.

**Recommendation 76.1**

Use the MDC in each vehicle to support the process of generating basic police reports.

Ensure that the MDC is properly working and expect that its ability to support report writing in the vehicle will reduce officer time in the station.

**Recommendation 76.2**

Maintain situational awareness when all patrol officers are at the station at one time.

Until appropriate staffing levels are achieved, have supervisors coordinate how many officers are allowed to be at the station at one time writing reports. In addition, consider hiring nonsworn personnel to respond, write lower-level crime reports, and conduct minor investigations.
Finding 77

The CPD has conflicting and uncoordinated policies regarding the requirements for use of force options authorized by the department.

This lack of coordination has led to major discrepancies in the interpretation of the policies by all sworn department members. The result is that, for all intents and purposes, CPD does not have written policies on use of force options that are applicable to all sworn personnel. This is a major concern from an operational, legal, and community trust perspective.

There are significant differences in interpretation among sworn officers of the policy regarding the force options available to or required from all sworn personnel. In particular, we noted a significant discrepancy regarding the policy to carry an electronic control weapon (ECW) as an alternative force option while on patrol. Some officers are issued the weapon and believe it is required that they carry it in the field at all times, while other officers believe they are allowed to do so at their discretion. After additional inquiry, we identified that this same discrepancy applied to the deployment of all deadly and nondeadly force options such as oleoresin capsicum spray ("pepper spray"), impact weapons, shotguns, and patrol rifles.

The confusion stems from the various policies that govern the different force options and the absence of clear direction from CPD leadership. For example, CPD Manual of Policy and Procedure Policy 308 requires pepper spray to be carried by all uniformed field personnel but does not specifically require officers to carry a baton. CPD Taser Policy 309 does not specifically address whether it is mandatory to carry an ECW but states that officers are authorized to carry these weapons if they are properly trained. Firearms Policy 312 authorizes the use of shotguns but does not mention if officers are required to have it available. Patrol Rifle Policy 432 authorizes patrol rifles to be available to officers if they have been properly trained but does not specifically require they be readily available during their shifts.

Recommendation 77.1

Develop a new use of force options policy that supersedes the current conflicting and uncoordinated policies.

This new use of force policy should provide CPD officers with clarification of use of force requirements as well as clarifying an organizational philosophy and expectations regarding use of force so they can be consistent with officer use of force options and protocols.

Recommendation 77.2

Conduct an annual review of the department’s policies regarding use of force options.

Clarify that they are in alignment with the department’s use of force philosophy. This annual review will also ensure that these policies are up to date and compliant with appropriate federal, state, and local laws and national best practices. Specify that all approved use of force instruments must be carried by the officer or be readily available in the field.

In a 2012 use of force symposium sponsored by the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office) and the International Association of Chiefs of Police, one of the recommendations that emerged was that

police departments should “conduct a review of force policies, looking at both state and local policy models, to ensure currency and comprehensiveness. Revise and enhance all policies as needed. Make sure all use of force training is entirely consistent with policy and it both reinforces and further articulates policy intent.”

Finding 78

**The CPD lacks accountability and oversight of equipment issued by the department.**

There is no centralized or organized method for the distribution, repair, or accountability of equipment issued by the department. Employees often wait months for equipment to be repaired or replaced. Once equipment is issued, there is no central registry to properly account for equipment issued to employees.

**Recommendation 78.1**

*Assign a permanent quartermaster responsible for conducting an inventory of all equipment issued to employees.*

**Recommendation 78.2**

*Institute a systematic method of issuing and auditing equipment distributed to employees.*

Ensure a centralized point of distribution and a structured process for reporting damaged and missing equipment.

**Communications and dispatch**

Finding 79

**The Communications/Dispatch unit does not have formal policies or procedures in place or adequate supervision.**

The absence of formal policies or procedures for dispatching operations is not standard practice for a municipal police agency and indicates a significant disregard for operational controls. For many years, CPD dispatching procedures have been handed down informally from senior communication operators to new operators and have unofficially become the operational practice for the CPD. In addition, there is inadequate supervision of the dispatch staff including oversight of entries into the communications system.

**Recommendation 79.1**

*Consider contracting communications and dispatch.*

This arrangement would eliminate the need to develop formal policies and procedures for this unit as well as reducing the need for ongoing supervision of dispatch staff. It would also ensure that records are properly entered, eliminate the current backlog, and allow the Records department to focus on other areas.

---

Recommendation 79.2
Establish a formal set of policies and procedures, including a standard operating procedure (SOP) for the Communications Center, if the CPD is unable to contract out this Communications/Dispatch unit.

After establishing these formal policies for communications, review the current training standards for communications operators and ensure all operators are trained to the minimum standard. Also, establish adequate supervision over the Communications/Dispatch unit by reclassifying a dispatcher to a supervisory role to ensure accountability for department policies and procedures related to communications.

Finding 80
Protocols regarding the prioritization of calls do not exist in the Communications/Dispatch unit.

Recommendation 80.1
Ensure that communications policies and procedures address prioritization of calls.

Require dispatchers to undergo refresher training. Establish adequate supervision including prioritization of calls for service and oversight of entries into the communications system.

Finding 81
There is a lack of training on the system for the Records department and supervision over this area is insufficient.

Records department personnel have received only two training courses in two years regarding the records management system and are only putting in minimal information based on their limited knowledge. There is no supervision of the information going into the system or omitted from reports and no guidance or direction by a supervisor. There is reportedly a two- to three-year backlog of cases that have yet to be recorded in the system.

Recommendation 81.1
Provide supervision to Records department personnel as well as training on system use.

Recommendation 81.2
Prioritize the entry of the backlog of reports into the records management system.

Finding 82
The unofficial dispatching practices practiced by CPD personnel place the safety of officers and the community at risk.

During our assessment, we observed officers dispatched to calls for service without backup despite generally recognized recommendations that two officers are required for a safe response. Even when more than one officer is available, calls that should have a two-officer response are assigned only one officer to the call. There appears to be an unofficial policy always to keep one unit available despite the need for a multiple-officer response.
We asked officers how dispatching procedures conflicted with their formal academy training and advanced officer safety training. They recognized that they are often dispatched alone to calls that require a two-officer response, despite being trained to have backup. Neither officers nor supervisors like this practice, but they have adapted to it because there is often only one officer available for calls for service and dispatchers do not have other options.

The patrol workforce has learned to adjust for lapses in officer safety protocols by self-directing whenever possible to assist with calls that warrant a second officer. CPD leaders are aware of the deficiencies but have not yet taken steps to correct obvious officer safety concerns.

**Recommendation 82.1**

Prioritize the review of unofficial public safety dispatching procedures and establish accepted best practices for dispatching calls. As previously stated, this should be done only if CPD is unable to contract out the Communications/Dispatch unit.

The key goal of any dispatch prioritization is to improve the response level of incoming calls. The objectives are to increase response time, improve coordination, increase officer and public safety, and improve accountability.

The Chula Vista prioritization system is one example among many that CPD can consider adopting. Although Chula Vista is a much larger city than Calexico, both are in the same region of southern California near the Mexican border. Chula Vista’s system was recently assessed by the Urban Institute and National Institute of Justice in cooperation with the Patrol Division of Chula Vista Police Department. The CPD could reach out to Chula Vista to explore this recommendation further, but whether the CPD uses Chula Vista’s priority dispatch system or another law enforcement agency’s practices, the department needs to establish best practices for dispatching calls.

**Finding 83**

**The primary police radio lacks dependability and contributes to employee safety concerns.**

During our ride-alongs, officers constantly checked their radios to see if they were working and displayed genuine anxiety over their dependability. Dispatchers told us that the radio technicians who try to repair the old system complain to them that it needs significant upgrades to improve reliability.

**Recommendation 83.1**

Have a qualified radio technician conduct a complete evaluation of the primary police radio system to determine if it is in working order and to clarify system coverage.

Also, contact the Association of Public Safety Communications Officials for assistance in modernizing the communications center.

---

Recommendation 83.2
Use the results of the radio system evaluation to take intermediate steps toward improving the system’s reliability until a master plan can be developed and implemented for the long term.

Recommendation 83.3
Develop a strategic plan for upgrading the primary radio system.
Share this plan with CPD employees so they are aware of immediate steps to improve the system and the long-term plan for upgrading it.
8. Crime Analysis

There is a critically close relationship between crime analysis and community policing. That is because measuring the value that a police agency brings to the community is not accomplished solely with activity-based metrics such as arrests, citations, and calls for service. Rather, it is best measured through evidence and outcomes aligned with the mission of the department, the public safety-related needs unique to each neighborhood, and community-oriented policing principles and priorities. Capturing these metrics—and helping agency leaders align the department to achieve them—requires data-driven law enforcement tactics and strategies that are cost-effective and high-impact.

The Calexico Police Department’s (CPD) greatest opportunities for improvement in crime analysis are concentrated in two areas:

1. System development
2. Information sharing

**System development**

Generally speaking, crime data can support crime and problem analysis functions by enabling agencies to gather more detailed information about offenders, victims, crime locations, and quality-of-life concerns. The outcome of using crime analysis data is a value-added approach to crime reduction and a more efficient use of resources. Police supervisors commonly rely on this information to develop patrol deployment strategies and allocate resources. Many agencies use crime analysis data to govern the design of patrol shift times, allocation of personnel, delineation of patrol beats, and use of specialized units to support patrol operations.

**Information sharing**

The ultimate goal for any law enforcement agency is to develop real-time crime information sharing, i.e., the use of criminal intelligence to support the deployment of resources to enhance both the police and the community’s crime reduction strategies. Instead of investigating one crime, officers can gather evidence regarding multiple similar crimes that can be used to determine if the same person is responsible. Having real-time crime data also allows a department to allocate its personnel resources more effectively to focus on crime reduction as well as to share key data with community partners, such as nonprofit social service organizations that use the data to work on crime reduction with their own resources. This ultimately helps to curtail crimes before they become bigger, city-wide trends.103

Crime analysis data change the crime strategy of an organization from a subjective, reactive, and instinctive response to crime to one driven by an evidence-based approach to crime reduction.

Over the course of this assessment, it was concluded that the CPD currently lacks crime analysis capabilities and does not currently use internal systems to share crime information within the department nor with the community it serves. The assessment team has two findings and six recommendations in this section related to patrol.

---

Findings and recommendations

System development

Finding 84

The CPD does not have an adequate crime analysis capability.

There is unquestionably a need at the CPD to share crime information, wanted suspect information, and crime trends with patrol officers and the community—a gap that is evident both between the CPD and the community and between shifts or units within the organization itself. The inability to access this data is problematic for both the department and the community. This results in uncoordinated efforts to share crime information and trends as well as to address crime and other community concerns.

Although no formal system for crime analysis has been established, former Chief Michael Bostic had planned to implement a pin-map type system to help officers visualize the crime problems.

The CPD Manual of Policy and Procedure Sections 400.2 through 400.2.5 describe procedures for the distribution of criminal intelligence and information sharing.104 However, the procedures described in the policy manual are not the current organizational practice.

Recommendation 84.1

Identify a provider of services that can establish a basic crime data and mapping system from computer-aided dispatch/records management system (CAD/RMS) data until internal competencies can be established.

Recommendation 84.2

Create an internal mechanism to routinely receive crime analysis of data from (at least) reports, arrest reports, and police calls for service to identify patterns and trends in crime as soon as possible.

Recommendation 84.3

Update the department’s policies regarding sharing information. These policies should be realistic and practical and represent desired organizational practices.

Information sharing

Finding 85

CPD internal systems are not being used to share even the most basic crime information—internally or with the community.

Technological enhancements can greatly assist with improving two-way communication with members of the public and in developing agency accountability systems and performance outcome measures.105

104. Calexico Police Department 2009 Policy Manual: Policy 400.2 through 400.2.5.
105. Community Policing Defined (see note 25).
**Recommendation 85.1**

*Establish an internal process for information sharing that provides the CPD with a method for communicating crime data, wanted suspect information, and other criminal intelligence to enhance their crime control and community policing strategies.*

The process for building the needed systems will evolve along with the culture of the organization, creating a more data-driven organization. Until then, contracting these services to establish a basic crime data and mapping system will be beneficial to resource allocation and crime reduction strategies.

**Recommendation 85.2**

*Establish a method to share crime and quality-of-life information with the community and engage them in the department’s crime reduction strategy.*

This could be done through either the department’s website, social media, or various paid services. Using information provided by the CPD means the community will become more engaged in community problem solving and developing partnerships with local law enforcement.

**Recommendation 85.3**

*Design an internal communication system that directs information from the community to the correct CPD personnel.*

Use this information from the community to follow up on and initiate multilateral communication between stakeholders.

---

**The CPD’s Recent Actions: Sharing Information Externally and Internally**

Former Chief Bostic had been attending U.S. Customs and Border Protection CompStat meetings to make presentations on crime in Calexico. Based on the 24-hour occurrence logs and daily logs, Bostic was pinpointing hot spots for the lieutenants to introduce the concept of problem-solving and targeted deployment.
9. Additional Areas of Focus

While the domains discussed earlier in this report represent the most critical opportunities for the Calexico Police Department (CPD), improvements in additional areas are worthy of strong consideration. These include

- the overall department policy manual;
- training priorities outside the scope of those addressed above;
- equipment;
- property and evidence.

Policy guidance

Throughout this report, there have been policies related to specific areas identified as inconsistent, insufficient, unclear, or nonexistent. In addition to those specific areas identified, the department-wide policy manual that includes all policies utilized by personnel on a daily basis in all aspects of their job function has not been updated recently.

Training

As we have noted, CPD should be taking advantage of the California Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) Commission training and requiring CPD members in various divisions to take complete POST-related training.

The POST Commission has specific requirements regarding a perishable skills and communications requirement for continued professional training standards. According to the POST Administrative Manual Section D-2-1, all peace officers, except reserve officers, below the middle management position who are assigned to patrol, traffic, or investigation and routinely are involved in the physical arrest of criminal suspects are required to complete perishable skills and communications training.106 This training consists of a minimum of 12 hours in each two-year period and a minimum of four hours in each of the following topics:

- Arrest and Control
- Driver Training/Awareness or Driving Simulator
- Tactical Firearms or Force Options Simulator

Communications training, either tactical or interpersonal, shall consist of a minimum of two hours. A total of 24 hours of required and authorized perishable skills training must be completed every two-year cycle.107

The assessment team determined that until recently, more than half the CPD officers were out of compliance with state-mandated training requirements. Currently, training requirements are not prioritized, and there is no accountability for the department’s training needs and deficiencies. Most agencies assign one person as the training coordinator or, at minimum, make the responsibility a collateral assignment.

---

107. Ibid.
Equipment

The CPD is now implementing a body-worn video (BWV) program and considering the deployment of a city-wide public camera system and license plate reader technology.

During our interviews with CPD leadership regarding the challenges of implementing a BWV system, it became apparent that they were underestimating the time and resources necessary to properly manage the BWV system. For example, they had not considered the need for a designated system administrator responsible for equipment maintenance and data storage, Public Records Act requests for video, and discovery requests from the district attorney and defense attorneys. The CPD intends to make all these tasks the responsibility of the Operations Services Division lieutenant, an assignment that would likely negatively impact that individual’s important operational and leadership priorities.

Property and evidence

During the review of the CPD regarding property and evidence, the assessment team conducted an examination of the department’s policies, processes, practices, and training as they relate to the collection, processing, and storage of property and evidence. This review also included observations of the operations of the property and evidence room, a review of property and evidence internal documents such as logs, and interviews with the Property and Evidence Manager and other CPD personnel.

The assessment team discovered few policies and standard operating procedures (SOP) for this area as well as an absence of or inconsistencies in documentation, security, retention, booking and releasing evidence, training, and accountability.

However, the assessment team acknowledges that, at former Chief Michael Bostic’s request, a complete property room audit was completed in 2015, and many deficiencies were identified including those outlined in the findings that follow. Bostic prepared a complete plan and budget for the evidence room that was included in the Fiscal Year (FY) 2015–2016 budget submitted in June 2015. This budget has still not been approved, as noted in key observation 1 on page 8 and “Staffing and organization” on page 20. The assessment team concluded that the CPD lacks an updated department policy manual; scenario-based training and driver training and awareness; a written training plan; appropriate planning for BWV cameras; and policies, procedures, training, management, and accountability of property and evidence.

Findings and recommendations

Policy guidance

Finding 86

The CPD’s Manual of Policy and Procedure (MPP) has not been updated since 2009, and much of it is now out of compliance with current legal and professional standards. There are key policies that should be addressed as a priority.
The CPD adopted the MPP currently approved for the organization in 2009.\textsuperscript{108} However, several critical policies require update, including those areas related to internal affairs, criminal investigations, and use of force.

The CPD’s 2009 MPP is now outdated. A plan to update the manual through an outside service provider was included in the FY 2015–2016 budget but has not been approved. The former chief personally began rewriting the manual to reflect appropriate policies and practices, but he was stymied by the extent of the task in addition to his other duties. In the interim, he started publishing orders to address the most important updates, such as the Completion of Reports Memo dated December 10, 2014 that establishes deadlines for officers to complete required reports. These are stopgap measures pending update of the MPP.

\textit{Recommendation 86.1}

Have CPD leadership ensure the MPP is up to date beginning with high priority areas, or find a suitable policy manual replacement that reflects policing best practices.

Having an updated CPD Manual of Policy and Procedure in compliance with federal, state, and local laws and professional best practices is a fundamental necessity as it contains the guiding principles of the organization and is the standard to which employees and the organization are held accountable.

\textbf{Training}

\textit{Finding 87}

\textbf{Scenario-based training on high-risk policies did not occur in the CPD in 2014 and 2015 because the service agreement for the third-party service provider used to update the CPD’s duty manual was either eliminated or otherwise not used.}

The third-party service provider the CPD had been using to maintain policies and procedures offered scenario-based training and a policy training accountability system along with the policy service. The service agreement provides access to optional scenario-based training and training management. However, based on interviews and a review of training records, we determined that the CPD has not made use of scenario-based training at least since 2013. Regardless of the service provider, it is imperative that the CPD understand the need for and requirement to provide scenario-based training for its officers.

The assessment team acknowledges that this update to the manual through a third-party service contract was in the chief’s FY 2015–2016 budget that has not yet been approved.

\textit{Recommendation 87.1}

Include appropriate scenario-based training in the MPP to ensure knowledge and proficiency of required policies and practices for all employees.

\textsuperscript{108} The CPD’s Manual of Policy and Procedure was created through a legal subscription service provided by a third-party service provider. However, the CPD has not maintained a service agreement with that or any other third-party provider to update their policies when laws and best practices change or are updated.

The CPD’s Recent Actions: Training

As of November 12, 2015, training for the second half of the department had been completed but not yet included by the POST Commission in the compliance report.

However, all CPD officers are now in compliance with all POST Commission perishable skills (with the exception of driver training) for the two-year training cycle from June 2015–June 2017.
Finding 88

Thirteen of the CPD’s 22 police officers were out of compliance with POST Commission perishable skills training until September 2015, when CPD personnel received perishable skills training on all but driver training and awareness or driving simulator training.

A review of CPD employee training files and interviews conducted with staff revealed significant deficiencies in the officer-training requirement until recently. From September 14–17, 2015 and from September 21–24, 2015, CPD employees—including patrol and investigations personnel—attended the Law Enforcement Tactical Application Course (LETAC) at the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD). The tactics course lasted four days, with eight hours each day of training that included arrest and control tactics, tactical firearms and force options simulator, and tactical communications. The LAPD LETAC training course did not include driver training and awareness or a driving simulator.

The assessment team debriefed the trainers, who indicated that the CPD trainees were very receptive to the training, understood the minimum POST Commission standards required, and accepted feedback well. The LAPD trainers acknowledged that there were some terminology differences between the agencies due to what may have been previous improper training received by the CPD and some procedural differences in how the agencies handled calls due to the staffing levels at the CPD. However, they said the CPD trainees adjusted well to these differences. The LAPD trainers indicated that the CPD trainees were engaged, had a positive attitude, and welcomed the opportunity to review the perishable skills for which they had been out of compliance with POST Commission requirements.

Our assessment team also debriefed the trainees and CPD supervisors who attended the training. The trainees and CPD supervisors appreciated the different approaches regarding car stops and building searches, as they are unable to use some of the approaches because they are understaffed. The trainees appreciated learning the communication terminology used by all law enforcement agencies, which will serve them well in multijurisdictional efforts, and many expressed their desire for more advanced training, including scenario-based training and training in groups or as a department.

Recommendation 88.1

Ensure that all officers who may be still deficient in perishable skills training, including driver training and awareness, complete the POST Commission required training as soon as possible.

Officers are required by the POST Commission to undergo a minimum of four hours of training on this subject in each two-year period. Bring the full department into compliance with driver training requirements as soon as possible.

Finding 89

There is no written training plan in the department to help ensure minimum training requirements are met. In addition, although there is currently a review of training for mandatory state requirements, there is no review or request process for discretionary training nor any departmental prioritization of or an automated system to track training for completion.
To properly ensure that employee training requirements are met, most law enforcement agencies produce a yearly training plan. The plan guarantees proper funding, scheduling, and resources are available to reach the training goals for the year. Training is generally prioritized in order of importance. POST Commission-mandated training courses generally take priority, followed by specific training required for the employee’s assignment, advanced training required for specific proficiencies, and discretionary training if possible.

It is not entirely clear how CPD training requirements are prioritized because training responsibilities are decentralized under the lieutenant in the employee chain of command.

Because of the high number of police officers who are out of compliance with mandated training, it appears that the arbitrary training selection method currently in place is not effective. In addition, because training is decentralized, there is not a specific person who can be held accountable for employee training needs.

**Recommendation 89.1**

*Prepare a comprehensive written training plan annually for the department.*

Complete this plan by October 1 of each year for the following calendar year to ensure that employees meet all training requirements.

**Recommendation 89.2**

*Assign a sergeant as the department’s training coordinator.*

The sergeant can be assigned other duties, but training is a critical function and should not be added onto a field supervisor’s workload. Having a specific training coordinator does not remove the need for all supervisors to know what training has been received and is needed by the officers under their supervision.

**Recommendation 89.3**

*Establish procedures that prioritize mandated training and ensure employees who are out of compliance are placed on a plan to correct the deficiency. Also, provide employees with access to their training files and make them aware of their current standing with respect to mandated training.*

**Recommendation 89.4**

*Conduct regular, periodic audits of department-wide training records for all personnel to ensure that the CPD is in compliance with mandatory training.*

**Finding 90**

**Procedures for how employees request training have not been established.**

During employee interviews, a common theme emerged among police officers: They all wanted more training. Most officers told us that the department is struggling to keep up with the POST Commission-mandated training. Any discretionary training to enhance specialization had been drastically limited or eliminated. Many officers complained about requesting additional training to enhance their skills and repeatedly being denied without an explanation.
Recommendation 90.1
Consider training requests for nonmandated training after a review is done on the officer’s current level of compliance with mandated training requirements.

Communicate the protocols for requesting nonmandated training for consistency and transparency, and have accountability for approval or denial of such requests maintained by the training coordinator.

Equipment

Finding 91
The CPD is pursuing advanced and resource intensive programs such as BWV cameras, a city-wide video system, and license plate reader (LPR) technology before implementing the essential fundamentals of policing.

In June 2015, the city council approved body cameras for the CPD at the request of the Calexico Police Officer’s Association. The CPD selected a provider and entered into a five-year service agreement that includes 42 body cameras and data storage. The agreement also includes full service or replacement as necessary of the cameras. The CPD began training on the use the camera system in August 2015 based on an expected operational deployment by October 2015.

The CPD has many complex and resource-intensive challenges that it needs to overcome to develop into a professionally managed organization that can implement contemporary policing standards. The assessment team understands that these body cameras are being deployed as the order and system is completed. The CPD plans to modify another law enforcement agency’s body camera policy for its own departmental use. However, given the personnel shortages, funding gaps, and significant organizational and technical deficiencies the organization is currently facing, the CPD needs to prioritize addressing these fundamental deficiencies while balancing the initial implementation of these BWV cameras.

Recommendation 91.1
Balance the development and implementation of the BWV cameras, a city-wide camera system, and LPR technology until more critical internal reforms are completed.

Focus on addressing the fundamental deficiencies included within this report as a higher priority while simultaneously implementing these body cameras, given the understanding that they are already in process of being deployed.

The assessment team understands that a city-wide camera system has been completed, but the LPR technology has been delayed by the California Department of Transportation. The city-wide camera system will initially be used for investigative follow-up until more personnel are hired, which will include a civilian manager with the skills to manage the system. Given this delay, the assessment team again urges the CPD to continue its focus on making critical improvements to the department in the fundamental areas outlined in this report while balancing these other programs.
Property and evidence

Finding 92

The Property and Evidence unit lacks appropriate management including clear documentation of policies and standard operating procedures.

During interviews with the Property and Evidence technician, personnel voiced concerns that the property and evidence room did not have enough space, policies and procedures were either not seen or not updated, and no SOP exists.

There are no controls in place—written log, key card access, or cameras—to monitor the entering and exiting of the Property and Evidence rooms by CPD personnel. In addition, the Property and Evidence technician was unaware of many aspects of his job regarding proper control and retention of evidence. He was unaware of any policies and procedures for property and evidence and had not undergone any state-required training for this position.

Recommendation 92.1

Review property and evidence policies and procedures.

Provide updates where appropriate and develop a property and evidence manual.

Recommendation 92.2

Develop a refresher training on property and evidence procedures and protocols. Provide this refresher training to the Property and Evidence technician.

Finding 93

The Property and Evidence unit lacks training and accountability for its technician and any other personnel that may fill this position in the technician’s absence.

The Property and Evidence technician reportedly had not been trained since attending International Association for Property and Evidence training in Burbank, California, four years earlier and has also not received any supervisory guidance or directions regarding property and evidence management, accountability, and oversight. The Property and Evidence technician was the only one with this limited knowledge, and therefore no other current CPD personnel can handle these duties in the technician’s absence.

Recommendation 93.1

Provide appropriate supervision to the Property and Evidence technician, and establish accountability for the management of this area by conducting regular and periodic audits of the property and evidence room.

Provide more oversight in property and evidence management, and ensure accountability by conducting regular and periodic audits of the property and evidence area including documentation, purging of evidence, storage room, security, and controlling procedures.
Recommendation 93.2
Train other CPD personnel to handle the position of Property and Evidence technician to ensure continuous coverage when the technician is absent.

Finding 94
The Property and Evidence unit lacks appropriate policies, security, and protocols for booking, securing, and releasing property and evidence.

Per interviews with the Property and Evidence technician, it was determined that the department has not established appropriate policies or protocols for property and evidence.

Recommendation 94.1
Establish appropriate policies and protocols regarding the process of booking, securing, and releasing evidence, including adequate storage and destruction for narcotics, biological evidence, and firearms as well as the releasing of property.

Recommendation 94.2
Provide more oversight and ensure accountability and management by conducting regular and periodic audits of the property and evidence area including booking, securing, and releasing of property and evidence as recommended.
10. Final Consideration

Only by embracing a deep commitment to cultural change that focuses on delivering professional and transparent police services to its community will the Calexico Police Department be able to deliver successfully on four strategic and mutually reinforcing objectives:

1. Advancing community and problem-oriented policing
2. Establishing internal and external coordination, collaboration, and information sharing
3. Instituting accountability, oversight, and best practices across the department
4. Rebuilding public trust
Appendices

Appendix A. Issues and concerns voiced by the community

This appendix contains some of the comments expressed by community members either during the community listening session on July 20, 2015 from 6:30–8:30 p.m. at the Women’s Improvement Club in Calexico or during interviews with Hillard Heintze. These comments are paraphrased and not quoted or attributed to anyone to protect the anonymity of these community members and interviewees.

Engagement with the CPD

- The community appreciated and welcomed the city manager’s efforts to reform the department, and they expressed their concerns about potentially losing former Chief Michael Bostic if he were ever fired.
- Members emphasized that the Calexico Police Department (CPD) needs more community engagement, transparency, and a proper complaint investigation process.
- Many felt Chief Bostic was one of the few leaders and change agents trying to make positive changes in the department.
- Many in the community like Chief Bostic making public presentations.
- There is a trust issue with CPD, as a young man was allegedly kidnapped and beaten by CPD officers and suffered brain damage.
- Some community members have allegedly been noted on the Blue Flame Society Facebook page if they speak out against CPD at city council meetings.

Quality of policing services

- Police Chief Bostic makes the community feel safe.
- A CPD officer was drunk when he showed up to a call for service.
- This community member had a positive CPD experience as they spoke with transitional kids in May 2015. This community member asked the kids if they feel safe, and they said, “Yes.”

City council and politics affecting policing

- Two of the council members cause trouble, and they ran around with the previous police chief and individuals who had lost their position with the department.
- Do not mix politics and the police.
- The former city council member was pressured to step down from the city council.
- The community feels they will eventually lose because of the City’s politics.
- City council members trying to get rid of Chief Bostic have not met him.
- Elected-official leadership is the issue.
- The CPD is not the problem; leadership and politics are.
- Chief Bostic has [courage] to make changes and the community has to support him.
- Chief Bostic is not the issue; politics are the issue.
• They brought in the best police chief [Bostic] and there are still issues with politics, so they need to get rid of the politics.
• This community member feels safe today, but will not tomorrow if Chief Bostic gets fired.
• Terminated officers are saying they will come back.
• The CPD needs open communication with the media.
• We need CPD to interact more with the community.
• Power and greed are in the city.
• All hell broke loose when one of the council members came aboard.
• Calexico is a dumping ground.
• The city council is micromanaging the City and Chief Bostic.
• There is a fight between bad and good, and good always wins.
• If two council members have not talked to Chief Bostic, then how are they micromanaging him?

Police department management
• Both of the current lieutenants were sidelined when the former sergeant ran the department.
• The Calexico Blue Flame Society still has terminated officers posting hate on its Facebook page. Chief Bostic is trying to work with the attorney to take down the page.
• There is comfort with the new environment based on Chief Bostic and City Manager Richard Warne.
• The community thinks things are good now but fears things going back to how it was before Chief Bostic.
• Some do not like the chief because he is an outsider.
• The community is fearful that the terminated officers are chipping away to get back into the department.
• It is sensible to have the U.S. Department of Justice here.
• Chief Bostic cannot do his job when others tell him what to do.

Corruption within the police department
• Two years ago, CPD officers went rogue.
• Some want Chief Bostic fired so the terminated officers will come back.
• Blue Flame is watching us right now.

Miscellaneous comments
• The City is divided but should be one.
• CPD officers do not stop and talk to pedestrians.
• CPD leadership is talking with their friends and not worrying about residents’ issues.
• There are four beats and only three officers on patrol so understaffed.
• Calexico officers call each other for backup on regular traffic stops and leave only one officer on patrol.
Appendix B. Acronyms, abbreviations, and initialisms

BWV  body-worn video
CAD  computer-aided dispatch
CALEA  Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies
CJSC  Criminal Justice Statistics Center
COPS  Office of Community Oriented Policing Services
CPD  Calexico Police Department
CPOA  Calexico Police Officers Association
CRI-TA  Collaborative Reform Initiative for Technical Assistance
CSI  crime scene investigation
DOJ  U.S. Department of Justice
ECW  electronic control weapon
EIS  early intervention system
FBI  Federal Bureau of Investigation
FY  fiscal year
JPIA  [California] Joint Powers Insurance Authority
LAPD  Los Angeles Police Department
LEP  limited English proficient
LETAC  Law Enforcement Tactical Application Course
LPR  license plate reader
MDC  mobile data computer
MPP  Manual of Policy and Procedure
OIC  officer in charge
POST  Peace Officer Standards and Training
RMS  records management system
SOP  standard operating procedure
Appendix C. Findings and recommendations

Finding 1
The CPD lacks a formal, written strategic plan to guide the leadership's priorities regarding crime reduction, community policing, personnel management, support, problem solving, and other appropriate expectations and department-wide policing efforts.

   Recommendation 1.1
   Develop a 90-day interim strategic plan.

   Recommendation 1.2
   Develop a long-term strategic plan.

Finding 2
The CPD does not have plan-driven approach to resolve the staffing shortage of officers and supervisors.

   Recommendation 2.1
   Develop a strategic hiring and promotional plan to properly staff and supervise police operations.

Finding 3
The CPD does not have a contingency plan in place in the event that it does not achieve its hiring goals.

   Recommendation 3.1
   Contract supervisors and patrol personnel from another agency until personnel shortages are addressed.

Finding 4
The performance evaluation system for personnel is highly subjective, and employees are not provided with sufficient direction or clarity on performance standards. Most notably, the performance appraisal system does not evaluate performance related to community policing efforts.

   Recommendation 4.1
   Reform the current performance appraisal process.

   Recommendation 4.2
   Ensure that performance evaluations match job expectations, activities, and the nature of police work. Integrate both quantitative measures such as crime data as well as qualitative measures such as community policing efforts.

   Recommendation 4.3
   Train CPD supervisors to complete performance evaluations.

   Recommendation 4.4
   Allow CPD officers and civilian employees an opportunity to provide their opinions on their own performance or respond to the evaluations provided by their supervisors.

   Recommendation 4.5
   Implement metrics that create baseline performance expectations for CPD members.
Finding 5
Performance evaluations are inconsistent, and many employees have not received yearly evaluations.

Recommendation 5.1
Require that all personnel files be reviewed by supervisors who have overseen the employee’s work. Any employee with a missing evaluation should have an interim evaluation conducted as soon as possible.

Recommendation 5.2
Establish employee expectations through clearly defined, understood, consistent, and timely performance evaluations.

Finding 6
Internal auditing procedures are not in place to ensure evaluations are done in a timely fashion.

Recommendation 6.1
Develop an internal auditing process to ensure evaluations are conducted in a timely manner so supervisors can be held accountable for completion of employee evaluations as scheduled.

Finding 7
The CPD provides limited and inconsistent rewards or acknowledgements for good behavior and job performance.

Recommendation 7.1
Develop policies and procedures that formalize, communicate, and champion positive employee behaviors.

Finding 8
Communication between supervisors and employees is inconsistent and unclear, and mentoring to provide direction and guidance does not regularly occur.

Recommendation 8.1
Establish clear and consistent communication between leadership and supervisors and employees.

Recommendation 8.2
Develop a mentoring plan to provide direction and guidance to employees.

Finding 9
Crime analysis, coordination, and information sharing are insufficient and inadequately used among the units and throughout the CPD. The responsibility for guiding these efforts falls directly on the department’s leadership, including supervisors.

Recommendation 9.1
Initiate specific protocols for information sharing and coordination among patrol officers, detectives, and other personnel and units through all supervisory ranks in the department.

Recommendation 9.2
Conduct regular meetings across units or with supervisors to discuss crime trends, strategies, and other issues for targeted problem solving.
Finding 10
CPD lieutenants do not receive the appropriate training, performance standards, and other tools required to be effective leaders.

Recommendation 10.1
*Conduct internal employee evaluations of lieutenants and sergeants. Use these surveys to identify leadership gaps and strengths.*

Recommendation 10.2
*Use the information gathered from leadership assessments to develop a strategic plan that provides direction for the department’s overall goals and organizational transformation.*

Recommendation 10.3
*Identify key tasks for lieutenants that are closely aligned with organizational goals.*

Recommendation 10.4
*Train lieutenants on how to provide leadership guidance while balancing their organizational responsibilities.*

Recommendation 10.5
*Hold lieutenants accountable for providing leadership guidance while balancing their organizational responsibilities.*

Finding 11
The CPD has not defined an integrated plan to embed community policing principles and tactics deeply within its core operations.

Recommendation 11.1
*Re-evaluate the department’s mission, vision, and values statements to ensure they reflect a commitment to community policing.*

Recommendation 11.2
*Conduct research among internal and external stakeholders to identify the key needs of the community and the current level of trust and confidence in police services.*

Recommendation 11.3
*Develop a comprehensive community policing strategy.*

Finding 12
The CPD does not meet with established neighborhood watch programs or community groups regularly.

Recommendation 12.1
*Provide direction to patrol officers to begin identifying key stakeholders within their beats.*

Recommendation 12.2
*Build community partnerships with individuals, organizations, and businesses willing to assist the department with a community engagement campaign and specify this if possible within the strategy document.*
Recommendation 12.3
Continue to expand the use of community events such as “Coffee with a Cop” or similar programs to create informal opportunities for the community to get to know their police officers and employees.

Recommendation 12.4
Form a community advisory group to meet with the chief of police once per month.

Finding 13
The CPD needs to incorporate problem-solving techniques when resolving crime and quality of life concerns.

Recommendation 13.1
Integrate problem-solving techniques into the process of resolving crime and quality-of-life concerns.

Recommendation 13.2
Communicate the tenets of problem solving to the entire department.

Finding 14
The CPD is not following policy 402.5, which requires the collection of traffic stop data and the annual reporting of efforts to prevent racial profiling. Department leadership acknowledges this nonadherence to policy.

Recommendation 14.1
Collect and analyze data to produce the racial bias policing report required annually by CPD policy.

Recommendation 14.2
Incorporate procedural justice and implicit bias training into the department’s training plan and use.

Finding 15
CPD employees do not receive community policing training.

Recommendation 15.1
Develop a training program for employees that introduces the community policing philosophy and operational practices.

Recommendation 15.2
Encourage CPD officers to engage community members in conversation on a daily basis on their regular beats.

Finding 16
The Community-Police Advisory Commission does not have a well-defined mission or purpose and is ineffective, specifically with respect to collaboration with the CPD.

Recommendation 16.1
Evaluate the strategic purpose of a Community-Police Advisory Commission, and develop a written framework that outlines the purpose, goals, and expectations for the group.
Recommendation 16.2

*Ensure that independent oversight is built into efforts to identify and resolve underlying systemic problems within law enforcement.*

**Finding 17**

Although honest and transparent communication by CPD leaders and other city officials during press conferences and community meetings should continue, such messaging has not shed enough light on the positive aspects of the CPD’s activities.

Recommendation 17.1

*Develop and enact a collaborative community-based communications strategy.*

Recommendation 17.2

*Acknowledge the past and look to the future by developing a clear and consistent message to the community that building trust is a top priority for the department. Such messaging to the community should continue to be frequent and transparent about the progress of reforms and efforts to build community trust.*

Recommendation 17.3

*Track the community’s level of trust in the CPD through annual community surveys.*

**Finding 18**

The CPD does not have the ability to update its own website as that duty lies with the City. The department website lacks community engagement information, safety tips, partnership opportunities, and crime information.

Recommendation 18.1

*Secure from the city the authorization to publish crime data and alerts on the website and via social media.*

Recommendation 18.2

*Develop a social media presence to promote partnerships and other popular platforms to engage the community, including younger residents.*

**Finding 19**

CPD disciplinary policy 340 does not explain the intended purpose of the disciplinary system in the organization.

Recommendation 19.1

*Include a philosophy and purpose statement in the CPD disciplinary policy.*

**Finding 20**

There is a concern among CPD employees that discipline is inappropriately meted out for minor policy violations and directives.

Recommendation 20.1

*Formalize the disciplinary process, and hold managers and supervisors accountable to discuss expectations with their employees.*
Finding 21
The CPD has not yet embraced a guardian culture and mindset to build public trust and legitimacy. The department needs to adopt procedural justice as a guiding principle for its interactions with residents.

Recommendation 21.1
Adopt procedural justice as a guiding principle for the organization, as implementation of procedural justice is critical to building public trust.

Finding 22
The CPD does not sufficiently make complaint forms accessible to the public and is not in compliance with department policy requiring a complaint form to be available in the lobby of the police facility.

Recommendation 22.1
Make personnel complaint forms more accessible. Offer multiple opportunities and methods for the public to commend or raise a complaint about an officer.

Finding 23
The CPD does not provide any public education materials explaining how to commend or complain about a department employee.

Recommendation 23.1
Develop and distribute a public education brochure explaining how to commend or complain about a police employee.

Recommendation 23.2
Make the brochure available in the languages spoken in the community and the local schools.

Finding 24
The CPD’s policy regarding accepting complaints from the community states that complaints “may” be accepted. This is overly subjective regarding the exceptions authorizing the denial of a complaint.

Recommendation 24.1
Accept all citizen complaints—including anonymous ones—at face value regardless of their subjective merit.

Recommendation 24.2
Create and implement formal policies and procedures outlining specific steps employees must take to ensure complaints are received, documented, and investigated appropriately and in a timely manner.

Finding 25
The CPD policy outlining the internal affairs process uses terms like “commanding officer” and “divisional commander,” which are not clearly defined.

Recommendation 25.1
Use the actual department ranks in CPD policy regarding the Internal Affairs process to clearly assign tasks and accountability.
**Finding 26**
Informal complaints and the organizational response to these complaints are not required to be documented.

Recommendation 26.1

*Develop a new initial complaint form that can be used to document all complaints, both informal and formal, and comply with department policy and state law.*

Recommendation 26.2

*Publish an annual public report of complaints to increase transparency and accountability with the community and within the department.*

**Finding 27**
CPD policy is not clear on the process for assigning and investigating citizen complaints.

Recommendation 27.1

*Develop an Internal Affairs SOP manual to clearly communicate roles and responsibilities for each rank in the complaint process.*

**Finding 28**
A written directive delineating policy violations by category does not exist.

Recommendation 28.1

*Develop a written directive that outlines and categorizes policy violations to communicate to employees the seriousness of a violation and to define clear investigative roles for supervisors in administrative investigations.*

**Finding 29**
The incomplete personnel complaint classification, as defined by departmental policy, states that incomplete complaints are instances where “the complaining party either refuses to cooperate or becomes unavailable after [a] diligent follow-up investigation.” This classification is ineffective because it is more closely aligned with a complaint disposition than with the nature of an allegation.

Recommendation 29.1

*Remove the incomplete classification related to personnel complaints from CPD policy.*

**Finding 30**
Informal complaints are not tracked or analyzed in the department.

Recommendation 30.1

*Develop a numbering system—separate from the system tracking formal complaints—to track all Informal complaints received and investigated by the department.*

**Finding 31**
CPD policy does not require employees to be notified when they are subject to an administrative investigation.
Recommendation 31.1

Notify employees when they are subject to a formal investigation, unless this notification would jeopardize the department’s ability to investigate employee misconduct successfully.

Finding 32

CPD policy does not explain how long internal investigations can reasonably take to complete.

Recommendation 32.1

Require a specific and more reasonable period of time for internal investigations to be completed.

Finding 33

CPD policy currently gives any supervisor the authority to place an employee on indefinite administrative leave during an administrative investigation.

Recommendation 33.1

Give all supervisors the ability to recommend placing an employee on temporary administrative leave.

Recommendation 33.2

Create and implement detailed policies and procedures outlining the types of incidents that would indicate administrative leave is warranted.

Finding 34

The CPD does not provide consistent training for employees and supervisors on the disciplinary process.

Recommendation 34.1

Develop and provide department-wide disciplinary process training including overall program information and descriptions of roles and responsibilities for each rank.

Finding 35

Administrative Internal Affairs case files and reports are not consistent, contain conflicting information, and are largely incomplete.

Recommendation 35.1

Require all Internal Affairs investigation reports to follow the format prescribed in the policy manual.

Recommendation 35.2

Train investigators on an Internal Affairs SOP that outlines requirements to be included in every administrative investigation case file.

Recommendation 35.3

Require the administrative investigation case file to clearly date and time stamp each phase of the investigation process.

Recommendation 35.4

Conduct random and periodic audits of the Internal Affairs unit’s investigation case files to ensure that proper policy and required procedures are being followed and that appropriate documentation is included where necessary.
Finding 36
CPD policy does not outline management responsibilities for reviewing internal investigations.

Recommendation 36.1
*Develop an administrative file review process and administrative checklist.*

Finding 37
The CPD has not held supervisors and managers accountable for the quality, consistency, and adjudication of internal affairs investigations.

Recommendation 37.1
*In the chain-of-command review process, document whether management (i.e., Internal Affairs supervisor, Internal Affairs commanding officer, or the chief) concurs with the findings of the investigation.*

Recommendation 37.2
*Clearly articulate in the CPD policy that command recommendations are required to be provided to the chief at the conclusion of the administrative investigation.*

Recommendation 37.3
*Conduct both a current and an ongoing review of file management, documentation, and accuracy within the chain-of-command review process to ensure administrative investigation files are consistent and complete, contain the required information and documentation, and either have no conflicting information or appropriately address and resolve any conflicts.*

Finding 38
CPD policy does not describe the progressive disciplinary options used by the department.

Recommendation 38.1
*Update the department policy to clearly communicate all performance management progressive disciplinary options available to ensure that staff sufficiently understands the disciplinary process and the consequences of any such behaviors.*

Finding 39
CPD does not have a formal process to ensure disciplinary sanctions are applied consistently.

Recommendation 39.1
*Develop a disciplinary matrix to assist management in communicating organizational consequences for misconduct.*

Recommendation 39.2
*Define clear parameters to ensure fair and consistent application of discipline.*
**Finding 40**
The CPD does not use any early intervention tools.

Recommendation 40.1
*Develop an early intervention system.*

Recommendation 40.2
*Develop a policy that explains the purpose of early intervention tools and defines how they are used effectively.*

Recommendation 40.3
*Train all staff on early intervention tools to ensure they have the proper technological resources for adoption and usage.*

Recommendation 40.4
*Define early intervention processes and practices in an SOP.*

Recommendation 40.5
*Track all early intervention reviews or notifications and document all related managerial actions to ensure supervisory oversight, accountability, and consistency of all managerial actions when similar notifications occur.*

**Finding 41**
The department reports external complaints against employees only as required by California law.

Recommendation 41.1
*Produce and publish an annual report detailing the number of internal investigations, complaints, and findings.*

**Finding 42**
The CPD does not have an investigations operations manual, policy, or department directive that ensures a comprehensive, professional criminal investigations process.

Recommendation 42.1
*Develop an investigations operations manual and patrol procedures policy that directs the criminal investigations process.*

**Finding 43**
Patrol officers and field supervisors have substantial discretion in conducting investigations—including the decision to pursue, follow up, file criminal charges, or close the investigation—despite a lack of knowledge and training on how to do so.

Recommendation 43.1
*Change the current practice of having patrol officers routinely conduct extensive criminal investigations until officers are trained and competent, and leverage the policies and written procedures already in place at the department that clearly establish parameters and boundaries for patrol-based investigations.*
Finding 44
Formal communication and case routing processes are lacking for criminal investigations, which can result in missed opportunities for follow-up and investigation.

Recommendation 44.1

*Develop clear and consistent policies for criminal case processing and tracking.*

Finding 45
CPD policy 358 outlines when the appropriate division lieutenant should be notified for detective support on a major incident, but the process is not used or understood.

Recommendation 45.1

*Provide clear expectations in CPD policy for detective notifications of significant investigations through roll-call training and ongoing monitoring of compliance.*

Finding 46
The CPD does not have any policies or written directives regarding rollout procedures for detective support on patrol operations.

Recommendation 46.1

*Establish a formal case routing process and internal communication system that provides a systematic method for the dissemination and management of criminal case files.*

Finding 47
Allowing patrol officer to file cases directly with the district attorney undermines the CPD’s criminal investigation process.

Recommendation 47.1

*Require a supervisor experienced in investigations to review all felony arrests and criminal cases.*

Finding 48
The investigative skills required of patrol officers are generally not commensurate with their level of training.

Recommendation 48.1

*Provide patrol officers with basic investigation, crime-scene processing, and evidence collection training.*

Recommendation 48.2

*Train select CPD patrol personnel using California Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST)-certified “train-the-trainer” internal affairs courses. Then have them train other CPD personnel.*

Finding 49
Officers do not routinely use audio or video recording to document statements of victims, witnesses, or suspects during the investigation process, as determined through personnel interviews and a review of criminal investigations.
Recommendation 49.1

*Require all patrol officers and investigators to audio record statements made by victims, witnesses, and suspects, at a minimum, to ensure transparency and the authenticity of documented statements used in the course of a criminal investigation.*

**Finding 50**

Officers do not routinely take photographs to document evidence at crime scenes or injuries to victims or suspects.

Recommendation 50.1

*Develop a team of patrol-based crime scene investigators.*

Recommendation 50.2

*Train CPD patrol personnel who have been selected to serve as crime scene investigators using California POST-certified “train-the-trainer” internal affairs courses. Then have them train other CPD personnel.*

Recommendation 50.3

*Establish an audit process that requires supervisors to review reports for the essential investigation and forensic standards to ensure preliminary patrol-based investigations are being conducted effectively.*

**Finding 51**

The Investigations Services Division is understaffed given its responsibility and caseload. The CPD would benefit from a workload analysis to evaluate the proper staffing levels needed for the division.

Recommendation 51.1

*Conduct a caseload study to determine proper staffing levels for Investigations Services.*

Recommendation 51.2

*Develop a plan to assign detectives to Investigations Services until this unit reaches its full staffing level.*

**Finding 52**

The CPD needs an organizational and systematic approach to criminal case management.

Recommendation 52.1

*Conduct an evaluation of the current case classification and assignment procedures.*

**Finding 53**

The CPD does not have a systematic method for the distribution of cases to the detectives. Because of the lack of procedures and direction, employees do not understand or apply the appropriate methods of case assignment and distribution to ensure the necessary controls for case management accountability.

Recommendation 53.1

*Train and assign a supervisor to Investigations Services for direct supervision of the detectives and investigation case management.*
Finding 54
In the absence of established procedures, employees have adapted and created their own shortcuts to facilitate case management.

Recommendation 54.1
Once the new case assignment system has been established, use it to assign specific criminal case responsibilities based on factors such as the detectives' caseloads and the degree of training and experience required for the given assignment.

Finding 55
CPD employees cannot identify an individual who is responsible and accountable for the maintenance of the CAD/RMS system.

Recommendation 55.1
Assign responsibility for maintenance of the CAD/RMS system to one person within the CPD to ensure a lower chance of error and to hold officers and supervisors accountable for their part in the criminal case investigation process, including follow-up and oversight.

Finding 56
The CPD is not fully using the auditing features and internal control processes available in the CAD/RMS System to improve employee accountability.

Recommendation 56.1
Develop an audit and inspection schedule of the CAD/RMS System regarding case management and accountability.

Finding 57
Placing responsibility for investigative case assignment and management with the Administrative Services lieutenant has caused a significant backlog of unassigned cases, is inefficient, and lacks proper controls.

Recommendation 57.1
Ensure that the Investigations Services supervisor is responsible for screening, classifying, and assigning cases to the detectives.

Finding 58
There is no supervisory or management oversight of case clearance procedures. There is also no method to monitor investigative performance.

Recommendation 58.1
Ensure case clearance decisions are made by the detectives and reviewed by the detective sergeant. Case clearance decisions should be made by experienced detectives rather than patrol officers.

Recommendation 58.2
Establish an inspection and audit plan for follow-up investigations that includes arrests, booking and charge dispositions, investigative case completeness, case categorization, metrics on case management, and overall solvability success.
Finding 59
There are no policies or procedures establishing how long cases can remain open without follow-up.

Recommendation 59.1
*Use the case tracking system capabilities to monitor cases beginning with initiation at the patrol level to case assignment with a detective to ensure proper oversight is in place.*

Recommendation 59.2
*Ensure that, at a minimum, all felony cases with workable information or suspect identification are reviewed every 30 days for status or disposition.*

Finding 60
The authority to open, close, and reassign cases without supervisor approval, as is the current practice, does not provide sufficient safeguards resulting in arbitrary and discretionary decision making by personnel without appropriate audit controls.

Recommendation 60.1
*Establish an internal control process that prevents patrol officers from opening, closing or reassigning a felony case without approval from a supervisor in Investigations Services.*

Finding 61
Detectives' scope of responsibility is too broad.

Recommendation 61.1
*Define the types of cases that fall within the scope and capabilities of the current detective personnel and outsource those that fall outside those core competencies.*

Finding 62
It is unrealistic to require detectives to be competent in all of the required investigative areas.

Recommendation 62.1
*Require all detective personnel, including supervisors and managers, to complete the POST Commission basic investigative course within their first year of assignment.*

Recommendation 62.2
*Train appropriate CPD detectives using California POST-certified “train-the-trainer” internal affairs courses. Then have them train other CPD personnel.*

Finding 63
Although charged with the added responsibility for crime scene investigation, the detectives have not received any advanced training in investigative procedures, crime scene processing, or forensics.

Recommendation 63.1
*Require detectives to attend advanced investigative courses in their assigned areas of responsibility.*

Recommendation 63.2
*Consider hiring a civilian crime scene investigator or forensic specialist or a retired crime scene investigator until staffing levels improve.*
Recommendation 63.3

Establish a team of patrol officers with more advanced crime scene investigation (CSI) training until personnel within Investigations Services have been trained to the appropriate level of CSI needs.

Recommendation 63.4

Use release time for appropriate CPD personnel to observe and ride along with other agencies such as the El Centro or San Diego Police Departments temporarily to develop their investigative and CSI skills.

Recommendation 63.5

Outsource investigative and CSI needs to another agency that can provide these services until the proper investigative and CSI skills are developed internally within the CPD.

Finding 64

CPD leaders have not communicated their justification for the current patrol deployment to the department. The CPD’s current deployment levels are based on the third-party study, but there is little knowledge or understanding of this study among patrol unit and other personnel.

Recommendation 64.1

Re-evaluate deployment and workload internally to determine the appropriate use of resources and staffing to meet organizational and community objectives before making any significant changes to patrol staffing and resources.

Recommendation 64.2

Communicate the results of the current patrol deployment and workload structure based on the management and deployment study as well as any significant future changes with the staff and any labor representatives.

Finding 65

Because of the current deployment structure and the limited number of supervisors, there is no overlap period to allow supervisors to change shifts and also maintain field presence.

Recommendation 65.1

Establish an overlap in officer coverage both now and in the new definitive staffing model.

Finding 66

The absence of permanent sergeants in the Patrol Division results in inadequate supervision over patrol personnel.

Recommendation 66.1

Require at least one regular sergeant to be on duty at all times.

Finding 67

Patrol sergeants do not attend a day watch patrol briefing. This lack of daily briefing contributes to poor information sharing between sergeants and day watch officers and undermines organizational accountability.
Recommendation 67.1  
*Ensure minimum supervisory staffing levels with at least one regular sergeant on duty to engage their personnel at briefings regarding policy, training, and setting expectations and to be available as a resource for patrol officers in the field.*

**Finding 68**  
With only two sergeants assigned to patrol, there is a 12-hour period every day during which there is no supervision present in patrol.

Recommendation 68.1  
*Make recruitment a priority and consider promoting an internal candidate to sergeant.*

Recommendation 68.2  
*Assign a minimum of four permanent supervisors to the patrol division.*

Recommendation 68.3  
*Use release time for appropriate CPD personnel including patrol officers and supervisors to observe and ride along with personnel from other agencies such as the El Centro or San Diego Police Departments to develop their patrol and supervisory skills.*

**Finding 69**  
The routine use of untrained OICs places the organization at increased risk, decreases accountability, and results in a lack of necessary oversight of high-risk situations.

Recommendation 69.1  
*Select an OIC on the basis of training and experience rather than strictly on the basis of seniority until permanent supervisors are available.*

Recommendation 69.2  
*Prioritize either reassignment or hiring to provide more permanent supervisors on all shifts.*

Recommendation 69.3  
*Ensure that if the department is required to use an OIC that officer is properly trained and has adequate experience for the position.*

**Finding 70**  
Shift briefings are underutilized. These briefings lack training, information sharing, discussion of organizational goals, and personnel mentoring components.

Recommendation 70.1  
*Establish a policy requiring information to be provided to patrol officers before every shift.*

Recommendation 70.2  
*Leverage opportunities at roll-call briefings for real-time information sharing rather than rote updates.*
Recommendation 70.3

*Design an internal shift log to share information among patrol shifts.*

Recommendation 70.4

*Emphasize to supervisors the importance of roll-call briefings to help align officers’ shift activities with the department’s desired outcomes.*

Recommendation 70.5

*Provide OICs direction on how to handle day or night watch roll-call briefings when they are required to supervise a given shift in the absence of a permanent supervisor.*

**Finding 71**

In the absence of crime data, patrol personnel currently conduct random patrols rather than using a targeted approach.

Recommendation 71.1

*Internally develop or outsource the creation of a basic crime analysis platform.*

**Finding 72**

Patrol officers determine what their individual priorities are for their shifts rather than coordinating efforts to work as a team to address community concerns and crime problems.

Recommendation 72.1

*Give patrol officers detailed direction supported by crime data on where they should patrol.*

**Finding 73**

Patrol supervisors are overwhelmed with administrative tasks that restrict their time in the field because of the limited number of supervisors currently employed.

Recommendation 73.1

*Increase the number of supervisors to share administrative responsibilities across more patrol sergeants.*

**Finding 74**

The mobile data computer (MDC) system does not provide connectivity to the CAD/RMS system in approximately half of the front-line patrol vehicles.

Recommendation 74.1

*Engage technical assistance to resolve the MDC connectivity issues with CAD/RMS in all patrol vehicles.*

**Finding 75**

Officers are required to maintain daily logs and monthly statistics sheets that are completed manually rather than being automated.

Recommendation 75.1

*Re-evaluate the capabilities of the CAD system, and seek out technical assistance in training staff to fully use and understand all its capabilities. This re-evaluation should take place after the new chief believes the culture of capturing all criminal and self-initiated activities has been ensured.*
Finding 76
Without coverage allowances for report writing at the end of each shift, entire shifts are often spent in the station completing their reports and logs, leaving the City of Calexico without police presence during this time period.

Recommendation 76.1
Use the MDC in each vehicle to support the process of generating basic police reports.

Recommendation 76.2
Maintain situational awareness when all patrol officers are at the station at one time.

Finding 77
The CPD has conflicting and uncoordinated policies regarding the requirements for use of force options authorized by the department.

Recommendation 77.1
Develop a new use of force options policy that supersedes the current conflicting and uncoordinated policies.

Recommendation 77.2
Conduct an annual review of the department’s policies regarding use of force options.

Finding 78
The CPD lacks accountability and oversight of equipment issued by the department.

Recommendation 78.1
Assign a permanent quartermaster responsible for conducting an inventory of all equipment issued to employees.

Recommendation 78.2
Institute a systematic method of issuing and auditing equipment distributed to employees.

Finding 79
The Communications/Dispatch unit does not have formal policies or procedures in place or adequate supervision.

Recommendation 79.1
Consider contracting communications and dispatch.

Recommendation 79.2
Establish a formal set of policies and procedures, including a standard operating procedure (SOP) for the Communications Center, if the CPD is unable to contract out this Communications/Dispatch unit.
Finding 80
Protocols regarding the prioritization of calls do not exist in the Communications/Dispatch unit.

Recommendation 80.1
Ensure that communications policies and procedures address prioritization of calls.

Finding 81
There is a lack of training on the system for the Records department and supervision over this area is insufficient.

Recommendation 81.1
Provide supervision to Records department personnel as well as training on system use.

Recommendation 81.2
Prioritize the entry of the backlog of reports into the records management system.

Finding 82
The unofficial dispatching practices practiced by CPD personnel place the safety of officers and the community at risk.

Recommendation 82.1
Prioritize the review of unofficial public safety dispatching procedures and establish accepted best practices for dispatching calls. As previously stated, this should be done only if CPD is unable to contract out the Communications/Dispatch unit.

Finding 83
The primary police radio lacks dependability and contributes to employee safety concerns.

Recommendation 83.1
Have a qualified radio technician conduct a complete evaluation of the primary police radio system to determine if it is in working order and to clarify system coverage.

Recommendation 83.2
Use the results of the radio system evaluation to take intermediate steps toward improving the system’s reliability until a master plan can be developed and implemented for the long term.

Recommendation 83.3
Develop a strategic plan for upgrading the primary radio system.

Finding 84
The CPD does not have an adequate crime analysis capability.

Recommendation 84.1
Identify a provider of services that can establish a basic crime data and mapping system from computer-aided dispatch/records management system (CAD/RMS) data until internal competencies can be established.
Recommendation 84.2

Create an internal mechanism to routinely receive crime analysis of data from (at least) reports, arrest reports, and police calls for service to identify patterns and trends in crime as soon as possible.

Recommendation 84.3

Update the department's policies regarding sharing information. These policies should be realistic and practical and represent desired organizational practices.

Finding 85

CPD internal systems are not being used to share even the most basic crime information—internally or with the community.

Recommendation 85.1

Establish an internal process for information sharing that provides the CPD with a method for communicating crime data, wanted suspect information, and other criminal intelligence to enhance their crime control and community policing strategies.

Recommendation 85.2

Establish a method to share crime and quality-of-life information with the community and engage them in the department's crime reduction strategy.

Recommendation 85.3

Design an internal communication system that directs information from the community to the correct CPD personnel.

Finding 86

The CPD's Manual of Policy and Procedure (MPP) has not been updated since 2009, and much of it is now out of compliance with current legal and professional standards. There are key policies that should be addressed as a priority.

Recommendation 86.1

Have CPD leadership ensure the MPP is up to date beginning with high priority areas, or find a suitable policy manual replacement that reflects policing best practices.

Finding 87

Scenario-based training on high-risk policies did not occur in the CPD in 2014 and 2015 because the service agreement for the third-party service provider used to update the CPD’s duty manual was either eliminated or otherwise not used.

Recommendation 87.1

Include appropriate scenario-based training in the MPP to ensure knowledge and proficiency of required policies and practices for all employees.
Finding 88
Thirteen of the CPD’s 22 police officers were out of compliance with POST Commission perishable skills training until September 2015, when CPD personnel received perishable skills training on all but driver training and awareness or driving simulator training.

Recommendation 88.1

Ensure that all officers who may be still deficient in perishable skills training, including driver training and awareness, complete the POST Commission required training as soon as possible.

Finding 89
There is no written training plan in the department to help ensure minimum training requirements are met. In addition, although there is currently a review of training for mandatory state requirements, there is no review or request process for discretionary training nor any departmental prioritization of or an automated system to track training for completion.

Recommendation 89.1

Prepare a comprehensive written training plan annually for the department.

Recommendation 89.2

Assign a sergeant as the department’s training coordinator.

Recommendation 89.3

Establish procedures that prioritize mandated training and ensure employees who are out of compliance are placed on a plan to correct the deficiency. Also, provide employees with access to their training files and make them aware of their current standing with respect to mandated training.

Recommendation 89.4

Conduct regular, periodic audits of department-wide training records for all personnel to ensure that the CPD is in compliance with mandatory training.

Finding 90
Procedures for how employees request training have not been established.

Recommendation 90.1

Consider training requests for nonmandated training after a review is done on the officer’s current level of compliance with mandated training requirements.

Finding 91
The CPD is pursuing advanced and resource intensive programs such as BWV cameras, a city-wide video system, and license plate reader (LPR) technology before implementing the essential fundamentals of policing.

Recommendation 91.1

Balance the development and implementation of the BWV cameras, a city-wide camera system, and LPR technology until more critical internal reforms are completed.
Finding 92
The Property and Evidence unit lacks appropriate management including clear documentation of policies and standard operating procedures.

Recommendation 92.1
Review property and evidence policies and procedures.

Recommendation 92.2
Develop a refresher training on property and evidence procedures and protocols. Provide this refresher training to the Property and Evidence technician.

Finding 93
The Property and Evidence unit lacks training and accountability for its technician and any other personnel that may fill this position in the technician’s absence.

Recommendation 93.1
Provide appropriate supervision to the Property and Evidence technician, and establish accountability for the management of this area by conducting regular and periodic audits of the property and evidence room.

Recommendation 93.2
Train other CPD personnel to handle the position of Property and Evidence technician to ensure continuous coverage when the technician is absent.

Finding 94
The Property and Evidence unit lacks appropriate policies, security, and protocols for booking, securing, and releasing property and evidence.

Recommendation 94.1
Establish appropriate policies and protocols regarding the process of booking, securing, and releasing evidence, including adequate storage and destruction for narcotics, biological evidence, and firearms as well as the releasing of property.

Recommendation 94.2
Provide more oversight and ensure accountability and management by conducting regular and periodic audits of the property and evidence area including booking, securing, and releasing of property and evidence as recommended.
About Hillard Heintze

Hillard Heintze is one of this nation’s leading privately held strategic advisory firms specializing in independent ethics, integrity, and oversight services with a special focus on federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies including police departments, sheriff’s departments, and internal affairs bureaus. The firm provides the strategic thought leadership, trusted counsel, and implementation services that help leading government agencies and institutions, corporations, law firms, and major public service organizations target and achieve strategic and transformational levels of excellence in law enforcement, security, and investigations. Headquartered in Chicago, Hillard Heintze also has operations in Washington, D.C.; Atlanta; Miami; Virginia Beach; Dallas; and San Jose, as well as operating capabilities across North and South America, Europe, the Middle East, Africa, Russia, and Asia. For more information, visit www.hillardheintze.com.
About the COPS Office

The Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office) is the component of the U.S. Department of Justice responsible for advancing the practice of community policing by the nation’s state, local, territorial, and tribal law enforcement agencies through information and grant resources.

Community policing begins with a commitment to building trust and mutual respect between police and communities. It supports public safety by encouraging all stakeholders to work together to address our nation’s crime challenges. When police and communities collaborate, they more effectively address underlying issues, change negative behavioral patterns, and allocate resources.

Rather than simply responding to crime, community policing focuses on preventing it through strategic problem solving approaches based on collaboration. The COPS Office awards grants to hire community police and support the development and testing of innovative policing strategies. COPS Office funding also provides training and technical assistance to community members and local government leaders, as well as all levels of law enforcement.

Another source of COPS Office assistance is the Collaborative Reform Initiative for Technical Assistance (CRI-TA). Developed to advance community policing and ensure constitutional practices, CRI-TA is an independent, objective process for organizational transformation. It provides recommendations based on expert analysis of policies, practices, training, tactics, and accountability methods related to issues of concern.

Since 1994, the COPS Office has invested more than $14 billion to add community policing officers to the nation’s streets, enhance crime fighting technology, support crime prevention initiatives, and provide training and technical assistance to help advance community policing.

- To date, the COPS Office has funded the hiring of approximately 127,000 additional officers by more than 13,000 of the nation’s 18,000 law enforcement agencies in both small and large jurisdictions.
- Nearly 700,000 law enforcement personnel, community members, and government leaders have been trained through COPS Office-funded training organizations.
- To date, the COPS Office has distributed more than eight million topic-specific publications, training curricula, white papers, and resource CDs.
- The COPS Office also sponsors conferences, roundtables, and other forums focused on issues critical to law enforcement.

The COPS Office information resources, covering a wide range of community policing topics—from school and campus safety to gang violence—can be downloaded at www.cops.usdoj.gov. This website is also the grant application portal, providing access to online application forms.
In the spring of 2015, the chief of the Calexico Police Department (CPD) and the Calexico city manager requested participation in the COPS Office’s Collaborative Reform Initiative for Technical Assistance (CRI-TA), designed to provide technical assistance to agencies in need of organizational reform. Using subject matter experts, interviews, and direct observations, as well as conducting extensive research and analysis, the COPS Office assists law enforcement agencies with enhancing and improving their policies and procedures, their operating systems, and their professional culture. Following the request for assistance, a team of CRI-TA researchers, analysts, and subject matter experts assessed the CPD’s policies, practices, and training related to community engagement, accountability, oversight, and internal and external investigations. This report summarizes their findings and recommendations.