Earlier this month, the 47 member states of the United Nations Human Rights Council passed a landmark Resolution (A/HRC/20/L.13) to include the “promotion, protection, and enjoyment of human rights on the Internet.” The Resolution, which was presented by Sweden, was backed by more than 70 countries in all, both members and non-members of the HRC.
In the New York Times, Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt called the Resolution a “victory for the Internet”, while US Secretary of State Clinton praised it as a “ welcome addition in the fight for the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms online, in particular the freedom of expression.”
The Resolution builds on the work of UN Special Rapporteur Frank LaRue who, after a year of consultations with civil society groups, released a report on the promotion and protection of freedom of expression on the Internet. In his report, LaRue touched upon a variety of threats to free expression online, including the enforcement of "real name" systems; the use of national security or counterterrorism measures to restrict free speech; the overbroad use of defamation laws; and the widespread use of technological surveillance. LaRue concluded by calling upon states to take measures to ensure "as little restriction as possible to the flow of information via the Internet, except in few, exceptional, and limited circumstances prescribed by international human rights law."
At the time, EFF praised the Special Rapporteur's report, and continues to be pleased with the work he is doing. We therefore see this Resolution—which affirms that “the same rights that people have offline must also be protected online”—as a step in the right direction. Despite that, states are increasingly failing to comply fully with their international human rights obligations, including the adoption of necessary measures to make human rights effective.
As Dr. Matthias Kettermann points out in the European Journal of International Law, however, the Resolution does not rule out the possibility of countries abusing human rights online. Specifically, the Resolution references Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which—as Kettermann explains—“allows for certain restrictions of the right [to free expression]” when provided by law, for “(a) respect of the rights or reputations of others; or (b) for the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals.”
Referring to Article 19 of the ICCPR, CCPR General Comment No. 10 notes that, "[W]hen a State party imposes certain restrictions on the exercise of freedom of expression, these may not put in jeopardy the right itself." Such restrictions may only be imposed by law and must be justified as being "necessary" for one of the purposes stated in Paragraph 3, subparagraph (b).
Despite such protections, however, a number of the 47 member states of the HRC censor the Internet and citizens’ right to free expression under such pretexts. For example, Qatar censors a variety of websites, including those critical of the royal family. The senior manager of the country’s largest ISP, Qtel, once explained this as a “desire to maintain ethical standards and protect the culture of the society.” India made headlines earlier this year for its designs to increase censorship on social networks. Turkey censors—both online and off—criticism of the country's founder, Kamal Atatürk, as well as insults to "Turkishness." And member states China, Cuba, Kyrgyzstan, Saudi Arabia and Thailand—among others—have all come under fire for heavy-handed censorship of websites.
Furthermore, a number of member states have used intellectual property as a justification for the installation of technical censorship mechanisms. In several countries, regulation that would cut an individual off from the Internet indefinitely—generally known as "three strikes laws"—has been proposed or enacted. Laws that prevent an individual from using the Internet entirely are surely a violation of human rights, and the Special Rapporteur agrees; in his report, he urged states to repeal or amend existing intellectual property laws that would permit disconnection of a user from the Internet, and to refrain from adopting such laws.
Lastly, the Resolution makes no mention of the ubiquity of online surveillance technologies, which are increasingly being used by governments to track down dissidents and stifle dissent, threatening to make meaningless the legal guarantees of privacy and free expression. From its widespread use in pre-revolutionary Tunisia and Egypt (both non-member signatory states) to its illegal use in the United States, online surveillance poses a huge threat to freedom of expression and must be considered as such.
All in all, however, UNHRC’s Resolution on Internet freedom is a positive step toward ensuring that human rights apply online, but it is only a first step, and it will not alone prevent countries determined to censor the Internet from doing so. The next step, of course, is putting action behind those words, and for that, the onus is on individual states.
EFF has been among several groups following the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the threatening ramifications it would have for the future of the open Internet, access to knowledge, and innovation. Based on what we know from the leaked intellectual property chapter (IP chapter) proposed by the US, it carries many of the restrictive copyright provisions that already exist in US law. From what we have seen, however, this agreement is even more extreme, going beyond ACTA and DMCA rules: it does not export the many balances and exceptions that favor the public interest and act as safety valves in limiting rightsholders’ protection.
One of the most problematic aspects of the TPP’s IP chapter, as we know from the leak, is its proposed language regulating temporary copies. As currently drafted, the related provision creates chilling effects not just on how we behave online, but also on the basic ability of people and companies to use and create on the Web.
Article 4.1 of the leaked TPP’s IP chapter on Copyright and Related Rights addresses temporary copies. It states:
Each Party shall provide that authors, performers, and producers of phonograms have the right to authorize or prohibit all reproductions of their works, performances, and phonograms, in any manner or form, permanent or temporary (including temporary storage in electronic form). [Emphasis our own]
This language reveals a profound disconnect with the reality of the modern computer. In fact, all routine computer functions rely upon the regular creation of temporary copies of programs and files. Temporary copies are files that are automatically copied by computers into their random access memory (“RAM”) during the course of routine operations. “Temporary copying” of data is fundamental to how computing works in general. However, this is especially true on the Internet: videos are buffered in memory in order to play smoothly, browser cache files are stored on servers to speed up the loading of websites, and copies of visited pages are stored in a temporary Internet files folder on your hard drive, speeding up the loading process for those websites the next time you visit them.
Since it’s technically necessary to download a temporary version of everything we see on our devices, does that mean—under the US proposed language—that anyone who ever views content on their device could potentially be found liable of infringement? For other countries signing on to the TPP, the answer would be most likely yes.
The United States has grappled with this problem for years through the judicial system. US courts have considered whether the literal copy made by ordinary operation of a computer is sufficiently fixed in place to be subject to copyright, and—if it is —whether other exceptions and limitations allow the operation without giving veto power to the copyright holder. To bring all temporary copies under copyright without the exceptions and limitations is bad policy, and it’s at the heart of the TPP provision.
Twenty years ago, in MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc. a US appeals court held that temporary copies in RAM were infringing when a third-party computer repair technician loaded a computer program into memory.1 The US Congress quickly reacted, creating a new exception for copies necessary to run a computer program (17 U.S.C. § 117). However, over the following years, several courts relied upon this notion to find that temporary copies, like local caches of webpages, were subject to the Copyright Act.2
Recognizing that a strict interpretation of this rule would lead to unintended consequences, many courts correctly applied other exceptions and limitations, like the fair use doctrine or implied licenses,3 which greatly helped prevent unjust results.
More recently, a line of cases has clarified the law for temporary copies. In CoStar v. LoopNet,4 another appeals court found that temporary copies that where qualitatively transitory were not subject to the Copyright Act. Subsequently, in the Cablevision remote DVR case,5 a different appeals court applied this reasoning to permit video buffering copies.
Thus, through the judiciary, the US legal system has provided the space for users and innovators despite the notion that a RAM copy would be subject to the Copyright Act. The TPP seeks to undo these years of positive development, and impose the controversial rule without requiring the accompanying exceptions and limitation that are necessary to balance the law.
Worse yet, it is hard to say that other TPP negotiating parties will have the same ability to carve out such exceptions and limitation. Neither the content, the footnotes, nor any part of the accompanying Side-letter requires any of those doctrines that have provided the US with the flexibility that has allowed the ordinary operation of computers, websites and video streaming to operate.
And this is not only potentially disastrous for users within TPP countries, it would have a nasty effect on technological innovation aimed at providing users with new ways of exploring and accessing content.
A definitive and inflexible international standard on temporary copies would not only create a new intricate layer of copyrights, it would impact the cost of accessing licensed content, as well as raise concerns about how this provision could affect privacy. Without further clarity, the TPP proposal could require licenses for every single copyrighted file that passes through a device. This is currently impossible to monitor with existing software and hardware, and developing the technology to monitor all transient copies of files would have profound negative effects on user privacy.
The US Congress has recognized the importance of creating escape valves to allow innovation to occur. For instance, it created a safe harbor for Internet services providers within the DMCA6. This protection is vital for companies hosting and storing others’ content including user-generated content, such as Wikipedia and open educational resources, such as Connexions. However, no such safe harbor has so far been included in the TPP’s IP chapter. In other words, this proposal is an example of the content industry fighting for not just the right to profit from their content, but to do so by retaining the right to shut down the innovation of others.
This proposal may seem absurd to you. It should. Given how crucial the storage of “temporary copies” of digital files is to the functioning of our devices, the inclusion of unfettered provisions to regulate it is purely backward, especially given the supporters’ failure to justify a legitimate purpose for imposing a burden without a balance.
The content industry is losing the debate in the US courts, as more cases are finding applicable exceptions and limitations. But if the proposed strict temporary copies provision were to be adopted by another country that does not have similar fair use safeguards, it could play out much worse for the users. What is clear is that such an abusive expansion of copyright restriction could easily pave the way for regulations and technological standards that are massively abused to block innovation and oppress users.
Humble Bundle is back with another great pay-what-you-want, DRM-free bundle — and this time it’s for music.
As with previous bundles, the Humble Music Bundle offers fans the chance to get great deals while supporting artists directly and demonstrating that innovative distribution models can work. Plus, you can choose to send a percentage of your purchase to Child’s Play Charity, an organization providing technology and games to children in hospitals, and to us here at EFF to protect your online rights.
From now until Thursday, August 9th, you can pay whatever you’d like to receive the following albums, described by Humble Bundle as:
• They Might Be Giants' rarities compilation Album Raises New and Troubling Questions
• an exclusive release from the leading geek folksman, Jonathan Coulton's Greatest Hit (Plus 13 Other Songs)
• nerdcore godfather MC Frontalot's exclusive compilation Favoritism
• composer Christopher Tin's GRAMMY award-winning Calling All Dawns
• celebrated game composer Hitoshi Sakimoto's Best of the Valkyria Chronicles
And, if you pay more than the average price at the time of your visit, you will also receive OK Go's Twelve Remixes of Four Songs, featuring cuts from their 2010 album Of the Blue Colour of the Sky as well as remixes from Ra Ra Riot, Passion Pit, Static Revenger, and more.
All of the albums are DRM-free and can be downloaded as MP3s and/or FLACs, meaning you can play them anytime, anywhere, on any device that supports MP3 or FLAC audio formats. Awesome sauce.
All of us here at EFF would like to sincerely thank Humble Bundle and the fantastic musicians who made this bundle possible, and the generous fans who will make it a success. So go get your bundle and support indie artists and EFF!
The US classification system is “dysfunctional” and “clearly lacks the ability to differentiate between trivial information and that which can truly damage our nation’s well-being.” Those are not the words of EFF, nor any other government transparency advocate, but instead came from the former classification czar himself.
J. William Leonard, who was in charge of the secrecy system under President George W. Bush, has recently become its most virulent critic. Buoyed by a massive bureaucracy that stamps virtually everything secret, he says it’s so bad the government actions are hurting democracy. And the government, in recent days, has only proven him correct.
Leonard’s complaints stemmed from a recently declassified memo from a now-defunct Espionage Act case against NSA whistleblower Thomas Drake, of which he said, “I have never seen a more willful example” of inappropriate classification. Though a judge rejected Leonard’s lawsuit to make it public, the Washington Post obtained the memo through a Freedom of Information Act request this week. Here’s how they described it:
The now-declassified two-page memo is titled “What a Wonderful Success,” and it contains praise from Gen. Keith B. Alexander, director of the NSA, for agency employees involved in the program. Two paragraphs were marked “secret.” One of them praised the merits of the program and spoke of getting members of Congress to see how it worked. In the other, a team member was lauded for “an excellent job” of briefing Alexander on the program.
Some secrets, indeed. Secrecy expert Steven Aftergood described it as “utterly innocuous and practically devoid of meaningful content. The idea that someone risked decades of prison over this document is an indictment of the agency and its classification policy.”
Amazingly, that may not have been the most absurd secrecy news this week. In another court decision on Monday, a federal judge rejected the ACLU’s lawsuit to force the State Department to declassify 22 of its diplomatic cables. All 22 cables, which had already been published in full by WikiLeaks, have been in the public domain for more than 18 months, with many featured on the pages of newspapers around the world.
The government offered no evidence as to why declassifying the already-public cables would harm national security and never had to acknowledge the cables were genuine, yet the judge ruled in their favor without even reviewing the cables for, say, evidence of alleged wrongdoing or the motive to hide embarrassing information, which are both supposed to be improper reasons for classification or continued classification. As the ACLU’s Nathan Freed Wessler put it, “the government is free to continue pretending that the contents of State Department diplomatic cables already disclosed by WikiLeaks are secret.”
The controversy over leaks has spilled into the Presidential race, and instead of pointing out the obvious and systemic problems of withholding too many secrets, Mitt Romney and President Obama are arguing about who would be a more secretive president.
Meanwhile, the government is busy creating still more secrets under a bigger umbrella. Spending on classification is now approaching $11 billion, double what it was ten years ago. That’s also a 10 percent increase from last year and a 30 percent increase since Obama took office. And as the New York Times pointed out, that total “does not include the costs incurred by the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency and other spy agencies, whose spending is—you guessed it—classified.”
Additionally, a new intelligence report to Congress shows that the US issued a staggering 4.8 million classified security clearances last year—which comes out to about one in every 50 Americans. That number is a 3 percent increase on the year before, and as Steven Aftergood remarked, the 2010 number “astonished observers because it surpassed previous estimates by more than a million.”
Of course, the number was just an estimate given all the myriad of classification guides of each agency, some of which are secret themselves.Wired’s David Kravets explained: “In other words: the roster of people who are allowed to know secrets is itself so secret, it’s impossible to even assemble a single, decent list.”
President Obama, for his part, promised to reform this system when he came into office, acknowledging in a memo on his very first day in office that the classification process is broken. For an administration that promised to be the “most transparent in history,” it’s getting harder and harder to not come to the opposite conclusion.
Senator Franken's New Amendment Would Strike Section 701 of the Cybersecurity Act of 2012, Removing Provisions that Permit Monitoring of Private Communications and Countermeasures
As we noted last week, a new cybersecurity bill (S 3414) (PDF) was introduced with privacy protective measures championed by Senators Franken, Durbin, Wyden, Coons, Sanders, Akaka, and Blumenthal. The bill is a step in the right direction of protecting online rights, but still has major flaws that allow for nearly unlimited monitoring of user data or countermeasures (like blocking or dropping packets). To address these concerns, Senator Franken is spearheading an amendment that would strike all of Section 701 (text below), the section of the bill which provides companies with the explicit right to monitor private user communications and engage in countermeasures. EFF is proud to support this amendment, though we continue to oppose the bill as a whole.
We’ve argued that the language of 701 is overly broad and could be interpreted by an overzealous ISP to let it block privacy-protective technologies like Tor. Companies have yet to answer why such excessive monitoring and use of countermeasures are needed when existing laws already allow some entities to protect their networks. And frankly, we don't want our online service providers turning into Digital Big Brothers.
We remain unconvinced that a cybersecurity bill is necessary at this time, and we're committed to fighting to ensure user privacy isn't sacrificed in the rush to pass a bill. While the most recent version of the bill has strong privacy protections, Section 701 continues to pose a real threat to the rights of users to communicate privately. We're glad that Sen. Franken is championing an amendment that tries to fix these serious flaws with the bill.
Please join us in calling on Washington to defend online privacy in the cybersecurity debates. Make your voice heard in Washington by contacting your Senators today.
Text of Section 701 of the Cybersecurity Act of 2012 (S 3414)
SEC. 701. AFFIRMATIVE AUTHORITY TO MONITOR AND DEFEND AGAINST CYBERSECURITY THREATS.
(a) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding chapter 119, 121, or 206 of title 18, United States Code, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.), and sections 222 and 705 of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 222 and 605), any private entity may—
(1) monitor its information systems and information that is stored on, processed by, or transiting such information systems for—
(A) malicious reconnaissance;
(B) efforts to defeat a technical control or an operational control;
(C) technical vulnerabilities;
(D) efforts to cause a user with legitimate access to an information system or information that is stored on, processed by, or transiting an information system to unwittingly enable the defeat of a technical control or an operational control;
(E) malicious cyber command and control;
(F) information exfiltrated as a result of defeating a technical control or an operational control;
(G) any other attribute of a cybersecurity threat, if monitoring for such attribute is not otherwise prohibited by law; or
(H) any combination of subparagraphs (A) through (G);
(2) operate countermeasures on its information systems to protect its rights or property from cybersecurity threats;
(3) consent to another private entity monitoring or operating countermeasures on its information systems and information that is stored on, processed by, or transiting such information systems in accordance with this section;
(4) monitor a third party’s information systems and information that is stored on, processed by, or transiting such information systems for the information listed in subparagraphs (A) through (H) of paragraph (1), if—
(A) the third party provides express prior consent to such monitoring; and
(B) such monitoring would be lawful under paragraph (1) or under any other provision of law if the third party were to perform such monitoring of its own networks; and
(5) operate countermeasures on a third party’s information systems to protect the third party’s rights or property from cybersecurity threats, if—
(A) the third party provides express prior consent to such countermeasures; and
(B) operating such countermeasures would be lawful under paragraph (2) or under any other provision of law if the third party were to operate such countermeasures on its own information systems to protect its own rights or property.
(b) USE AND PROTECTION OF INFORMATION.—A private entity performing monitoring or operating countermeasures under subsection (a)—
(1) may use cybersecurity threat indicators ac- quired under this title, provided such use is solely for the purpose of protecting an information system or information that is stored on, processed by, or transiting an information system from cybersecurity threats or mitigating such threats;
(2) shall make reasonable efforts to safeguard communications, records, system traffic, or other information that may be used to identify specific per- sons acquired in the course of such monitoring from unauthorized access or acquisition;
(3) shall comply with any lawful restrictions placed on the use of cybersecurity threat indicators, including, if requested, the removal or destruction of information that can be used to identify specific per- sons from such indicators;
(4) may not use cybersecurity threat indicators to gain an unfair competitive advantage to the detriment of the entity that authorized such monitoring or operation of countermeasures; and
(5) may use information obtained under any other provision of law.
The FinFisher spyware, produced by the UK-based Gamma Group, has been for years as elusive as it was notorious. Since protesters found FinFisher company records in an abandoned Egyptian state security building last year, security researchers and activists around the world have been eager to get their hands on a copy of the tools in the FinFisher suite, especially the component called FinSpy. FinSpy has been the subject of particular interest because of its ability to wiretap calls made over the Skype network, which is widely used among activists all over the world, often in the belief that it is more secure than other forms of communication.
Now for the first time, a copy of the spyware has been publicly analyzed. Morgan Marquis-Boire, a security researcher at Citizen Lab, and Bill Marczak, a founding member of Bahrain Watch, have published an in-depth analysis of FinSpy after obtaining a copies of the program used to target pro-democracy activists.1 The targeted activists were each involved with the government transparency organization Bahrain Watch, but were located in different cities around the world. The spyware was included in targeted attachments that purported to come from an Al-Jazeera journalist and contain pictures and information about current events in Bahrain.
It's not clear that Bahrain Watch was being targeted specifically. "The malware seemed to have targeted people who are involved in activist organizations, particularly activists who have significant contacts outside of Bahrain," said Marczak.
The activists were suspicious of the email attachments they had received and passed the files along to Bloomberg News, which turned them over to Marquis-Boire. In addition to posting materials on the Citizen Lab site, he will be presenting the results of his analysis at the BlackHat security conference today in Las Vegas. Perhaps the most notable difference Marquis-Boire has revealed between FinSpy and less sophisticated malware tools like those used by the Syrian government is the way in which this software was designed to defy analysis: not only was FinSpy actively avoiding detection by anti-virus programs, but it was also heavily "booby-trapped," causing many of the most popular debugging programs to crash during attempts to analyze and identify the code.
Gamma and FinFisher have come under heavy international scrutiny for their apparent willingness to export sophisticated surveillance technologies to oppressive government regimes. Hosni Mubarak's government in Egypt is just one example. According to Privacy International, "there is also evidence that this technology has been deployed in Turkmenistan, a one-party state that Human Rights Watch labelled 'one of the world's most repressive countries' in March 2012." Privacy International is currently engaged in legal action against the British government. The action arose after Privacy International issued repeated requests for information about why the government has chosen not to exercise its powers under the Export Control Act of 2002 to restrict sales of technical goods or services to governments that could be used to commit human rights abuses. FinFisher's products appear to fall into that category.
Similarly, EFF has been calling for companies that produce surveillance technology to adopt "Know Your Customer" standards, like those required by Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and other export regulations, and avoid becoming "repression's little helper." An EFF white paper from April of this year, "Human Rights and Technology Sales," addresses the problem in greater depth.
Citizen Lab has provided a set of straightforward recommendations that advise against opening unsolicited attachments, even from links that appear to be from friends. And now that security researchers have obtained a copy of FinSpy, work can begin on preparing tools that can detect and remove the program from infected computers.
1. Marquis-Boire has also co-written several entries on this site analyzing reports of Syrian government malware.
This article has been co-authored with Gabriela Manuli, EFF International Privacy Intern
The Mexican government shelled out $4.6 billion pesos ($355 million USD) to expand Mexican domestic surveillance equipment over the past year, a set of newly leaked documents has revealed. According to a July 16 press report, the Secretariat of National Defense (Sedena) -- the body that oversees Mexico’s Army and Air Force -- awarded five surveillance contracts from March 2011 - 2012, without opening them up to bid. The contracts were for the procurement of devices capable of intercepting mobile phone and online communications. The classified contracts were allegedly leaked to Aristegui Noticias, a Mexican newspaper, by military sources.
Official government channels contain hardly any evidence of the awarded contracts. Journalist Daniel Lizarraga has called attention to the fact that they’re nowhere to be found on the website of the Mexican Access to Information agency (IFAI). Yet basic information about the contracts should be made publicly available on that site, according to the Mexican Freedom of Information Act. Even in the case of classified documents, the government has an obligation to disclose “the administrative unit that generated the information, the date of the classification, the grounds, the reserve period, or, if it is the case, those portions of the documents that are privileged or confidential.”
The Mexican government’s new spy gear
Sedena purchased different kinds of technology in each of the five contracts. One kind of software is “capable of extracting text and multimedia messages, contact lists, agenda registries, e-mail monitoring, voice interception, background sound, [and] room monitoring via microphone activation,” among other features.
Sedena also purchased software capable of surveilling e-mails, Internet navigation history and audio. Another kind of equipment can monitor the status of a computer by keeping tabs on “log-in and log-off, screensaver and operational hours to study the behavior and routines of the target or intruder.” The vendor, Security Tracking Devices S.A de C.V., also offers training on “ethical hacker version 7," “security wireless attacks,” “penetration,” “cracking the perimeter” and software for cracking passwords.
This new surveillance apparatus builds upon a Mexican trend of increasing its surveillance capacity. Last May, EFF published an Op-ed in Al Jazeera calling attention to the U.S. State Department’s plans to help the Mexican government triple the size of its national surveillance system. In March, the Mexican legislature adopted a surveillance legislation that will grant the police warrantless access to real time user location data.
Government transparency is vitally important for accountability and democracy. Mexicans have the right to know how government surveillance technologies are being used against them, and what type of information is being collected. As a wise person once said, sunshine is the best disinfectant. Mexicans should not be left in the dark.
YouTube recently unveiled a new face blurring tool that lets users choose to conceal every face in a video they have uploaded. This is a commendable step towards fostering anonymous speech on the Internet. Activists around the world rely on being able to speak freely through online media, including video, while hiding their own identities for fear of persecution. Such a tool would allow for crucial footage to be seen and dialogue to be heard—all without risking visual recognition. Though the tool is not perfect, YouTube has noted that they hope to improve the technology to allow more targeted, accurate blurs. For an-indepth analysis of the tool, see this detailed post from WITNESS.
The timing of this announcement is appropriate, as the Senate held a hearing about the greater implications of facial recognition technology last week. EFF's Jennifer Lynch testified at the hearing about how such technologies bring up major privacy and civil liberties concerns. The possibility of matching YouTube stills to large databases full of identifying data makes online video a risky domain for activists around the world. (Google does warn that "Video footage of your face is not the only way someone can detect your identity," noting vocal identifiers and background clues.)
Despite these important steps towards protecting anonymity, YouTube also has begun encouraging users to use their real names in an attempt to clean up video comments. Though YouTube policymakers "realize that using your full name isn’t for everyone," there is tension in a system that urges the use of real identities as a default mode while providing options to preserve anonymity.
EFF believes anonymous speech is crucial to political and social discourse. We are glad to see potentially lifesaving technological approaches to protecting free speech.