


Cell-Site Simulators Resources

Extra Materials for Criminal Defense Attorneys



EFF One-Pager
Revised 4.10.18

Learn more:
[eff.org/
CSSFA](https://eff.org/CSSFA)

Support our
work on Cell
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EFF Briefs

EFF Litigation Briefs

- [EFF v. County of San Bernardino](#), (Case No. CIVDS 1827591, 2018) in the superior court of California, County of San Bernardino, our [writ of mandate](#) urges the court to enforce the California Public Records Act by disclosing the case numbers for 6 search warrants and supporting affidavits that authorized the use of cell site simulators in San Bernardino county in 2017.

EFF Amicus Briefs

- [U.S. v. Daniel Rigmaiden](#), 2013 WL 1932800 (D. Ariz. 2013) in the United States District Court of Arizona, our [amicus brief](#) urged the court to exclude evidence collected by warrantless CSS use.
- [State of Maryland v. Kerron Andrews](#), 227 Md.App.350 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2015) in the Court of Special Appeals in Maryland, our [amicus brief](#) explained why warrantless CSS use violates the Fourth Amendment.
- [U.S. v. Damian L. Patrick](#), 842 F.3d 540 (7th Cir. 2016) in the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, our [amicus brief](#) explained why the Fourth Amendment protects location privacy.

- January 25, 2016 EFF press release—
<https://www.eff.org/press/releases/eff-aclu-court-accessing-cell-phone-location-records-without-warrant-violates>
- March 23, 2016, Department of Justice letter admitting that the Milwaukee Police Department used a cell-site simulator—
<https://www.eff.org/document/us-v-patrick-government-letter-admitting-stingray-use>
- *Prince Jones v. U.S.*, Case No. 15-CF-322 (DC Cir. 2017) in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, February 24, 2016, our [amicus brief](#) explained why CSS use violates the Fourth Amendment, and should at the very least require a warrant with minimization rules.

EFF Blogs and Press Releases

- [US Marshals Airborne IMSI Catchers](#)
- [Stingrays: The Biggest Technological Threat to Cell Phone Privacy You Don't Know About](#) - Oct. 22, 2012
- [As Secretive "Stingray" Surveillance Tool Becomes More Pervasive, Questions Over Its Illegality Increase](#) - Feb. 12, 2013
- [When a Secretive Stingray Cell Phone Tracking "Warrant" Isn't a Warrant](#) - March 28, 2013
- [Justice Department Must Provide Records of Aircraft-mounted Cell Tower Simulators](#) — Feb. 10, 2015
- [DOJ Reverses Course and Requires Warrants for Stingrays!](#) — Sept. 3, 2015
- [New FOIA Documents Confirm FBI Used Dirtboxes on Planes Without Any Policies or Legal Guidance](#) — March 9, 2016
- [Here are 79 California Surveillance Tech Policies. But Where Are the Other 90?](#) — April 11, 2016,
- [Illinois Sets New Limits On Cell-Site Simulators](#) — Aug. 11, 2016
- [Civil Rights Coalition files FCC Complaint Against Baltimore Police Department for Illegally Using Stingrays to Disrupt Cellular Communications](#) — Aug. 17, 2016
 - [Baltimore FCC complaint re: CSS use](#)
- [FCC Helped Create the Stingray Problem, Now it Needs to Fix It](#) — Oct. 6, 2016
- [Congressional Oversight Committee Wants Warrants to Rein in Police Abuse of Cell-Site Simulators](#) — February 22, 2017
- [No Hunting Undocumented Immigrants with Stingrays](#) — May 19, 2017
- [EFF Sues San Bernardino County Sheriff's Department to Obtain Records About Use of Privacy Invasive Cell-Site Simulator](#) — October 23, 2018

EFF Freedom of Information Act Work

- EFF filed a [complaint](#) against the San Bernardino Sheriffs' Department for [failing to produce the case numbers](#) for 6 search warrants that authorized CSS use in 2017.
- Following a 2014 [Wall Street Journal report](#) that revealed that U.S. Marshals attached cell-site simulators to small aircraft for a U.S. spy program, [EFF sued](#) the Department of Justice to learn more. EFF wrote a [blog about the documents we received](#) in 2016. Here are responses to our Freedom of Information Act request.
 - “DRTbox” FOIA documents from the Office of the General Counsel for the FBI, [CELL 466-502](#)

- “DRTbox” FOIA documents from the Office of the General Counsel for the FBI, [CELL 1145-1319](#)
- “DRTbox” FOIA documents from the Office of the General Counsel for the FBI, [CELL 5-29](#)
- “DRTbox” FOIA documents from the FBI, [CELL 175-223](#)
- “DRTbox” FOIA documents from the FBI, [CELL 224-278](#)

Academic Articles and Research

● Legal

- "[Stingray: A New Frontier in Police Surveillance](#)" by Adam Bates of the CATO Institute"
- "[The Stingray is Exactly Why the Fourth Amendment was Written](#)" by Olivia Donaldson
- "[The Latest 4th Amendment Privacy Conundrum: Stingrays](#)" by Max Bulinski, University of Michigan Journal of Law
- "[TriggerFish, StingRays, and Fourth Amendment Fishing Expeditions](#)" by Brian L. Owsley

● Technical

- "[Easy 4G/LTE IMSI Catchers for Non-Programmers](#)" by Stig F. Mjølunes and Ruxandra F. Olimid
- "[White-Stingray: Evaluating IMSI Catchers Detection Applications](#)" by Ravishankar Borgaonkar, Andrew Martin, Shinjo Park, Altaf Shaik, and Jean-Pierre Seifert
- "[LTE security, protocol exploits and location tracking experimentation with low-cost software radio](#)" by Roger Piqueras Jover
- "[SeaGlass: Enabling City-Wide IMSI-Catcher Detection](#)" by Peter Ney, Ian Smith, Gabriel Cadamuro, and Tadayoshi Kohno
- "[Gone Opaque? An Analysis of Hypothetical IMSI Catcher Overuse in Canada](#)" by Tamir Israel and Christopher Parsons
- "[IMSI Catchers and Mobile Security](#)" by Joseph Ooi
- "[Defeating IMSI Catchers](#)" by Fabian van den Broek, Roel Verdult, Joeri de Ruiter
- "[Rapidly Mixing Gibbs Sampling for a Class of Factor Graphs Using Hierarchy Width](#)" by Christopher De Sa, Ce Zhang, Kunle Olukotun, and Christopher Ré
- "[Detecting IMSI-Catcher Using Soft Computing](#)" Thanh van Do, Hai Thanh Nguyen, Nikolov Momchil, Van Thuan Do
- "[IMSI-Catch Me If You Can: IMSI-Catcher-Catchers](#)" by Adrian Dabrowski, Nicola Pianta, Thomas Klepp, Martin Mulazzani, Edgar Weippl
- "[Location Leaks on the GSM Air Interface](#)" by Denis Foo Kune, John Koelndorfer, Nicholas Hopper, and Yongdae Kim
- Technical Videos
- "[LTE & IMSI Catcher Myths](#)" published by Black Hat
- "[Camp++ 0x7e0 // FOS LTE IMSI catcher by Domi](#)" published by Budapest Hackerspace
- "[DEF CON 23 - Ian Kline - LTE Recon and Tracking with RTLSDR](#)," published by DEFCON Conference
- "[Understanding IMSI Privacy](#)" published by Black Hat

- [“DEF CON 18 – Chris Paget – Practical Cellphone Spying”](#) published by DEFCON Conference
- [“BlackHat 2011 – Femtocells: a Poisonous Needle in the Operator's Hay Stack”](#) published by blackhattish

Legislation

● Federal

- [Electronic Communications Privacy Act](#), 18 U.S.C. § 2510, et. seq.
- [Federal Wiretap Act](#), 18 U.S.C. § 2701, et. seq.
- [Pen Registers and Trap and Trace Devices Act](#), 18 U.S.C. § 3121, et. seq.
- [Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act](#), 50 U.S.C. § 1801, et. seq.
- [Federal DOJ Policy](#): Though not legislation, the Department of Justice announced a policy change in 2015 that required federal agents to obtain a probable cause warrant before using cell-site simulators in investigations. The [Department of Homeland Security](#), its components, and the [Internal Revenue Service](#) adopted similar policies the same year.

● State

- [California Email Communications Privacy Act](#), California Penal Code § 1546, et. seq.
 - [SCA & CalECPA Prezi presentation](#) by EFF staff attorneys Stephanie Lacambra and Lee Tien
 - [California Peace Officers' Association CalECPA factsheet](#)
 - Santa Clara CCOPS, EFF blog [“A California County Breaks New Ground for Surveillance Transparency”](#)
 - [Proposed City of Oakland ordinance](#)
- [California Cellular Communications Interception statute](#), California Government Code § 53166
- [Illinois Citizen Privacy Protection Act](#)
- [Florida statute, Title 33, Chapter 501, Consumer Protection, 501.171 Security of Confidential personal information](#)
- [Illinois Citizen Privacy Protection Act](#)
- [Florida statute, Title 33, Chapter 501, Consumer Protection, 501.171 Security of Confidential personal information](#)

Known Manufacturers

- Pen-Link Ltd., of Lincoln, Nebraska.
- Harris Corp., of Melbourne, Florida.
 - Makers of the Stingray, KingFish, AmberJack, Hailstorm, Harpoon, etc.
- Telesoft Technologies, of Blandford Forum, United Kingdom.
 - Maker of the HINTON Abis Probe device.
- Rayzone Group, of Tel Aviv, Israel.
 - Maker of the Piranha device.
- PKI Electronic Intelligence GmbH, of Lütjensee, Schleswig-Holstein, Germany
 - Maker of several digital and communications surveillance devices.
- GammaGroup
 - Maker of FinFisher, a remote spyware tool that has been sold to autocratic governments.