

The Honorable James L. Robart

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

MICROSOFT CORPORATION,

Plaintiff,

v.

THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE, and LORETTA LYNCH,
in her official capacity as Attorney
General of the United States,

Defendants.

No. 2:16-cv-00538-JLR

**AMICUS BRIEF ON BEHALF OF
FORMER LAW ENFORCEMENT
OFFICIALS IN SUPPORT OF
MICROSOFT'S OPPOSITION TO
MOTION TO DISMISS**

Noted on Motion Calendar:
September 23, 2016

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IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE

1
2 The Amici Curiae are former federal law enforcement officials in the Western
3 District of Washington with a combined 80 years of real-life experience fulfilling their
4 obligation to keep the public safe while operating within the bounds of the Constitution.
5 They have a unique perspective on how to achieve the balance between public safety and
6 personal liberty, particularly with respect to government searches and seizures of private
7 information. They respectfully offer that perspective in the hopes of assisting the Court
8 understand that law enforcement can function effectively—even in the cloud—while
9 following the Fourth Amendment’s requirement of notice to individuals whose private
10 information has been searched.

11 Amici are cognizant of the increasing challenges to law enforcement in the digital
12 age. They understand and agree that specific circumstances, like the safety of a witness or
13 operational integrity, can justify and require delaying notice to targets of an investigation.
14 But as discussed below, that should require a specific and meaningful showing that such an
15 exigency exists, and the delay should be limited in duration.

16 Jeffrey Sullivan was the U.S. Attorney for the Western District of Washington from
17 2007 to 2009. Sullivan also served as the Yakima County Prosecuting Attorney for 27
18 years.

19 John McKay was the U.S. Attorney for the Western District of Washington from
20 2001 to 2007.

21 Kate Pflaumer was the U.S. Attorney for the Western District of Washington from
22 1993 to 2001.

23 Mike McKay was the U.S. Attorney for the Western District of Washington from
24 1989 to 1993. McKay also served as a Senior Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for King
25 County for five years.
26

1 Charles Mandigo was the Special Agent in Charge of the FBI's office in Seattle
2 from 1999 to 2003. Before retiring in 2003, he worked for the FBI for 28 years, including in
3 New York, Chicago, and at FBI Headquarters.

4 Both parties have consented to the filing of this amicus brief. Amici have also filed
5 a motion for leave to file this brief, consistent with this Court's Order on the filing of
6 amicus briefs (Dkt. 42).¹

7 I. INTRODUCTION

8 The Fourth Amendment protects all of us from unreasonable searches and seizures
9 of private information. "The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the
10 police—which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment—is basic to a free society." *Wolf v.*
11 *Colorado*, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949). Law enforcement officials are charged with supporting
12 and defending that right.

13 The balance between individual liberty and public safety in the context of emerging
14 technologies is not new to the courts. What started with cameras, telephones, and recording
15 devices has evolved into computers, smart phones, and the cloud. Each new technology
16 requires an equivalent application of the bedrock Fourth Amendment principles that law
17 enforcement officials have operated under for decades. The Fourth Amendment "must keep
18 pace with the inexorable march of technological progress, or its guarantees will wither and
19 perish." *United States v. Warshak*, 631 F.3d 266, 285 (6th Cir. 2010). The "broad and
20 unsuspected governmental intrusions into conversational privacy which electronic
21 surveillance entails necessitate the application of Fourth Amendment safeguards." *United*
22 *States v. U.S. Dist. Court for E.D. Mich.*, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972) (footnote omitted).

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¹ Amici state that neither a party nor a party's counsel authored this brief in whole or in part, and no person (including a party or its counsel), other than amici or their counsel, contributed money intended to fund preparing or submitting this brief. John McKay is a partner at Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, which is representing Microsoft in this matter. He joins this brief in his personal capacity as a former law enforcement official.

1 In the face of ever advancing technology, Amici respectfully submit that law
 2 enforcement officials have functioned—and can continue to function—effectively under the
 3 constitutional rule that the Fourth Amendment requires notice to the target of the
 4 government’s search. There are narrow exceptions to that rule when the particular facts of
 5 the case demand it. In those cases, notice to the target may be delayed for a reasonable
 6 period, but not abandoned entirely. In the Ninth Circuit, for 30 years, the permissible delay
 7 has been seven days, with longer periods of delay allowed, but only “upon a strong showing
 8 of necessity.” *United States v. Freitas*, 800 F.2d 1451, 1456 (9th Cir. 1986). Law
 9 enforcement officials are accustomed to making particularized showings to defer notice of
 10 searches in both the physical and electronic world. They can continue to do so in the cloud.

11 II. ARGUMENT

12 A. An essential function of a warrant is to provide notice to the target of a 13 government’s search which, in turn, serves important interests.

14 The Fourth Amendment requires that government searches be reasonable. A
 15 hallmark of reasonableness is law enforcement’s obtaining a warrant from a neutral
 16 magistrate. “A conventional warrant ordinarily serves to notify the suspect of an intended
 17 search.” *Katz v. United States*, 389 U.S. 347, 355 n.16 (1967). That notice is vital.
 18 Obtaining a warrant, but not disclosing it, nullifies an essential function of the warrant,
 19 which is to provide notice to the person who is the target of the search. Moreover, non-
 20 disclosure of searches has a broader effect on the criminal justice system that undermines
 21 the balance between public safety and personal liberty.

22 An “essential function of the warrant is to ‘assure *the individual whose property is*
 23 *searched* or seized of the lawful authority of the executing officer, his need to search, and
 24 the limits of his power to search.’” *United States v. Williamson*, 439 F.3d 1125, 1132 (9th
 25 Cir. 2006) (quoting *United States v. Chadwick*, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977)) (emphasis added). A
 26 “major function of the warrant is to provide *the property owner* with sufficient information

1 to reassure him of the entry’s legality.” *Michigan v. Tyler*, 436 U.S. 499, 508 (1978)
2 (emphasis added).

3 For the individuals deprived of notice, they “will never know that [the government]
4 chose not to provide notice to them,” and thus “have no opportunity to challenge the
5 government’s failure to give notice, let alone the legality of the underlying search.” Patrick
6 Toomey & Brett Kaufman, *The Notice Paradox: Secret Surveillance, Criminal Defendants,*
7 *and the Right to Notice*, 54 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 843, 848 (2014). That not only erodes the
8 public’s trust in law enforcement, it also deprives the judicial branch from serving as a
9 check on executive power. As one commentator, who is also a magistrate judge and thus on
10 the front lines of issuing warrants and electronic surveillance orders, has observed,
11 “excessive secrecy effectively shields electronic surveillance orders from appellate review,
12 thereby depriving the judiciary of its normal role in shaping, adapting, and updating
13 legislation to fit changing factual (and technological) settings over time.” Stephen Smith,
14 *Gagged, Sealed & Delivered: Reforming ECPA’s Secret Docket*, 6 HARV. L & POL’Y REV.
15 313, 326 (2012).

16 He further explained, “[l]ack of appellate review is unhealthy for any regulatory
17 scheme, especially one designed to check executive power. Every statute has its rough
18 edges of ambiguity and gaps of uncertainty. These flaws are brought to light and repaired,
19 day by day, case by case, through lower court rulings subject to review and correction by
20 the courts of appeal, and, ultimately, by the Supreme Court.” *Id.* at 331.² Without that, the
21 “careful balance between privacy and security set by Congress is inevitably washed away
22 by a torrent of secret orders, unrestrained by the usual adversarial and appellate process.”
23 *Id.*; see also *In re Sealing and Non-Disclosure of Pen/Trap/2703(d) Orders*, 562 F. Supp.

24 _____
25 ² None of that is to suggest that a facial challenge is inappropriate here. Rather, Microsoft is challenging—and
26 Amici support its challenge—a statutory scheme that prevents individuals from receiving notice that would
allow them to challenge the lawfulness of a government’s search, which, in turn, allows for the day by day,
case by case review necessary for effective judicial oversight.

1 2d 876, 895 (S.D. Tex. 2008) (Smith, M.J.) (“As a rule, sealing and non-disclosure of
 2 electronic surveillance orders must be neither permanent nor, what amounts to the same
 3 thing, indefinite.”). Law enforcement officials—and the entire criminal justice system—
 4 benefit from that judicial oversight and guidance, including the review provided by district
 5 courts of orders by magistrate judges.

6 Finally, providing notice of a search also serves a fundamental goal of law
 7 enforcement officials: maintaining the public’s faith in them. Giving notice helps “head off
 8 breaches of the peace by dispelling any suspicion that the search is illegitimate.” *United*
 9 *States v. Gantt*, 194 F.3d 987, 1002 (9th Cir 1999) (quotations omitted). Leaving the public
 10 in the dark regarding governmental intrusion into individuals’ private effects and
 11 communications, does not, in the long run, foster trust in the law enforcement community.
 12 Rather, indefinite secrecy increases public suspicions that government searches are
 13 illegitimate. Without the public’s confidence, law enforcement officials struggle with their
 14 mission to keep order.³

15 **B. Because covert searches raise serious constitutional concerns, they are allowed**
 16 **only when the facts of a particular case demand it and notice is delayed—not**
 17 **abandoned.**

18 The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit *all* covert searches. *Dalia v. United*
 19 *States*, 441 U.S. 238, 247 (1979). Effective law enforcement efforts often require some
 20 measure of secrecy during an investigation to avoid alerting a target, who might destroy
 21 evidence or flee. But covert searches raise significant constitutional concerns that Congress
 22 and the courts recognize by establishing strict parameters and reasonable after-the-fact
 23 notice requirements. The law enforcement community has operated effectively within those
 24 parameters for decades. It can continue to do so in the cloud.

25 ³ Amici focus in this brief on the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. But they recognize the
 26 compounding effect of the non-disclosure orders authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b), which creates a situation
 in which the government need not provide notice of its search *and* can compel a provider like Microsoft to
 stay silent about the search indefinitely.

1 **1. Wiretaps and bugging equipment.**

2 When the government wants to listen to a person’s conversations, it must obtain a
3 warrant, although it may delay providing notice of the warrant and search to avoid alerting
4 the targets. Two features of the federal statute authorizing the interception of wire, oral, or
5 electronic communications (18 U.S.C. § 2518)—and key to its constitutionality—are a
6 showing of special facts justifying the search and eventual notice to the target of the search.
7 The Supreme Court struck down a state wiretapping statute because it had “no requirement
8 for notice as do conventional warrants, nor does it overcome this defect by requiring some
9 showing of special facts.” *Berger v. New York*, 388 U.S. 41, 60 (1967). A “showing of
10 exigency, in order to avoid notice, would appear more important in eavesdropping, with its
11 inherent dangers, than that required when conventional procedures of search and seizure are
12 utilized.” *Id.*

13 In contrast, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the federal statute
14 authorizing covert wiretapping because it “provided a constitutionally adequate substitute
15 for advance notice by requiring that once the surveillance operation is completed, the
16 authorizing judge must cause notice to be served on those subjected to surveillance.” *Dalia*,
17 441 U.S. at 248 (citing *United States v. Donovan*, 429 U.S. 413, 429 n. 19 (1977)). The
18 Court also upheld the constitutionality of covert entries into private premises to install
19 electronic bugging equipment for recording conversations on the same grounds. *Id.* at 247-
20 48. The Court recognized that “electronic surveillance can be a threat to the cherished
21 privacy of law-abiding citizens unless it is subjected to the careful supervision prescribed
22 by” the statute. *Id.* at 250 n.9. But that the “detailed restrictions” of the statute “guarantee
23 that wiretapping or bugging occurs only when there is a genuine need for it and only to the
24 extent that it is needed.” *Id.* at 250.

25 The statute requires the government to establish, among other things, that there is
26 probable cause to believe that an individual has committed a crime; that particular

1 communications concerning that offense will be obtained through interception; and that
2 normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be
3 unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1). The statute provides
4 for notice of searches “[w]ithin a reasonable time but not later than ninety days.” *Id.*
5 § 2518(8)(d). And notice is not limited to the target of the search, but may also go to “other
6 parties to intercepted communications as the judge may determine ... is in the interest of
7 justice.” *Id.* The combination of the government’s showing a particularized need, plus
8 eventual notice of the search to the target, allow the statute to pass constitutional muster.

9 **2. “Sneak-and-Peek” warrants / delayed notice searches.**

10 Courts have also upheld the constitutionality of so-called “sneak-and-peek” warrants
11 that permit law enforcement to enter and examine an area, take an inventory, and then leave
12 without disturbing the contents or notifying the person whose effects were searched. “Lack
13 of seizure explains the ‘peek’ part of the name; the ‘sneak’ part comes from the fact that
14 agents need not notify the owner until later.” *United States v. Mikos*, 539 F.3d 706, 709 (7th
15 Cir. 2008). “Such warrants are designed to permit an investigation without tipping off the
16 suspect.” *Id.* They are also called “delayed notice” searches.

17 The Ninth Circuit has authorized delayed notices searches, but, at the same time,
18 recognized their dangers: “surreptitious searches and seizures of intangibles strike at the
19 very heart of the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment.” *United States v. Freitas*,
20 800 F.2d 1451, 1456 (9th Cir. 1986). Because of those risks, the Court imposed restrictions
21 on delayed notice searches, principle among them the requirement of prompt notice. “[T]he
22 Fourth Amendment requires that officers provide notice of searches within a reasonable, but
23 short, time after the surreptitious entry.” *United States v. Johns*, 948 F.2d 599, 605 n.4 (9th
24 Cir. 1991). Thus, the government may delay notice of a sneak-and-peek search, but the
25 delay “*should not exceed seven days except upon a strong showing of necessity.*” *Freitas*,
26 800 F.2d at 1456 (emphasis added).

1 In *Freitas*, the Court noted that the federal wiretapping statute, discussed above,
2 “makes clear the constitutional importance of *both* the *necessity* for the surreptitious seizure
3 *and* the *subsequent notice*.” 800 F.2d at 1456 (emphasis added). And while the Court
4 suggested that a showing of necessity “could have strengthened the claim” that the sneak-
5 and-peek search was constitutional, it was “clear that the absence of any notice requirement
6 in the warrant cast[ed] strong doubt on its constitutional adequacy.” *Id.* As a noted
7 commentator observed about *Freitas*, “[i]t is to be doubted ... that a showing of necessity
8 for surreptitious entry would excuse a *total* failure to give the occupant a post-search notice
9 of the warrant execution.” 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE
10 FOURTH AMENDMENT § 4.7(c) (5th ed. 2012); *see also* Toomey & Kaufman, 54 SANTA
11 CLARA L. REV. at 855 (under existing case law “the idea that notice of the search may be
12 dispensed with altogether is simply off the table”). In other words, the Fourth Amendment
13 allows delayed notice—not *abandoned* notice.

14 The Ninth Circuit re-affirmed its holding in *Freitas* and applied its notice
15 requirement to sneak-and-peek searches of a person’s effects in an off-site storage facility.
16 *United States v. Johns*, 851 F.2d 1131, 1134-35 (9th Cir. 1988); *Johns*, 948 F.2d at 605 n.4.
17 In the *Johns* decisions, there was no indication that the government could have by-passed
18 the Fourth Amendment simply by providing notice of the search to the owner of the storage
19 facility. Those decisions have important implications for the government’s position in this
20 matter regarding the adequacy of providing notice of the search to Microsoft, i.e., the owner
21 of the off-site storage facility, not the person whose information has been searched.

22 In 2001, Congress codified delayed notice search warrants. 18 U.S.C. § 3103a.
23 When applying for a warrant under the statute, the government may ask the court for
24 permission to temporarily delay notice that a warrant has been executed upon a showing of
25 “reasonable cause to believe that providing immediate notification of the execution of the
26 warrant may have an adverse result,” and, in the case of a delayed notice seizure, a showing

1 of “reasonable necessity for the seizure.” *Id.* § 3103a(b)(1)&(2). Similar to earlier case law,
2 the statute requires notice of the search, but allows notice to be delayed for a “reasonable
3 period” of time specified *in the warrant* and “not to exceed 30 days after the date of its
4 execution, or on a later date certain if the *facts of the case* justify a longer period of delay.”
5 *Id.* § 3103a(b)(3) (emphasis added). No delay of notice beyond the time specified in the
6 warrant is allowed without further court authorization, with good cause shown and upon
7 “an *updated* showing of the need for further delay and that each additional delay should be
8 limited to periods of 90 days or less, unless the *facts of the case* justify a longer period of
9 delay.” *Id.* § 3103a(c) (emphasis added).

10 The statute also includes reporting requirements such that a court must report the
11 issuance or denial for a delayed notice search warrant, including the offense specified in the
12 warrant or application, the period of delay authorized, and the number and duration of any
13 extensions. 18 U.S.C. § 3103a(d)(1). The reporting requirement provides information to
14 policy makers and the public as to how often and for what purposes the government is
15 conducting delayed notice searches. That, in turn, allows for transparency, at least in the
16 aggregate, of law enforcement’s use of the statute’s procedures.

17 **C. Law enforcement officials can operate effectively within parameters that**
18 **require particularized showings and eventual notice to search targets.**

19 Law enforcement officials have decades of experience operating within the
20 parameters of making particularized showings and delaying—but not dispensing with—
21 notice of searches. Congress enacted the wiretapping statute in 1968, which means law
22 enforcement officials nationwide have functioned within its limits for almost 50 years.
23 Further, law enforcement officials in the Ninth Circuit have operated effectively within the
24 parameters of *Freitas*’s seven-day delayed notice default rule for 30 years. Longer periods
25 of delay are allowed, but only “upon a strong showing of necessity.” *Freitas*, 800 F.2d at
26 1456. A “strong showing of necessity” surely must be more than a rote recitation of the

1 statutory elements constituting an “adverse result,” and instead require a case-specific
2 showing.

3 Section § 3103a provides for a 30-day delay of a search warrant, but any delays
4 beyond 30 days must be justified with a particularized showing grounded in “facts of the
5 case.” Congress did not do away with notice entirely. In a 2004 report to Congress, the U.S.
6 Department of Justice emphasized how workable delayed notice warrants were—and that
7 they were used “infrequently and judiciously.” U.S. Dep’t of Justice, *Delayed Notice*
8 *Search Warrants: A Vital and Time-Honored Tool for Fighting Crime*, at 4, 8, Sept. 2004,
9 available at [https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/dag/legacy/2008/10/17/
10 patriotact213report.pdf](https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/dag/legacy/2008/10/17/patriotact213report.pdf).

11 The number of applications for delayed notice search warrants has increased since
12 then. Over a one-year period ending September 2014, prosecutors made 7,627 delayed
13 notice warrant requests and 5,243 requests for extensions. Report of the Director of
14 Administrative Office of the United States Courts on Applications for Delayed-Notice
15 Search Warrants and Extensions, at 1, 2014, available at [http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-
16 reports/analysis-reports/delayed-notice-search-warrant-report](http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/analysis-reports/delayed-notice-search-warrant-report). That averages to 81 delayed
17 notice search warrants for each of the 94 federal district courts over a one-year period, or
18 6.7 per month. The most frequently reported period of delay was 90 days. *Id.* at 2.⁴ Of
19 greater relevance, Microsoft here suggests that a review of orders it has received indicates
20 that the standard practice in particular U.S. District Courts is to set definite time limits on
21 the § 2705(b) orders that preclude it from notifying customers of a search. *See* Microsoft’s
22 *Opp. to Government’s Mot. to Dismiss*, at 13 n.10 (Dkt. 44).

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⁴ The data include delayed notice searches not just of homes and businesses, but also cell phone location tracking, GPS tracking, and searching emails, which helps explain the increase in applications since 2004. Jonathan Witmer-Rich, *The Rapid Rise of Delayed Notice Searches, and the Fourth Amendment “Rule Requiring Notice,”* 41 PEPP. L. REV. 509, 542-44, 531, 539-49 (2014) (increasing judicial pressure on the government to use search warrants for searches that had previously been conducted without a warrant, like cell phone location tracking, GPS tracking, and email searches, has likely driven the increase in applications under § 3103a).

1 All that is meant to show that the law enforcement community has lived with
 2 delayed notice searches, and the restraints around them, for decades. They can operate
 3 effectively within those parameters in the cloud, too—not because it is easy, but because
 4 the Fourth Amendment requires it.

5 III. CONCLUSION

6 Some commentators have warned of the risk of delayed notice searches, noting that
 7 “[w]ith traditional searches, each person in the community knows when and if her home or
 8 business has been searched by the government. ... The privacy intrusion of these searches is
 9 deep but narrow—deep in the sense that one’s home has been searched, and narrow in the
 10 sense that the invasion impacts only those few who are searched. With delayed notice
 11 searches, however, every member of the community suffers a more indirect and uncertain
 12 loss of privacy.” Witmer-Rich, 41 PEPP. L. REV. at 555-56. The Ninth Circuit recognized
 13 those risks in *Freitas* and *Johns* and established a seven-day delay default rule. But
 14 however great the perils of delayed notice searches are, the risks posed by no-notice
 15 searches are greater. And for no good reason. Law enforcement officials have no practical
 16 need to keep their searches secret indefinitely, except in the rarest of circumstances, which
 17 must be supported by particularized need. For the foregoing reasons, Amici respectfully
 18 request that the Court deny the government’s motion to dismiss Microsoft’s complaint.

19 DATED this 2nd day of September, 2016

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 Enforcement Officials*

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on September 2, 2016, I electronically filed the foregoing
**AMICUS BRIEF ON BEHALF OF FORMER LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS IN
SUPPORT OF MICROSOFT'S OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS** with the
Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system, which will send notification of each filing to
those attorneys of record registered on the CM/ECF system.

DATED this 2nd day of September, 2016.

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